JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava 1. This writ petition is directed against the order passed by the respondent no. 1 whereunder allowing the revision filed by the landlord-respondents, the suit filed by them for ejectment of the petitioner from the premises In dispute has been decreed reversing the decree passed by the trial court to that extent and modifying the said decree for recovery of arrears of rent by reducing the decretal amount from Rs. 1719.50 P., to Rs. 1666/- only. The petitioner-tenant has approached this Court challenging the aforesaid decree passed by the revisional court and has sought for the quashing thereof so far as it relates to the eviction from the accommodation in question. 2. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition which are not in dispute are that initially the building in question had been let out to Municipal Board, Farrukhabad. The tenancy of this tenant was terminated vide the composite notice envisaged under section 20 (2) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) dated 27-11-71 which was served on the defendant on 9-12-71. In the notice it has been alleged that the tenant had committed default in paying the rent for the period 1-3-67 to 31-10-71. The suit was filed on 26-3-72 on the assertions that inspite of the service of the notice the tenant had neither paid arrears of rent nor vacated the premises hence the suit. During the pendency of the suit section 18-A was added in the U. P. Basio Education Act, 1972 it appears that in view of the amendment brought in the U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972 the plaintiff respondents got amended the plaint and added the U. P. Board of Basic Education, Lucknow as defendant no. 2 and sought for the same relief even against this defendant which had initially been claimed against the originally impleaded defendant no. 1. The trial court while considering the question as to whether the suit was bad for want of valid notice of demand and quit came to the conclusion that the notice relied upon by the plaintiffs was illegal and bad In law on the ground that the plaintiffs had not specifically required the defendant to pay the arrears of rent within 30 days from the date of service of notice. The trial court, therefore, was of the view that forwant of valid notice the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree for eviction as claimed. The trial court recorded a finding that the defendants had not. paid rent at the rate of Rs. 45/- per month for the period 1-3-67 to 31-10-71 as well as for the period 1-11-71 to 31-3-72 Inspite of the claim of the plaintiff about the defendants being in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months and inspite of the fact that their tenancy had been terminated, the suit far eviction was dismissed on the ground indicated above. The revisional court reversed the finding recorded by the trial court on the question relating to the validity of the notice holding that it was not necessary that the notice should say that rent should be paid within 30 days of its service and the tenant will become a defaulter within the meaning of section 20 (2) (a) of the Act if he does not make the requisite payment within 30 days of the service of the notice. The revisional court was of the view that the composite notice terminating the tenancy and demanding the payment of arrears of rent was valid. 3. I have heard Sri S. N. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Prakash. Krishna, learned counsel appearing for the respondent landlord. 4. The sole ground on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the impugned decree of eviction passed against the petitioner tenant is that the defendant no. 2, the pre*ent petitioner, had become tenant of the accommodation in dispute by virtue of section 18-A which was inserted In the U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972 (U. P. Act no. 34 of 1972) by section 31 of U. P. Act no 5 of 1972 and was to be deemed always to have been inserted as such. Consequently, it was urged that the composite notice issued by landlord against the originally Impleaded defendant no 1, who had ceased to have any tenancy rights in the accommodation in dispute could not be utilised for maintaining the suit against the defendant no. 2 and passing a decree of eviction against him on its basis. It has been asserted that in the circumstances the tenancy of the defendant no. 2 and passing a decree of eviction against him on its basis. It has been asserted that in the circumstances the tenancy of the defendant no. 2 could not be deemed to have been terminated at all and in the absence of any notice contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 having been issued against the defendant no. 2, the suit for its ejectment was liable to be dismissed. In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon heavily on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 . The learned council for the landlord respondent has urged that section 18-A as inserted in the D. P. Basic Education Act, 1972 has no such effect as alleged. It has farther been asserted that in the present case the notice terminating the tenancy of defendant no. 1 had been issued and served on the defendant no. 1 much before the passing of U. P. Act no. 34 of 1972 and the suit having been filed on 26-3-72, the provisions contained In order XXII rule 10 of the CPC. stood clearly attracted. It has been assarted that on the application filed by the plaintiffs the trial court had permitted the impleadment of the defendant no 2 and the requisite leave of the court to continue the suit against defendant no. 2 stood granted as envisaged under the aforesaid provision. In the circumstances, therefore, it is urged that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the revisional court which may justify any Interference therein. The learned counsel has further asserted that the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar (supra) was considered in a later decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Gian Devi (supra) and taking into consideration the latter decision of the Apex Court it is apparent that the decision in the case of V. Dhannpal Chettiar has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 5. I hive given my anxious thought to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 6. U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972 received the assent of the Governor of the State on 17-8-72 and was published in the U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 19-8-72. 5. I hive given my anxious thought to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 6. U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972 received the assent of the Governor of the State on 17-8-72 and was published in the U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 19-8-72. Section 18-A was inserted in the U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972 by section 31 of U. P. Act no. 5 of 1972 with retrospective effect. Section 18-A referred to above is to the following effect :- "18-A. Board to become tenant In respect of certain buildings : (1) where any building or part thereof was on the appointed day occupied as tenant by any local body for the purpose of any basis school, the tenancy in respect of such building or part, shall, with effect from the said day stand transferred in favour of the Board. (2) Where any building or pert thereof belonging to a local body was on the appointed day occupied by it for the purposes of any basic school, the Board shall with effect from the said day, be deemed to have become licensee on behalf of the local body in respect of such building or part on such terms and conditions as the State Govt., may by general or special order determine. (3) The provisions of this section shall have effect, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, lease or other instrument, or any law for the time being in force." 7. A perusal of the aforesaid provision indicates that where any building or part thereof was, on the appointed day, occupied as tenant by any local body for the purpose of any Basic School the tenancy in respect of such building or part shall, with effect from the said day stand transferred in favour of the Board. This provision was to have effect notwithstanding anything contained In any contract, lease or other instrument or any law for the time being in force. 8. The appointed day referred to in section 18-A, as envisaged under section 2 (a) thereof meant the date on which the Board is established. In the present case, the building in question had been occupied as a tenant by the defendant no. 1 which is a local body, for the purposes of running a Basic School. 8. The appointed day referred to in section 18-A, as envisaged under section 2 (a) thereof meant the date on which the Board is established. In the present case, the building in question had been occupied as a tenant by the defendant no. 1 which is a local body, for the purposes of running a Basic School. The question which has arisen for consideration is as to what is the effect of the transfer of this tenancy in favour of the Board as contemplated under section 18-A of the U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972 indicated above. It is not disputed that, to begin with, the status of the defendant no. 1 was that of contractual tenant and Its relationship with the landlord respondents in this connection stood governed by the terms of the contract. Obviously, therefore, it was a contractual tenancy. The building in question falls within the purview of the Rent Act. With the determination of the contractual tenancy after serving of the notice in this regard, the contractual tenancy came to an end but in view of the protections available to the tenant under the provisions of the Rent Act in regard to the continuance of the tenancy, notwithstanding the determination thereof, its status and legal position did not change and the tenant continued to enjoy the estate or interest In the tenanted premises. In its decision in the case of Gian Devi v. Jeevan Kumar, AIR 1985 SC 796 , the Honourable Supreme Court clearly held such an interest or estate, which the tenant under the Act despite termination of contractual tenancy continues to enjoy, to be a heritable interest in the absence of any provision to the contrary. In its aforesaid decision the Apex Court clearly observed that it is in view of this status and right of contractual tenant, even after determination of tenancy, that he is at times described as statutory tenant. 9. In its aforesaid decision the Apex Court clearly observed that it is in view of this status and right of contractual tenant, even after determination of tenancy, that he is at times described as statutory tenant. 9. Relying upon the observations made in the case of Smt Gian Devi Anand (supra), the Apex Court in a later judgment in the case of M/s. Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, JT 1992 (3) SC 98, observed that the Legislature, which by the Rent Act to confer the benefit on the tenant and to afford protection against eviction, is perfectly competent to make appropriate provision regulating the nature of protection and the manner and extent of enjoyment of such tenancy rights after the termination of contractual tenancy of the tenant including the rights and nature of protection of the heirs on the death of the tenant. This was a case where the Honourable Supreme Court had to consider the effect of the regulatory provision in the Karnataka Rent Control Act which prohibited any tenant to sublet whole or part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein. The Apex Court while interpreting the provisions of the said Act held that except in cases covered by the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 23 there was a prohibition for a tenant to sublet whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein. The Supreme Court had clarified in that case that the aforesaid prohibition in view of the specific provision contained in the Act was, however, subject to a contract to the contrary. 10. In the present case there can be no manner of doubt that inspite of the determination of the contractual tenancy the defendant no. 1 continued to enjoy tenancy rights as envisaged and protected under the Rent Act and the determination of its tenancy did not bring about a change in its status and legal position as such tenant. Section 13 of U. P. Act no. 1 continued to enjoy tenancy rights as envisaged and protected under the Rent Act and the determination of its tenancy did not bring about a change in its status and legal position as such tenant. Section 13 of U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 contains a specific restriction to the effect that where a tenant ceased to occupy a building or part there of no person shall occupy it la any capacity on his behalf or otherwise than under an order of allotment and if a person so purports to occupy it shall without prejudice to the provisions of section 31 be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of such building or part. Section 25 of the aforesaid Act prohibits sub-letting by a tenant by providing that no tenant shall sub-let the whole of the building under his tenancy. It is in view of the aforesaid restrictions that the Legislature specifically provided for the transfer of the tenancy right in respect of a building as envisaged under section 18-A of the U. P. Basis Education Act, 1972 which provision relating to tranter of tenancy right had an overriding effect and had to be given effect to notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, lease or other instrument or any law for the time being In force. It is, therefore, obvious that the provisions contained in section 13 or section 25 of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 could not be made applicable to the case of such transfer of tenancy rights as contemplated under section 18-A of U. P. Act no 34 of 1972. Except as contemplated under sections 3 (g), 13 and section 25 of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 there is no other prohibition under the provisions of the,said Act against assignment or transfer in any other manner of the interest of statutory tenant. The transfer of tenancy rights as envisaged under section 18-A of the U. P. Act no. 34 of 1972 is a statutory assignment of the tenancy rights and by virtue of this statutory assignment the assignee which in the present case is the defendant no. 2 steps into the shoes of the defendant no. 1. The assignment signifies transference of property or a right. 34 of 1972 is a statutory assignment of the tenancy rights and by virtue of this statutory assignment the assignee which in the present case is the defendant no. 2 steps into the shoes of the defendant no. 1. The assignment signifies transference of property or a right. The term 'assign' Is a word of the widest significance in respect to the nature of the transfer to which it relates and is variously applied, generally in the case of transfer of interest in property especially personal estate, or make over a right to another. In the circumstances of the present case, by virtue of the transfer of the tenancy rights in favour of the defendant no. 2, which was a complete transfer of the interest held by defendant no 1 in the building in question an assignment as envisaged under order XXII rule 10 of the CPC clearly came into existence by operation of law. 11. A Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Mohammad Shafi v. Gram Sabha Vill Bisaull, 1970 ALJ 824, relying upon the decisions of the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Calcutta and Patna clearly held that the provision contained in order XXIl rule 10 of the CPC does apply to cases of statutory assignment. In my opinion, the provisions contained in section 18-A of the U. P. Act no. 34 of 1972 did rot create any independent right in favour of defendant no. 2. The mere use of the word 'transfer' in the aforesaid section clearly negatives such a situation. The present one is clearly a case of assignment of the interest and since such an assignment of interest has been effected by force of a statutory provision, the assignment is clearly statutory to which order XXII rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply. 12. In the circumstances of the case, taking into consideration the facts proved and established on record it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to issue a fresh notice as contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 against the defendant no. 2 who was allowed to be impleaded in the suit as defendant no. 2 being a statutory assignee of the defendant no. 1. 13 of 1972 against the defendant no. 2 who was allowed to be impleaded in the suit as defendant no. 2 being a statutory assignee of the defendant no. 1. I am clearly of the view that the suit in the circumstances of the case could be continued against the defendant no, 2 and the decree passed by the revisional court doss not suffer from any error much less manifest error of law which may Justify any interference in the exercise of the extraordinary Jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.