JUDGMENT Majumdar, J. This revisional application is directed against the Order No. 33 passed by the Assistant District Judge at Alipore dated April 20, 1988, for setting aside the compromise decree in Title Suit No. 210 of 1983 under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The facts of the case, for effective determination of the present challenge, by way of revision are, in short, placed below : The Title Suit No. 210 of 1983 culminated in passing of final decree in terms of Solenama dated February 6, 1984. By an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘the said application’ hereafter), the said compromise decree was challenged on the ground of fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation. The suit for partition between the parties was filed on December 6, 1983, together with the petition for compromise (for brevity the said petition hereafter) under Order 23 rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There was usual prayer for preliminary decree in respect of the properties covered by the Schedule for the proposed partition. 2. The signatories to the said compromise were Jnanendra Chandra (since deceased), Pranab Kumar Nath, Anil Baran Nath and Pratibha Bhowmick (for brevity ‘the petitioners’ hereafter) who on the death of Jnanendra Chandra Nath are transposed as the plaintiffs by an order dated April 11, 1989. The said petition was filed by Sm. Namita Basu Roy, the learned Advocate for the plaintiff and Sri Sankar Ganguly, the learned Advocate for the Defendant No. 4. By the said compromise, prayer for final partition was made. The allotment was made on engineering valuation with schedule wise property “A” to “E” with the rights of user of the common portion of the properties as per as per Schedule "F" and "G". Payment of owelty money as per Schedule “H” was the foundation of the proposed scheme for the compromise. The said application has been filed for setting aside the said compromise decree on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence and unjust enrichment. The signature of the opposite party No. 1 in the said petition was fraudulently obtained. The opposite party No. 1 further alleged that her Advocate in collusion with the opposite party practised fraud. The alleged partition was, in actuality, partial partition. The savings of the mother of Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and wife of the plaintiff, Sm. The signature of the opposite party No. 1 in the said petition was fraudulently obtained. The opposite party No. 1 further alleged that her Advocate in collusion with the opposite party practised fraud. The alleged partition was, in actuality, partial partition. The savings of the mother of Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and wife of the plaintiff, Sm. Hemaprabha Devi rents thus collected from May, 1977, ornaments income, shops, movables of her estate were not made part of the compromise. Sm. Hemaprabha Devi died intestate on May 18, 1977. Hemaprabha Devi left behind her two sons and two daughters and her husband (since deceased) as her legal heirs, each of them having one-fifth share of her properties. 3. After the death of Hemaprabha Devi, there was a prolonged dialogue between the plaintiff's husband and her sons and daughters for the purpose of amicable partition of the joint properties by metes and bounds. The petitioner (since deceased) was then aged about 88 years. At that time; the petitioner relied on the suggestion of Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, husband of the defendant No. 4. Thereafter, there was a discussion among the parties in presence of the learned Advocate Sri Hrishikesh Ghosh and Birendra Kumar Bhowmick. Ultimately, it was decided that the suit should be filed and it should be decreed on consent in terms of the said petition containing the agreed terms and conditions made therein. To avoid time and expenses, the said petition was drafted on the lines of suggestion given by Sri Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and opposite party No. 1, Pabitra Bhowmick and the said draft was approved by Sri Hrishikesh Ghosh, the learned Advocate for the petitioner (since deceased) and by Sri Sankar Ganguly, the learned Advocate for the defendant No. 4. 4. The valuation of the three properties as referred to in paragraph 4 of this application was made by an Engineer, appointed by the parties, according to the suggestion and choice of Sri Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and Sri Hrishikesh Ghosh. The valuation of all the properties was fixed at Rs. 1,00,000/- in figure on the basis of suggestion of the Engineer and the aforesaid learned Advocates and the allotment was made according to the decision of all the parties assisted by the aforesaid learned Advocates, namely, Sri Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, Sri Hrishikesh Ghosh and Sri Sankar Ganguly. 5. The valuation of all the properties was fixed at Rs. 1,00,000/- in figure on the basis of suggestion of the Engineer and the aforesaid learned Advocates and the allotment was made according to the decision of all the parties assisted by the aforesaid learned Advocates, namely, Sri Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, Sri Hrishikesh Ghosh and Sri Sankar Ganguly. 5. The said petition was duly signed by all the parties and their learned Advocates. All the papers and draft petition of compromise were in custody of Sri Sankar Ganguly, the learned Advocate for Defendant No. 4/opposite party No. 1. Sri Sankar Ganguly finally typed out the final petition of compromise from the draft petition in his chamber in the court campus of Alipore. The plaint annexed to the said petition was signed by opposite party No. 1 and her Advocate. The petitioner (since deceased) after death of his wife realised and collected rents from the tenants of the properties as one of the co-sharers of the properties and expressed his willingness to pay defendant No. 4/opposite party No. 1 her due share of the collected rents. The admitted rents were thus effectively averred in the aforesaid partition suit. The said petition also settled the question of the owelty money payable amicably within one year from the date of compromise decree. 6. Thereafter, the opposite party No. 1 was requested to receive her share arising out of the collected rents from the petitioner (since deceased) upon making over a certified copy of the compromise decree along with plans annexed. On account of the death of Hrishikesh Ghosh, the payment for Stamp Duty for compromise decree could not be arranged at the time when it was drawn up and signed by the learned, Judge. Each of the co-sharers in terms of the compromise decree was entitled to Rs. 20,000/- for that stamp was duly filed. The compromise decree was challenged by opposite party No. 1 on the grounds as mentioned above. 7. The Assistant District Judge after hearing the application see aside the final decree dated February 6, 1984, by an order passed on April 20, 1988 on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence practised by the petitioner (since deceased). 8. The compromise decree was challenged by opposite party No. 1 on the grounds as mentioned above. 7. The Assistant District Judge after hearing the application see aside the final decree dated February 6, 1984, by an order passed on April 20, 1988 on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence practised by the petitioner (since deceased). 8. In the affidavit-in-opposition to the revisional application, the opposite party No. 1 set out all the relevant facts forming the basis of her challenge against the compromise decree dated February 6, 1984 and presented her case as averred in paragraph 6 and its various sub-paragraphs of the affidavit-in-opposition. The opposite party No. 1 also asserted that the infiltration of fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation in the said compromise decree was manifest. In paragraph 1 of the affidavit-in-opposition, the opposite party No. 1 specifically stated that other suit properties have not been included in the partition suit for oblique reasons. 9. Mr. Dhruba Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner asserted that the order thus passed by the learned Assistant District Judge is wholly without any jurisdiction inasmuch as Rule 3A of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for shore 'the Code' hereafter) is not attracted and in applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case, that the compromise decree cannot be set aside by the Court by invoking its power under Section 151 of the Code, inasmuch as, sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code provides for appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise. 10. Mr. Shyama Prasanna Roychowdhury, the learned Advocate, appearing for the opposite party duly assisted by Mr. A.K. Chatterjee claimed and contended that no appeal lies against the compromise decree. The said application filed by the Opposite party No. 1 was competent. The order passed by the learned Court below is unassailable. It is further claimed that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with consent of the parties in any circumstances. Mr. Roychowdhury referred to Section 96(3) and also Rule 3A of Order 23 of the Code. 11. The order passed by the learned Court below is unassailable. It is further claimed that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with consent of the parties in any circumstances. Mr. Roychowdhury referred to Section 96(3) and also Rule 3A of Order 23 of the Code. 11. The focal point for determination is whether an application under Section 151 of the Code is competent when there is provision for appeal as provided for under Sub-clause (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code; though, there is a bar to appeal under Section 96(3) of the Code. 12. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in case of (1) Sailendra Nath Roychowdhury v. Md. Alim and Anr. reported in AIR 1983 Cal 180 and (2) Mrs. Namita Dhar v. Dr. Amalendu Sen, reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta 187. 13. Let us now embark upon the determination of the point involved in this revisional application. 14. Section 96(3) of the Code provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. Finally, a suit is barred under Rule 3A of Order 23 of the Code. Therefore, a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties is to be tested and examined on the touchstone of Section 96(3) the deletion of sub-rule (m) of Rule 1 of Order 43 by the Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976, sub-rule 2 of rule 1A of Order 43 and Rule 3A of Order 43 of the Code. 15. By 1976 amendment Act new Rule 1A has been inserted in Order 43 of the Code to provide that certain orders, which are not appealable may be challenged in appeal. Rule 3A of Order 23 of the Code provide that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based is not lawful. 16. The compromise decree passed by the Assistant District Judge was challenged by the opposite party on the grounds mentioned above. 17. Amendment Act 104 of 1976 also engrafted Rule 3A of Order 23. Clear intention in enacting Rule 3A of Order 23 and deleting Rule (m) of Order 43 of the Code by adding Rule 1A to Rule 43 requires in depth examination. 18. 17. Amendment Act 104 of 1976 also engrafted Rule 3A of Order 23. Clear intention in enacting Rule 3A of Order 23 and deleting Rule (m) of Order 43 of the Code by adding Rule 1A to Rule 43 requires in depth examination. 18. After deletion of sub-rule (m) of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code party to compromise decree, if aggrieved, has to challenge the same by an appeal against the decree. The appeal may be filed under Section 96 read with Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code, despite the embargo of Section 96(3) of the Code inasmuch as the compromise decree on the ground of fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation may be challenged by an appeal under Section 96 read with Rule 1A of Order 43 of the code. Section 96(3) of the Code is only an exception to general rule contained in section 96 of the Code. The opening words of Section 96(1) arc significant and meaningful and sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Code without ambiguity points out that sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the Code, is an exception to general rule. 19. The whole Section 96 of the Code is to be read i.e. golden rule of interpretation. It is therefore, necessary to read the whole section including sub-rule(3) of Section 96 of the Code and to find out the meaning in its conceptual, contextual and legal perspective. 20. A section should be construed in such a manner as to interpret the right of appeal as conferred against all decrees barring one passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. The words "with the consent of the parties" do not carry with in the technical sense and any significance whatsoever. Construction of the said provisions is to be governed by a well recognised rule. An interpretation should not render sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code meaningless and absurd. 21. If any different interpretation of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code is put the aforesaid sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code would be treated as still born. A question "why sub-rule (2) has been introduced and what purpose of legislative intention would be served by inserting such sub-rule" may emerge. If any different interpretation of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code is put the aforesaid sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code would be treated as still born. A question "why sub-rule (2) has been introduced and what purpose of legislative intention would be served by inserting such sub-rule" may emerge. The interpretative answer in our view will be if the compromise is not lawful, the appeal is not incompetent. 22. It is also to be borne in mind that the judgment by consent acts as an estoppel and no useful purpose would be served by filing an appeal against the decree. The real difficult creeps in a given case where the compromise decree is challenged on such grounds as are taken in the present case on hand. Excepting the cases covered by Section 96(3) an appeal against the decree being not lawful under sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code is permissible. 23. A fresh suit is barred under Rule 3A of Order 23 of the Code. The term "with the consent of parties" requires little examination. Consent of parties will have to be understood in its ordinary grammatical meaning. Section 96(3) of the Code bars an appeal against the compromise decree if it is lawful. Consequently, appeal in a case of the present nature lies under Section 96 read with sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code, against the compromise decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded. The bar imposed by Section 96(3) of the Code is applicable in respect of compromise decree which is lawful. There might emerge a controversy between Section 96(3) and Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code. Such controversy may be resolved if the Court adopts a construction which would neither render such lawful compromise futile or create anomaly. Intention of the legislature for making amendment in the Code was to simplify the procedure and to get over multiplicity of the proceedings so as to put a halt to litigation explosion. 24. Such controversy may be resolved if the Court adopts a construction which would neither render such lawful compromise futile or create anomaly. Intention of the legislature for making amendment in the Code was to simplify the procedure and to get over multiplicity of the proceedings so as to put a halt to litigation explosion. 24. The submission of the learned Advocate for the opposite parties that against the compromise decree no appeal lies by reason of the apparent conflict between Section 96(3) and Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code, in our view, cannot but fail for the reasons given below : In the context' of legislative changes, the debate thus ensued before is to be considered. By amendment Ace of 1976, now Rule 1A has been inserted to provide certain orders which are not appealable may be challenged in appeal against the decree. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code, makes an express provision sequel to which the right of appeal against an order under Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code recording or refusing to record agreement compromise or satisfaction permitting a party in an appeal against the decree passed in a suit, to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should or should not have been recorded. 25. The contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in our view, has much force. The plain reading of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 envisages an appeal against the decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. To construe in different manner, sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code would become otiose. Where an appeal is preferred against the decree passed in a suit after recording or refusing to record a compromise, sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 cannot but be construed as enabling provisions entitling the party to go in for an appeal against the decree to dispute and challenge the order passed on such grounds as are present in the instant case. Sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the Code debars those appeals including the appeal against a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. 26. Sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the Code debars those appeals including the appeal against a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. 26. We have already discussed in detail, the meaning of the word “with the consent of the parties” and also the opening words of Section 96 of the Code. Sub-section (3) of Section 96 would not operate as a bar if the party disputes and challenges the decree on the grounds indicated above. If such dispute is raised in the appeal itself the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 96 would not stand in the way. 27. In that situation, the appeal against a decree as provided for by Section 96 (1) read with sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order 43 is maintainable. The strenuous efforts of the learned Counsel for the opposite party in salvaging the situation, in our view, are futile, inasmuch as the entire matter is to be examined from the angle of the legislative changes which provide for preferring an appeal. 28. In view of the deletion of Rule 1(m) of Order 43 of the Code the appeal subject to provisions and exceptions inserted in the Code by Amendment Act 104 of 1976, is impermissible and rule 3A of Order 23 of the Code provides that the suit cannot be filed. 29. The point involved for our determination is as to whether the petition invoking inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code is maintainable or not? In our view, the Court cannot make use of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and be neglected to avail himself of the same. Power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power. The inescapable conclusion is that the Court while exercising inherent powers recognised by Section 151 of the Code has no power to do which is specifically prohibited by the Code. Recourse to Section 151 of the Code is permissible only in the matter which are neither prohibited, nor expressly provided for in the Code. In those cases, the Court has inherent power to exercise its power. 30. The plea thus taken by the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party that there is no remedy provided elsewhere in the Code by reason of the aforesaid discussion, cannot be accepted. In those cases, the Court has inherent power to exercise its power. 30. The plea thus taken by the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party that there is no remedy provided elsewhere in the Code by reason of the aforesaid discussion, cannot be accepted. The Court exercising its inherent power under Section 151 of the Code would not be invited to embark upon the validity of the decree passed with the consent of the parties in a case where at the material time, the parties to the compromise, decree agreed to the terms and those terms which form part of the compromise decree. The Court exercising it power under Section 151 of the Code, in our view, therefore, has no jurisdiction to set aside the decree by usurping the powers of the Appellate Court. 31. The revisional application, in our view, is wholly incompetent and the Order No. 33 dated April 20, 1988 passed in the Court below, cannot but be set aside, inasmuch as the Court in exercise of its inherent powers cannot usurp the powers of the Appellate Court. If the defendant No. 4/opposite party No. 1 is really aggrieved by the compromise decree on the grounds indicated in the application, the proper remedy for that was to take steps in terms of the provisions of the Code. 32. In view of the foregoing discussions and the findings arrived, we are of the view that the order passed by the leaned Assistant District Judge cannot be sustained. The Court below exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law. The Order No. 33 dated April 20, 1988 is set aside. This application is allowed without any order as to costs. Ahmed, J. : I agree.