JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava 1. Feeling aggrieved by the decree of ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation In respect of the accommodation in dispute, which was under the tenancy of the petitioner, passed by the Judge Small Cause Court, which was affirmed in revision filed under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, he has approached this Court for redress and has sought for the quashing of the impugned orders dated 14-1-1988, passed by the trial court as well as the order dated 1-11-1989 passed by the revisional Court where under the revision filed by the petitioner tenant was dismissed. 2. The respondent landlord had filed a suit giving rise to the present writ petition on the assertions that the tenant was a defaulter within the meaning of Section 20 (2) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972 (herein after referred to as 'Act') and inspite of the service of the notice dated 20-1-1979, terminating the tenancy and requiring the defendant to pay the arrears of rent, which was alleged to be due since 1-12-1976, which notice was duly served on 29-1-1979, the defendant has neither tendered or paid the rent nor had vacated the premises in dispute. The aforesaid suit was contested by the defendant asserting that no rent was due as claimed as the same was being paid under Section 30 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. vide Misc. Case No. 347 of 1978, which was still pending and that neither notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the defendant nor he had ever refused to accept it and It was further asserted that combined notice under Section 20 (2) (a) and 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was illegal, void and bad in law. Initially the trial court had decided the suit vide the judgment and order dated 8-9-1986, where under while decreeing the suit for the recovery of Rs. Initially the trial court had decided the suit vide the judgment and order dated 8-9-1986, where under while decreeing the suit for the recovery of Rs. 513/-as rent for the period 1-12-1976 to 28-2-1979 as claimed in the plaint, the suit was dismissed so far as the other reliefs claimed thereunder were concerned, as the trial court was of the view that the combined notice could not: be deemed to have been served simply on the strength of the endorsement of 'refusal' endorse by the postman on the registered envelop containing the notice in as much as the postman had not noted his beat number, while miking the endorsement of refusal. 3. The decree passed by the trial court was challenged in revision by the plaintiff as well as the defendant tenant. The defendant felt aggrieved by the decree passed by the trial court for the recovery of the arrears of rent, which were held to be due. The plaintiff felt aggrieved by the portion of the decree passed by the trial court, where under the relief of the ejectment of the defendant from the premises in dispute had been refused. Both these revisions were heard and disposed of by the revisional court Vide the judgment and order dated 12-11-11987, where under while dismissing the" revision filed by the defendant tenant and upholding the decree passed by the trial court regarding the recovery of the arrears of rent for the period 1-12-1976 to 28-2-1979, the other revision filed by the plaintiff was allowed and the matter was remanded to the trial court for deciding the Issues No. 2, 3 and 4 afresh in accordance with the law In the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment. It may be noticed that the issue No. 1, the finding whereof had been affirmed was as to whether the defendant was in arrears of rent, since 1-12-1976 as alleged in the plaint. The decision of the trial court on the aforesaid issue attained finality with the dismissal of the revision filed by the defendant tenant to which a reference has already been made above as the said revisional order was never challenged by the petitioner tenant. 4. The decision of the trial court on the aforesaid issue attained finality with the dismissal of the revision filed by the defendant tenant to which a reference has already been made above as the said revisional order was never challenged by the petitioner tenant. 4. After remand, the trial court proceeded to decide the issues No. 2, 3 and 4, which related to the questions regarding the validity of the notice and whether the defendant tenant could be deemed to be a defaulter as contemplated under Section 20 of the Act and whether in the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of eviction against the defendant as claimed. The trial court after carefully considering the evidence and the materials on the record held that the notice in question had been duty served by 'refusal'. The trial court believed the statement of the postman, who had tendered the notice in question to the defendant and had made the endorsement of 'refusal' on the registered envelop The trial court further found that the deposits made by the defendant in the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, were invalid deposits and consequently the tenant could not derive any advantage out of the same in order to save himself from becoming a 'defaulter' as contemplated under Section 20 of the said Act. Cons quently the trial court decreed the suit for the petitioner's ejectment from the premises in dispute and for the recovery of damages for use and occupation pendentelite and future as claimed. 5. The revisional court has affirmed the findings recorded by the trial court and has up held the decree passed by it. 6. I have heard Sri N A. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Haider Hussain, learned Counsel representing the landlord respondent. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the finding on the question of the service of the combined notice claimed to have been issued by the landlord, which is alleged to have been served on the defendant by 'refusal' is manifestly erroneous. It has been further urged that during the pendency of the revision, the petitioner bad moved an application far bringing on record certain additional evidence but the said application had been wrongly rejected and the revisional court bad failed to exercise the jurisdiction vesting in it without any justifiable reason. It has been further urged that during the pendency of the revision, the petitioner bad moved an application far bringing on record certain additional evidence but the said application had been wrongly rejected and the revisional court bad failed to exercise the jurisdiction vesting in it without any justifiable reason. It has further 'been asserted that the deposits made by the defendant tenant In the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act were valid deposits and the court below had acted with manifest illegality in determining the question of 'default' in the payment of rent on the part of the defendant without taking into account the amount of rent deposited under the aforesaid proceedings. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further tried to challenge the order passed by the revisional court dated 12-11-1987, where under the revision of the petitioner was dismissed and the revision of the plaintiff had been allowed. 7. The learned Counsel far the respondent has urged that the findings recorded by the court below,' regarding the services of the notice in question on the defendant is based on appraisal of evidence and on a perusal of the judgment passed by the trial court, it is apparent that the evidence tendered by the plaintiff for proving the fact of the tender of the notice to the defendant tenant by the postman concerned and the genuineness of the endorsement of the 'refusal' made on the registered envelop had been believed by the trial court, which necessarily implied the outright rejection of the denial of service of the notice by the defendant and this question being a question of fact was not open to challenge in the proceedings either under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act or in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been further asserted that the validity of a deposit made in the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act is always open for consideration In the proceedings in regular suit and in the present case both the courts below having categorically found that none of the grounds having been made out, which could justify depositing of the amount of rent In question in the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, the said deposits could not be held to be valid deposits and the defendant tenant could hot claim any adjustment thereof, while considering the question regarding arrears of rent as claimed by the plaintiff. It. has further been asserted that, in any view of the "matter, there could be no Justification for making any deposit in. the proceeding under Section 30 of the Act after the service of the notice dated 20th January, 1979 on the defendant tenant as the said notice clearly indicated the landlord's willingness to accept the amount of rent, if tendered to him within the time allowed in the notice and there could be no Justification for the defendant tenant to deposit any amount of rent in the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act subsequent to the service of the aforesaid notice. It has also been asserted that In any view of the matter, the deposits claimed to have been made by the defendant tenant in the year 1971 in the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act were quite delayed and in that view of the matter also were not liable to be taken into account and save the tenant from becoming a defaulter within the meaning of "Section 20 of the Act. It has further been asserted that the petitioner has not sought for any relief in the writ petition for the quashing of either the order dated 12-11-1987 or the order dated 23-8-1989 and consequently, he can not be permitted to challenge the same at this belated stage. 8. I have given my anxious thought to the rival contentions raised "by the counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the record. 8. I have given my anxious thought to the rival contentions raised "by the counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the record. So far as the question of service of the notice in question on the defendant tenant is concerned, suffice it to say that as observed by the Honourable Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Gujrat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433 , there Is a preemption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorement that the addressee refused to accept the same. The mere denial of service made by the addressee was not sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to the service of the registered cover It has been observed by the Honourable Supreme Court that no doubt, the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to the addressee or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. It has been clarified by the Apex Court that the burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service. 9. From the evidence and materials on the record, which have been elaborately discussed by the trial court, there Is no escape from the conclusion that the defendant tenant had completely failed to discharge the aforesaid burden as he had failed to place the material before the court to show that the endorsement made by the postal authority was wrong and incorrect. 10. In the circumstances of the case, the finding returned by the trial court on the question of service of notice by 'refusal' and that the service was therefore complete did not suffer from any such Infirmity, which could justify any interference while exercising the revisional jurisdiction envisaged under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The effect of the service of the notice being complete even by 'refusal' is that the addressee stands imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice. The effect of the service of the notice being complete even by 'refusal' is that the addressee stands imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore, the willingness of the landlord to accept the rent, if tendered as indicated in the notice will be deemed to have been communicated to the tenant on 29-1-1979 and the deposit of rent in the proceedings under section 30 of the Act on 9-2-1979 could not therefore; be held to be justified arid the said deposit could not be deemed to be a valid deposit. On the finding recorded by the court below to the effect that none of the ground entitling the defendant to make a deposit in the proceedings under section 30 of the Act has been made out, is also justified since there was so evidence to show that the amount of rent in dispute was ever tendered to the plaintiff or there was any refusal on his part to accept the same. Taking into consideration, the ratio of the decision of this court in the case of Chunni Lal and another v. Ramesh Chand (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 903 of 1982), decided on 26-8-1992, the finding returned by the court below on the question relating to the validity of the deposit made in the proceedings under section 30 of the Act can not be held to suffer from any such infirmity. which may justify any interference by this Court. 11. As has already been noticed above, the petitioner has not claimed any relief seeking the quashing of the order passed by the revisional court dated 12-11-1987 where under the revision filed by him had been dismissed and the revision filed by the plaintiff landlord was allowed the aforesaid order had attained finality long ago. The petitioner had submitted to the said order and had taken part in the proceedings which were resumed subsequent to the passing of the aforesaid order, It is too late for the petitioner to challenge the same now at this belated stage. The petitioner had submitted to the said order and had taken part in the proceedings which were resumed subsequent to the passing of the aforesaid order, It is too late for the petitioner to challenge the same now at this belated stage. Even otherwise, as observed by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Satydhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 , the principle of resjudicata applied also as between the two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not sallow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Considering the effect of the aforesaid observations, I am clearly of the view that it is now not open to the petitioner to challenge the validity or the correctness of the revisional orders referred to above, at this stage. 12. So far as the order passed by the revisional Court dated 23-8-1989 la concerned, it may be noticed that the aforesaid order had been passed) rejecting the application of the tenant for bringing on record the additional evidence. The petitioner has not prayed for the quashing of the said order in this writ petition. The revisional court has given cogent reasons for refusing to admit the additional evidence at the revisional stage and has disbelieved the case of the defendant tenant that Inspite of the exercise of due deligence, he was not able to produce the documentary evidence sought to be brought on record before the trial court during the pendency of the suit there. In the circumstances. I do not find any justification for interference, in the order passed by the revisional Court, refusing to admit the additional evidence. For the reasons indicated. hereinbefore, I do not find any justifiable ground, which may warrant an interference in the Impugned orders in the exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is clearly devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. 13. The parties are however, directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.