JUDGMENT A.K. Banerji, J. - By means of this writ petition, the Petitioner who is a tenant of the disputed shop, has challenged the order passed by the Respondent No. 2 releasing the said shop in favour of the Respondent-landlord. He has also challenged the order of the Respondent No. 1, dismissing the Petitioner's appeal. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the present case are that the Respondent No. 3 Kedar Nath filed an application u/s 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of the disputed shop on the ground of his personal need. It was stated in the application by the Respondent No. 3 that the applicant as well as his brothers were living as a joint family after the death of their father Gulab Chand. However in the year 1981, there was a partition between him and his brothers and their business has also been partitioned on account of which the applicant has been allotted the house in which the disputed shop is situate. He will have to vacate the shop in which he is doing his handloom business as the same has fallen in the share of his brothers. In the disputed shop the opposite parties are tenants for a quite long time but the opposite party No. 1 is employed in Kanpur and lives there with his family and does not require the shop at all. The opposite party No. 2 (Petitioner) is not doing the business himself but getting it done through his servant and besides the opposite parties have another shop in front of the disputed shop of which too they are the tenants. It was pleaded that the opposite parties have no need of the present disputed shop and besides the nature of the business, is such that can be carried on also from their residence which is nearby. 3. The tenant opposite parties (Petitioner and the opposite party No. 7) filed separate written statements in which it was stated that the opposite parties were tenants of the shop in dispute since the time of their father. After the death of their father, they continued to remain tenants and after some time the opposite party No. 2 (the Petitioner) separated and became the sole tenant of the disputed shop where he is doing separate business Ft was denied that the need of the landlord was either genuine and bonafide. After the death of their father, they continued to remain tenants and after some time the opposite party No. 2 (the Petitioner) separated and became the sole tenant of the disputed shop where he is doing separate business Ft was denied that the need of the landlord was either genuine and bonafide. It was further denied that there was any partition in the family of the landlord or that the disputed shop has come in the share of the opposite party No. 3. It was further pleaded that in the year 1972. there was an agreement between the father of the present landlords namely Gulab Chand and the Petitioner and his brother Keshav Prasad (opposite party No. 7) in pursuance of which the tenants vacated the northern portion of the premises with this condition that they will not be evicted from the present shop In dispute. The Petitioner (opposite party No. 2) also pleaded in the written statement that he has no connection with the other shop of which his brother Keshav Prasad is the tenant and that the nature of the business was such that it could not be carried from the residence of the Petitioner which was quite a distance from the disputed shop The Petitioner further pleaded that the landlord does not need the disputed shop where as if the release application is granted, the Petitioner tenant nant shall suffer irreparably as he has already earned good will in the disputed shop and it will be impossible for him to get another alternative shop. 4. The parties filed their affidavits and their documents before the Respondent No. 2 in respect of their respective cases. The Prescribed Authority allowed the release application of the landlord Respondent No. 3 on the finding that it is established from the record that there has been a partition in the family of the landlords and the need of the Respondent No. 3 with regards to the disputed shop is genuine and bonafide. It was also held that the landlord Respondent will suffer greater hardship in case the disputed shop is not released in his favour as the landlord does not have any other shop to carry on his business whereas the tenants opposite parties own another shop. Besides they could also carry on the business from their residence. It was also held that the landlord Respondent will suffer greater hardship in case the disputed shop is not released in his favour as the landlord does not have any other shop to carry on his business whereas the tenants opposite parties own another shop. Besides they could also carry on the business from their residence. Mainly on these findings, the Respondent No. 2 allowed the release application filed by the landlord opposite party No. 3. 5. The Petitioner and his brother Keshav Prasad filed two separate Misc. Appeals before the District Judge, Azamgarh which were transferred to the Court of the Respondent No 1. Both these appeals were consolidated and decided together by the said Respondent No. 1. Concurring with the findings of the Prescribed Authority the Respondent No. 1 held that the need of the Respondent No. 3 was genuine and bonafide and the partition in the family of the Respondent-landlord was fully established It was found that the Respondent No. 3 did not have any other shop in which he could carry on his business, but so far as the tenants were concerned, they have failed to establish that there has been a partition or separation between them and they were having another shop in which the same business is carried on. Besides the nature of their business was such which could be carried out from the house of the tenants as well. The Respondent No. 1, therefore dismissed the appeals filed by the Petitioner and his brother Keshav Prasad. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has challenged the order of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the question of bonafide and genuine need of the landlord and the comparative hardship of the parties, as illegal and perverse. It has been argued that the partition in the family of the landlord as pleaded by the Respondent No 3 was sham and only set up for the purposes of the present case. The document which has been filed as evidence to show the partition, was an unregistered document and therefore, not admissible. It could not therefore, be looked into or relied upon Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and they have manifestly erred in relying upon the said document. The document which has been filed as evidence to show the partition, was an unregistered document and therefore, not admissible. It could not therefore, be looked into or relied upon Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and they have manifestly erred in relying upon the said document. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the case of Bal Krishna Das Agarwal v. Smt. Radha Devi AIR 1989 133. The learned Counsel has also challenged the findings on the grounds that the Petitioner was carrying on his business in the disputed shop for over 50 years and had earned a good-will and the finding that the business could be carried on from his residential house (which was quite far from the disputed shop and not on the main road) was perverse. He has further argued that the landlord has an alternative accommodation available and the gallery could be converted into a shop whereas the Petitioner tenant has no other shop and it is not possible to carry on the said business from his residence. 7. I have carefully gone through the evidence as well as the findings of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground of genuine and bonafide need and comparative hardship of the parties. I am not satisfied that the said findings are either illegal or perverse. On the contrary, the reasons given for recording the said findings by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the question of partition in the family of the landlord and on genuine need and comparative hardship are fully borne out from the evidence on record Besides in exercise of jurisdiction under Article- 226 of the Constitution, it is well settled, that such findings of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court. So far as the decision in the case of Bal Krishna Das Agarwal (supra) which has been cited by the counsel for the Petitioner, I am of the view that the same does not apply to the facts of the present case. It is well settled that a memorandum depicting that there has been a settlement in the family does not require registration. See Roshan Singh and Others Vs. Zile Singh and Others, AIR 1988 SC 881 . It is well settled that a memorandum depicting that there has been a settlement in the family does not require registration. See Roshan Singh and Others Vs. Zile Singh and Others, AIR 1988 SC 881 . In the present case the document filed by the landlord was held to be a memorandum of family settlement by the Respondent No. 2, and consequently no registration was required and the said document was admissible in evidence .It was, therefore, rightly relied upon by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The findings with regard to the same, given by the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. therefore, cannot be said to be either illegal or incorrect The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have correctly held that the need of the landlord for the disputed shop was genuine and bonafide and the finding with regard to the comparative hardship of the parties is substantially correct and does not call for any interference by this Court. 8. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the Respondent No. 2 has illegally ignored the agreement dated 31-7-1972 entered into between Gulab Chand Agarwal the father of the landlord and the Petitioner and his brother Kesav Prasad. A copy of this agreement has been filed as Annexure No. 2 the writ petition and stated to be a true copy. The contents of this Annexure shows that Gulab Chand Agarwal who is the father of the landlord had entered into an agreement with the Petitioner and his brother who were the tenants of the premises in question in which the disputed shop is situate, bad agreed to vacate the northern portion of the said premises and handed over possession of the same to the landlord Gulab Chand Agarwal, on the condition that they shall retain the shop in dispute which was in the southern part and a fresh tenancy will commence from the date of the agreement i.e. to say 31st July, 1972 at the rate of Rs. 7/- per month to be paid regularly by the tenants. It has been stated in the said agreement that the said agreement will be binding on the present landlord and the tenant will not be evicted from the shop in question. 7/- per month to be paid regularly by the tenants. It has been stated in the said agreement that the said agreement will be binding on the present landlord and the tenant will not be evicted from the shop in question. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed strong reliance on this annexure and has argued that this agreement is binding on the sons of Gulab Chand Agarwal and Petitioner cannot be evicted from the shop in question. Consequently, the application for release of shop u/s 21(1)(I)(a) of the Act is not maintainable. 9. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner in support of this argument has referred to paragraph Nos. 3 and 4 of the written statement of the Petitioner. In these paragraphs, a specific plea has been taken by the Petitioner that in view of the agreement dated 31-7-1972 on the basis of which the northern portion of the house was vacated by the Petitioner on the condition that they will not be ejected from the disputed shop, the present application for the release of the shop was not maintainable and that the agreement is binding on the sons of Gulab Chand Agarwal. It was argued by the learned Counsel that the agreement in question was filed before the Prescribed Authority and arguments were advanced on the basis of the same. However, the Prescribed Authority had illegally ignored to refer to the said argument The Petitioner raised this argument before the appellate Court again which was taken notice by the said Court but has been repelled on the ground that when the compromise was arrived at between the parties there were other landlords also of the shop in dispute, i.e. to say the major sons of the landlord Gulab Chand Agarwal who had not signed the agreement, besides, there was no partition amongst the tenants and as such the circumstances had changed when the present application for release was filed against the sole tenant and therefore, the agreement could not stand as a bar to the release application. 10. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has in support of his argument that the landlords are bound by the aforesaid agreement entered into by Sri Gulab Chand Agarwal has placed reliance on the case of Raj Narain Jain v. Firm Sukhanand Ram Narain AIR 1989 All. 78, and in the case Dr. 10. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has in support of his argument that the landlords are bound by the aforesaid agreement entered into by Sri Gulab Chand Agarwal has placed reliance on the case of Raj Narain Jain v. Firm Sukhanand Ram Narain AIR 1989 All. 78, and in the case Dr. Nawal Kishore Dubey v. Sardar Khajan Singh 1984 (1) ARC 461. In the case of Raj Narain Jain (supra) a Division Bench of this Court had, in the facts of the said case, held that Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 11 of 1972 does not prohibit a landlord from entering into a covenant by which the landlord confines his right to obtain eviction of his tenant on a certain specified ground and relinquishes his right to evict him on any other ground including his personal need It was open to the landlord to waive even such right and confine his right to evict his tenant on conditions specified in the agreement. The Division Bench had repelled the submission of the landlord that because of the statutory provisions contained in Section 21(1)(a) of the Act which entitled the landlord to obtain an order of eviction of his tenant on the ground of his personal need, the covenant, which restricted the right of the lessor to evict his tenant stood obliterated. In the case of Dr. Nawal Kishore Dabey (supra) a learned single Judge of this Court relying upon the Division Bench decision in the case of Raj Narain (Supra) held that right u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act can be waived by the landlord and as the landlord had waived his right, his application for release was not maintainable. 11. Heavily relying upon the aforesaid authorities, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted chat the aforesaid agreement dated 31 -- 7-1972 stood as a bar for the landlords to file the application for release of the disputed shop and the reasons given by the Respondent No. 1 for repealing this argument was legally untenable. 12. 11. Heavily relying upon the aforesaid authorities, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted chat the aforesaid agreement dated 31 -- 7-1972 stood as a bar for the landlords to file the application for release of the disputed shop and the reasons given by the Respondent No. 1 for repealing this argument was legally untenable. 12. The learned Counsel for the Respondent, landlord on the other hand has argued that the alleged agreement will not be binding upon the present landlord as firstly because the execution of the said agreement was denied, secondly, assuming that the same was executed their father Gulab Chand Agarwal alone had no right to execute the same as the Respondent landlord and his brother were major in the year 1972 and were not signatory to the said agreement. 13. I have carefully considered the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent. I have also perused the aforesaid two decisions cited by the learned Counsel. I am however, of the view that the aforesaid decisions do not apply to the facts of the present case. It is noteworthy that a typed copy of the agreement dated 31-7-1972 has been filed by the Petitioner as Annexure No. 2 to the writ petition. The Prescribed Authority has not referred to this document at all nothing has been shown by the Petitioner whether this document had been admitted in evidence and whether the same was proved in accordance with law. In the counter affidavit, which has been filed on behalf of the landlord to the writ petition, it has been asserted in paragraph No. 4 thereof that the alleged agreement was never executed between the parties and even if it is taken to be an agreement it is not binding upon the sons of Gulab Chand Agarwal who were major at the time of the alleged agreement. The Respondent No. 1 has taken notice of the said agreement and has referred to the same. However, even assuming that the said agreement was admissible in evidence and had been proved I find force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the same would not be binding on the present landlord as it was executed by Gulab Chand Agarwal alone. However, even assuming that the said agreement was admissible in evidence and had been proved I find force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the same would not be binding on the present landlord as it was executed by Gulab Chand Agarwal alone. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the property in question was a joint family property of Gulab Chand Agarwal and his sons, and the sons had not signed the alleged agreement and as such the same cannot be binding on them. In a similar situation like the present, it was held by this Court in the case of Nairn Uddin v. Smt. Kamla Devi 1985 (2) ARC 216, that the compromise entered into between the erstwhile owner and landlord with the tenant that he will not evict him, is not binding on the new landlord who had nothing to do with the compromise. Briefly stated the facts of Nairn Uddin's case (Supra) was that the Respondent landlords had filed an application for releasing the accommodation on the ground that the same was required bonafide for their own residence. The aforesaid application was contested by the Petitioner on the ground that there was a compromise between the erstwhile owner and landlord of the property in dispute and the Petitioner-tenant under which the landlord was given half portion of the accommodation and the remaining half was allowed to continue in the tenancy of the Petitioner. It was also [stated that there was a specific clause in that compromise that the Petitioner shall not be evicted from the premises in dispute unless the Petitioner fraudulently conspires to appropriate the property. The Petitioner had taken the plea and also urged before the Court that he could not be evicted from the premises in dispute, in view of the compromise which had been entered into between the Petitioner and the deceased landlord, and the landlords are estopped from moving the application u/s 21 of the Act. This argument was repelled by this Court with this observation that by no stretch of imagination would it be taken to mean that the condition which had been mentioned in that clause would be binding on the persons who become landlords of the property in future. This argument was repelled by this Court with this observation that by no stretch of imagination would it be taken to mean that the condition which had been mentioned in that clause would be binding on the persons who become landlords of the property in future. Further it was observed that the argument raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the landlords having derived benefits under the compromise were estopped from moving the application u/s 21 of the Act is also without force, as admittedly at the time of the execution of the compromise the landlord was one Kashi Nath who had since died. His son Harihar Nath cannot be said to be bound by the terms of the compromise which at best could only be said to bound deceased Kashi Nath. There was no question of Harihar Nath (son) taking advantage of the compromise inasmuch as it was the act of his father deceased Kashi Nath, which resulted in a compromise and it is Kashi Nath alone who can be said to have derived any advantage at the time of filing the compromise. As already stated above, the facts of Nairn Uddin's case, so far as the second argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is concerned, is almost similar. In the present case also the alleged agreement was entered into by Gulab Chand Agarwal with the tenants when latter were living jointly and were also doing the business jointly. The sons of Gulab Chand Agarwal were not signatory to the alleged agreement and consequently as held in the case of Nairn Uddin (Supra) they were not bound by the said agreement, even assuming that the same was duly executed and was admissible in evidence. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I do not find any substance in either of the two arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I do not find any substance in either of the two arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. However, admittedly, the father of the Petitioner and thereafter the Petitioner and his brother were doing the same business in the disputed shop, since, a very long time, therefore, in the interest of justice in the facts of the present case, I deem it proper to give six months' time to the Petitioner to vacate the shop in dispute, provided the Petitioner gives an under-taking in writing in the form of an affidavit to the Respondent No. 2 within one month's time from today, to hand over the vacant and actual possession of the shop in dispute to the landlord-Respondent within a period of six months. The Petitioner shall also pay the entire arrears of rent to the landlord within one month and continue to pay the monthly rent each month till such time as he occupies the said shop as per this order. However, if the Petitioner does not give the undertaking as stated above within the time granted by this Court or fails to comply with the conditions stated, above, it will be open to the landlord-Respondent to take possession of the shop in dispute in accordance with law. 15. With these observations, the aforesaid writ petition is dismissed with costs.