Judgment 1. A former Chief Justice of India, Justice chandrachud, states in his Foreward to Justice K. K. Mathew's 'democracy, equality and Freedom' (Edited by Dr. Upendra Baxi) that "in our present dispensation, a Judge cannot, except for honourable exceptions, lay plausible claim to legal scholarship". If a Judge of a Court of Law, having had to decide questions of law day in and day out, cannot still lay plausible claim to legal scholarship, he should not a fortiori have any claim to know non-law matters like Medical Science or such other subjects of speciality. At any rate, my learned brother Guin, J., and I have no claim to legal or any other scholarship and would never dream of laying any claim to any knowledge in Medical sciences and that too of Post-graduate level Why I make this observation would appear hereinafter. 2. THE writ-Petitioner, who is now Respondent before us, has challenged the correctness of the test-examination for admission to the N. D. Course in obstretics and Gynecology. The pattern of examination is what is called 'multiple-Choice-Objective-Type Test There was one paper containing 95 questions; four alternative answers were set out against each question and the candidate was to choose one by putting a tick -mark to the most appropriate answer. One mark was to be allotted for the correct choice, half-mark was to be deducted for an incorrect choice. The Paper-setter supplied to the University the correct answer to each question, called the 'key-answer'. The Writ Petitioner contended that she was wrongly declared to have failed on the basis of such 'key-Answers' as many of those answers were wrong while her answers were correct. The Appellant University, as directed by the learned trial Judge, referred the questions and the answers to two experts in succession and their reports were duly received. It is not disputed, and has rather been rarely conceded by the learned Counsel for the Respondent, that even on. the basis of those two reports and after giving full effect thereto, the Petitioner could not obtain the minimum marks necessary for admission. 3. It is not disputed, and has rather been rarely conceded by the learned Counsel for the Respondent, that even on. the basis of those two reports and after giving full effect thereto, the Petitioner could not obtain the minimum marks necessary for admission. 3. THE Petitioner however, at the close of the arguments, submitted a Supplementary Affidavit with detailed Note purporting to contain extracts from various treatises on the subject and contended therein that though not so held by any of the two Experts, some more questions ?were ambiguous or otherwise defective and some more Key-answers were wrong and her answers were correct. The learned Judge chose to admit and also to accept the Note contained in the Petitioner's Supplementary Affidavit, even though no opportunity was given to the University to counter the same, as we are told, relevant treatises were also not produced by the Petitioner for the perusal of the learned judge. And on that basis, the learned Judge decided in favour of the Petitioner in restrict of about 11 questions more and after awarding marks on such basis, declared the Petitioner to have obtained marks requisite for admission and allowed the writ-Petition. 4. AS I have held in recent Division Bench Case in University of Calcutta vs. Anindya Kumar Das and Ors decided on 13th March, 1992, these questions cannot be appropriately determined in a Writ-proceeding unless we throw as under all the limitations imposed in Writ Jurisdiction by well-settled principles and binding precedents. Ajoy Nath Ray, J., who has come out with a much more comprehensive and well-considered Judgment in that case, has very ably and amply demonstrated the impossibility as well as. impermissibility of such a task in a Writ proceeding. And even though I am grateful to the learned Senior counsel, Sri Kashi Kanta Maitra, for his very persuasive and learned argument for and on behalf of the Respondent, I have not been able to take a different view. The Judgment of the learned trial Judge would itself demonstrate how complicated and seriously disputed the questions and their answers are. The petitioner herself has admitted in her Writ Petition that Experts and Text books very often differ in their opinions on these questions. Vehad Vibhinna. Smritavo Vibhinna, Nasou Munitiasya Natong Na Bhinnam'. The Judgment of the learned trial Judge would itself demonstrate how complicated and seriously disputed the questions and their answers are. The petitioner herself has admitted in her Writ Petition that Experts and Text books very often differ in their opinions on these questions. Vehad Vibhinna. Smritavo Vibhinna, Nasou Munitiasya Natong Na Bhinnam'. A proceeding under Article 226 is not to be resorted to as a substitute for ordinary suits when investigation into disputed and complicated questions is necessary. It is not to be availed of when a remedy by way of suit is available and is adequately, if not more, efficacious. The decision of the five-Judge Bench of the Supreme court in Thanstngh Nathmai ( AIR 1964 SC 1419 } is a clear authority for this view where it was observed inter alia (at page 1423) as hereunder :- The very amplitude: of the jurisdiction demands that it will be. ordinarily exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed " 5. TO the same effect is the earlier five-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. T. R. Verma { air 1957 SC 882 ) where it was also observed (at 884) that where there "is a serious dispute, which cannot be satisfactorily decided without taking evidence, it is not the practice of Courts to decide questions of that character in a Write petition and it would have been a proper exercise of discretion. . . if the learned Judges had referred to respondent to a suit. " 6. I entertain no doubt that in view of the enunciation of law by the five-Judge Bench in T. R. Verma (supra) and in Thanstngh Nathmal (supra), these matters ought not to have been entertained in Writ Jurisdiction. . . if the learned Judges had referred to respondent to a suit. " 6. I entertain no doubt that in view of the enunciation of law by the five-Judge Bench in T. R. Verma (supra) and in Thanstngh Nathmal (supra), these matters ought not to have been entertained in Writ Jurisdiction. But the decision of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Kanpur University vs. Samir Gupta ( AIR 1983 SC 1230 1 has been used as a spring-board for many later decisions of our High Court where the correctness (and not merely the legality) of an academic examination being challenged even in a Writ proceeding, the Court has gone into spirited action of a super-examiner and has determined, on the basis of specialized treatises on the subject and the opinions, very often conflicting, of the experts, as to whether the examiner knew the subject, or at least the correct answer and correctly examined the answer script (s. This is not and cannot be the function of a Writ Court, at least. I have examined the decision of the Supreme Court in Kanpur University (supra, AIR 1983 SC 1230 ) with anxious advertence and care, but have not been able to discover any declaration of law to the effect that academic correctness of the examination of an answer sculpt in specialized subjects, made by academic experts of a University, is always justiciable in a Writ Court and whenever such a challenge is thrown, the Writ Court must delve into the mass of expert opinions and relevant treatises on the subject and pronounce upon the academic soundness of the key-answers put forward by the experts of the university. It must be noted, as noted by D. K. Sen, J., in Somenath Bando-padhyaya vs. University of Calcutta (90 CWN 743 at 771. that Kanpur university (supra) related to examination ail almost elementary level of pre Medical standard, and not to an examination of higher specialized level for admission to post-graduate Medical Course, as is the case before us. Three and only three questions were in issue in Kanpur University (supra), of which in respect of one, the Hindi translation of the question was demonstrably wrong and in respect of another, even the University's own expert opined the key-answer to be wrong. Three and only three questions were in issue in Kanpur University (supra), of which in respect of one, the Hindi translation of the question was demonstrably wrong and in respect of another, even the University's own expert opined the key-answer to be wrong. In respect of the remaining one also, the opinion of the university's own expert being absolutely confusing, and the question being an elementary one not requiring any specialized knowledge, the Court referred to recognized text books on the subject and held the answer to be wrong. The Supreme Court no doubt did so, but declared its anxious awareness of the dangers inherent in such a course and directed that "no fresh petitions should be entertained hereafter on the questions involved in these appeals arising out of the test which was held". The decision of a two-Judge Bench of the supreme Court in Abhijit Sen ( AIR 1984 SC 1402 ) was rendered in four appeals connected with the appeals in Kanpur University (supra) and arising from the same judgment of the Allahabad High Court and, therefore, the same course was adopted and the same action taken as in Kanpur University (supra. 7. THE decisions in Kanpur University (supra), a three-Judge Bench decision and in Abhijit Sen (supra), a two-Judge Bench decision, are not easily reconcilable with the dicta in the five-Judge Bench decisions In Thansingh nathmal (supra) and in T. R. Verma (supra. When there are two different fiats from the same authority, we have got to reconcile them by assuming that they apply to different situations. 'srutirdwaidhe Smritirdwaidhe Sthalabheda prakalpate'. We must with a Vedic frame of mind realize that Truth is one -'ekam Sat', and apply the Nimangsha rule of interpretation that the apparent conflict is the result of applying the same principle to different sets of facts -'prayoge Hi Virodha Syat'. The only way to reconcile Kanpur university and abhijit Sen with the dicta in Thansingh Nathmal and T. R. Verma is to hold that where the error is apparently manifest and would stare at the face without any elaborate argument as in Kanpur University (supra), a Writ Court may choose to intervene. But where the errors cannot show their heads without a detailed and elaborate probe into opinions of experts and specialized treatise, the Court must stay its hands leaving the parties to seek remedy in ordinary trial. But where the errors cannot show their heads without a detailed and elaborate probe into opinions of experts and specialized treatise, the Court must stay its hands leaving the parties to seek remedy in ordinary trial. It would be extremely unfair to brand the question or Key-answer prepared by an academic body like the University as wrong by any Judge, not expected to be as expert in the subject, by his own searches or researches in a specialized field unaided by experts. 8. THE Division Bench decisions of our Court in Somenath Bandopadhyaya (supra) and in. Amalendu Santxa (AIR 1986 Calcutta 153) cannot bind us in view of the dicta of the Supreme Court in Thansingh Nathmal (supra) and in t. R. Vermafsupra. The Division Bench decisions have treated the Supreme Court decision in Kanpur University (supra) and in Abhijit Sen (supra) as blanket authority for the proposition that the correctness of the Key-answers are always justiciable even in Writ Jurisdiction. They are no such authority. We are not to treat the course adopted by the Supreme Court in a given case as a binding precedent. What can bind us is only the declaration of law. And the declaration that can be said to have been made in those Supreme Court decisions is that if the answer" be clearly demonstrated to be wrong, that is to say. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . such as no reasonable body of men well-versed in the particular subject would regard as correct", the Court may intervene. I have my doubts as to when a highly specialized academic body like the university prepares the 'key-answers and argues in support of its correctness, whether it can still be said that "no reasonable body of men. . . . . . . . . . . . would regard them as correct". Unless in a given case the error irresistibly manifests without any detailed and sustained academic exercise, matters purely academic should ordinarily be left to the academic bodies and be a no-entry area for Law-Courts. What is binding on us in Kanpur University (supra) and Abhijit Sen (supra) is the enunciation of law that only when the Key-answer is such that "no reasonable body of men well-versed in the particular subject would regard as correct", the Court may intervene to give relief. What is binding on us in Kanpur University (supra) and Abhijit Sen (supra) is the enunciation of law that only when the Key-answer is such that "no reasonable body of men well-versed in the particular subject would regard as correct", the Court may intervene to give relief. And not what the Supreme Court actually did in disposing of the cases. And I am afraid, and this I say with obvious respect, that neither in Somenath Bandopadhyaya (supra) nor in amalendu Santrd (supra), the Division Bench has followed the declaration of law by the Supreme Court in Kanpur University and Abhijit Sen. The ratio was not followed, but what was sought to be followed was the course of action actually adopted de hors the declaration of law. According to the precise declaration of law by the Supreme Court, the Division Bench could not do what it did in those two decisions. It is obvious that we must govern ourselves by the declaration of law by the Supreme Court and not by the actual course of action adopted by the Division Bench, or even the Supreme Court, unsupported by such declaration of law. 9. ANY step taken or course adopted by a higher Court in disposing of a lie, if unaccompanied or unsupported by a declaration or enunciation of law, does not bind any one except the parties to the lis. Any inference, however logical, from the course or step so taken by the higher Court is not necessarily a declaration of law to operate as a precedent. That is what Lord Halsbury stated at the beginning of this century in Quim vs. Leatherm (1901 AC 495 at 506), cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Sudhangshu Sekhar Misra (AIR 1968 SC at 651-652. In India at least, there is no scope for any doubt in the matter in view of the clear terms of Section 212 of the Constitution Act of 1935 and Article 141 of the present Constitution. What binds the parties is the decision, but what can operate as a precedent is only the ratio, if any. If no declaration of law is made, or even if made, not followed or applied, a decision, however eminent the Court or tribunal delivering it may be, fails to rank and govern as precedent. 10. "I have the highest regard far the learned trial Judge, knowing him as I do. If no declaration of law is made, or even if made, not followed or applied, a decision, however eminent the Court or tribunal delivering it may be, fails to rank and govern as precedent. 10. "I have the highest regard far the learned trial Judge, knowing him as I do. But, with the greatest respect, it is not at all possible for me to endorse the course of action adopted by him in holding the relevant questions or the Key-answers to be defective or wrong an the basis of the extracts referred to in the supplementary Affidavit of the Wait Petitioner, purported to have been made out of text-books on the subject. We are told that the Text-Books themselves were not produced before him. Even If the Books were produced before him, those could not ordinarily be relied upon, unless put to experts, whose opinions were before him, as held by the Supreme Court in Piara Singh vs. State ( AIR 1977 SC 2274 at 2277. As ruled by the Supreme Court in State of maharashtra vs. Manglya (AIR. 1972 SC 1797 at 1801), a Judge Is not justified In drawing upon his own knowledge, whether derived from books or otherwise. And as already pointed out, even assuming that the learned Judge found a contrary view in the relevant text-books perused by him, could the questions or the Key-answers be still held to be demonstrably wrong so much so that no reasonable person well-versed in the subject could regard the same to be correct, when an accredited academic body like the University held them to be correct and has argued In their support? The learned trial Judge has also awarded marks to the Petitioner even on questions, about 12 in number, even though those were not attempted by her. There, the learned Judge, If I may say with respect, was clearly wrong even according to the decision In Somenath Bandopadhyaya (supra), at 760), and Mr. Maitra, with his usual fairness, has also conceded that. 11. I would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Judgment under appeal and dismiss the Writ Petition. In the circumstances, I would make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.