JUDGMENT : S.P. Srivastava, J. This writ petition of the tenant arises out of the proceedings initiated in the year 1985, u/s 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') by the landlady, Respondent No. 3, seeking release of the accommodation in dispute, under the tenancy of the Petitioner, being utilised for non-residential purpose. 2. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case are that the application for release indicated above was filed asserting that Sanjay Kumar, the third son of the landlady wanted to start his own business of sweat-meat of which alone he bad some experience and to augment his income so as to comfortably maintain himself, his wife, his family members and expected issues. It was alleged that a sweat meat shop specially a new one could be run successfully in the shop in dispute on the ground floor abutting on the main road and that except that accommodation, the landlady had no other accommodation available at her disposal, where Sanjay Kumar may establish himself in business. It was asserted that the accommodation in dispute was suitable for his proposed business. It was further asserted that the need for the release of the shop was genuine, bonafide and pressing one. It was also asserted that the tenant had in his occupation sufficient space, where he could easily shift. In the circumstances, therefore, it was alleged that the landlady would suffer greater hardship in the event of the rejection of the application as compared to the hardship likely to be suffered by the tenant, in case the application was allowed. 3. The tenant Petitioner contested the aforesaid application on various grounds ; denying the allegations made in the application for the release. It was asserted that the alleged need set up by the landlady was imaginary and in fact Sanjay Kumar was already engaged in business and there was no genuine requirement for his being established in his own independent business as alleged. The tenant also asserted that he will suffer tremendous loss in case; he is evicted from the premises in dispute and will suffer greater hardship as compared to the landlady in the event of the grant of the application, 4. Both the parties led voluminous evidence in support of their respective cases. The tenant also asserted that he will suffer tremendous loss in case; he is evicted from the premises in dispute and will suffer greater hardship as compared to the landlady in the event of the grant of the application, 4. Both the parties led voluminous evidence in support of their respective cases. During the pendency of the case certain new developments took place, which were brought to the notice of the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority, asserting that certain accommodations had become available to the landlady, which could easily satisfy the alleged requirement set up by her. The Prescribed Authority got the disputed premises inspected twice through Commissioner and lastly itself inspected the premises in question. After considering the voluminous evidence on the record, the Prescribed Authority came in the conclusion that the premises in dispute was bonafide required by the landlady and need for the release was genuine. It was further found that the hardships likely to be suffered by the landlady would be greater as compared to the hardships likely to be suffered by the tenant in case of the rejection of the application for release. The prescribed authority further came to the conclusion that the tenant had several alternative accommodations, available at their disposal, where they could easily shift without any difficulty. It was further noticed by the prescribed authority that the tenants were doing business from premises No. 26/71. Birhana Road, Kanpur and were utilising the premises in dispute as godown, in as much as so much stock was kept there that there was no place even to move about and even no space was available for the ingress and egress of a single person. In view of the findings on the question relating to the bonafide need and comparative hardship, which had been returned in favour of the landlady, the prescribed authority granted the application for release of the accommodation in dispute. 5. The order granting the release was challenged by the tenant before the appellate authority u/s 22 of the Act. The appellate authority after considering the evidence and materials on the record, endorsed the findings recorded by the prescribed authority and dismissed the appeal. 6. 5. The order granting the release was challenged by the tenant before the appellate authority u/s 22 of the Act. The appellate authority after considering the evidence and materials on the record, endorsed the findings recorded by the prescribed authority and dismissed the appeal. 6. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant Petitioner has approached this Court for redress and has sought for the quashing of the orders referred to above passed by the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority dated 9-2-1989 and 30-9-1989 respectively. 7. During the pendency of the writ petition, an application along with an affidavit with a prayer that this Court may appoint a Commissioner in order to verify the facts mentioned in the affidavit, which, if taken into account, will indicate that subsequent to decision of the appeal under challenge sufficient accommodation had become available to the landlady which could satisfy the need set up by the landlady, asserting that in the presence of such alternative suitable accommodation, the impugned orders of release could not be sustained. 8. The aforesaid application has been vehemently opposed by the learned Counsel for the Respondent landlady. It has been asserted on behalf of the landlady Respondent, that this application is not maintainable and taking into consideration, the nature and scope of the provisions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and specially the scheme of the Uttar Pradesh Act, No. 13 of 1972, this Court has no jurisdiction to permit bringing on record the additional evidence at this stage, even though it may be in regard to the events subsequent to the passing of the order by the appellate authority under challenge and therefore, the application deserves to be rejected In the alternative, it has also been urged that the alleged subsequent events sought to be relied upon by the Petitioner do not have any material bearing on the controversy involved in the present case and in this view of the matter, also the application is liable to be rejected. 9. The question which therefore, arises for consideration is, as to whether, while deciding the writ petition exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, any additional evidence concerning facts relating to developments taking place subsequent to the filing of the writ petition could be allowed to be brought on record and considered. 10. 9. The question which therefore, arises for consideration is, as to whether, while deciding the writ petition exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, any additional evidence concerning facts relating to developments taking place subsequent to the filing of the writ petition could be allowed to be brought on record and considered. 10. A full Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Udai Bhan Singh alias Babban Singh v. Board of Revenue, Uttar Pradesh 1974 RD 107, while relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh and Another Vs. Seth Gendalal Motilal Patni and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1445 and in the case of Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. Vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand and Others, (1972) 1 SCC 898 , held that a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not a continuation of the suit or proceeding giving rise to it. It further held that if a writ petition is not a continuation of the original suit or proceeding unlike an appeal or revision, the inference is not only reasonable but inevitable that the orders passed in the original suit or proceeding or in an appeal or revision arising therefrom do not merge in the orders passed in such petition. 11. In the case of The Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. (supra), the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court had made it clear that an appeal or revision is a continuation of the original suit or proceedings and while explaining the nature of jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court had observed as follows: ...Under that jurisdiction, the High Court does not hear an appeal or revision...The controversy in the High Court, in a proceeding arising under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ordinarily is, whether a decree or a proceedings before a Court or Tribunal or authority should be allowed to stand or should be quashed for want of jurisdiction or on account of errors of law apparent on the face of the record.... 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Rameshwar and Others Vs. Jot Ram and Another, (1976) 1 SCC 194 , has observed as follows : In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Rameshwar and Others Vs. Jot Ram and Another, (1976) 1 SCC 194 , has observed as follows : In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor and General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 , this Court dealt with the adjectival activism relating to post institute circumstances. Two propositions were laid down. Firstly, it was held that it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date run for or institutes the legal proceeding. This is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted. Granting the presence of such facts, then he is entitled to its enforcement. Later developments cannot defeat his right because, as explained earlier, had the Court found his facts to be true the day he sued he would have got his decree. The Courts procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal justice or right crystallized in the initial course of action. This position finds support in Bhajan Lal Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1971) 1 SCC 34 . 13. After making the aforesaid observations, the Supreme Court observed that where the nature of the relief as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is molded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. 14. It has further been observed that the subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. 15. It was clarified that conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. 16. It may be noted that in the above case an event which had taken place during the pendency of a regular appeal was sought to be relied upon for dismissing the order of the original authority but was ignored. 17. In its decicion in the case of Hasmat Rai and Another Vs. 16. It may be noted that in the above case an event which had taken place during the pendency of a regular appeal was sought to be relied upon for dismissing the order of the original authority but was ignored. 17. In its decicion in the case of Hasmat Rai and Another Vs. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 , the Apex Court after considering the implications arising under its earlier decision in the case of Pasupuleti Venkatesarlu (supra) observed as follows : Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the Court to take into consideration subsequent events. He can be precluded from so contending when the decree or order for eviction has become final. (Emphasis supplied) 18. A Division Bench of this Court, while considering the effect of an amendment brought in the Act having a material bearing on the rights of the landlord during the pendency of the writ petition refused to take note of them and observed in its decision in the case of Gopinath Goel Vs. 1st Addl. Dist. Judge, Meerut and Another, (1977) AWC 192 as follows : As the proceedings in the writ petition are independent proceedings and not continuation of the proceedings before the learned District Judge, the finality of the judgment of the learned District Judge cannot be disturbed by applying the law that was not in force when he rendered that judgment. 19. The above principle which was enunciated by the Division Bench remained undisturbed by the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Ram Kumar, reported in 1978 ACJ 272 and applies with greater force in the case of subsequent developments of facts. 20. The scheme of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972 clearly stipulates that the question relating to the release of an accommodation should be finally determined with utmost expediency. 20. The scheme of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972 clearly stipulates that the question relating to the release of an accommodation should be finally determined with utmost expediency. Rules 15(3) of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act provides that an application for release u/s 21(1) of the Act, as far as possible be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. Rule 7(7) of the Rules provides that as far as possible an application u/s 22 of the Act shall be decided within six months from the date of its presentation. Section 10(3) of the Act clearly stipulates that the order passed in appeal against an order passed in the proceedings for release contemplated u/s 21 of the Act shall be final. It is therefore, obvious that under the Scheme of the Act, not only the matter relating to release of an accommodation is expected to be decided with most expediency, a finality has been attached to the order passed by the appellate authority in the proceedings for the grant of the release. 21. From the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, to which a reference has already been made above, there can be no manner of doubt that a supervening fact having a fundamental impact can be taken notice of in a proceeding whether it be of an appeal or revision, wherein the appellate or revisory authority exercises the same jurisdiction as is exercisable by the original authority or Court, to mould the relief only. The basis for this appears to be that an appeal or revision, in that case, would be nothing else but a continuation of the suit or the original proceedings and the appellate or revisory authority can correct any mistake in the decree or order passed by the original authority or the trial Court and further can substitute its own decree or order in place of the one passed by the trial Court or the original authority. 22. The proceedings contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can not, by any stretch of imagination, be put at par with, such appellate or revisory proceedings where such authority is entitled under the relevant statute to correct any error in the impugned order or decree or could substitute its own order. 22. The proceedings contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can not, by any stretch of imagination, be put at par with, such appellate or revisory proceedings where such authority is entitled under the relevant statute to correct any error in the impugned order or decree or could substitute its own order. The three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai and another (Supra) was very emphatic when it laid down that the tenant can be precluded from inviting the Court to take into consideration subsequent events when the decree or order for eviction has become final. 23. In the present case, the application for release of the accommodation in dispute was decided by the prescribed authority on 9-2-1989. With the passing of this order, a valuable right flowing from the provisions contained u/s 21(5) of the Act stood secured in favour of the landlady. The tenant's appeal u/s 22 of the Act, which had been filed against the aforesaid order of the prescribed authority was dismissed on 30-9-1989. The order passed by the appellate authority is a 'final order' as contemplated u/s 10(3) of the Act. In view of the finality attached to the aforesaid order, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai and another (Supra) stands clearly attracted and the tenant Petitioner in the present case stands precluded from bringing on record additional evidence in the present proceeding in respect of the alleged subsequent events, which are said to have taken place during the pendency of this writ petition, for being taken into consideration. 24. There is yet another aspect, which can not be lost sight of. This Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Union of India, 1977 AWC 440 , had observed that while deciding a writ petition, it has only to be seen if the judgment of the learned District Judge suffers from any manifest error of law. Subsequent events particularly which require to be ascertained on evidence, cannot be taken into account for holding that the appellate authority had committed any manifest error of law in the circumstances of the case. In the case of Bal Swaroop Srivastava v. Additional District Judge 1980 (UP) RCC 58, this Court observed thus : ...The Court in certiorari jurisdiction sends for and examines the record for this purpose. In the case of Bal Swaroop Srivastava v. Additional District Judge 1980 (UP) RCC 58, this Court observed thus : ...The Court in certiorari jurisdiction sends for and examines the record for this purpose. Obviously an order of the Court or Tribunal below cannot develop a jurisdictional error apparent because of subsequent happenings.... 25. In this connection, it has further to be noticed that as Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, the findings of fact cannot be interfered with in the exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Petitioner, in the circumstances of the case, cannot be permitted to tender additional evidence before this Court, which is confined to questions of law and cannot decide a question of fact. The Petitioner further cannot be permitted by this indirect method to set at the naught, the finality attached to the order passed by the appellate authority, which stands fastened to it under the statute by virtue of the provisions contained u/s 10(3) thereof read with Section 22 of the Act. 26. learned Counsel for the Respondent has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Variety Emporium Vs. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina, (1985) 1 SCC 251 , wherein it has been observed by a Bench constituted by two Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court that no authority is needed for the proposition that, in appropriate cases, the Court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the proceeding before it and mould the relief in the light of those events. While making the aforesaid observations, reference was made by the Apex Court to its decision in the case of Hasmat Rai and another (supra). 27. The perusal of the facts involved in the case of M/s. Variety Emporium (supra) which was under consideration in the above case, makes it apparent that the High Court was dealing with a revision, which is a continuation of the suit or the proceeding. High Court therefore, could, in that case while exercising revisional jurisdiction take notice of the subsequent events. The decision in the case of M/s. Variety Emporium (supra) is not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, where a statutory finality stands attached to the decision of the appellate authority. High Court therefore, could, in that case while exercising revisional jurisdiction take notice of the subsequent events. The decision in the case of M/s. Variety Emporium (supra) is not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, where a statutory finality stands attached to the decision of the appellate authority. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can not be equated with the revisional jurisdiction and the decision of the larger Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court to which a reference has already been made hereinbefore, is clear on the point. The Petitioner therefore, can not derive any advantage out of the observations made in the case of M/s. Variety Emporium (supra). The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has further relied upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Tribhuvan Nath Mehrotra v. District Judge, Allahabad 1988 (1) ARC 536. As well as in the case of Jagdish Sarup v. 2nd Additional District Judge, Aligarh 1992 ALR 368. In these cases, the same learned Single Judge has expressed a view on the strength of the observations made in the case of M/s. Variety Emporium (supra) that principles laid down in that case applied to the proceedings arising under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also. It appears that the decision in the case of Hasmat Rai and another (supra) decided by a larger Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court and the limitation pointed out therein and the decision in the case of Ramesh and Another Vs. Seth Gendalal Motilal Patni and Others,(supra), and the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Udai Bhan Singh alias Babban v. Board of Revenue Uttar Pradesh 1974 RD 107 as well as the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gopinath Goel Vs. 1st Addl. Dist. Judge, Meerut and Another,(supra), were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. In this connection it may be noticed that a Full Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur, 1991 ACJ 114. While agreeing with the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Indo Swiss Time Limited Vs. In this connection it may be noticed that a Full Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur, 1991 ACJ 114. While agreeing with the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Indo Swiss Time Limited Vs. Umrao and Others, AIR 1981 P&H 213 , held that when the judgments of superior Court are of coequal Benches of matching authority then their weight inevitably must be considered by the rational and the logic thereof and not by the mere fortuitous circumstances of the time and date on which they were rendered and the High Court must follow the judgment which appears to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately and the mere incidence of time whether the judgments of co-equal Benches of the Superior Court are earlier or later is a consideration which is hardly relevant. 28. In its decision in the case of The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi, (1976) 4 SCC 52 , the Apex Court has observed thus : It is also to be borne in mind that even in cases where a High Court finds any conflicts between the views expressed by a larger and Smaller Benches of this Court......the proper course......as observed by this Court in Union of India v. K.S. Subramarham Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1975, decided on 30-7-76, reported in Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. K.S. Subramanian, (1976) 3 SCC 677 ......is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of this Court which practice hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by this Court.... 29. Taking into consideration the ratio of the decision in the case of Kailash Chandra v. Ram Naresh 1982 ACJ 608, the decisions in the cases of Tribhuvan Nath Mehrotra (supra) and Jagdish Sarup (supra) are obviously per incuriam. I am bound to follow the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai and another (supra) and Rameshwar and others (supra) and the decisions of the larger benches of this Court. It may further be noted that the decision in the case of Hasmat Rai (supra), is a decision of a larger Bench. I am bound to follow the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai and another (supra) and Rameshwar and others (supra) and the decisions of the larger benches of this Court. It may further be noted that the decision in the case of Hasmat Rai (supra), is a decision of a larger Bench. It is this decision which has binding effect under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. So far as the decision in the case of Rameshwar and others (supra) is concerned, it is binding in view of the observation of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ganga Saran (supra) which has been referred to earlier. 30. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has further placed reliance upon the decision in the case of Gulabbai Vs. Nalin Narsi Vohra and others, (1991) 3 SCC 483 decided by a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein it has been observed that in appropriate cases events subsequent to the filing of the suit can be taken notice of and can be duly considered provided the same is relevant in determining the question of bonafide requirement. It has further been observed that the High Court was right in duly considering the new facts and circumstances that had been brought to the notice of the Court by the application for additional evidence filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC and in coming to a firm finding. A perusal of the aforesaid decision does not indicate that there was any provision in any statute which attached finality to the order passed by the appellate authority. Moreover, in view of the explanation to section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC could not be made applicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, in view of the explanation to section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC could not be made applicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If any case, a larger Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court had clearly held that in a case where finality is attached to an order passed by the appellate or the revisory authority it is not open to the tenant to take advantage of any event coming into existence subsequent to the passing of that order, though it may have an impact in a proceeding which can not be deemed to be a proceeding in continuation of the suit or appeal so as to give rise to a presumption that the suit or proceeding is itself pending irrespective of whether the order passed by the trial Court could be substituted by any other order and any factual error could be rectified. In the circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai and another (supra) with the qualification and limitation attached to the taking cognizance of any event subsequent to the passing of the order by the appellate authority having finality attached to it under the statute continues to hold the field and is the law declared by it as envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to produce a single decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of a larger Bench as compared to the Bench which had decided the case of Hasmat Rai and another (supra), which can lead to an inference that the aforesaid decision is no longer good law and has lost its binding effect as envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel has further not been able to cite a single case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, decided by a Bench larger than that which had decided the case of Ramesh and Another Vs. The learned Counsel has further not been able to cite a single case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, decided by a Bench larger than that which had decided the case of Ramesh and Another Vs. Seth Gendalal Motilal Patni and Others,(supra), which may indicate that the principles laid down therein which clearly stipulate that the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can not be treated to be continuation of the original or the appellate proceedings has ceased to be a good law and is not binding on this Court. 31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365 at 1602 had clearly observed that a decision of the Supreme Court by a larger Bench has to be followed even if that decision was rendered earlier in point of time. In the circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court by a larger Bench to which a reference has been made above, is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and grant of the application in question will amount to the writ petition being degenerated and put at par with an appeal or revision, which will be most inappropriate. Further the finality attached to the impugned order passed by the appellate authority can be interfered with only if any ground is made out justifying an interference in the exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ of certiorari. The alleged subsequent events can not be deemed to furnish or make available to the Petitioner any such ground. 32. There is another aspect, which can not be lost sight of. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, the Petitioner has asserted that Respondent landlord had constructed a commercial building situated at premises No. 26/100-A, Birhana Road, Kanpur and that the landlord had got vacant possession of first floor portion of shop No. 26/45, Birhana Road, Kanpur which premises was in possession of Cymat Traders and further that the Respondent landlord had purchased a shop No. 47/107, Generalganj, Kanpur. The Petitioner had fifed a supplementary affidavit 33. The Petitioner had fifed a supplementary affidavit 33. The assertions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in the affidavit field in support of the application in question as well as, the supplementary affidavit referred to above were denied by the landlady by filing a supplementary counter affidavit and the second supplementary counter affidavit. It was asserted that premises No. 26/100-A, Birhana Road. Kanpur did not belong to the landlady at all and had been purchased by Sri Rakesh Kumar, who alone was the exclusive owner thereof and the landlady has no concern whatsoever with the building constructed by Rakesh Kumar out of his own funds. It has been asserted that Kanpur Development Authority had issued a notice for demolition of a portion of the building and Rakesh Kumar had challenged the order of the High Court in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been further asserted that the accommodation in possession of Cymat Traders had fallen vacant and was released for residential purposes by the competent authority. It has been further asserted that this portion was not suitable for business purposes and was situated on the first floor with a passage from the back side of Birhana Road, Kanpur. So far as, the accommodation referred to by the Petitioner at premises No. 47/109, Generalganj, Kanpur was concerned, it was asserted that the said accommodation was continuing in the tenancy of Hansraj Arora and was not available. It was also asserted that Sanjay Kumar or his wife had no concern whatsoever with Kiran Security System, which belonged to Smt. Shashi Gupta wife of eldest son of Respondent No. 3 as she being well qualified in the work of electronic and computer had installed a fax machine for running her business. So far as the accommodation of M/s. Ashoka Engineering, referred to in the affidavit of the Petitioner was concerned, it was asserted that the said accommodation was not in possession of the landlady and an application for the recall of the allotment order had been filed by her on the ground that it has been obtained fradulently by the allottee acting in collusion with the sitting tenant without any information to the landlady. It has been asserted that the application for recall of the order filed u/s 16(5) of the Act is still pending voluminous documentary evidence has been filed by the landlady in support of her allegations made in the supplementary counter affidavit. The tenant Petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavits in reply to the assertions made in the counter affidavits referred to above and have reiterated the stand taken by them in the original supplementary affidavit. 34. A perusal of the aforesaid affidavits will clearly indicate that all the assertions made by the Petitioner regarding the alleged subsequent events showing availability of alternative accommodation belonging to the landlady during the pendency of the writ petition have been emphatically denied by the landlady. The facts relating to the availability of the alternative accommodation which could allegedly satisfy the requirements for the accommodation in dispute, are disputed questions of facts, the correctness whereof is not admitted by the landlady. As a matter of fact, taking into consideration the documentary evidence, which has been filed along with the counter affidavit referred to above, it cannot be said that the denial of the availability of the alternative accommodation relied upon by the Petitioner is just for the sake of denial. However, it is not possible in these proceedings to decide the rival contentions of the parties regarding the availability of the alternative accommodation during the pendency of the writ petition and if available about the suitability thereof for satisfying the need set up by the landlady, which has been found by both the authorities below to be genuine and pressing. 35. In the present proceedings, the finality of the judgment passed by the appellate authority as envisaged under the provisions of the act cannot be lightly interfered with and the original proceedings cannot be allowed to be reopened simply because in the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Certain facts relating to events taking place during the pendency of the writ petition are brought to the notice of this Court, the correctness whereof is disputed. Such a course of action will run not only contrary to the policy underlying the Act indicating that the application for release should be decided with expediency and if the requisite grounds are specified, the accommodation should be made available for satisfying the requirement of the- landlord at the earliest, but it will also run contrary to the well established principles which govern the exercise of the extra ordinary jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. The aforesaid finality cannot be allowed to be disturbed merely by raising a controversy involving disputed questions of fact, in the proceedings of the nature of the present case. 36. In the circumstances, I am clearly of the view that no case has been made out for permitting the Petitioner to bring on record the additional evidence in the present proceedings and the application by him for the purpose is totally misconceived and deserves to be rejected. It is accordingly rejected 37. I have heard Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned Senior Advocate representing the Petitioner in support of the writ petition and Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel representing the landlady Respondent in opposition thereto and have carefully perused the record. 38. The submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in support of the writ petition were confined to the findings recorded by the authorities below on the question relating to the existence of the bonafide requirement set up by the landlady Respondent for claiming the release of the accommodation in dispute in favour of his third son Sanjay Kumar. 39. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has asserted that the finding recorded by the prescribed authority as affirmed by the appellate authority on the aferesaid question was perverse and stood vitiated on account of omission to consider material evidence on the record and could not be sustained on account of having been recorded with an entirely wrong approach to the evidence and the materials on the record. It has been asserted that while affirming the finding recorded by the prescribed authority on the question relating to the existence of the bonafide requirement the appellate authority proceeded on an entirely erroneous assumption to the effect that the back portion of the accommodation, in the tenancy of M/s Lalita Printers, had been released for satisfying the bonafide need of the eldest son, Rajesh Kumar, who had been established therein accordingly. It has been asserted in this connection that the aforesaid portion had neither been in the possession of Rajesh Kumar nor he had established any business therein. It has further been asserted that the aforesaid accommodation was being utilised by Rakesh Kumar instead The learned Counsel has further asserted that the mezzanine floor, which was got released from M/s Lalita Printers and was being utilised for running a restaurant was more than sufficient to satisfy the alleged requirement of Sanjay Kumar, the third son of the landlady and this accommodation clearly fell within the category of suitable alternative accommodation available to the landlady, which could be utilised without any difficulty for satisfying the requirement for which accommodation in dispute was sought to be released. His submission is that the appellate authority did not consider at all the effect of the availability of this alternative accommodation, which had become available to the landlady. 40. In his bid to get over the finding on the question of the existence of the bonafide need and non-availability of any suitable alternative accommodation to the landlady for satisfying the requirement of his third son in business, the learned Counsel tried to draw support from the Commissioner's report and the inspection note of the prescribed authority and tried to assail that finding by urging that from a perusal of the aforesaid report, not only the availability of the alternative accommodation stood established but there could be no manner of doubt about its suitability for the purpose of satisfying the alleged requirement of Sanjay Kumar. 41. It has also been asserted that during the pendency of the appeal some portion of the premises no. 26/45 Birhana Road, Kanpur, which was in occupation of Rajendra Home Industries was also released which also constituted an alternative accommodation, the effect of the availability whereof was not considered at all by the appellate authority. 42. learned Counsel for the Respondents has contended that the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority has, infact taken into account the accommodation, which was got released from the tenancy of M/s. Lalita Printers and Rajendra Home Industries. It was asserted that the release of the portion of the accommodation in the tenancy of M/s. Lalita Printers was sought for satisfying the requirement of Rakesh Kumar, the second son also and after release, was actually being utilised by Rakesh Kumar. It was asserted that the release of the portion of the accommodation in the tenancy of M/s. Lalita Printers was sought for satisfying the requirement of Rakesh Kumar, the second son also and after release, was actually being utilised by Rakesh Kumar. Similarly the portion in the tenancy of M/s. Rajendra Home Industries was being utilised by Rakesh Kumar and was released for satisfying his need. It has been asserted that the accommodation vacated by Rajendra Home Industries and M/s. Lalita Printers were re-modelled by Rakesh with extensive changes making them suitable for efficient running of the establishment set up by Rakesh Kumar, the second son of the landlady. It has further been asserted that the accommodations which were in the tenancy of either M/s. Lalita Printers or M/s. Rajendra Home Industries did not face towards main Birhana Road, Kanpur and had their opening at the back of Premises No, 26/45, Birhana Road, and faced the Tapeshwari Road and could not be utilised for setting up the independent business which was sought to be established by Sanjay Kumar, the third son of the landlady. learned Counsel for the Respondents has asserted that the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority have elaborately considered the evidence and the materials on the record and have come to the conclusion that the requirement set up by the landlady for seeking release of the accommodation in dispute was genuine and bonafide and pressing. The learned Counsel for the Respondents has asserted that this finding is a finding on the question of fact and, is not at all vitiated in law as suggested. 43. The finding on the question of bonafide requirement of the accommodation in dispute concurrently recorded by the prescribed authority and the appellate authority is a finding on the question of fact. Since the finding of the Additional District Judge, Respondent No. 1 that the Respondent landlady did bonafide require the premises in dispute for the purpose of establishing her third son Sanjay Kumar in an independent business, is a finding of fact, it cannot be interfered with unless it could be shown that it was vitiated by a manifest error of law or is based on no evidence at all or had been arrived at in an arbitrary manner or is unreasonable or perverse. 44. 44. In the present case, the prescribed authority after considering the voluminous evidence on the record has came to the conclusion that Sanjay Kumar genuinely needed the accommodation in dispute for establishing himself in an independent business and this requirement had become, all the more pressing in order to provide him a source to augment his income which was too meager. The prescribed authority clearly observed that the accommodation in the tenancy of M/s. Rajendra Home Industries was got released for satisfying the need of Rakesh Kumar. After taking into consideration the report of the Commissioner on the record and the inspection note of the prescribed authority, it was found that the mezzanine floor, which was got released from M/s. Lalita Printers could not satisfy the requirement of Sanjay Kumar and there was no such accommodation available at the disposal of the landlady where any independent business sought to be established by Sanjay Kumar could be started. In another words, the finding of the prescribed authority was that except the accommodation in dispute, there was no other alternative suitable accommodation, which could be said to be available for satisfying the requirement of Sanjay Kumar. The appellate authority has endorsed this findings recorded by the prescribed authority. It has been found that his need is genuine. It appears that some mistake has occurred in mentioning the names of the sons of the landlady at certain places in the judgment passed by the appellate authority, in as much as instead of Rakesh Kumar, Rajesh Kumar had been mentioned but from a perusal of the judgment passed by the appellate authority, as a whole, it is clear that it was conscious of the facts brought on record and there was no confusion in its mind about the availability of any accommodation or the suitability thereof for the purpose of satisfying the need of Sanjay Kumar. The appellate authority has clearly observed that from the perusal of the entire record, it was clear that there was no shop vacant where Sanjay Kumar could be settled. It has further held that so far as the question of under ground floor, mezzanine floor and first floor were concerned, they could not be utilised for establishing the business in question sought to be set up by Sanjay Kumar. 45. It has further held that so far as the question of under ground floor, mezzanine floor and first floor were concerned, they could not be utilised for establishing the business in question sought to be set up by Sanjay Kumar. 45. There could be no manner of doubt that the release contemplated u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act can be granted for settling in a new venture of the unengaged member of a family. There is nothing in the Act or policy underlying it, which may lead to any inference contrary to it. In the present case, the question of bonafide need of the disputed shop was the need to settle the third son of the landlady, Sanjay Kumar in an independent business. The need to set up a son in independent business has always been recognised as bonafide and genuine. Even if some members of the family of the landlord are engaged in the business that can not be an impediment for the grant of release of the accommodation for enabling the un-employed or un-engaged member of the family to start business of his own or for augmenting income as each adult member of the family is entitled to work for his own independent existence and is further entitled to choose a vocation suiting his individual aptitude, education and qualification. There could be no manner of doubt that such release can also be granted to provide a source to augment the income of a family member, so that he may lead a decent file and cater to the needs of his own growing family. 46. The findings recorded by the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority to the effect that the shop in dispute is best suited for satisfying the requirement for which the release is sought is clearly based on appraisal of evidence on the record. The mezzanine floor or the portion got released from M/s. Rajendra Home Industries could by no stretch of imagination be held to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose for which the release was sought. The assertions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the mezzanine floor was being utilised for running a restaurant and could therefore, very well satisfy the purpose of Sanjay Kumar also has no merit. The assertions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the mezzanine floor was being utilised for running a restaurant and could therefore, very well satisfy the purpose of Sanjay Kumar also has no merit. In this connection, it may be noticed that the fact that these accommodations, which originally formed part of the tenancy of M/s. Lalita Printers and M/s. Rajendra Home Industries were not on the ground floor and could not be utilised for the purpose of Sanjay Kumar in their original shape. These were got released for satisfying the requirement of Rakesh Kumar as well. Much emphasis had been led on the fact that the mezzanine floor was being utilised as restaurant but it has been overlooked that this floor has no independent opening on the Birhana Road and the use of such an accommodation as an annexe to the already running business of Rakesh Kumar on the ground floor portion can not lead to an inference that the said accommodation could be utilised for setting up independent business by Sanjay Kumar, which may include the manufacturing of sweetmeats, which could not be done on the mezzanine floor. In any case, the extent of the accommodation available in the disputed premises is much more as compared to the accommodation available on the mezzanine floor in question. 47. Taking into consideration, the fact that the genuineness for the requirement of the accommodation in dispute, which is greater in extent as compared to the mezzanine floor in question, there could be no manner of doubt that the appellate authority was not wrong in upholding the order of the release granted in favour of the Respondent landlady. 48. After considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, and also taking into consideration the facts- which had been taken into account for determining the question relating to the comparative hardships, the finding in respect where of has not been challenged, I do not find the present one to be a fit case for interference in the exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 49. 49. Moreover, the findings recorded by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority on the question of bonafide need and the question relating to the existence of requirement of the accommodation in dispute for satisfying the need to set up in the release application and genuineness of the same are findings on pure questions of fact which had been arrived at after considering the evidence and materials on the record. These findings on the question of fact do not appear to suffer from any such error much less manifest error of law, which may warrant any interference by this Court in the present proceedings. 50. In view of my conclusions indicated hereinbefore, the writ petition is clearly devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. 51. In the circumstances of the case, however, I think it will be in the interest of justice that sometime may be granted to the Petitioner for vacating the premises in dispute. The Petitioner will therefore not be dispossessed from the premises in dispute for a period of two months from today, provided he files an undertaking before the prescribed authority to the effect that he will handover the vacant peaceful possession of the premises in dispute to the landlady and further deposits the up to date rent and the rent for the period indicated above in advance along with undertaking which may be filed within three weeks from today. In default of the compliance of any of the conditions indicated above, the impugned order of eviction shall become executable forthwith.