ORDER V.D. Gyani, J. 1. Both these petitions are closely connected. They raise and involve a common question of law. In fact arguments advanced are common to both these petitions. Therefore they are being decided by common order. 2. The petitioners are holders of stage carriage permits, plying their carriages on Harda-Indore (Via Nemavar, Khategaon, Kannod Bijawad-Chapda with a total distance of 156 kms.) routes making two single trips daily as per timings shown by them. 3. Respondents Jagdevisingh and M/s R.J. Fouzdar are also Bus operators, who have been granted permits to operate their Buses between Hoshangabad-Indore covering the above route, subject counter signatures by R.T. As Indore and Ujjain within whose jurisdiction the above route lies. The respondents applied for counter signatures of their respective permits under Section 63 of the M.V. Act 1939 on 18.8.88, 3.8.88. These applications were published in the State Government Gazette on 18.8.88 and objections were invited to the granted of counter signed permits. Accordingly the petitioners duly submitted their objections before the R.T.A. Ujjain raising various objections. 4. These objections were taken up for hearing on 23.6.90 but adjourned to 7.7.90, when some other objectors raised a point contending that applications for counter signatures as made by the respondents on 18.8.88 and 3.8.88 under the provisions of old M. V. Act of 1939. Lapsed with coming into force of New M. V. Act on 1.7.89 and no longer survived for counter signatures. The point was argued at length before the R.T.A. Ujjain on 31.8.90. The case was reserved for order for which no date was fixed. Eventually on 21.11.90 the R.T.A. passed an order filed as Ann. 'A' to M.P. No. 1899/91 and Ann. 'B' to M.P. No. 874/91. By this order dt. 21.11.90 the respondent R.T.A. Ujjain, following a judgment of this Court in M.P. No. 293/89 decided on 12.12.89, held that the applications for grant of permit made under the old Act of 1939, did not survive, on coming into force of the new M.V. Act for 1988, which came into force on 1.7.89 and were not maintainable as such. It is the petitioners case, that they were not heard, not afforded any opportunity of being heard by the R.T.A. Ujjain, before passing the aforesaid order on 21.11.90, which is grossly violative of principles on natural justice. 5. It is the petitioners case, that they were not heard, not afforded any opportunity of being heard by the R.T.A. Ujjain, before passing the aforesaid order on 21.11.90, which is grossly violative of principles on natural justice. 5. As is evident from record, the matter was again taken up for hearing by R.T. A. on 24.11.90 when the respondents seeking counter signatures brought it to his notice that they had already made fresh application 29.6.90 and 9.8.90 under the provisions of the new Act of 1988, which should be taken up for consideration on merits. The petitioners it may be noted, had not notice of these applications made by respondents, R.T.A. Ujjain on 11.1.1991 passed order counter signing the permits (filed as Ann. 'C to MP.No. 1899/91) and Ex. D.I to M.P. No. 874/91 without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners who had their objections to the grant of counter signed permits. The petitioners have denounced this order dt. 11.1.91 as grossly violative of the principles of natural justice. 6. The petitioner in M.P. No. 1899/90 had challenged the order Ann. 'C in revision before S.T.A.T. but it was dismissed as barred by time vide dt. 29.5.91 (Ann. E) passed by the S.T. A.T. It is only here in this regard of filing of a revision petition before the S .T. A.T. that this MP. No. 1899/91 differs from M.P. No. 874/91, otherwise the basic facts are common to both these petitions. 7. Shri Chafekar learned Counsel appearing with Shri Agarwal for the petitioners has made two fold submissions. It was contended that on a plain reading of Section 217 of M. V. Act 1988 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it could not be said that applications made under provisions of the repealed Act 1939 had lapsed with coming into force of the new Act. It was also contended that elementary rules of natural justice have been breached by the R.T.A. in passing the impugned order, in as much as the petitioners were neither noticed nor afforded any opportunity of being heard, before passing the said order, thus voilating the rule of 'Audi alter am Partem'. 8. It was also contended that elementary rules of natural justice have been breached by the R.T.A. in passing the impugned order, in as much as the petitioners were neither noticed nor afforded any opportunity of being heard, before passing the said order, thus voilating the rule of 'Audi alter am Partem'. 8. Shri Kutumbale learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondent M/s R. J. Fouzdar Respondent No. 3 (Respondent Jagdev Singh though served has not entered appearance) submitted that Shri Agarwal was in fact heard by the R.T. A. before passing the impugned order as is evident from record and the order itself. According to him the new Act does not provide for any such opportunity of being heard. He also pointed out that the objection sought to be raised by the petitioners had in fact been considered and disposed of by the R.T.A. as such no legitimate grievance can be made by the petitioners on this count. 9. The first point therefore that arises for consideration is whether on coming into force of the New Act of 1988, the applications for grant of permit made under provisions of the old Act of 1939 had lapsed? and secondly whether the petitioners were entitled to a right of hearing before grant of such permit? 10. So far as the old M.V. Act of 1939 is concerned it has not been disputed before us that the Act itself provided for inviting objections to the grant of permits and deciding the same after affording due opportunity of hearing, before granting or countersigning such permit. It is common ground that under the old M.V. Act of 1939, an objector to the grant of counter signed permit was entitled to a right of hearing before such permit was granted under Section 63 of the old Act. 11. What is disputed before us it that an application preferred under the old Act for grant of such permit would not survive on coming into force of the new Act, 1988, which does not provide for any such right of hearing, which is not available to the objectors under the new Act. 12. Shri Chafekar learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order dt. 12. Shri Chafekar learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order dt. 21.11.90 as passed by the R.T.A. Ujjain is essentially based on a judgment of this Court in M.P. No. 293/89 decided on 12.12.89 and this judgment in M.P. No. 293/89 was relied upon and followed in another petition, but the Supreme Court has reversed the same in Gurucharansingh v. Yeshwantsingh (AIR 1992 page 180). 13. It was argued that applications for grant of permit preferred under the old Act are saved on correct interpretation of Section 217 of the new Act read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the submission made by the learned Counsel must be accepted in view of the Supreme Court judgment in M/s Gurucharansingh's Case (supra) Dealing with and discussing Section 217 of the new Act 6 of the General Clauses Act the Supreme Court concluded as under: It would be too artificial to say that it was not a right or it had not accrued under 1939 Act. Therefore in our opinion, by virtue of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act the right of the appellant to get his application considered and decided in accordance with law was saved by sub section (4) of Section 217 of Motor Vehicles Act. The two decisions M.P. No. 2184/91 Smt. Muraver Jahon Begum and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. decided on 27.9.91 (a photostat copy of the certified copy of which has been placed on record) and Mithlesh Garg s,Union of India relied upon by Shri Kutumbala learned Counsel for the respondents does not help the respondents to support their contention. 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, it follows that the applications made by the respondents for grant of counter signed permits under the old Act did not lapse, with the coming into force of the new M.V. Act as erroneously hold by the R.T.A. Ujjain. The petitioners were entitled to a right of hearing in support of objections preferred by them. It is held accordingly. 15. Shri Kutumbala learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondent submitted that the objection as raised by the petitioners were in fact considered by the R.T.A. It can therefore be said that there was any violation of rules of natural justice. 16. It is held accordingly. 15. Shri Kutumbala learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondent submitted that the objection as raised by the petitioners were in fact considered by the R.T.A. It can therefore be said that there was any violation of rules of natural justice. 16. Shri Chafekar referring to the impugned order submitted that while it is true that Shri Agrawal appearing for the petitioners was present at the time of hearing, but he was not heard on behalf of the petitioners-in whom the right of hearing vested. 17. Going through the order it would be seen that Shri Agarwal, in fact sought for a separate date to be fixed for detailed discussion on the judgment in M.P. No. 293/89 and it was also pointed out by him that the judgment dt. 12.12.89 in M.P. 293/89 was essentially based on different facts and would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 18. Shri Chafekar learned Counsel on the other hand contended that the right of hearing is that of the individual objector and more consideration of the objection either suo moto or at the instance of some one else, cannot be equated with the opportunity of hearing to be afforded or extended to a person who is going to be adversely affected by an action or order of the authority. It is the person aggrieved or likely to be aggrieved who ought to be heard, so as to fulfill the requirement of rules of natural justice. The rule has been stated in R. v. Diggins Ex p Rekmani (1985)1 All E.R. 1073, in the following words: -- It is an aspect of the rule of natural justice requiring both sides to be heard that reasonable facilities be allowed for the making of representation. Unless there is some reason to the contrary, these must include oral representations. Even a party's own legal representation may not override, this by his acquiescence (at least where he lacks his client's explicit consent). Thus where a solicitor or other legal representation advises or agrees to a non oral hearing denial of an oral hearing may nevertheless constitute a remediable injustice R v. Digginsexp Rehmani (1985)1 All ER 1073. 19. Even a party's own legal representation may not override, this by his acquiescence (at least where he lacks his client's explicit consent). Thus where a solicitor or other legal representation advises or agrees to a non oral hearing denial of an oral hearing may nevertheless constitute a remediable injustice R v. Digginsexp Rehmani (1985)1 All ER 1073. 19. Mere consideration of the nature of objection without affording an opportunity of being heard to the objector would not absolve the authority concerned of its duty to extend an opportunity of being heard to the person concerned, if the opportunity of hearing is to be meaningful and effective as it ought to be. Even if, construing impugned order in a most liberal manner and taking it on its face value yet it cannot be said that the objector Nandkishore was heard before passing the impugned order. This position so far as objector Nandkishore is concerned, remains uncontroverted and undisputed. While for objector Arshad Hussain it was urged by the respondents, that his counsel Shri Agrawal was present and heard. Although going through the order dated 21.11.90, it would be seen that submissions made by Shri Agrawal, were in altogether different context, and he cannot be held to have been heard even no behalf of objector Arshad Hussain. 20. For the foregoing reasons both these petitions deserve to be allowed. They are accordingly allowed with costs. The petitioners are held to be entitled to a right of hearing in support of their objections to grant of countersigned permits to the respondents, whose applications for such grant made under provisions of old M. V. Act are held to service notwithstanding the coming into force of the new Act of 1988. Order dt. 21.11.90 passed by R.T.A. Ujjain filed as Ann. 'A' in M.P. No. 1899/91, order dt. 11.1.91 Ann. D-1, in M.P. No. 874/91 and order dt. 11.1.91 filed as Ann. C in M.P. No. 1899/91 are quashed. Counsel's fee Rs. 2500/- in each case, if certified.