JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This petition relates to determination of title dispute under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954. The petitioner won before the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. He has lost only before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad. 2. Before the Consolidation authorities the following pedigree was placed on record about which, there is no dispute between the parties :- 3. In the basic year Khitauni the Khata in dispute was recorded in the names of Nandan, father of the petitioner. Mallu, Ninku and Moti, opposite parties 2, 3, and 4. Against this recorded entry one objection was filed by the petitioner and another by Kashi Nath, son of Raj Deo. In his objection the petitioner's plea was that the Khata in question was acquired by his father Nandan for his exclusive benefit in state of separation from the family and Nandan died leaving him as his only heir and legal representative and since his death he had been in possession as Sirdar. It was asserted that amongst his brothers Nandan was not the eldest and he never acted as Karta of the family. It was pointed out that Mangru was the eldest amongst the five sons of Sheo Ambar. It was asserted that ever since the land of the Khata was acquired the name of Nandan had been coming down in the revenue records and no-one ever made any attempt to get his name recorded. With the connivance of the officials, Mulla, Ninku and Moti got their names recorded in the revenue records and on coming to know of this the petitioner made application for correction of records. In this proceeding for correction of records evidence had been recorded and the Naib Tahsildar was satisfied with the claim preferred by the petitioner but before final order could be passed the village was notified for consolidation operations and the case was abated. It was stated that there was a joint Khata also which was cultivated jointly by the parties but in the Khata in dispute the opposite parties had no share. 4. In his objection, Annexure-2, opposite party no. 2 asserted that the land comprised in the Khata was ancestral and he had one-tenth share therein over which he had been in possession along with the other co-sharers whose names were mentioned in the pedigree given in the objection. 4. In his objection, Annexure-2, opposite party no. 2 asserted that the land comprised in the Khata was ancestral and he had one-tenth share therein over which he had been in possession along with the other co-sharers whose names were mentioned in the pedigree given in the objection. On this basis he pressed that his name be recorded and the Khata be partitioned in accordance with the share reflected in the pedigree. 5. In support of their respective claims the parties filed oral and documentary evidence. The Consolidation Officer in his order dated 28th April, 1981, Annexure-4, accepted the claim of the petitioner and directed that his name alone shall be recorded on the Khata in question and the names of others shall be expunged. He recorded specific finding to the effect that the Khata was not ancestral and the land comprised in the Khata had been acquired by Nandan alone. This order was confirmed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, through his order dated 9th September, 1982 passed in the appeal preferred by Mallu and others. The Deputy Director, Consolidation has through his order dated 1st January, 1937 upset the orders passed by the two authorities below and has directed the names of opposite parties 2 to 6, namely Mallu. Ninku, Moti, Kashi and Purnmasi to be recorded along with the petitioner Ram Lakhan. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner Ram Lakhan, son of Nandan has approached this Court through the instant petition. 6. On the basis of extracts from revenue records the Consolidation Officer held that the name of Nandan had been coming down in the records continuously since 1320 F and it was only in the year 1369-71 F that the names of Mallu, Ninku and Moti, opposite parties 2 to 4, came to be recorded for the First time. The Khitauni extract for 1369-71 F contained reference to order dated 27th January, 1963 alleged to have been passed in CLRD proceeding for recording the names of opposite parties 2 to 4 but no such order in fact existed and, therefore, the entry in favour of opposite parties 2 to 4 was fictitious. The last finding was recorded on the basis that the opposite parties did not file copy of the order dated 27th January, 1963 and the original register maintained under Rule 23 did not contain any "amaldaramad". The last finding was recorded on the basis that the opposite parties did not file copy of the order dated 27th January, 1963 and the original register maintained under Rule 23 did not contain any "amaldaramad". The Consolidation Officer had summoned the original register and kept record of his observation which is as follows :- "Aaj mohafij Khana mal Akbarpur se register kayada 23 talab ho kar aya. Ukt register 1366F. to 1373F. Ka hai. 1969F. va 1370F. main mukadama number 151 tarikh faisla 27-1-63 ke nirnaya ka amaldaramad ankit nahi hai. 1371F. main bhi gram Karim Nagar ki araji ki Bavat koi amaldaramad nahin hai". The conclusion of fictitious nature of the entry was found to be reinforced by the fact that in 1377F. Opposite parties 2 to 4 themselves filed suit against Nandan under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, in which they asserted that the name of Nandan alone was recorded in representative capacity with the consent of all the members of the joint family. Indeed if the names of opposite parties 2 to 4 had been validly recorded in the revenue records in the Fasli year 1369-71 there was no occasion for opposite parties 2 to 4 to file suit in 1377F. asserting that the name of Nandan was existing in revenue records in representative capacity. The suit was filed on 28th December, 1970 which is equivalent to 1377 F. as stated by the Consolidation Officer. 7. The plaint of the aforesaid suit did not exhibit only the fictitious nature of the entry in favour of opposite parties 2 to 4, it also revealed inconsistency in the stand of the contesting opposite parties. In the present proceedings the case of all the opposite parties was that the Khata in question was ancestral while in the aforesaid suit the plea was that the land was acquired by the members of the joint family with their joint funds and the name of Nandan was recorded in representative capacity with the consent of all the members of the joint family, including Sheo Ambar'. the common ancestor. From this plea in the plaint it would appear that the land was acquired during the life time of Sheo Ambar. Amongst his sons, Nandan was not the eldest, admittedly the eldest was Mangru. the common ancestor. From this plea in the plaint it would appear that the land was acquired during the life time of Sheo Ambar. Amongst his sons, Nandan was not the eldest, admittedly the eldest was Mangru. On these facts there should be strong reason for the members of the family to agree to the exclusion of the names of Sheo Ambar and Magru. No reason is forthcoming. 8. In respect of the above suit under Section 229-B it may be stated that the same also abated on the village being brought under consolidation operations. 9. So far as Nandan is concerned he did not sleep over his rights. As soon as he came to know of the entry made in favour of opposite parties 2 to 4 he filed application for correction of records. This proceeding abated on the village being brought under consolidation operations. 10. About the existence of the above evidence on the record of the consolidation authorities there is no dispute between the parties. There is also no dispute between the parties that the said evidence existed in the manner stated herein above. On the basis of the said evidence the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation came to the conclusion that the acquisition of land was not ancestral but Nandan alone acquired the same. It is not the case of the contesting opposite parties that the finding is not borne out from the evidence on record. 11. Before proceeding further, a plea canvassed before the Consolidation Officer on behalf of the opposite parties may also be noticed. There was one more Khata which was recorded in the names of Bishram, Purn-masi and Raj Deo, sons of Magru, in which share was given to the petitioner also, apart from other members of the family shown in the pedigree. It was submitted that the petitioner could not accept share in the Khata in which his name was not recorded and deny share to other members of the family in the Khata which was recorded solely in the name of his father. The principle that a person could not appropriate and reprobate at the same time was invoked. It was submitted that the petitioner could not accept share in the Khata in which his name was not recorded and deny share to other members of the family in the Khata which was recorded solely in the name of his father. The principle that a person could not appropriate and reprobate at the same time was invoked. The Consolidation Officer has rejected the plea pointing out that the Khata was originally recorded in the name of Mangru and before the Assistant Consolidation Officer all the parties got share on the basis of compromise which was never challenged. The finding of the Consolidation Officer is very sound. Un-disputedly Mangru was the eldest amongst his brothers. Therefore, existence of his name in the revenue records was not unusual. In fact existence of Magru's name in representative capacity considerably weakened the case of the contesting opposite parties. If in one Khata the name of the eldest member of the family was recorded it showed that the pattern in the family was to have the name of the eldest recorded and not the names of the younger members of the family. 12. The line of reasoning adopted by the Consolidation Officer has been adopted by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation also while dismissing the appeal of Mallu and others. 13. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in his order states that Khasra of 1359 F. contains 5 "Bata" numbers of plot no. 1381-and against each "Bata" number "Marfat" entry is made in the name of one or the other member of the family. The entries as stated by the Deputy Director are as follows :- 1381/1 Moti Bhatija 1381/2 Birju, Purnmasi 1381/3 Raj Deo 1381/4 Mallu and Moti, and 1381/5 Ninku. 14. In the same year plot no. 1402 contains 4 Bata 'numbers and entries as follows:- 1402/1 Mott 1402/2 Bishram 1402/3 Ninku 1402/4 Mallu Plot no. 1403 has been found by the Deputy Director of Consolidation to be included in plot no. 1402. The same position of possession the Deputy Director noticed in the Khasra of 1361 F. and 1364 F. After making this observation regarding the Khasra entries the Deputy Director goes on to refer to the possession found on the spot at the time of consolidation "Partal." He states that during "Partal" "Mends" were found dividing the land of the Khata into several plots. At the time of verification of Khitauni persons whose names had been recorded in CLRD proceedings were stated to be tenure holders of these plots. At this time nothing came to light from which it could be inferred that the names were fictitiously recorded and Nandan alone was the tenure holder. If at the time of verification of Khitauni dispute of co-tenancy could be raised by the opposite parties, dispute of sole tenancy could also be raised by the petitioner but no such dispute was raised by the petitioner at that time. In the oral evidence there is no explanation for the existence of "Mends". These "Mends" existed before the abolition of Zamindari and also after the abolition and continued even upto the time of "Partal". From these facts the Deputy Director of Consolidation has inferred that the Khata in question was joint. 15. In my opinion, the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is untenable and cannot he sustained. On the basis of factors which would at the most prove possession the Deputy Director has found title in favour of the contesting opposite parties and he has drawn no conclusion from the shifting stand taken by them. Two factors appear to have weighed heavily on his mind. One is "Bata" entries in the Khasra and the other is existence of "Mends" at the spot. On the basis of "Bata" entries the Deputy Director has drawn the conclusion that the contesting opposite parties were in possession of the land comprised in the Khata according to their share. The common ancestor Sheo Ambar indeed had five sons. On this basis the inference drawn by the Deputy Director of Consolidation may be drawn in respect of plot no. 1381 which has 5 "Bata" numbers, but this is not the position in respect of plot no. 1402 which has only 4 "Bata" numbers. Further these "Bata" numbers do not exhibit possession of land according to share, In plot no. 1381 Moti's name was recorded at two places viz. 1381/1 and 1381/4. If the "Bata" numbers of plot no. 1381 are based on possession according to share the name of the petitioner or his father was also required to be recorded on one of the "Bata" numbers but the name of neither is recorded either in plot no. 1381 or 1402. The name of Nandan is recorded in the column of Kashtkar. If the "Bata" numbers of plot no. 1381 are based on possession according to share the name of the petitioner or his father was also required to be recorded on one of the "Bata" numbers but the name of neither is recorded either in plot no. 1381 or 1402. The name of Nandan is recorded in the column of Kashtkar. it also needs to be mentioned that the entry against these "Bata" numbers is "Marfat" and not "Kashtkar". A "Marfat" entry does rot indicate possession by virtue of right as laid down in Bhikoo v. Assistant Director of Consolidation and others, 1983(1) LCD 372. The Deputy Director does not appear to have properly appreciated the scope, consequence and connotation of a "Marfat" entry. While the orders of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation are based on entries in Khitauni, which is document of title, the finding of the Deputy Director is based on entries in Khasra which is a document of possession only. In determining title, entries in Khitauni are preferable to entries in Khasra. The Deputy Director has committed manifest error in superseding a finding based on document of title and in substituting his finding which is not based on document of title bet is based on document of possession. 16. The existence of "Mend" is also not a factor which could negative the title of the petitioner. Division of a plot by "Mends" facilitate irrigation. Such divisions are not necessarily made to divide plots on the basis of title. The inference of title drawn by the Deputy Director from the existence of "Mends" is, therefore, untenable. 17. Equally untenable is the conclusion drawn by the Deputy Director from the dispute of sole tenancy being not recorded during consolidation "Partal". The petitioner had the right to file objection before the Assistant Consolidation Officer after the publication of the basic year Khitauni. It was not obligatory on the part of the petitioner to raise the dispute of sole tenancy before the officials entrusted with the "Partal" proceeding. Once objection is filed before the Assistant Consolidation Officer it may be decided before him on the basis of compromise and by the Consolidation Officer if no compromise is arrived at. In the present case in respect of Khata in question no compromise was arrived at and, therefore, the dispute was referred to the Consolidation Officer. Once objection is filed before the Assistant Consolidation Officer it may be decided before him on the basis of compromise and by the Consolidation Officer if no compromise is arrived at. In the present case in respect of Khata in question no compromise was arrived at and, therefore, the dispute was referred to the Consolidation Officer. Such a dispute could not be ignored on the mere ground that the same was not raised during the consolidation "Partal". 18. The Deputy Director has committed another manifest error. Without going into the existence of the order at. 27th January, 1963 alleged to have been passed in CLRD proceedings he has relied upon the same. The Consolidation Officer had summoned the original register maintained under Rule 23 and found that no "amaldarmad" was noted of that order. The Deputy Director has not made any comment on this aspect. Placing reliance on the alleged order without upsetting the finding of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, in respect thereof is a manifest error which vitiates the order of the Deputy Director. 19. On the pleading contained in the objection of opposite party no. 5 which was adopted by other contesting opposite parties also, the material question that arose for determination was whether the land in question had been acquired by the common ancestor Sheo Ambar. On this material question no finding has been recorded by the Deputy Director. The Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation have recorded negative finding. Unless this negative finding was upset there could be no occasion for the Deputy Director to uphold the claim of cotenancy set up by the contesting opposite parties. 20. In upholding the claim of cotenancy set up by the contesting opposite parties the Deputy Director was impressed by the fact that in the Khata which was originally recorded in the name of Mangru all the parties including the petitioner were given share. This factor was of no consequence and the Deputy Director has failed to appreciate the law relating to joint family and acquisition of property by members of joint family. Under Hindu Law there is indeed presumption of joint-ness of the family but there is no presumption that a property standing in the name of a member of the joint Hindu family is also a joint family property. Under Hindu Law there is indeed presumption of joint-ness of the family but there is no presumption that a property standing in the name of a member of the joint Hindu family is also a joint family property. In Bala Charan and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1978 RD 51 it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court as follows :- " It is a settled principle of Hindu Law that there would be a presumption of joint-ness of the family, but there can be no presumption that a property standing in the name of a member of the joint Hindu, family is also a joint family property." (See para-4) Again in paragraph 5, it has been observed : "The fact that the plots standing in the name of Mitthoo were held to be joint family property would not go to prove that the plots in question which stood in the name of Thakuri were also joint family property." Applying the proposition laid down in this case the fact that the Khata standing in the name of Mangru was found to belong to joint family would not go to prove that the Khata standing in the name of Nandan also belonged to the joint family. 21. In Jagdamba Singh and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others, 1984(2) LCD 398, it was held that the claim of co-tenancy rights cannot be upheld in respect of certain plots of the holding but the claim is to be considered and is to be accepted or rejected into in respect of the holding and not in respect of any portion thereof. In the case on hand the Deputy Director rejected the claim of co-tenancy in respect of plots numbered 444 and 1177. After rejection of this claim the Deputy Director should have rejected the claim in respect of the remaining plots of the Khata also. 22. In Tribhuwan Nath and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad and others, 1984 RD 137 : 1984 ALJ 1128, the claim of co-tenancy was negatived where the land was recorded in the name of son during the life time of the common ancestor and there was no evidence to the effect that the land was acquired by the joint family funds. In the present case also the Khata in question was recorded in the name of Nandan during the life time of his father Sheo Ambar and there was neither pleading nor evidence that the Khata was acquired with the joint family funds. This authority has full application to the facts of the present case. 23. It was strongly contended by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that in consolidation matters pleadings should not be meticulously examined, In support of the proposition he has cited the decision of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 4881 of 1970, Awadh Narain and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Mirzapur, Camp at Gyanpur and others, decided on April 5, 1973, Unreported Revenue Cases 252, and the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Madan Copal Kanodia v. Mamraj Maniram and others, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 461. In the first case it has been observed in paragraph-6 of the report thus : "........ From a perusal of the. record, it is apparent that an objection has been filed by respondent no. 2 although it is not happily worded. All the same, it cannot be said that there was no objection. Before the Consolidation authorities the pleadings should not be given undue importance and we cannot expect the draftmanship of Chamler in the lay man's pleadings. We have to see the objection filed by the parties only to find out as to what their case in substance was and undue importance should not be attached to the form but to the substance by the consolidation authorities ......... " In the second case their lordships of the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 26 of the report- "...It is well-settled that pleadings are loosely drafted in the Courts and the Courts should not scrutinise the pleadings with such meticulous care so as to result in genuine claims being defeated on trivial grounds...." Even by application of the principle laid down in these two authorities no benefit can be given to the opposite parties as the claim of the opposite parties was not negatived by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer. Consolidation on the basis of pleadings but on the basis of evidence on record. 24. Consolidation on the basis of pleadings but on the basis of evidence on record. 24. The following authorities were relied upon on behalf of the opposite parties for submitting that co-tenancy can be acquired by estoppel and acquiescence :- (1) 1964 AWR 459, Dudh Nath Kori v. Smt. Dhamrajia, (2) 1970 ALJ 1019, Mewaram and others v. Shankar and others and (3) 1985 RD 135, Girdhari Lal and another v. D.D.C and others. In the present case there is no conduct of either the petitioner or his father which may debar the petitioner from claiming exclusive right over the Khata in question. As observed herein above the Khata all along remained recorded in the name of petitioner's father and as soon the petitioner's father acquired knowledge of the entry of the names of opposite parties 2 to 4 he filed objection. This is a conduct which would negative the plea of estoppel. Acceptance of share in the Khata which was admittedly joint will also not result in entitling the opposite panics to set up the plea of estoppel against the petitioner. Accordingly these authorities bring no benefit to the opposite parties. 25. AIR 1973 Supreme Court 893, Kailash Rai v. Jai Jai Ram and others was cited for submitting that Bhumidhari rights in act ", agriculture land can be claimed by a con-sharer even if he is not in actual cultivate try possession. In the case on hand the finding of fact recorded by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer. Consolidation is that the opposite parties were not co-sharers at all. In view of this finding the opposite parties cannot claim any share on the basis of this authority. Further the Khata in question was not Bhamidhari Khata but Sirdari Khata. About the finding recorded by the Deputy Director Consolidation I have already observed that he has arbitrarily interfered with the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation a.id the Consolidation Officer. 26. 1956 Supreme Court Reports 451, Nagubai Ammal and others v. B.Shama Rao and others was cited for submitting that the petitioner can not approbate and reprobate. The basis of this principle is that a person cannot take contradictory stand in respect of the same matter. 26. 1956 Supreme Court Reports 451, Nagubai Ammal and others v. B.Shama Rao and others was cited for submitting that the petitioner can not approbate and reprobate. The basis of this principle is that a person cannot take contradictory stand in respect of the same matter. In the present case in view of the legal position discussed herein above there is no question of the petitioner approbating and reprobating simply because he accepted share in the Khata which was admittedly joint By claiming and getting his share in the joint Khata the petitioner cannot be denied the right to claim that the Khata in dispute belongs exclusively to him. On the facts of the present case the principle of approbate and reprobate is not at all attracted. 27. 1964 RD 70, Indra Deo and another v. Rant Govind and others, and AIR 1966 Supreme Court 405, Bharat Singh and others v. Mst. Bhagirathi were relied upon for the proposition that the ordinary rule of Hindu Law was that any property acquired in the name of an individual member of the joint Hindu family was presumed to he joint. The Head note of the first case is misleading. It is an extraction front the passage where the learned Judge has referred to the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court. In the relevant paragraph it has been observed - " .... The learned Civil Judge also held that the plaintiffs certainly had a share in the ancestral plots and also in those plots which were acquired at a time when the family was joint, because ordinary Rale of Hindu Law that any property acquired in the name of an individual member of a joint Hindu Family is presumed to be joint will apply to the facts of the case, as the defendants had failed to prove that the plots acquired by Thug who was admittedly eldest of the four brothers, were acquired by him independent of the joint family resources... (Emphasis Supplied) The emphasised portion is not the statement of law made by this Court. It is the statement of law as understood by the learned Civil Judge against whose judgment the learned single Judge of this Court was hearing the Second Appeal. The proposition of law as laid down by this Court is different from the one stated by the learned Civil Judge. It is the statement of law as understood by the learned Civil Judge against whose judgment the learned single Judge of this Court was hearing the Second Appeal. The proposition of law as laid down by this Court is different from the one stated by the learned Civil Judge. That proposition has been laid down in Bala Charan and others (Supra). Further in Indra Deo's case the acquisition was in the name of the eldest member of the joint Hindu Family. In the present case the acquisition was not in the name of eldest member of the family but was in the name of the third eldest member in the family, the first being the father and the second being the elder brother. This authority is, therefore, of no assistance to the petitioner (opp. p. So far as Bharat Singh's case is concerned that is regard-presumption of jointness of family. It is not regarding jointness of acquisition of property by a member of the joint family. The presumption as stated by their lordships is that Hindu brothers constitute joint family and. therefore, it is for the person alleging severance of the joint family to prove it. This authority is also, therefore, of no assistance to the petitioner (opp. party ?) 28. It was also the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation was pre-eminently just and fair and had done substantial justice between the parties and, therefore, this Court may not in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution interfere therewith. In support of the submission the learned counsel has cited the following authorities :- (1) 1955 AWR 339 (SC) Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others, (2) 1963 ALJ 909 (DB) Begum A.H. Khan v. Regional Transport Authority, Meerut, and others, (3) 1964 ALJ 240 (DB), Prahhu and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation U.P. at Gorakhpur and others, and (4) AIR 1966 Allahabad 156, Bux Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow, and others. In the first case it has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that the Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction and, therefore, the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they are erroneous. In the first case it has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that the Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction and, therefore, the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they are erroneous. This proposition will apply where a finding which on the facts of the case was required to be recorded has been recorded. Giving allowance for loose pleadings to the opposite parties the said opposite parties could be said to have share in the Khata in question only on recording either of the two findings of fact - (i) that it was acquired by the Common ancestor : and (ii) that it was acquired in the name of Nandan with the aid of joint family funds. If a finding of fact had been recorded in respect of either of the two questions on the basis of evidence on record it could be said that the said finding would not be reappraised in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution but where no finding has been recorded on either of the two questions and share has been allowed to the opposite parties it cannot be said that such finding also cannot be interfered with by the application of the rule laid down by their Lordships. If the present writ petition is dismissed on the principle urged by the learned counsel for the opposite parties the result will be that a person who is exclusive owner of a property will lose substantial part of the property to those who have no share in the property at all. In none of the authorities cited by the opposite parties it has been laid down that this Court may not interfere under Article 226 even when such is the consequence. The sum and substance of the law laid down in these authorities is that where justice has been done this Court may not interfere on technicalities and this Court may not reappraise evidence. In the present case I have pointed out herein above that the Deputy Director has omitted from consideration entries of title and has preferred to rely upon entries of mere possession for superseding the orders of the two authorities below to him. In the present case I have pointed out herein above that the Deputy Director has omitted from consideration entries of title and has preferred to rely upon entries of mere possession for superseding the orders of the two authorities below to him. It has also been pointed out herein above that the possession entries relied upon by the Deputy Director also did not show that the possession was in the own right of the person whose possession was recorded in the revenue papers as the entry was "Marfat". In my opinion no benefit can be given to the opposite parties on the basis of the law laid down in the above authorities. 29. AIR 1977 Allahabad 370. L. Deep Chandra v. Lala Raghuraj Swarup and others was cited for the proposition that even obiter dicta of the Supreme Court is binding on the High Court in appraisement of the decision rendered by their lordships or the Supreme Court. I have not deviated from this principle. Accordingly this authority has no application to the present case. 30. Learned counsel for the opposite parties had submitted that the matter was old and no direct evidence was possible to be adduced in support of the claim of the opposite parties. The present is a case in which both the parties led evidence in support of their respective claims. The authorities below were, therefore, required to make assessment of that evidence and come to a finding. The present is not a case where there is lack of evidence on account of the transactions taking place at an antiquated time. After adducing evidence and relying thereon it is not open to the opposite parties to plead that evidence was not available. Evidence in the shape of entries was available and that evidence negatived the claim of the opposite parties, Accordingly the submission of the learned counsel is without substance. 31. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed and the order of the Settlement Officer. Consolidation is hereby restored. The contesting opposite parties 2 to 5 shall bear the costs of the petitioner.