JUDGMENT : S.R. Singh, J. By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the Petitioner seeks quashed of order dated 21-3-1991 (Annexure V to the writ petition) passed by the Respondents No. 2 and the order dated 26-6-1991 (Annexure-VIII) passed by the Respondent no 1. 2. The factual matrix of the case in short is that the Petitioner and the Respondents No. 4 to 6 filed an objection u/s 9A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in respect of plot No. 823 and 848 situate in village Dora, pargana Saidpur, district Ghazipur which was included in the town area with effect from 25-10-1971. The objection was filed beyond time, but an application for condonation of delay was also filed along with the objection dated 15-12-1989. It is alleged that a compromise was entered into between the parties on 6-3-1990 and the Consolidation Officer by his order dated 20-4-1990 condoned the delay in filing the objection and decided it in terms of the alleged compromise. The recorded tenure holder Mst. Reshma Kunwar preferred an appeal on 31-1-1991, inter alia, on the ground that she was not party to the compromise and that the order of the Consolidation Officer was passed behind her back and without notice to her and she came to know of the order passed by the consolidation officer only on 31-1-1991 on the basis of Intkhab (extract of khatauni). In ground no 11, it was stated by her that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal was within time, but if in the opinion of the court it was found to be belated, she might be given benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Settlement Officer Consolidation after hearing the parties condoned the delay in filing the appeal. The Settlement Officer Consolidation further held that the compromise was fraudulent and that the 3rd Respondent was not a party to the compromise The Settlement Officer Consolidation further held that the land in dispute being situate in the town area, the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act were not attracted and therefore, the Consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction in the matter. The Petitioner filed a revision which was dismissed by order dated 26-6-1991. The Petitioner filed a revision which was dismissed by order dated 26-6-1991. The findings as to the fraudulent nature of the compromise and the applicability of the provisions of the UP CH Act to the land in dispute as recorded by the Settlement Officer Consolidation were maintained by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 3. I have heard Sri Sankatha Rai, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri V. C. Misra, learned senior counsel for the Respondent No. 3, Respondents No. 4 to 6 are proforma, whereas Respondents No. 1 and 2 are formal parties. Accordingly with the consent of the parties counsel I propose to decide the writ petition at the admission stage without issuing notice to Respondents No. 4 to 6, who have common interest with the Petitioner. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended before me that the Settlement Officer consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation have erred in holding that the provisions of the U P. Consolidation of Holdings Act were not applicable to the land in dispute merely because the disputed land is situated within the town area. I find substance in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 3 of the UP CH Act being relevant for the purposes of discussion on the question involved in the case is quoted as below: Consolidation area' means the area, in respect of which a notification u/s 4 has been issued except such portions thereof of which the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and land reforms Act 1950 do not apply. Section 1(2) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act being relevant for the purposes of discussion of the controversy involved in the case is also quoted below: 1 (1) x x x (2) it extends to the whole of Uttar Pradesh except the areas which on the 7th day of July, 1945 were included in a municipality or notified area under the provisions of United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, or a cantonment under the provisions of Cantonment Act, 1924, or a town area under the provisions of United Town Areas Act, 1914. A conspectus of the provisions contained in Section 1 (2) of the UP ZA and LR Act 1950 and Section 3(2-A) of the UP CH Act, makes it abundantly clear that the former Act applies to whole of the Uttar Pradesh except the areas which on the 7th day, 1949 were included in a Municipality or notified area or a cantonment or a town area constituted under the appropriate Act and the later Act applies to the area notified u/s 4 except such portions thereof to which the provisions of former Act Ho not apply. 5. It is not disputed before me that Town Area Sadat District Ghazipur was constituted u/s 3 of the U.P. Town Area Act 1914 for the first time w.e.f. 25-10-1971 and the village in question was one of the villages comprising the said town area as mentioned in the Notification constituting it. The provisions of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 which were admittedly applicable in the area prior to 25-10-1971, did not cease to be applicable after the said date. The applicability of the UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 is governed by Section 1 (2) of the Act and not by any other enactment and if by strength of the Sub-section (2) of Section 1 the Act became applicable to an area, the provisions thereof would continue to apply to such area even if it is included in any Municipality or Town Area etc. after the 7th day of July, 1949 which is the cut off date for the purposes of applicability of the Act to municipal area or Town Area etc. There is no provision in the Act in this regard. On the other hand the second proviso to Section 1 (2) provides for applicability of the Act to the area which ceased to be a municipal area or town area etc. at any time after 1-7-1949 I am, therefore, of the considered view that the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 continued to be applicable to the area in question even after 25-10-1971 and accordingly the provisions of the UP CH Act were very much applicable to the area in question and the contrary view taken by the Respondents No. 1 and 2 suffers from manifest error of law. I am fortified in my view by two decisions of this Court. I am fortified in my view by two decisions of this Court. First in Autar Krishna v. Gaon Sabha 1974 (supp) RD 252 and the second in Narendra Pratap Singh v. Indra Misra 1984 ALJ 20. The decisions in Haribans Bahadur v. State 1980 AWC 252 and Ram Lal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Hamirpur 1988 RD 309 reliance on which was placed by the learned Counsel for the third Respondent, do not lead to any different result. The observation, "The Zamindari Act has no application to the urban areas like municipality Cantonment etc. (emphasis supplied) occurring in the Division Bench decision in Ram Lal's case (supra) has to be read in the context of Section 1 (2) of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 quoted by the Division Bench immediately before the passage containing the above observations Maharaj Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1990 RD 115 no doubt supports the view taken by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 but the crucial words "except the area which on the 7th day of July, 1949" occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the U P. Act No. 1 of 1951 seem to have escaped the notice of the Learned Judge (Hon. R. P. Singh, J.) who decided the case of Maharaj Singh (supra) The Division Bench decision in Ram Lal's case (supra) has been misapplied to the facts of Maharaj Singh's case (supra) as is evidently clear from the following passage of the said decision; Thus Consolidation Act would apply when the Zamindari Abolition Act applies. Section 1 (2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act, however, provides that it extends to whole of Uttar Pradesh except the areas which were included in Municipality or a notified area under the provisions of U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 or Cantonment Act or Town Area Act Thus it will be clear that the Zamindari Abolition Act does not apply to the land included in an area which is under the Municipality, notified area, town area or Cantonment . Since the area of land in dispute was included within the municipal limits in the year, 1976, it ceased to be covered by the Consolidation of Holdings Act and consequently the Consolidation Authorities thereafter had no jurisdiction to pass any orders in respect of the land in dispute which came to be included within municipal limits, hence under law the Consolidation Authorities could not pass any order in respect of the land in dispute after it was included within the municipal limits in the year 1976. Consequently the order passed in reference proceedings on 8-6-78 and the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 27-11-1987 are without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel for both the parties could not contest the position under law that after the land was included within the municipal limits the consolidation authorities have ceased to have jurisdiction to pass any orders in respect thereof It has already been held by this Court in the case of Hari Bansh Bahadur v. State 1980 AWC 252 that Consolidation of Holdings Act is not applicable to the land situate in Municipal area or to an area where Local Bodies Act apply. In a later Division Bench case of Ram Lal v. D.D.C. Hamirpur 1988 RD 309, it was held that the Consolidation of Holdings Act is not applicable to land falling within the municipal area or town area. Thus the position under the law is well settled that after the land was included within the municipal limits of Kashipur in the year 1976, the consolidation authorities could not pass any orders in respect thereof and the Act ceased to apply to that area. (emphasis supplied) 6. Since the crucial words occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 1 escaped the notice of the Learned Judge who decided the case of Maharaj Singh (supra), the decision rendered therein can be ignored on the basis of doctrine of per-incurium. In State of U.P. v. M/s. Synthetic and Chemicals Ltd. JT 1991 (3) 268, the Supreme Court while discussing the doctrine of per incurium held as under: 'Incuria' literally means 'carelessness'. In practice per incurium appears to mean per ignoratium. In State of U.P. v. M/s. Synthetic and Chemicals Ltd. JT 1991 (3) 268, the Supreme Court while discussing the doctrine of per incurium held as under: 'Incuria' literally means 'carelessness'. In practice per incurium appears to mean per ignoratium. English Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered in ignoratium of a Statute or other binding authority, Young v. Bistol Aeroplane Ltd. (1944) 1 KB 718 . Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. In Jaisri Sahu Vs. Rajdewan Dubey and Others, AIR 1962 SC 83 , this Court while pointing out the procedure to be followed when conflicting decisions are placed before a Bench extracted a passage from Halsbury Laws of England incorporating one of the exceptions when the decision of an Appellate Court is binding "Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any considerations In other words can such conclusion be considered as declaration of law ? Here again the English Courts and Jurists have carved an exception to the rule of precedents It his been explained as rule of sub-silentio.' A decision passed sub silentio', in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind (Selmond 12th Edition). In Lancester Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bramith Ltd. 1941 IKB 673, the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered 'without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority' It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101 . The Bench held that, 'precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment. 'The Courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not expressed and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. 'The Courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not expressed and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In Shama Rao v. State of Pondicherry AIR 1967 SC 1680, it was observed, 'it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein.' Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or proceeded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. 7. In view of the above discussion I am of the considered opinion that the law laid down in Maharaj Singh's case (supra) is not a quotable law. 8. Coming now to the merits of the question as to the validity of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer condoning the delay in filing objection and deciding the case in terms of the alleged compromise, I find that the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation have concurrently held that the proceeding before the Consolidation Officer terminating in order dated 20-4-1990 was fraudulent and I am not inclined to interfere with the view taken by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation on this question Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended before me that the 3rd Respondent instead of filing restoration application before the Consolidation Officer straightway filed appeal against the order of the Consolidation Officer and could not adduce evidence to substantiate her allegation that the proceeding before the Consolidation Officer leading to the order dated 20-4-1990 was fraudulent. His contention is that mere allegation in the ground of appeal that the proceeding before the Consolidation Officer was fraudulent was not enough to set aside the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. 9. His contention is that mere allegation in the ground of appeal that the proceeding before the Consolidation Officer was fraudulent was not enough to set aside the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. 9. So far as non filing of the restoration application is concerned, it would not be fatal to the maintainability of the appeal in as much as both the remedies were available to the 3rd Respondent As regards merits it is true that no affidavit was filed on behalf of the 3rd Respondent in support of her allegation made in the grounds of appeal, but the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation both have placed reliance upon certain intrinsic circumstantial evidence leading to the conclusion that the proceeding before the Consolidation Officer was fraudulent and that the 3rd Respondent was not party to the alleged compromise As held by the Deputy Director of Consolidation the vakalatnama filed on behalf of the 3rd Respondent before the Consolidation Officer is dated 6-3-1990 and therefore, it does not inspire confidence that the 3rd Respondent was duly represented before the Consolidation Officer. No notice seems to have been issued to her by the Consolidation Officer. The view taken by the S.O.C. and the D. D.C. in this regard cannot be termed as illegal or perverse in as much as both these authorities have arrived at the conclusion about the genuineness of the compromise of the (sic) has of intrinsic evidence before calling for the file of the case u/s 9A(2) of the UP CH Act. 10. I am therefore, not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders in so far as they set aside the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. However, since I am of the view that the Consolidation Authorities have jurisdiction to entertain the objection and decide the same in accordance with law, the impugned orders have to be quashed and a direction has to be issued to the Consolidation Officer to decide the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act in accordance with law after affording opportunity of hearing to the 3rd Respondent and thereafter, if necessary, to decide the objection u/s 9A(2) of the UP CH Act on merits. 11. In view of the above discussion the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. 11. In view of the above discussion the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned orders passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation are maintained in so far as they set aside the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, but these orders are quashed in so far as they held that the Consolidation Authorities have no jurisdiction to entertain the Petitioner's objection u/s 9A(2) of the UP CH Act. Accordingly, I direct that the Consolidation Officer shall decide the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act afresh in accordance with law after affording opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties and thereafter, if necessary, to decide the objection u/s 9A(2) of the UP CH Act on merits. 12. Parties shall bear their own costs.