L. M. GHOSH, J, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner husband is the appellant. He filed Matrimonial Suit No. 685 of 1987 at Alipore for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. It is an admitted position that the petitioner was married to the respondent on the 10th of May, 1968 according to Hindu rites and customs. The petitioner is an engineer and obtained HMC in Mechanical engineering from the U. K. The parties did not dispute that for some time, after the marriage, the relationship between the two continued to be good. Out of the wedlock, two female children were born to the parties. The petitioner had a business and it continued smoothly till November, 1985, when the workshop of the petitioner came to be under lock-out. The petitioner averred that he had a very good income from the business and the paternal properties and the respondent could live a luxurious life. But since November, 1985, as stated by the petitioner, there was a financial stringency. It was alleged that since then, the respondent started misbehaving towards the petitioner by abusing and in other ways. The petitioner also made out a case that the respondent suspected that the petitioner had illicit relation with other women. The petitioner felt hurt because the respondent abused him in the presence of the children. For sometime past, according to the petitioner, the respondent along with her children, were living separately from the petitioner. It was summed up that the matrimonial ties in between the petitioner and the respondent had broken. On these allegations, the petitioner filed the suit for divorce. ( 2 ) THE respondent admitted the marriage. It was also admitted that the respondent could lead a comfortable and peaceful life with her husband and her two minor children for some time. All other allegations are denied. It was denied that the respondent abused the petitioner in the presence of the daughters. The respondent also asserted that she along with her husband (the petitioner) and the two minor children were very much living together in their own residential house of Bondel Road. The respondent refuted the alleged grounds for divorce. ( 3 ) DURING trial, the petitioner examined himself. Some documents were also marked exhibits on his side. On behalf of the respondent, herself and her sister were examined. The respondent refuted the alleged grounds for divorce. ( 3 ) DURING trial, the petitioner examined himself. Some documents were also marked exhibits on his side. On behalf of the respondent, herself and her sister were examined. ( 4 ) UPON a consideration of the materials on record, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit. The ground of cruelty was not accepted by the trial court. Against the dismissal of the suit, the petitioner has preferred this appeal. ( 5 ) MR. Bhattacharya has appeared for the appellant. Mr. Shakti Nath Mukherjee has appeared for the respondent. ( 6 ) BEFORE coming to the grounds of cruelty, we must have in view the circumstances prevailing. The parties admittedly are living in the same house, under the same roof, though in separate rooms. It is sought to be made out by Mr. Bhattacharya that the parties are separate in mess also. But that case has not been made out at the time of trial. The petitioner, as PW-l, has not deposed that the parties are separate in mess. On the side of the respondent, DW-2, in her chief, has asserted that the parties are joint in mess till date. That assertion, however, has lost its significance in view of the fact that during cross examination, this witness has admitted that she did not know if the parties became separate in mess in the same house. However, it is also not asserted that the parties are separate in mess. Therefore, one cannot proceed on the footing that the parties are separate in mess, as the case is not made out. This aspect has got bearing upon the question whether their marriage ties have broken down completely. We get that the parties are living under the same roof and we do not get that they are separate in mess. The other circumstance, we are to note is that even according to the petitioner, the respondent looks after the children. Then the respondent herself has also admitted that her daughters are prosecuting their studies in the English Medium Schools and their entire educational expenses and needs are being looked after by the petitioner. So it comes to this that both the husband and the wife are taking care of the children. This is a significant feature about the matrimonial ties; the children supply strong links between the husband and the wife. So it comes to this that both the husband and the wife are taking care of the children. This is a significant feature about the matrimonial ties; the children supply strong links between the husband and the wife. It cannot be a case here that the marriage has become a total wreck. ( 7 ) WITH this background in view, we have now to consider the grounds on which the divorce is sought for. ( 8 ) IN the petition, the main grounds alluded to are the suspicion entertained lay the respondent about the petitioner's character and abuses hurled by the respondent against the petitioner in presence of the children. In paragraph 11 of the petition, suspicion of the respondent is referred to. In evidence also, the petitioner reiterates that since 1985, his wife started suspecting illicit connection between him (the petitioner) and other women. We may say that mere suspicion, without any overt act or outward expression cannot amount to cruelty. The suspicion must touch the husband objectively. Only a certain state of mind of one spouse, without more, cannot have the adverse effect on the body and mind of the other spouse so much so that it would amount to cruelty. Even if the other spouse is right in reading the though, suspicion would remain an internal matter and would not flow out externally to affect the other person. It may be noted that prior to the Amendment Act of 1976, cruelty per se was not a ground for relief by way of divorce, but was only a ground for the relief of judicial separation under Clause (b) Section 10 (1) which laid down "has treated the petitioner with such cruelty is to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party". In t 1980 (2) CLJ 82 : ( AIR 1980 Cal 370 ), it has been pointed out that the position in law is still the same though the Amended Act of 1976 has come into force. It has further been observed that even after the Amendment, cruelty simpliciter will not suffice. That is to say, there must be some test of objectivity in the concept of cruelty. Therefore, mere suspicion can never amount to cruelty, as mainly it is relating to subjective phenomenon. It has further been observed that even after the Amendment, cruelty simpliciter will not suffice. That is to say, there must be some test of objectivity in the concept of cruelty. Therefore, mere suspicion can never amount to cruelty, as mainly it is relating to subjective phenomenon. ( 9 ) THE petitioner, however, has tried to prove some acts on the part of the respondent to establish the charge of cruelty. It is alleged that the respondent abused the petitioner in presence of the children. Though referred to in the petition, the same is not proved. The respondent has firmly denied in her written statement that she used to abuse in filthy languages in the presence of the children. ( 10 ) THEN the petitioner has tried to prove that the respondent threatened to commit suicide. For that, the petitioner has relied upon Ext. 2 (a ). Indeed, in Ext. 2 (a), there is a veiled threat of committing suicide. But even if she threatened to commit suicide once, we cannot say that single act constituted cruelty. We do not also know the background against that declaration, Ext. 2 (a); one cannot say whether the respondent was under mental agony or not because of the conduct of the petitioner. Under any circumstances, this solitary instance cannot constitute cruelty, without knowing who in fact was actually cruel. ( 11 ) THEN, there is Ext. 3, which discloses that the police called upon the petitioner to meet the police officer of the police station. The petitioner has deposed that the respondent reported against him at the Karaya Police Station. The respondent has frankly admitted in her evidence that she lodged a complaint to the Karaya Police Station against the petitioner, as he threatened to drive her out of the house. The matter rests there. We do not know whether indeed the petitioner threatened to drive out the respondent or not. If the respondent reported to the police station maliciously, then, no doubt, her conduct would not be justified. Even then, a solitary instance would not furnish the ground of cruelty. We, however, cannot say, without further materials, whether the respondent reported to the police without any justifiable cause. The ground of cruelty cannot be built up on such solitary instance. ( 12 ) THEN comes Ext. 2, the memorandum of the respondent meant for the petitioner. In Ext. Even then, a solitary instance would not furnish the ground of cruelty. We, however, cannot say, without further materials, whether the respondent reported to the police without any justifiable cause. The ground of cruelty cannot be built up on such solitary instance. ( 12 ) THEN comes Ext. 2, the memorandum of the respondent meant for the petitioner. In Ext. 2, no doubt, there are some hints about illicit relationship between the petitioner and another woman. We cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether there were good grounds for making such allegation against the petitioner because evidence is very scant. But apart from that, we notice that the communication was made to the husband only. We do not get any evidence that there was communication to the outside world. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned advocate for the appellant, has contended that Ext. 2 discloses that the respondent had communicated to the children also. We do not find any such communication as to this memorandum. We find that there are certain references about the statements and the opinions of the children themselves, but there is nothing to indicate that this memorandum itself was publicised to the outside world, including the children. Assuming that the allegations in the Ext. 2 are not well founded, even then, it would be an outburst of the wife to the husband only. Even if it be a frailty on the part of the wife, it would be a mere frailty of a single instance. Such frailties are always there in the affairs between the husband and the wife exclusively. Marriage cannot be so frail and fragile that it should be wrecked because of some quarrels between the couple or on account of some frailty on the part of this or that spouse. Once again, we think that this single act, as evidenced by Ext. 2, cannot amount to cruelty. ( 13 ) IN course of argument, the learned advocate for the petitioner has also made reference to Ext. 1 series - a receipt showing that the wife advanced loan to the husband at a high rate of interest. We do not think that any attempt to show that Ext. 1 series constitute cruelty cannot succeed. The petitioner himself has not treated these instances as furnishing ground of cruelty. We have no idea about the background of these Ext. 1 series - a receipt showing that the wife advanced loan to the husband at a high rate of interest. We do not think that any attempt to show that Ext. 1 series constitute cruelty cannot succeed. The petitioner himself has not treated these instances as furnishing ground of cruelty. We have no idea about the background of these Ext. 1 series; they might quite well be for the mutual benefits. ( 14 ) THUS we find that the ground of cruelty has not been substantiated. ( 15 ) MR. Bhattacharya, the learned advocate for the appellant, has relied upon certain decision for convincing this Court that the instances furnished in the petition and in evidence should be accepted as constituting ground of cruelty. He has first referred to the case of Santana Banerjee v. Sachindra Nath Banerjee, ( 1990 (1) CLJ 53 ). It has been held in that case that false allegations levelling serious charge to the police culminating in the husband being called by the police, but eventually the charge being found baseless cause mental agony to the husband which operates as cruelty by wife to husband. It has been noted that in that case, the allegations levelled by the wife were very serious and ultimately the same were found baseless. Here, in this case, we have already noted that the wife's case that she informed the Karaya police station as her husband had threatened to drive her out has not been proved to be baseless. If that case of the wife is neither proved not disproved, we cannot readily say that the act per se amounts to cruelty. In Santana Banerjee's case, the wife also stated in the written statement that the husband was guilty of sexual perversion and reiterated it during her deposition. Here, the wife has not made any allegations regarding the petitioner's character either in the written statement or during evidence. We are of the view that the decision cited by the learned advocate does not advance the case of the petitioner. ( 16 ) MR. Bhattacharya has next cited the case of Dastane v. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1575 SC 1534. What constitutes cruelty was elaborately discussed in that case. We find that the case in hand bears no similarity to the case cited. ( 16 ) MR. Bhattacharya has next cited the case of Dastane v. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1575 SC 1534. What constitutes cruelty was elaborately discussed in that case. We find that the case in hand bears no similarity to the case cited. In the case of Dastane v. Dastane, the wife threatened her husband to put an end to her life or that she would set the house on fire. She also threatened that she would make him lose his job and have the matter published in newspapers. The persistent abuses and insults hurled at the husband and his parents were all of so grave an order as to imperil the husband's sense of personal safety, mental happiness, job satisfaction and reputation. On the basis of such instances, the Supreme Court found that the conduct of the respondent/wife clearly amounted to cruelty. It would be seen that the acts of the wife in that case were very numerous, persistent and the grave nature. Here, in our case only some stray and solitary acts are referred to; and those were also not communicated to the outside would. The ratio in Dastane's case cannot support the petitioner's case here. ( 17 ) MR. Bhattacharya has next cited Smt. Krishna Rani's case, AIR 1981 P and H 119. But that was mainly concerning when condonation of acts of cruelty took place. Another decision has been referred to by Mr. Bhattacharya and that is the case of Krishna Sarbadhikary v. Alok Ranjan, AIR 1985 Cal 431 . There, the series of acts committed by the respondent/wife were found to have constituted cruelty. The wife frequently departed the matrimonial home without permission and stayed in her father's house for long time. The husband felt humiliated socially and his health had suffered. She was a highly impulsive and emotional lady who lacked balance and had suspicious nature. She very often flew into rage and abused and threatened the husband. All these series of acts committed by the wife were found to constitute cruelty. We have already observed that the instances referred to, in this case, are solitary instances and excepting one report to the police station, there was no communication to the outside world. So the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from the case cited. We are not persuaded to accept that in this case, the respondent was guilty of cruelty. We have already observed that the instances referred to, in this case, are solitary instances and excepting one report to the police station, there was no communication to the outside world. So the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from the case cited. We are not persuaded to accept that in this case, the respondent was guilty of cruelty. ( 18 ) MR. Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent, has argued that the instances referred to by the petitioner/husband are in the nature of ordinary quarrels between the husband and the wife and cannot be considered so serious or damaging as to constitute cruelty. He has referred to the decision of Harendra Nath Burman v. Smt. Suprava Burman, AIR 1989 Calcutta 120 for the principle that the fact that the marriage has irretrievably broken-down, is, by itself, no ground for dissolution of marriage. That undoubtedly is the law. Moreover, we have noticed that the couple are residing under the same roof and both are looking after the children. So, we can add that in this case, it cannot be said that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. ( 19 ) UPON a consideration of all the aspects, we are of the view that the petitioner/husband has not proved the ground of cruelty. That being the position, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit. The appeal must fail. ( 20 ) THE appeal is dismissed on contest. The judgment and decree of the learned trial court are hereby confirmed. We make no order for costs of this appeal. ( 21 ) AMARABHA SENGUPTA, J :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.