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1992 DIGILAW 134 (KER)

Abdul Hameed v. Asst. Excise Commissioner

1992-04-02

JAGANNADHA RAO, KRISHNAMOORTHY

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Judgment :- Jagannadha Rao, CJ. This Writ Appeal is against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in O.P.9179 of 1991 dt.22-10-1991. The first writ petitioner is the appellant. The second writ petitioner has not joined with the appellant in filing this appeal. 2. The facts of the case are as follows: In the writ petition which was filed on 9th September, 1991 the appellant questioned the bar licence issued in favour of the fourth respondent in Form FL 3 on 4-9-1991. Before the learned Single Judge the appellant raised the question that the bar is located within the prohibited area that is within 200 metres of the mosque. The learned Single Judge by order dated 18-9-1991 passed in CMP 16025 of 1991 directed the Assistant Excise Commissioner to cause the distance between the shop of the fourth respondent and the mosque measured. Thereafter the Assistant Commissioner himself went and measured the distance between the hotel and the mosque. The Assistant Commissioner pointed out in his report dt. 3-10-1991 that according to Note 2 under sub-rule (3) of R.13 of the Foreign Liquor Rules, in calculating the distance the basis will be shortest pathway/lane/street/road generally used by the public. When the distance from the gate of the Kaithakkad Muslim Jumaath Mosque to the gate of the Kottayil Tourist Home was measured through the shortest road generally used by the public (Kizhakkambalam-Muvattupuzha road) the distance was 210 metres. When the measurement was taken diagonally in a straight line through the same road the distance was 205 metres. The Mosque is on the southern side of the road and the Kottayil Tourist Home is on the northern side. The Mosque as such is located at a distance of 47.5 metres inside from the gate of its compound. The Courtyard in front of the Kottayil Tourist Home is having a width of 8 metres. This in short is the report submitted by the Assistant Excise Commissioner. 3. The report was filed by the Assistant Excise Commissioner after measuring the distance. The appellant did not challenge the correctness of the said report. The Courtyard in front of the Kottayil Tourist Home is having a width of 8 metres. This in short is the report submitted by the Assistant Excise Commissioner. 3. The report was filed by the Assistant Excise Commissioner after measuring the distance. The appellant did not challenge the correctness of the said report. This is what the learned Single Judge has observed: "The correctness of the report was not challenged and the learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the writ petition itself may be disposed of on the basis of the report." The learned judge disposed of the writ petition stating that in view of the report the hotel where the bar is located is beyond 200 metres from the mosque and the writ petition therefore was dismissed. It is against this judgment the present writ appeal has been preferred. 4. Before us the learned counsel for the appellant has raised two points. The first contention is that even going by the report of the Assistant Excise Commissioner the shortest distance between the mosque and the bar will be 205 metres. According to the learned counsel the excess over 200 metres is negligible and has to be ignored in view of the decision of this court in Sambamoorthy v. Excise Inspector (1985 KLT 1150). The second point urged before us that when the Rule prohibits the bar to be located within 200 metres of the 'church', the said prohibition will be attracted even to a case where the bar is within 200 metres from 'chapel'. These are the only two points urged in this appeal. 5. Coming to the first point, we are unable to hold that when the distance between the bar and the mosque is more than 200 meters, still the bar can be said to be within the prohibited distance. When the Rules prescribe the mode of measurement, as is clear from the report of the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, it will be difficult for us, to accept the contention that even though the distance rule is attracted we should ignore the report which says that the distance is 205 metres. In our view, it is not permissible to omit from consideration the fact that the distance is more than 200 metres. In our view, it is not permissible to omit from consideration the fact that the distance is more than 200 metres. In the decision in Sambamoorthy v. Excise Inspector, 1985 KLT 1150, we find that the learned single judge was mainly considering clause 22 of the Conditions of the Licence which did not specifically refer to any particular distance. If the learned judge intended to lay down any absolute proposition that when the distance is found to be more than 200 metres, the prohibition has to be treated as still not attracted, if the excess is not much, we are not inclined to accept the said view. We therefore hold that as per the report of the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, the distance between the mosque and the bar is 205 metres which is beyond the prohibited distance of 200 metres. We therefore hold that the challenge against the grant of the licence on this ground fails. 6. The next point relates to the distance from the 'chapel'. We shall assume for the purpose of this argument that the 'chapel' is within 200 metres from the bar. The contention is that a 'chapel' is a church. The relevant rule which was relied upon by the appellant relates to the distance between the 'church' and the bar and the prohibited distance. The learned counsel' for the appellant says that a chapel is also a church and in as much as the chapel in the instant case is within 200 metres from the bar, the prohibition is attracted. 7. Under the Abkari Shops (Disposal in auction) Rules (which rules are relied upon by the appellant), a 'church' is defined under R.2(ea). The definition says that a 'church' means "a public place where prayer is offered by Christians provided that any structure on the road side, pavement or in a compound of a private building with or without diety shall not be considered as a church". The learned counsel wanted to contend that a, chapel will also come within the definition of 'church'. 8. In our view, there can be no dispute that a'chapel' is a place where prayer is offered by the Christians. The learned counsel wanted to contend that a, chapel will also come within the definition of 'church'. 8. In our view, there can be no dispute that a'chapel' is a place where prayer is offered by the Christians. But that by itself is not sufficient to bring the place of worship within the definition of 'church' in the Rules inasmuch as the proviso excludes from the definition any structure on the road side, pavement or in a compound of a private building with or without diety. In the present case before us it is not in dispute that the 'chapel' is just by the side of the road which is a very small structure. During the course of arguments it was almost accepted that people who go by the side of the road stop there for a little while, pray and then move on. It is not as if there is sufficient space in a 'chapel' for the people to go inside and worship as in a church. In Concise Oxford Dictionary a 'church' is described as a building for public Christian worship, especially according to established religion of country. A 'chapel' on the other hand is described as a place of Christian worship other than parish church or cathedral. 9. In the common parlance a 'chapel' is not equated with the 'church'. The legislative policy appears to be to prohibit the distance of a bar or a shop from a 'church' in the stricter sense. The prohibition is not to be attracted in a case where there are small structures on the road side, pavement or in a compound of a private building with or without diety. Such small structures are not to be equated with a 'church'. On a consideration of the meaning of the above words in the common parlance, we are of the view that the 'chapel', though it is a place of worship is not equated with a 'church' in R.2(ea) of the Abkari Shops (Disposal in auction) Rules. 10. For the purpose of this case it is not disputed by both sides that we could proceed on the basis that the Abkari Shops (Disposal in auction) Rules apply. No contention has been raised as regards to the prohibited distance between the bar and the parallel college (private college) or with regard to the distance between the bar and the private hospital. No contention has been raised as regards to the prohibited distance between the bar and the parallel college (private college) or with regard to the distance between the bar and the private hospital. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.