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1992 DIGILAW 132 (DEL)

KULDIP SINGH DHINGRA v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI

1992-02-25

JASPAL SINGH

body1992
Jaspal Singh ( 1 ) I do not propose to take long. I should not, for,the situation is still in a state of flux and it would be would be too hazardousto venture into the specifics. What is required at present is to take a prima fadeview and this is precisely what I propose to do. However, first a brief resumeof the facts. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff has been granted an Industrial Power (LT) connectionfor small power consumers which is being used for the purpose of manufacturing of paints being carried on by the, company M/s. U. K. Paints (1) India. ( 3 ) ONLY on 8/01/1992 the plaintiff a writ petition had obtained an orderstaying disconnection of supply of electricity due to non-payment of the billstreating the said connection as Large Industrial Power connection. On January 10, a large contingent the employees of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (hereinafter called the Undertaking) swooped on the premises and made certaininspections. Alarmed by the action the plaintiff addressed a latter datedjanuary 11, 1992 to the Undertaking requesting a joint inspection. There wasno response. However, on or about January 17, the plaintiff received whatpurported to be the record of inspection carried out on January 10 alleging inshort, theft of electricity and tampering of service line. On January 23, theplaintiff made a representation to the Undertaking refuting the allegations andalleging malafides and praying again for a joint inspection. The Undertakinghowever, lodged a First Information Report with the Police and served a 24hours show-cause notice cum-disconnection notice. This was on February I,1922. On February 3 came this s suit before the Court, The prayer of theplaintiff was for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Undertakingfrom disconnecting the supply of electricity. It was accompanied by an application under Order 39 for the grant of ad interim injunction order. Noticeswere issued for 4/02/1992 when I was informed that supply of electricityhad been disconnected. This was followed by two applications, one for theamendment of the plaint and the other under Order 39 Rule I seeking restoration of the supply of electricity. It is the later application which is thebone of contention and which has led to this order. ( 4 ) HAS the plaintiff made out a case for restoration of electric supply ?it was contended by Mrs. It is the later application which is thebone of contention and which has led to this order. ( 4 ) HAS the plaintiff made out a case for restoration of electric supply ?it was contended by Mrs. Ahlawat appearing for the defendants that it beinga fool-proof case of theft of electricity, the relief sought by the plaintiff deserved outright rejection. Mr. V. P. Singh Counsel for the plaintiff, however, tookme. through Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the documents onthe record and contended that no case had been made out showing the commission of theft and in support sought to draw force from the judgment of thesupreme Court in Jaggannath Singh v. Ramaswamy AIR 1966 SC 849 . How ever, on my part, I refuse to be drawn into the controversy, at least for thepresent. A First Information Report stands lodged. Investigation is to takeits own course. Criminal trial may or may not commence. As for me I am ill-equipped, at least at present to return a finding of guilt or even to assumethe accusation as correct. Would it not require a full-fledged trial ? And, itis in this context that Jagannath Singh s case becomes clearly distinguishable,for, in that case the consumer had already been convicted under the Indianpenal Code. We, on the other hand, are still at a stage where allegations arebeing buried by one side and denied by the other. This being the position, Ido feel that the relief sought cannot be denied merely on the ground that theundertaking is crying wolf, and, in support, I seek to draw force from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s. Ajantairon and Steel Company (Pvt.) Ltd. AIR 1990 SC 882 . ( 5 ) COMING to the show-cause notice, it was argued that since represen the tations had been made to Undertaking giving plaintiff s version and denying the correctness of the Inspection Report, the authorities concerned ought tohave, before issuing the show-cause notice, considered the same and as this wasnot done principles of natural justice stood violated. It was further contendedthat there was total lack of application of mind in the matter. of issuance of theshow-cause notice and an attempt to demonstrate the same was made bytaking me through it. It was further contendedthat there was total lack of application of mind in the matter. of issuance of theshow-cause notice and an attempt to demonstrate the same was made bytaking me through it. ( 6 ) THERE is nothing on the record to suggest even obliquely, that beforeissuing the show cause notice the representations made by the plaintiff wereblessed with even a cursory look. I was told that the issuance of the showcause notice was preceded by the approval of the "competent authority" to disconned supply after giving 24 hrs. notice to the consumer". Was the "competent authority" apprised of the representations ? The pleadings say nothing. The Counsel for the defendants also preferred to parry the query. I, therefore,assume that he too gave the green signal to go ahead without caring to lookinto the representations. As for the show-cause notice it is a cyclostyled demon. Even all the blanks are not filled in. Allegations 1 to 8 enumerated thereindo not apply, and yet no body took the trouble to score them off. And asif this was not enough, it asks the consumer to show-cause why supply ofelectricity be no! disconnected in terms of "clause 39/44 of Delhi Electricitycontrol Order". I could not locate any such "clause 39/44". The Counselfor the plaintiff also could not. Even the Counsel for the defendants failed tofind it. No body can, because it simply does not exist. ( 7 ) WHAT does one get out of all this ? It is, first, that before issuingthe show-cause notice, the authorities concerned did not examine the representations made by the plaintiff and, secondly, there was some lack of applicationof mind at the time of the preparation of the show-cause notice. If that be sothe crucial question would be with regard to the effect of all this on the legalityof the action taken. ( 8 ) WERE the authorities bound to take the representations into consideration before the issuance of the show-cause notice ? Since this questionis concerned with the width and interpretation of Clause 36 of the Delhielectric Supply Undertaking, Conditions of Supply, it may be usefullyextracted: "36. Discontinuance of supply. ( 8 ) WERE the authorities bound to take the representations into consideration before the issuance of the show-cause notice ? Since this questionis concerned with the width and interpretation of Clause 36 of the Delhielectric Supply Undertaking, Conditions of Supply, it may be usefullyextracted: "36. Discontinuance of supply. (1) The Undertaking shall have the right to discontinue supply toa consumer on giving 24 hours notice in writing if there is reason to believethat the consumer is contravening any of the provisions of the Act or of thefollowing conditions: (i) If any consumer adopts any electrical appliance which is likelyto affect injuriously the supply to other consumers or uses theenergy supplied or deals with it in any manner so as unduly orimproperly to interfere with the efficient supply of energy to anyother person by the Undertaking. (ii) Fails to keep in proper order any meter belonging to him bywhich the supply is registered. (iii) If the electric supply lines, fittings, works or any other apparatuswithin the premises of the consumer are not in good order andconditions are likely to affect injuriously the use of energy bythe Undertaking or by any other person. (iv) Commits a breach of his agreement with the Undertaking. (v) If the consumer is a limited company, it is liquidated compulsorily or voluntarily. (vi) If having been duly notified the consumer refuses to permit orfails to give any authorised representative of the Undertakingreasonable facilities to enter any promises to which energy is,or has been supplied for the purpose of testing or inspectingthe installation of the consumer. The Undertaking shall also have the right to discontinue the supplyof energy to a consumer who fails to pay any amount due to the Undertakingor who becomes bankrupt or executes any assignment for the benefit of biscreditors after giving such consumer not less than seven clear days notice ofintention so to do. The Undertaking shall, however, on the cessation of the Act on thepart of the consumer which entitled it to disconnect the supply to the consumerand on payment by the consumer of the expenses incurred by the Undertakingin cutting off and reconnecting the supply, reconnect the supply with all reasonable speed. ( 9 ) CLAUSE 36, we have seen, empowers the Undertaking to discontinuesupply to a consumer "on giving 24 hrs. ( 9 ) CLAUSE 36, we have seen, empowers the Undertaking to discontinuesupply to a consumer "on giving 24 hrs. notice in writing" and if there is reasonto believe" that the consumer is contravening any of the provisions of the Actor the conditions as enumerated in Clause 36. Significantly, Clause 36 prescribesno procedure to be followed before the issuance of the show-cause notice. Isthe issuance of ashow-cause notice to be preceded by the affording of a reasonable opportunity to the party concerned ? The perusal of the Conditions ofsupply or the Act would show that Undertaking is not bound to follow any suchrigid, hide-bound, pre-determined procedure. It may evolve its own procedureand such a procedure may vary in each case keeping in view the facts circumstances and exigencies of each case. ( 10 ) IT was argued that since the representations were before the authorities they were bound, at least by principles of natural justice and fair play, toconsider them before deciding to issue the show-cause notice and that since thiswas not done, the notice must be ignored. The argument, with all respect, hasleft me totally unconvinced. There is no rule of justice or fair play, at leastnot to my knowledge, which requires the authority, at least in a case like thepresent one, to seek the comments of the person concerned before even embarking upon to issue a show-cause notice or to necessarily concern itself with thecomments offered suo-motu. As already noticed, the statute too does notprovide for such a course. Show-cause notice is issued by the Undertakingso that the aggrieved party is given an opportunity to make an appropriaterepresentation. It would, in my opinion, be inconsistent with the scheme ofclause 36 to hold that before issuing a show-cause notice the Undertakingmust hold a hearing, which may include, as in the present case the consideration of the representations made. If this were done, the issuanceof a show-cause notice would be an unnecessary repetition. Moreover, themain object of Clause 36 is not only to follow the rule, which is one of elementary justice, that a man shall not be subjected to final judgment or punishmentwithout an opportunity of being heard, but also take prompt action. Thisprovides yet another ground to hold that the authorities concerned are notenjoined to consider the representations made by the person aggrieved beforethe issuance of the show-cause notice. Thisprovides yet another ground to hold that the authorities concerned are notenjoined to consider the representations made by the person aggrieved beforethe issuance of the show-cause notice. Moreover, here is a case where pendingthe issuance of the show-cause notice no order of any interim nature had beenpassed. Thus it was not a stage where plaintiff had been exposed to any riskor hazard. There was thus no requirement to observe any modicum of residual,core natural justice. This much for the first limb of the argument. ( 11 ) UNDOUBTEDLY the show-cause notice does betray some lack of mind. But then the defendants case is that the portion written in hand succinctlybrings to the notice of the plaintiff the allegations against him with regard towhich he had been called upon to show cause. I do tend to agree with thedefendants on this aspect of the matter. Even Mr. V. P. Singh could not matchthe contention and since the hand written portion does contain all the necessaryallegations in clear and unambiguous terms, it cannot be said that there wastotal lack of application of mind. It is because of this that while dealing withthe contention of the Mr. Singh, I have preferred to use in this as well as inone of the preceding paragraphs the expression "some lack of mind" asopposed to "total" lack of mind and I do feel, that it would not be wise butotherwise to throw out the notice merely because some inaccuracies have creptit and some allegations foreign to the case have been introduced more so,when the allegations central to the case have been incoporated unmistakenlyand unambiguously. This much for the remaining limb of the argument. ( 12 ) AFTER the hearing I called for the departmental file which Mrs. Ahlawat so graciously allowed me to examine. It was revealing. Since whatfollowed after the expiry of the show-cause notice period has provided me withthe brick and mortar, let me mention that what the perusal of the file hasshown me is that after the service of the show-cause notice and before thedisconnection of the supply of electricity no effort was made to go through therepresentations or to examine them and further that since approval for disconnection had already been obtained prior to the issuance of the show-causenotice, no fresh look was given. Order to disconnect was passed mechanicallyand without further application of mind. Order to disconnect was passed mechanicallyand without further application of mind. ( 13 ) UNDOUBTEDLY the plaintiff did not respond to the show-causenotice. No reply was filed. No representation was made. No hearing wasclaimed. Was the Undertaking under, the circumstances, not justified in disconnecting the supply of electricity ? More so, when Clause 36 emphasises thenecessity of taking speedy action ? My answer, to the expected disappointmentof the Undertaking must be in the negative. The simple reason is that althoughthe authorities had the representations of the plaintiff, though made beforethe issuance of the show-cause notice, fully controverting the allegations andgiving his side of the story, no effort was made to look into them or to examinethem. The Undertaking ignored them before issuing the show-cause noticeon the ground that there was no such requirement, ft ignored them againafter notice presumably on the ground that they had not been made in responseto the notice thereby reducing fairness into something worst than a rigid,ritualistic abstraction where the victim has b. en lock-jawed. It must not bforegotten that fair hearing, however minimal, is the requirement of administrative gentlemanliness. What has happened here is that natural justice which V. R. Krishna lyer J. described as "a brooding ominpresence" (See : Mohinder Singh Gill 5 case AIR 1978 SC 851 ) has been hurried fathoms deep. It wasobserved by Lordparker that good administration and an honest or bonafidedecision require not only impartiality or merely bringing one s mind to bear onthe problem, but acting fairly (In re. H. K. [an Infact) 1965 A. C. 201]. Unfortunately, by ignoring the representations made by the plaintiff, the studyof which could have helped the defendants in taking a fair and balanced viewthey have acted unfairly or unjustly. What could have promoted was thusfrozen. ( 14 ) WHAT should then be done ?byles Jtells usin Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works: (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180: "i remember to have heard it observed by a very learned manthat even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before hewas called upon to make his defence. "adam (says God) "whereart thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commandedthee that thou shouldest not eat;" And the same question was put toeve also. "let the defendants follow the laws of God, for, they are the laws ofman also. "adam (says God) "whereart thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commandedthee that thou shouldest not eat;" And the same question was put toeve also. "let the defendants follow the laws of God, for, they are the laws ofman also. Opportunity shall be given to the plaintiff to make his defence, ifhe has any, and in so making it he shall also be, in view of the peculiar factsof the case, afforded one hearing. In the meanwhile the defendants mayremove the metering equipment etc. which may be required for investigationbut shall see to it that supply of electricity is restored to the plaintiff withintwo days from today. Of course, nothing stops the defendants, not this orderar least, from taking appropriate action after hearing the plaintiff in hisdefence.