JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava 1. This petition is directed against the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejecting the application of the petitioner seeking re-allotment of the premises in dispute in his favour as contemplated under rule 10 (6) Proviso) (b) of the Rules framed under the U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act, 1972 U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 which order was affirmed in revision by the respondent no. 1. 2. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the petitioner has approached this Court for redress seeking the quashing thereof. The facts, in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of the present writ petition are that the accommodation in dispute had initially been let out to the petitioner and was occupied by him and the members of his family for residential purpose. It appears that in the year 1982, the petitioner constructed a separate residential unit in Rishikesh which had two rooms of the size of 8'x8' and two rooms of the size 12'x10' and 8'x8' apart from kitchen, bathroom and latrine. The accommodation which' was in his tenancy consisted of two rooms of the size of 7.6'x9' and 10"x9' and the third room of the size of 6'x6' apart from kitchen and latrine. Since with the construction of the aforesaid house a residential building within the meaning of section 12 (3) of the Act stood acquired in a vacant state by him a vacancy in respect of the premises its dispute under his tenancy came into existence by fiction of law as envisaged under section 12 (3) of the Act. Taking advantage of the aforesaid fast an application seeking allotment of the building which was in occupation of the petitioner as tenant was filed by Sri Vinod Kumar Sharma on 9-2-84. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the vacancy in respect; of the accommodation in dispute under the order dated 20-11-84 passed by him. The effect of the declaration of the vacancy was that the accommodation under the tenancy of the petitioner became available for allotment or release. The landlord-respondent filed an application seeking release of the aforesaid application. Thus there was an application seeking allotment of the accommodation and another application seeking its release. The effect of the declaration of the vacancy was that the accommodation under the tenancy of the petitioner became available for allotment or release. The landlord-respondent filed an application seeking release of the aforesaid application. Thus there was an application seeking allotment of the accommodation and another application seeking its release. In the circumstances the petitioner moved an application seeking re-allotment of the accommodation in dispute in his favour asserting that on account of relieving congestion in the house under the tenancy It had become necessary to acquire separate accommodation and the accommodation available in the newly constructed house was not such where the entire family of the petitioner could shift. It was asserted that the newly built house was being utilised by petitioner's married son Rishi Kumar Sharma, his wife and two small children who had separated messing and were residing there. It was further asserted that the accommodation in dispute was being utilised for residential purpose by the petitioner, his wife his unmarried daughter and other son Om Prakash. It was further asserted that the room of the size of 8'x8' was being utilised as store room, one room was being utilised by the daughter of the petitioner and his third son and the third room was being utilised by the petitioner and his wife for Jiving purposes as well as Baithak, In the above circumstances, it was asserted that the accommodation in dispute be re-allotted in his favour otherwise he will be put to an irreparable loss. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer under his orders dated 17-4-85 rejected the aforesaid application simply observing that the newly constructed house of the petitioner had sufficient accommodation. After rejecting the application for re-allotment the Rent Control and Eviction Officer proceeded to consider the application for release and under the same order released the accommodation in dispute in favour of the landlord. 4. The order rejecting the application for re-allotment was challenged by the petitioner before the revising authority respondent no. 1 without any success. The respondent no. 1 under his order dated 8-5-86 affirmed the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the ground that it had been clearly observed therein that the accommodation available in the house built by Jauhari Dutt was sufficient. 1 without any success. The respondent no. 1 under his order dated 8-5-86 affirmed the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the ground that it had been clearly observed therein that the accommodation available in the house built by Jauhari Dutt was sufficient. The revisional court was of the view that the question as to whether the accommodation available in the house constructed by the petitioner was sufficient for his family was a question of fact and since the newly built house had more accommodation than the portion which was in the tenancy of the petitioner where the entire family had been living before the construction of new bouse, there was no justification for interfering with the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The revisional court, however, observed that no doubt the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was brief sand the evidence had not been discussed in detail but the order was supported by the evidence on record and could not be said to be pervese or against law. I have heard Sri R. K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition and Sri L. P. Naithani learned counsel for the landlord in opposition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the provisions contained in rule 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules framed under U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 regarding re-allotment of the premises, which had been declared vacant under section 12 (3) of the Act, in favour of the tenant continuing to occupy the same are of a mandatory nature. It has been asserted that the word 'may' used in rule 10 (6) proviso (b), in the circumstances of the case has to be read as 'shall'. The submission of the learned counsel is that inspite of the use of the word 'may' in Rule 10 (6) proviso (b) a duty stands cast on the District] Magistrate to re-allot the residential building deemed to be vacant under section 12 (4) of the Act to the tenant or a member of a family as the case may be who is deemed to have ceased to occupy the same by reason of his on any member of his family building or otherwise acquiring in a vacant estate and another residential building in the same local area. The learned counsel has further urged that in the circumstances of the present case it stood established that two buildings were being occupied by the petitioner and a member of his family separately and that they were separate in messing. These two conditions which according to the learned counsel for the petitioner were the condition precedent for re-allotment having been setisfied in the present case, the District Magistrate was bound in law to re-allot the premises in dispute in favour of the petitioner. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, urged that the word 'may' as used in rule 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules vested the District Magistrate with a judicial discretion to allot the premises in question in favour of tenant continuing to occupy the same inspite of the vacancy in law having occurred and this discretion had to be exercised taking into consideration the equities of the matter. In case, the District Magistrate was satisfied that the newly acquired building did not have such space or the extent of the accommodation available there was not such which could justify for forcing out the tenant occupying the premises held to be vacant, he may re-allot the building to such a tenant. It has further been urged that the use of the word 'may' does not make it imperative for the District Magistrate to re-allot the building in favour of the tenant ceasing to occupy the same under the law. It has further been urged that the caution to exercise the judical discretion with which the District Magistrate stand vested in the matter relating to re-allotment as envisaged under rule 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules can arise only if the condition precedent stipulated under that prevision comes into existence before the acquisition of the residential building in a vacant state and not later. It has been asserted that in the present case; none of the pre-requisite conditions envisaged under rule 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules could be said to be satisfied inasmuch as there was neither any pleading nor proof that the eldest son of the petitioner has separted from the petitioner before the acquisition of the new building or that they were separate in messing prior to such acquisition. The learned counsel contended that in such a situation the application seeking re-allotment was clearly not maintainable and has been rightly rejected. The learned counsel contended that in such a situation the application seeking re-allotment was clearly not maintainable and has been rightly rejected. Ordinarily the word 'may' is not a word of compulsion. It is an enabling word and confers capacity, power or authority and implies a discretion. However, the word 'may' has sometimes been understood in the Imperative sense as 'shall' but ordinarily it indicates choice of action and not a command. The legal and factual context in which the power is to be exercised may sometimes combine the power with an obligation to exercise it even though it is conferred by use of the word 'may'. This enabling word may be construed ;as compulsory whenever the object of the conferment of the power is to effectuate a legal right. 7. The purpose behind the provision relating to re-allotment envisaged under rule 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules was considered by this court in its decision In the case of Swaroop Narain Srivastava v. The IV Additional District Judge, Lucknow, 1983 ARC 46$, wherein the proviso (b) to sub-rule (6) of rule 10 was held to be a regularisation provision which is independent of rule 13 (4). It was held that an application of re-allotment has precedence over the landlord's application for release. In this connection it may further be noticed that in view of what has been stated above an application for re-allotment cannot be put at par with the application for allotment contemplated under rule 10 (1) and consequently rule 11 of the Rules relating to the priorities in allotment of residential buildings does not apply to such an application. Taking into consideration the policy underlying the Act and the scheme thereof there does not appear to be any reason to assume that the word 'may' has been used in its extraordinary meaning under the provisions contained under rule 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules. It is an enabling provision and confers a choice of action and a judicial discretion on the District Magistrate to re-allot the premises deemed to be vacant in favour of the tenant who is deemed to have cased to occupy the same taking into consideration the exigencies of the situation and genuine need for re-allotment. It is an enabling provision and confers a choice of action and a judicial discretion on the District Magistrate to re-allot the premises deemed to be vacant in favour of the tenant who is deemed to have cased to occupy the same taking into consideration the exigencies of the situation and genuine need for re-allotment. This judicial discretion has to be exercised after taking into consideration the relevant evidence and the materials on the record and the hardships which may result in the event of rejection of the application for re-allotment. There is nothing in the scheme of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder to indicate that the condition precedent for exercising the judicial discretion relating to re-allotment must have come into existence prior to the acquisition of the vacant building. However, the aforesaid conditions must exist before the premises in dispute is declared vacant and becomes available for allotment or release under section 16 of the Act. It is only when the District Magistrate is satisfied that the two buildings are occupied by the tenant and a member of his family separately and that they are separate in messing that the question of re-allotment of the residential building deemed to be vacant under section 12 (4) of the Act to the said tenant or to the said member of his family may arise otherwise not. In the above circumstances, I am not inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the word 'may' as used in 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules should be understood in the imperative sense as 'shall'. There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder which may Indicate may reason worth the name to assume that the word 'may' has been used in its extraordinary meaning under the provisions contained in rule 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules in question. 8. In this connection it may further be noticed that on 9-5-84 an application was filed by Sri Vinod Kumar Sharma seeking allotment of the premises in dispute in his favour alleging that the said premises was deemed to be vacant and available for such purpose on 12-9-84 the landlord moved an application seeking release of the accommodation in dispute asserting it to be vacant. The petitioner moved an application seeking allotment of the premises in dispute on 20-11-84 informing the District Magistrate that he had in his name a newly built house in Adarsh Nagar, Rishikesh which was being occupied by his son, his daughter-in-law, grand daughters and two grand sons. The vacancy in respect of the accommodation in dispute was declared on 20-11-84 itself. Subsequently on 28-2-86 the petitioner moved an application seeking re-allotment of the accommodation in dispute in his favour giving facts in detail. It appears that the application which had been filed on 20-11-84 was an application in the form prescribed for moving applications under rule JO (1) of the Rules framed under the Act This irregularity was sought to be removed by moving the application seeking re-allotment which was filed on 28-2-86 during the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The request of the petitioner to allot the premises in dispute to him had. thus, been made on the date the premises in dispute were declared to be vacant. In the circumstances the question whether the applicant could be re-allotted the accommodation in dispute in his occupation which had become unauthorised on account of the declaration of vacancy in respect thereof could very well be considered on merits by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that this prayer could not be entertained has no merit and is not acceptable. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has manifestly erred in not recording any reasons in support of his conclusion to the effect that the petitioner was not entitled to re-allotment of the building in question as claimed. It has been asserted that the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner true copies whereof have been annexed as Annexures RA-6,7, 8, 9 and 30 as well as the affidavit filed is support of the application dated 28-2-86 have not been considered on merits. It has been asserted that the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner true copies whereof have been annexed as Annexures RA-6,7, 8, 9 and 30 as well as the affidavit filed is support of the application dated 28-2-86 have not been considered on merits. It has further been asserted that it was incumbent upon the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to pass a reasoned order after considering the evidence and the materials on record after determining the question as to whether the accommodation which had become available giving rise to the accrual of vacancy of the tenanted accommodation was sufficient for satisfying the needs of the tenant and the members of his family. It has been asserted that without giving any reason whatsoever the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has straightaway recorded a conclusion that the newly acquired building had sufficient accommodation which could not be justified. According to the learned counsel, the question of re-allotment envisaged under rule 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules framed under the Act had to be decided after determining the extent of the need of the tenant and the members of his family and a clear finding after appraisal of evidence ought to have been recorded considering the equities of the case which has not been done. It has been pointed out that even the revisional court had observed that the impugned order passed by the Rent: Control and Eviction Officer was brief and the evidence had not been discussed in details. The learned counsel submitted that the respondent no. 1 was also swayed away by the mere fact that the newly built house had more accommodation than the portion in the tenancy of the petitioner without realising that the question which had to be considered as to whether accommodation which was under the tenancy of the petitioner were sufficient to meet the requirements of the petitioner and his family members. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent in this connection has urged that the conclusion as reached by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has been upheld by the revisional court and the question involved being a question of fact no interference therein is justifiable. 10. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent in this connection has urged that the conclusion as reached by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has been upheld by the revisional court and the question involved being a question of fact no interference therein is justifiable. 10. In its decision in the case of Union of India v. M. L. Capoor AIR 1974 SC 87 , the Honourable Supreme Court has observed thus :- "......Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusion are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable........" Disclosure or recording of reasons guarantees consideration and introduce charity excluding or minimising arbitrariness. An order which does not disclose the points which were considered and the reasons for rejecting them was not approved of by the Honourable Supreme Court in several cases, emphasising the necessity to give sufficient reasons which disclosed proper appreciation of the problem to be solved and the mental process by which the conclusion is reached. 11. In its decision in the case of S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , the Apex Court again emphasled that even an administrative action must be supported by reasons. la the above case while holding that the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order was, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice, the Apex Court observed as follows: "...Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities........" 12. In view of what has been stated above I am clearly of the opinion that the approach of the authorities below to the present case for re-allotment stands vitiated in law and has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice. In view of what has been stated above I am clearly of the opinion that the approach of the authorities below to the present case for re-allotment stands vitiated in law and has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer does not appear to be alive to the real controversy involved in the case and the purpose behind the regularisation envisaged under the scheme or re-allotment of the building held to be vacant in favour of the tenant or the member of the family as envisaged under rule 10 6 proviso (b) of the Rales framed under the Act. The respondent no 2 has further failed to apply his mind to the evidence and the materials on record which was filed by the petitioner in support of his case that the requirements to retain the premises in dispute for satisfying his need and the need of his family members continued to exist and the acquisition of the new building could satisfy the need of only a few members of the family of the tenant who had already shifted there. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the needs of the tenant and the entire members of his family could be satisfied by shifting to the newly acquired building and whether the newly acquired building had only that much accommodation which could satisfy the requirements of the family members of the petitioner who has already shifted there. The judicial discretion envisaged under rule 10 (6) proviso (b) of the Rules framed under the Act relating to the matter concerning re-allotment has to be exercised in a just manner with care and caution, after proper appraisal of the evidence on the materials on record and considering the needs of the tenant and his family members seeking re-allotment. In view of my conclusion indicated hereinbefore this writ petition succeeds in part. The impugned orders dated 8-5-86 passed by respondent no. 1 and 17-4-85 passed by respondent no. 2 are quashed with the direction to the respondent no 2 to consider the question relating to the re-allotment of the accommodation in dispute in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.