JUDGMENT H.N. Tilhari, J. - This is plaintiff's Second appeal arising out of judgment and decree dated 151979 passed by Civil Judge (Sri R.C. Pandey), District Faizabad whereby the learned Civil Judge has dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 351978 passed by Munsif Sadar (Sri Akhtar Abbas), Faizabad. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffappellant Shri Sadhu Saran filed the suit for the decree for declaration, being passed in his favour and against the defendantrespondents that order dated 161974, whereby the respondent no. 1 had terminated services of the plaintiff, to be void, illegal and unconstitutional for the reasons given in the plaint and that the plaintiff be reinstated to his original post. The plaintiff's case as per plaint allegations has been that on 29768, the plaintiff was appointed a peon (Chaprasi) by the defendant no. 1 in the Institution Bapu Balika Vidyalaya, Faizabad which according to the plaintiff is and has been recognized. The institution is being managed by the defendant nos. 1 to 5. The plaintiff further alleged that his initial pay on the date of his appointment was Rs. 70 per month, that the plaintiff had worked to the utmost satisfaction of the authorities of the institution and was drawing the salary @ of Rs.197 per month in the year 1974. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff asserted that his appointment was confirmed and he was made a permanent employee of Class IV i.e. peon in the institution. The plaintiff alleged the defendant no. 1 to have developed ill will against the plaintiff as he, the plaintiff refused to do the private housework of the defendant no. 1, and defendant no. 1 in order to appoint her favourite person in place of the plaintiff managed in collusion with defendant no. 2 to 5, to suspend the services of the plaintiff on 1951974 without assigning any cogent reasons. The plaintiff further averred in the plaint that the defendant with the consent of defendants 2 to 5 ultimately terminated the services of the plaintiff on 1.7.1974. The plaintiff challenged that order of termination dated 1674 and has alleged the same to be illegal and unconstitutional on the ground as mentioned hereinafter. A That the plaintiff was not given any chargesheet or a show cause notice after the suspension of his services. The plaintiff challenged that order of termination dated 1674 and has alleged the same to be illegal and unconstitutional on the ground as mentioned hereinafter. A That the plaintiff was not given any chargesheet or a show cause notice after the suspension of his services. B That the plaintiff was not given any opportunity of hearing before the passing of the termination order against him by the defendant no 1 and as such, the action of defendant no. 1 is violative of the principles of natural justice and so the order of termination of services dated 1.6.1974. according to the plaint case has been void, and illegal ab initio. C That the order dated 1.6.74 was absolutely whimsical and arbitrary one, as such, was the one which did not have any legal or constitutional basis to depend upon. D That the Regulations 31 to 37 framed by the Board of High School and Intermediate of Uttar Pradesh were not complied with. 3. The plaintiff further alleged that he made a representation to the authorities concerned but all resulted in vain and so the plaintiff filed the present suit on the basis of cause of action which is alleged to have arisen on 1.6.1974 the date on which the plaintiffappellant's services were terminated by the defendantrespondent no. 1. 4. The plaintiff's suit was contested by the defendants. 5. The defendant's ease has been that plaintiff was appointed as a temporary peon by the answering defendant no. 1 as the Principal of Bapu Balika Vidyalaya, Faizabad. The defendants denied the plaintiff to be a confirmed employee or that he was confirmed on the post. The defendants further alleged that the plaintiff's work, behaviour and conduct was not at all satisfactory and that he often absented himself without any application and that answering defendants pulled up the plaintiff and gave him warning off and on so much so that on 6th December, 1969, services were terminated by giving one month's notice. He was also suspended several times but on tendering apology, he was reinstated again and again. The defendants admitted that the plaintiff was suspended on 19574 by answering defendant but denied other allegations made in paragraph 7 of the plaint to the effect that he was suspended without assigning any reasons or on account of any ill will. He was also suspended several times but on tendering apology, he was reinstated again and again. The defendants admitted that the plaintiff was suspended on 19574 by answering defendant but denied other allegations made in paragraph 7 of the plaint to the effect that he was suspended without assigning any reasons or on account of any ill will. The defendants further alleged that in accordance with the Education code and rules framed thereunder the answering defendant being the Principal of the College was the sole appointing authority and she alone was competent to pass order of termination of plaintiff's services. According to the defendant's case, plaintiff's services were quite unsatisfactory and inspite of warnings and orders of suspension and termination passed several times, and later on the plaintiff having been reinstated with hope to improve did not improve and did not act satisfactorily. The defendant terminated the services of the plaintiff on 1674 as defendants got disgusted from the misbehavior and misconduct of the plaintiff. 6. The defendants also alleged that rule 31 to 37 did not apply to the case of the plaintiff as he was simply an employee of IVth Grade Ministerial Staff. The learned trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues: 1 Whether the suit is undervalued? 2 Whether the courtfees paid is insufficient? 3 Whether the order dated 1674 passed by defendant no. 1 terminating the plaintiff from services is illegal? 4 Whether the suit is not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as alleged in para 13 of the writtenstatement? 5 Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form for misdescription of the defendant no. 2 to 5? 6. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 7. The learned Munsif who tried the suit answered the issues I, 2, 4 and 5 in negative. The learned Munsif further held that the order of termination of service dated 1674 was not illegal or unconstitutional of bad. The court took the view that regulations 31 to 37 did not apply to the Class IV employees. The plaintiff preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 261 of 1978 in the Court of District Judge, Faizabad and same has been heard and decided and dismissed by the Civil Judge, Faizabad by judgment and decree dated May 1, 1979. The court took the view that regulations 31 to 37 did not apply to the Class IV employees. The plaintiff preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 261 of 1978 in the Court of District Judge, Faizabad and same has been heard and decided and dismissed by the Civil Judge, Faizabad by judgment and decree dated May 1, 1979. The learned lower appellate court has after consideration of the contentions and arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties before him had taken the view that there has been no substance in the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant to the effect that on the expiry of the probation period of one year, plaintiff's services stood or can be deemed to be automatically confirmed or that plaintiff was to be deemed to have become a permanent employee. The learned lower appellate court took the view that the services of the plaintiff, as is clear from the records, were unsatisfactory. He was suspended & even he was removed from service during the period from 196874 and, as such, there was no question of plaintiff's automatic confirmation to the post as the appointing authority was the principal who was never satisfied with his work and conduct. Therefore, the learned lower appellate court held that the plaintiff appellant could not be and will not be deemed to have been confirmed and will be deemed to be working as probationer and his services were liable to be terminated. The learned lower appellate court further held that regulations 31 to 37 did not apply to the plaintiff who was the Class IV employee. The learned lower appellate court held that the learned Munsif was justified in holding that plaintiff was not entitled to protection or benefit of regulations 31 to 37 of Chapter III of the Regulations as contained in Part II A of Calendar framed under Section 16(5) of U.P. Intermediate Education Act. The learned appellate court further took the view that the enquiry was made regarding the incident dated 19574 and there had been no violation of the principles of natural justice. He held that the plaintiff was given opportunity and due inquiry was made regarding the alleged incident and, as such, order of termination passed against the plaintiff is legal and valid. 8. He held that the plaintiff was given opportunity and due inquiry was made regarding the alleged incident and, as such, order of termination passed against the plaintiff is legal and valid. 8. With these findings, the learned lower appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court decree of dismissal of plaintiff's suit. 9. The plaintiff has comeup in Second Appeal in this Hon'ble Court. 10. I have heard Shri Anand Swaroop Chaudhary, assisted by Shri Raj Verdhan Chaudhary, learned Counsels for the appellant as well as Shn Umesh Chandra, learned Senior Advocate of this Court assisted by Shri Prithvi Nath Srivastava, Advocate for and on behalf of respondents. 11. On behalf of the appellant, learned Counsel for the appellant urged that the plaintiffappellant was appointed on the post of peon on probation of one year, on July 29, 1963 and that he continued in service till 1st June, 1974. His services stood automatically confirmed though he was initially appointed on probation, his service continued there after ill the end of 31st May, 1974. Shri Chaudhary invited my attention to regulation 22 of the regulations framed under Section 16 (G) of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and contended that according to this regulation appointment of the inferior staff is to be made by the principal or Head Master of the School and according to 22nd regulation in the matter of appointment on probation and confirmation of clerks including Libraran and the inferior staff, the regulations 1,4, 15 and 21 of Chapter III have been made applicable and the matters of appointment on probation and confirmation are to be governed by regulations 1,4, 15 and 21 of Chapter III in relation to the plaintiff. He further referred to regulation 8 and 12 and contended that the probation period of an employee appointed in his school is provided to one year. He further contended that regulation 11 provides for confirmation of the employee on the post and in the grade at the end of the probation period. He further submitted that under regulation 12, the probation period could be extended by a maximum period of 12 months. He further contended that regulation 11 provides for confirmation of the employee on the post and in the grade at the end of the probation period. He further submitted that under regulation 12, the probation period could be extended by a maximum period of 12 months. Learned Counsel for the appellant Shri A.S. Chaudhary elaborating his contention submitted that since 29th July, 1968 plaintiffappellant's period of probation extended up to 29th July, 1969 and the said period of one year could be extended by a further period of 12 more months i.e. it could be extended upto July 30, 1970. Shri Chaudhary submitted that the maximum period for which the probation period could be extended in respect of plaintiff's service would have been the last day of July, 1970 because the regulation provide the maximum extent to which the probationary period could be extended i.e. 12 more months from the date of expiry of the initial period of probation of one year and that when no action for terminating the service of the plaintiffappellant by that time had been taken by the oppositeparties, the implication leads to that the plaintiffappellant became automatically confirmed on the post of peon in the school. Shri Chaudhary submitted that it is nothing but an inference based on implication, under the provisions of regulation 12, which has provided the maximum limit to which the probationary period of the plaintiff could be extended and beyond which the appointing authority could not extend the period of probation, that the plaintiffappellant became confirmed automatically and as such is to be deemed to have been confirmed on the post in question Once he has become automatically confirmed, Shri A.S. Chaudhary urged, that there was no question of the plaintiffappellant's services being terminated as in view of the provisions under the Regulations, the plaintiffappellant has been entitled to continue on the post upto the age of 60 years. The plaintiffappellant's counsel submitted that in view of regulation 21, plaintiff has acquired a right as a result of automatic confirmation to continue in service upto the age of 60 years and his service could not be terminated or determined except by way of punishment, and in particular after plaintiffappellant having been given reasonable opportunity of hearing. The plaintiffappellant's counsel submitted that in view of regulation 21, plaintiff has acquired a right as a result of automatic confirmation to continue in service upto the age of 60 years and his service could not be terminated or determined except by way of punishment, and in particular after plaintiffappellant having been given reasonable opportunity of hearing. He submitted apart from the rules and regulations, the principles of natural justice and fair play required that before an order of punishment is passed against one, having civil consequences and adversely affecting one's rights he should be given the opportunity of showing cause and of having his say in the matter before the orders adversely affecting his civil rights are passed. Shri Chaudhary submitted that an action taken in violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play, in an arbitrary manner is negation of rule of law and doctrine of equality enshrined in provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. An arbitrary action, or an action in breach of provisions of the fair play is negation of Rule of la and the doctrine of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India, Shri Chaudhary urged. He emphasised that no opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant before passing of the termination order which order is per se not an order of simple termination but is primafacie an order in the nature of order of punishment, as such, the order in penal and void and that the appellant is entitled to the declaration as claimed that the order dated 161974 is illegal, void and inoperative and that the plaintiffappellant continues to be in service with all benefits. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant in support of his contention to the effect that plaintiffappellant stood automatically confirmed on the post on the expiry of the period of probation, placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dharmvir, reported in (AIR 1968 SC page 1210) as well as decision of the Supreme Court in Paramjeet v. Ram Rakkha reported in (AIR 1979 SC page 1073). He also made a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factory Federation, Lucknow reported in 1968 Labour and Industrial Cases Page 1198 which has also been reported in AIR 1986 S.C. page. He also made a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factory Federation, Lucknow reported in 1968 Labour and Industrial Cases Page 1198 which has also been reported in AIR 1986 S.C. page. 1844. Shri Chaudhary made a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case State of Gujarat v. Akilesh Chandra Bhargava, reported in (AIR 1987 SC page 2135) as well. 13. On behalf of the respondent Shri Umesh Chandra, learned Senior Advocate submitted that in view of the provisions of regulations 8 to 14, the plaintiffappellant cannot be said to have stood confirmed automatically on the expiration of the period of probation. He submitted that the law on the subject is that a person appointed on probation does not acquire the status of a permanent employee. The probationer if his services are not terminated or reverted at the end of probation continues to be a probationer until and unless, the authority competent has passed the order of confirmation of the probationer on the post to which he has been appointed or terminated after having found him unsuitable for the post. He has submitted that unless there is a rule to the effect that a person appointed on probation will automatically stand confirmed on the failure of the officer competent to pass either an order of determination of probation of petitioner at the end of probation or to pass an order of confirmation on the post, the probationer will continue to be a probationer. In this connection, Shri Umesh Chandra made a reference to the following decisions: 14. Shri P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India reported in (AIR 1958 SC page 36) and in particular, made a reference to paragraph 11 of the judgment. In this connection, Shri Umesh Chandra made a reference to the following decisions: 14. Shri P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India reported in (AIR 1958 SC page 36) and in particular, made a reference to paragraph 11 of the judgment. He also made a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1962 SC page 1711), Shri Umesh Chandra further made references to that cases of Ramaswami v. I.G. Police, Mysore reported in (AIR 1966 SC page 175) and to the case of State of U P. v. Akbar All Khan reported in (AIR 1966 SC page 1842) as well as to the cases Kedar Nath v. State of U.P. reported in (AIR 1972 SC page 873 and to the case of State of Maharashtra v. V.R. Sabaji reported in (AIR 1980 SC page 42). He made a reference to the case of Pratap Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh reported in (AIR 1980 SC page 57) in support of his contention that no proceedings need be taken against the probationer while terminating his services. Shri Umesh Chandra made a reference to the observation held in the case of State of Gujarat v. S. Chandra reported in (AIR 1988 SC page 336), and lastly, he made a reference to the decision of Shri Dhiraj Ghosh v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC in order to give strength and support to his contention that confirmation of a temporary employee or a probationer is not automatic on account of nonextension or termination of the period of probation. He referred to the following observations of the Supreme Court, In those circumstances, the confirmation of temporary/probationary appointee was not automatic after nonextension or termination of the period of probation. Shri Umesh Chandra further contended that in case this Hon'ble Court takes the view that the order of termination was in the nature of penal order or that the plaintiffappellant had acquired the position and status of a permanent employee by an automatic confirmation then in that case there can be no dispute that the plaintiffappellant would be entitled to get reasonable opportunity of hearing and to show cause, but he emphatically submitted that a perusal of the documents on record will show, as has been held by the courts below, that the plaintiffappellant had got ample opportunity of hearing. He submitted that a perusal of the service record would reveal that his conduct has not been satisfactory and he has been suspended for his wrongs and, therefore, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed. Deeming confirmation or the doctrine of implication to the effect that as the maximum period of probation had expired and no order of confirmation or termination having been passed after the expiry of period of probation or extended period of probation or maximum period of probation, the employee should be deemed to have been confirmed will not apply to the case of such an employee whose conduct is not revealed by records to have been satisfactory and above Board. The doctrine of deemed confirmed on the expiry of period of probation or to say, the expiry or the maximum permissible probationary period will apply to the cases of an employee whose service record is unblemished and shows that the conduct of the employee is free from blames, adverse entries and in ordinary circumstance the reasonable person would have son firmed as such, Shri Umesh Chandra submitted, the plaintiff cannot be deemed to be a confirmed employee, irrespective of the fact that no order either of termination of probation or confirmation of service has been passed in the case of the plaintiff, at all and the orderimpugned, on account of plaintiff appellant being the probationer, terminating the appellant's services could be passed as appellant was considered unfit or unsuitable. 15. His last contention has been that it is a finding of fact recorded by the two courts below that the plaintiff appellant had been given amole opportunity of hearing before passing of the termination order during the period from 1962 to 1974 as well as with reference to the incident of 19574. Thus I have gone through the record and have taken note of the contentions of the learned counsel for parties and it appears to me that the following questions require to be considered in the present appeal: (a) Whether and in what circumstance a probationer becomes a confirmed employee, if no order of confirmation or termination has been passed on the expiry of the period of probation or the maximum permissible period of probation i.e. the maximum permissible limits of extension of probationary period ? (b) Whether in the present case, the plaintiff acquired the status of a permanent confirmed employee and could he be deemed to be confirmed on and after 29th July, 1973 on which date, the maximum possible extended period of probation would have expired or period upto which the extension of probation could have been granted, as no action had been taken by the authorities in the matter of termination of probation or his confirmation in the context of the record of the service? (c) Whether doctrine of deemed confirmation in the circumstances of the facts of the case will apply to the plaintiff if and particularly when the service record indicated adverse material exhibited that his services were not satisfactory? (d) The question to be considered is, if the plaintiff appellant's services could be terminated or determined by order dated 1674 and whether the order impugned is parse a penal order casting stigma and if yes, whether it has been passed after giving reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff appellant, of hearing, if not, its effects? and (e) Whether it is open to this Hon'ble Court to interfere with findings recorded by Courts below on the question of plaintiff appellant being given reasonable opportunity of hearing? 16. The present case is governed by the law i.e. the previsions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Regulations framed thereunder as it then stood on the date on which the order dated 1674 was passed. 17. That Section 16G of U.P. Intermediate Act, 1921 reads as under: Section 16G; (1) Every person employed hi a recognized institution shall be governed by such conditions of service as may be prescribed by Regulations and any agreement between the management and such employee,, insofar as it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or regulations shall be void. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1) Regulations may provide for: (a) The period of probation, the condition of confirmation and the procedure and conditions for promotion and punishment including suspension pending enquiry and emoluments for the period of suspension and termination of service with notice. (b) The scale of pay and payment of salaries. (c) The transfer of service from one recognized institution to another. (d) Grant of leave and provident fund and other benefits; and (e) Maintenance of record of work and service. 18. (b) The scale of pay and payment of salaries. (c) The transfer of service from one recognized institution to another. (d) Grant of leave and provident fund and other benefits; and (e) Maintenance of record of work and service. 18. In exercise of powers under subsection 1 and Section 8 of intermediate Education (Amendment) Act, 1958, The Governor was pleased to frame the regulations in respect of matters governed by Section 16A, Section 16B, Section 16C, Section 16D, Section 16F and Section 16G of Intermediate Education Act. Regulation 22 of the regulations which deals with Ministerial and Inferior Servants reads as under: Regulation 22Ministerfal and Inferior Servants The Committee of Management is the appointing authority in respect of the clerk including a librarian, and the Principal or Headmaster in respect of the inferior servants. The appointment, probation (period for which will be one year) and confirmation of clerks including a librarian and inferior servants shall mutatis mutandis be governed by Regulations 1, 4 to 15 and 21 foregoing?' Regulation 7 and 8 read as under: Regulation 7 A person selected for substantive appointment against a clear vacancy shall be placed on probation from the date of joining duty. Regulation 8 The period of probation shall be one year whether a person is a direct recruit or has been promoted from a lower grade 'in the service of the institution to a higher grade. Regulations 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 are also relevant for the purpose of this case and they read as under: Regulation 10 A person placed on probation shall be confirmed if he fulfils the requirements of Regulation 9 above, has worked with diligence, has otherwise proved himself fit for the post for which he was recruited and his integrity is certified. Regulation 11 Unless before the expiry of the period of probation, the service of a Head Master, Principal or teacher is terminated or action is taken to dismiss, discharge or remove him or reduce him in rank in the case of Headmaster or Principal or the period of probation is extended under Regulation 12 following, he shall bi confirmed on the post and in the grade at the end of his probation. Regulation 12 The period of probation of a teacher or a Principal or Headmaster may be extended by a maximum period of 12 months. Regulation 12 The period of probation of a teacher or a Principal or Headmaster may be extended by a maximum period of 12 months. Regulation 13 At least six weeks before the date on which the confirmation of a teacher is due, the Headmaster or Principal shall prepare his confirmation papers, and send them along with his own remarks, copies of the teacher's character roll and order of appointment to the Management who shall place them before the Committee of Management for its consideration. Confirmation paper of the Principal or Headmaster shall likewise be prepared by the Committee of Management shall in each case be recorded in the form of resolution. Regulation 14 A copy of the resolution of the Committee of Management confirming a person shall be supplied to him and another copy forwarded to the Inspector or Regional Inspectress in the case of a teacher, and to the Regional Deputy Director of Education (Women), in the case of Headmaster or Principal as the case may be. An entry to this effect shall also be made in the service book of the person concerned. 19. Regulation 10 provides as to when a person placed on probation shall be confirmed on satisfying the conditions specified therein. Regulation 11 provides that on the expiry of the period of probation unless the services of the employee have been terminated or unless an action to dismiss or discharge or remove him or to reduce in rank is taken or unless the period of probation is extended under Regulation No. 12, the person i.e., employee placed on probation shall be confirmed on the post and in the grade at the end of his probation. 20. Regulation 12 provides for the extension of period of probation and it provides that the period of probation may be extended by maximum period of 12 months. 21. Regulations 13 and 14 provide and make provisions and lay down the processes for the action being taken for confirmation and provide that the copy of resolution of the Committee of the Management confirming an employee shall be supplied to him while another shall be sent to Inspector i.e. to higher authorities and further provides for an entry to that effect that the employee concerned has been confirmed, shall also be made in the service book of the employee concerned. 22. 22. According to facts of the case, no order of confirmation appears to have been passed confirming the plaintiff appellant on the post on the expiry of the period of probation or thereafter till the date the action had been taken by passing order dated 161974 terminating the service of the plaintiff appellant which the plaintiff appellant contends to be a penal order and which as the plaintiff contends to have been passed against him in violation of principle of natural justice and in violation of regulations 31 to 37 framed under Intermediate Education Act. Thus, admittedly, no order of confirmation to the post of plaintiff appellants to which he has been appointed on 29th July, 1963 has been passed and, as such, the question is whether, in the context of the rules and law applicable, the appellant is a confirmed Employee. 13. That as regards the position of a probationer in the case of P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India reported in (AIR 1958 SC page 36) it has been laid down at page 42 as under: Such an employment on probation under ordinary law of master and servant comes to an end if during or at the end of probation the servant so appointed on trial is found unsuitable and his service is terminated by a notice. 24. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further laid down at the same page as under: 'It is, therefore, quite clear that an appointment to a permanent post in Government Service either on probation or on an officiating basis is from very nature of such employment, itself, of transitory character and in absence of any special contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of service, the implied term of such appointment under original law of master and servant is that it is terminable at any time. 25. Thus, it is clear that an appointment on probation carried with itself an implied term to the effect that such an appointment i.e., appointment on probation, is terminable. The service of a person appointed on probation is, by its nature either terminable at the end of probation if it is found unsuitable, and if he, the employee concerned is found fit and suitable he is to be confirmed according to rules and Regulations. 26. The service of a person appointed on probation is, by its nature either terminable at the end of probation if it is found unsuitable, and if he, the employee concerned is found fit and suitable he is to be confirmed according to rules and Regulations. 26. In the case of S. Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1962 SC page 1711), their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the law on this subject as under: But very fact that a person is probationer implies that he has to prove his worth, his suitability for higher post in which he is officiating. If his work is not found satisfactory, he will be liable to be reverted to his original post even without assigning any reason...It would therefore, be not correct to say that a probationer has any right to higher post in which he is officiating or a right to be confirmed, the plaintiff appellant being made eligible for being absorbed in a permanent position is not better position. Their Lordships further observed, a probationer can not, as rightly pointed out by a Division Bench, automatically acquire the status of a permanent members of service unless of course the rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. 27, It means in other words that a probationer will continue to be a probationer unless reverted or absorbed in the permanent post. In the case of Ramaswami v. I.G. of Police, Mysore reported in (AIR 1966 SC page 175), their Lordships of the Supreme Court after having referred to rule 486 of Hyderabad District Police Manual as well as after having made reference to the provisions of the Act has observed: It is true that the words used in the sentence set out above are not that the promoted officer will be eligible and qualified for promotion at the end of probationary period which are the words to be often found in the rules in such cases. Even so though the part of rule 468 says that promoted officer will be confirmed at the end of probationary period, it is qualified by the words if they have given satisfaction clearly, therefore, the rule does not contemplate automatic confirmation after the probationary period of two years, for a promoted officer can only be confirmed under this rule if he has given satisfaction. This condition of giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before a promoted officer can be confirmed under this rule and this condition obviously means that the authority competent to confirm must pass an order to the effect that the probationary officer has given satisfaction and is, therefore, confirmed.'' 28. Similar view has been expressed in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar All (AIR 1966 SC page 1842). Delivering the judgment of five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.C. Shah after having made a reference to the revenue executive services (Tehsildar) rule 1944 and in particular to rules 12, 13, 14 and 15 thereof, has been pleased to lay down as under: There is no rule that on the expiry of the probation, the probationer shall be deemed to have been confirmed in the post which is holding as a probationer. 29. His Lordship further observed and has been pleased to lay down; Confirmation, in the post which a probationer is holding, does not result merely from the expiry of the period of probation and so long as the order of confirmation is not made the holder of the post remains a probationer. It has been held by this Court that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for specified period an employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the said without any specific order of confirmation he continues as a probationer only and acquires no substantive right to hold the post. If order of an appointment itself states that at the end of period of probation, the appointee will stand confirmed in absence of an order to the contrary, the appointee will acquire a substantive right to the post even without such confirmation. In all other cases in absence of such an order, or in the absence of such a rule, an express order of confirmation is necessary to give him such a right. Where after the period of probation, an appointee is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, the only possible view to take is that by implication the period of probation has been extended and it is not a correct proposition to state that an appointee should be deemed to be confirmed from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue after the end of period of probation. 30. Their Lordships have made a reference with approval to the above mentioned cases of Sukhwans Singh (Supra) as well as to the case of Chief Conservator of Forest v. D.A. Layll. C.A. No. 259 of 1963 decided on 24265. 31. Learned Counsel for the appellant further made a reference to the case of Kedar Nath v. State of Punjab reported in (AIR 1972 SC page 873). The Hon'ble Palekar, J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed as under: The law on the point is now well settled. Where a person appointed as a probationer in any post and a period of probation is specified it does not follow that even at the end of specified period of probation he obtains confirmation automatically even if no order is passed in that behalf. Unless the terms of appointment clearly indicate that the confirmation would automatically follow at the end of the specified period or there is a specific rule to that effect expiration of the probationary period does not necessarily lead to confirmation. At the end of the period of probation an order confirming the officer is required to be passed and if no such order is passed and he is not reverted to his substantive post, the resultmerely is that he continues in his post as a probationer. This decision was followed with approval in the case of State of Maharashtra v. V.P. Sevaja reported in ( AIR 1980 SC 42 ) and the same view was reiterated. In my opinion, the rule in question, therefore, comes out to be that the ordinary and normal rule is that without an express order of confirmation, the Government Servant will not be taken to have been confirmed in the post, to which he was appointed temporarily and/or on probation post. Hon. Untwalia, J. with reference to the case of Slate of Punjab v. Dharm Singh which has been referred by the learned Counsel for the appellant before me as well as and has observed that under Punjab rule in that case certain maximum time had been fixed beyond which the probationary period could not be extended and it was held that when the Govt. Servant was allowed to continue after completion of maximum period of probation without expressed order of confirmation he could not be deemed to continue in that post as probationary by implication. Servant was allowed to continue after completion of maximum period of probation without expressed order of confirmation he could not be deemed to continue in that post as probationary by implication. In other words, because an expressed provision in rule visavis the maximum period of probation, the confirmation was automatic. 32. In the case of Dheeraj Ghosh v. Union of India ( AIR 1991 SC 73 ) it has been laid down as a broad proposition of law that the confirmation of a temporary appointee is not automatic on non extension or termination of the period of probation. 33. These above mentioned eases, no doubt, lay down the broad proposition of law to the effect that if a person has been appointed on probation and the period of probation comes to an end and expires, the probationary does not automatically acquire the status of a confirmed employee i.e. a probationary remains a probationary until the authority competent pass an order of confirmation after having been satisfied that the person concerned is suitable for the post. The above cases laid down that there is no automatic confirmation simply due to expiry of the period of probation. An order of confirmation is necessary to be passed before an employee appointed on probation can acquire the status of a confirmed employee subject to the exception of those cases where there is an express rule to the effect or there is an express term of the order of appointment to the effect that on the expiry of the period of the probation, the employee working on probation will automatically be deemed to be confirmed. 34. That a line of distinction has been drawn by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in another set of cases beginning from the case of State of Punjab v. Dharm Singh reported in AIR1968 SC page 1210. In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed and laiddown the law. 35. 34. That a line of distinction has been drawn by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in another set of cases beginning from the case of State of Punjab v. Dharm Singh reported in AIR1968 SC page 1210. In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed and laiddown the law. 35. After having made reference to S. Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1962 SC page 1711) and to the cases of G.S. Rajwans v. I.G. Police (AIR 1966 SC page 175) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali and others, the Court observed as under where......The service rules fixed a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post, after completion of the period of probation without an express order of confirmation by implication. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by service rule forbidding extension of probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a case it is permissible to draw an inference that an employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. The rational of this case i.e. State of Punjab v. Dharm Singh is that in cases where the service rules prescribed a maximum period beyond which the probation cannot be extended but an employee is allowed to continue in that post, the implication that the employee is and has been on probation continues to be probation is negatived by service rules itself which forbids extension of probationary period beyond the maximum period provided by the rules and so an inference can be drawn that the employee if allowed to continue beyond the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in that post, by another implication. That on line of reasoning based on inference and implication in Dharm Singh's case the doctrine of automatic confirmation has been developed and laiddown by, the Supreme Court. That on line of reasoning based on inference and implication in Dharm Singh's case the doctrine of automatic confirmation has been developed and laiddown by, the Supreme Court. Their Lordships distinguished the earlier case on the grounds that in all those cases i.e. in S. Sukhbans Singh's case, G.S. Rajvan's case or in the case of State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali, the condition of service of the employee deemed extension of probationary period for indefinite period and there is no service rule forbidding its extension beyond a certain maximum period. This line of reasoning and the principle enunciated therein have been followed by the Supreme Court in other cases as well which may be referred as under: 35 A. Paramjeet Singh and others v. Ram Rakha and others reported in (AIR 1979 SC page 1073) and Om Prakash Maurya v. Cooperative Sugar Factory Federation Ltd. and others reported in (AIR 1986 SC page 1844). In the case of Om Prakash v. U.P. Cooperative Factory Federation Ltd. the Supreme Court after having made a reference to regulation 17 and 18 of the employees service regulation, 1975 observed Regulation 17 and 18 together provide that appointment against regular vacancy is to be made on probation for a period of one year and this probationary period can be extended for one year more. The proviso to regulation 17 restricts the powers of appointing authority in extending the period of probation beyond one year.........Regulation 17 does not permit continuance of an employee on probation for a period of more than two years, the necessary result would follow that after the expiry of two years the probationary period, the employee stands confirmed by implication. While making these observations and laying down these propositions, their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the case of State of Punjab v. Dharm Singh (Supra). The principle laid down incase of State of Gujarat v. Akliesh Bhargava also reported in (AIR 1987 SC page 2135): Thus from the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, the following principles emerged: (a) That an employee who has been appointed on probation for a certain period he continues to be a probationary until the appointing (authority) passes an order of confirmation after having found him suitable and fit. (b) A probationer does not automatically stand confirmed and does not acquire the status of a permanent member of service simply on the ground that the period of probation has expired and the competent authority has not passed an order either of termination or reversion of the employee from the post or an order of confirmation. Unless and until with the exception to the cases where terms of appointment or service rules expressly provide for such result i.e. automatic confirmation of the probationary on the expiry of the term of the probationary. In other words, it means that a probationer will continue to be a probationer unless he is reverted or absorbed in the permanent post i.e. by implication the period of probation has been extended. (c) That in cases where the service rule provide for a period of probation & thereafter provide for extension of probationary period and put a limit on the (sic) of the Govt. with reference to the maximum period to which the period of probation can be extended and the authorities do not pass any order either terminating the appointment during or at the end of the maximum limits of probationary period, nor do pass an order confirming the probationer on the post he has been appointed, the inference that can be drawn is that there is no power to extend the period of probation. So the implication that probationer continued to be probationary is negatived by service rule forbidding the extension of probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it and so it is permissible to draw an inference that employee who has been allowed to continue on the post even on completion of maximum period of probation has been confirmed in that post by another implication. 36. These principles lead to another question, if by the inference of automatic confirmation by another implication referred to in the case of Dharm Singh be made applicable to the case of present appellant and can the appellant in the circumstances of the case be held to have been automatically confirmed. The rules referred to above i.e. Regulation 7 and 8 referred to above provide that initial appointment shall be made on probation for a period of one year. The rules referred to above i.e. Regulation 7 and 8 referred to above provide that initial appointment shall be made on probation for a period of one year. That regulation 10 provides that a person placed on probation shall be confirmed if he fulfills the requirements of regulation 9, he works with diligence & otherwise proves himself fit for the post in which he happens to work & his integrity is certified. Regulation 11 further directs that unless before the expiry of the period of probation the service of the probationer has not been terminated or determined by dismissal or removal or reduction in ranker unless his period of probation is extended under regulation 12 he shall be confirmed on the post in the grade at the end of his probation. 37. Regulation 12 provides that the period of probation of the employee appointed on probation may be extended by a maximum of further period of 12 months. 38. Regulation 13 provides the processes how the confirmation is to be made and it provides that atleast six weeks before the date of confirmation, the authority concerned shall prepare the confirmation paper of the probationary employee and shall send them with his own remarks, character role of the employee and the order of appointment to the Manager who shall place them before the Committee for his consideration and then the decision will be taken by the Committee after consideration of those papers, and the confirmation in each case will be made in the form of a resolution as per regulation 14 shall be supplied to the employee concerned and another will be forwarded to the Inspector or Regional Inspector and an entry to the effect that the employee has been confirmed shall also be made in the servicebook of the employee concerned. These are the regulations which are applicable in view of regulation 22 to the case of the plaintiffappellant as well. There appears to be no rule expressly providing that on the expiry of the maximum period of probation, the probationer will stand confirmed automatically on the post. Regulations 10, 11 & 13 to 14 as mentioned above make confirmation subject to an express order being passed by competent person or authority on its having found that the probationer is suitable and fit person to be confirmed in light to conditions referred to in that regulation i.e. Regulation 10 itself. Regulations 10, 11 & 13 to 14 as mentioned above make confirmation subject to an express order being passed by competent person or authority on its having found that the probationer is suitable and fit person to be confirmed in light to conditions referred to in that regulation i.e. Regulation 10 itself. 39. The question now is whether the implication carried under the first principle i.e. a probationer by implication continues to be on probation if at the end of the period of his probation, no orders of termination or confirmation is passed as has been held in Sukhvans Singh's case or that said implication stood negatived by the maximum limits to extension being prescribed by regulation 12 to the effect that period of probation can be extended to the maximum period of 12 months and the plaintiffappellant is to be deemed to have been confirmed. 40. In the case in hand, it has been the defendant's case as per defence pleadings that the plaintiff's work and behaviour and conduct having been unsatisfactory and he often having absented himself without any application and for that he having been pulled up and was given warnings so much so that on 6th December, 1969 his services were terminated by giving one month's notice and thereafter as well he having been reinstated on tendering apologies & thereafter he has been suspended several times which allegations appears to be established from documents i.e. notice of termination order dated 61269 which has been admitted on behalf of the plaintiff by his counsel as well as by the plaintiff himself to have been served on him which provides and in which it has been mentioned that by one month's notice dated 61269 it is hereby pointed out that your services will not be required w.e.f. 6770 as your conduct has not been satisfactory vide Ext. Ka. 5 on record. That by Ext. A19 on record, i.e. paper no. 41C. 1 on record it is exhibited and proved that on 241269, the plaintiff tendered an application for being excused and pardoned and prayed that the order of termination be withdrawn and that he should be allowed to work and that by an order dated 6170 passed by Principal, the plaintiff was given afresh opportunity to work as well as to improve his conduct and behaviour. This order was passed on the date, the period of notice dated 61269 had been expiring Ext. Ka. 7 shows that he was suspended by the order dated 6371 and he again submitted a letter for being excused and the suspension order was withdrawn in pursuance of the appellant's application dated 931971. Ext. 10 further indicates that he was given show cause notice for his misconduct on 14772, to show cause why his services be not terminated and was called upon to reply within three days vide Ext. 10 which shows that his conduct was not satisfactory and that he was negligent in performance of the duties. Ext. 11 further shows that he was negligent in performance of the duties and without proper permission he has left for home as well as he bad threatened another peon to assault him and was required to submit his explanation. Ext. 12 shows that he had been suspended by order dated 22121972 for disobedience and that order was withdrawn by order dated 911973. Ext. Ka. 13 on record shows there had been scuffle and fight between plaintiff appellant and one Ram Chandra, Chaukidar on 1951974 and that he was suspended by order dated 19574. Ram Chandra had made a complaint about the same on 19574 & by order dated 1674, plaintiffappellant's services were terminated or determined, the termination order is Ext. Ka. 14 on record. Whether the order dated 1674 is a simple order of termination of the probationer on account of his work and conduct being unsatisfactory or it is an order in the nature of penal order amounting to removal will be considered lateron. The reference to these documents and Ext. Ka. Ka. 14 on record. Whether the order dated 1674 is a simple order of termination of the probationer on account of his work and conduct being unsatisfactory or it is an order in the nature of penal order amounting to removal will be considered lateron. The reference to these documents and Ext. Ka. 15 i.e. the service book of the plaintiff is being made to examine the question whether the conduct of the plaintiffappellant had been such i.e. free from any blemish and free from unsatisfactory conduct so as to enable us to draw an inference that on the expiry of the maximum period of probation, the plaintiffappellant can be deemed to have been confirmed or not, whether on the expiry of the maximum period of probationary the authorities could have and should have as well as would have passed the order of confirmation after holding him fit and suitable for the post or there are circumstances which denote to the contrary and prevent such an inference being drawn that on the expiry of the maximum period of probation, the plaintiffappellant can be deemed to have been confirmed. The service book of the plaintiffappellant also indicates and shows that on 61269, the plaintiffappellant's services have been terminated by one month's notice but on tendering apologies and moving an application dated 241269, the plaintiffappellant was allowed to continue to work even after the expiry of the period of notice vide the order dated 6170. The character roll further indicates that for various dates on account of absence from duties from 28271 to 35371, the plaintiffappellant had been suspended. The characterroll further shows that from 11072 he was reappointed on the post of peon. The characterroll further shows that during the period 221272 to 9173, the plaintiffappellant had been under suspension which suspension order was withdrawn after admonition on 11073. 41. A perusal of these documents per se show that the conduct of the plaintiff was not satisfactory one. It also shows that earlier in 1968, the appellant had been appointed as Chaukidar but w.e.f. 11072 he was appointed as peon. 41. A perusal of these documents per se show that the conduct of the plaintiff was not satisfactory one. It also shows that earlier in 1968, the appellant had been appointed as Chaukidar but w.e.f. 11072 he was appointed as peon. This shows that the appointment of the plaintiff appellant as peon w.e.f. 11072 was a fresh appointment and so his appointment as a peon Chaukidar was again on probation and the period of probation on the post of peon did and could be extended under the aforesaid rules for the maximum period of two years and it did extend upto 11074. Thus considered, firstly; it comes out that if his appointment as a peon as Exhibited by Ext. 15 the characterroll entries is taken to be a fresh appointment on the post of peon on probation it can without doubt be said that the plaintiffappellant continued to be on probation on 1674 and the doctrine of implication or inference of automatic confirmation on the basis of the principle of law laid down in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharm Singh (Supra) and other cases referred to above and relied by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffappellant, cannot be applied to the case of the appellant and he continued to be a probationer as in that case, the period of probation has not expired on the date, the order dated 1674 i.e. Ext. Ka. 14 had been passed. Even otherwise, if it is taken that initial appointment of the plaintiffappellant was as Chaukidar, which had been made on 29768 as asserted by the plaintiff no. 1 and thereafter even if he continued to be in service, the plaintiffappellant, firstly, cannot be deemed to be in service in continuance as by notice dated 61269 his services were determined, though, the order of termination was no doubt withdrawn on 61070. In any case, originally and ordinarily the confirmation, as provided under the Regulations 10 to 14 as well as under the general law of services, has got to be made by the appointing authority of passing an express order of confirmation on the appointing authority's or on the competent authority's being satisfied that the person concerned is and has been found to be suitable for being confirmed. That under regulation 10, it is specifically provided that the confirmation has to be made only after it having been found that the employee has worked with diligence and proved his conduct and himself to be otherwise fit as well as he has proved his integrity, during the period. The service law requires, confirmation of the person suitable for the post to be made. The rule provides for confirmation of persons who have worked with diligence during the course of probation period and who proved their metal, merits, integrity as well as satisfy the authority that they are fit for the post and their integrity is beyond doubt. The question is if an employee and his service record show otherwise can such an inference of automatic confirmation be drawn in his favour, that irrespective of the fact that record shows, his conduct to be unsatisfactory, that record show that it contains entries indicating that he was not fit and his conduct had not been satisfactory and in ordinary course of thing he would not have been confirmed can be held to be automatically confirmed simply on account of expiration of maximum period of probation. The above mentioned Supreme Court Decisions, therein State of Punjab v. Dharm Singh or others relied upon by Shri Chaudhary, do not appear to lay down any such proposition of law that irrespective of the fact that the service record of an employee shows that his conduct was not satisfactory and that his conduct was not free from blemish or adverse entries yet he should be deemed to have been confirmed on the post on the expiry of the maximum period of probation, simply on the ground of expiry of the maximum period of probation and failure or abstinence or omission on the part of the competent authority to pass order of termination or otherwise. In the case of Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (AIR 1974 SC page 2193), after having made a reference to the case of State of Punjab v. Dharm Singh (Supra) the Supreme Court laid down as under: Any confirmation by implication is negatived in the present case because before the completion of three years, the High Court found, prima facie, that the work as well as conduct of appellant was unsatisfactory and a note was given to the appellant on 4th October, 1988 to show cause why his services should not be terminated. 42. In the present case as well, as has been mentioned above, the appellant's services have been terminated for unsatisfactory conduct by notice dated 61269 and notice indicated that his services will no more be required from 6170 but thereafter, no doubt, after admonition he was given fresh opportunity to work, the service record further indicated, his conduct was not satisfactory and he was suspended on account of absence from duty from 28271 to 25371 and later on as well as he was suspended during the period from 221272 to 9173 and w. e. f. 7173 he was taken on work after admonition. As such on the principles laid down in the case of Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (AIR 1974 SC 2193) referred to above that the doctrine of inference of automatic confirmation by implication will not apply to the case of present plaintiffappellant. That if no order of termination or confirmation had been passed on the expiration of probation of such employee he will be deemed under the doctrine of implication to have continued as probationary, is for this reason that if a probationary employee's servicerecord and other evidence show that his conduct was not satisfactory or suitable and yet he is to be deemed confirmed simply on the ground that authority concerned has not passed any order of termination and confirmation the result that will follow, will be far reaching and disastrous. As such, in view of this principles laid down in the case of Shamsher Singh (Supra) that if the record of service of an employee and the evidence show his conduct to be unsatisfactory etc. As such, in view of this principles laid down in the case of Shamsher Singh (Supra) that if the record of service of an employee and the evidence show his conduct to be unsatisfactory etc. then irrespective of the fact that the maximum period of probation has expired and no order has been passed by the appointing authority and the probationary employee is allowed to work then only possible implication or inference can be that he is allowed as a probationer and be cannot be deemed to have been confirmed automatically by implication. Thus considered, in my opinion, the plaintiffappellant continues to be a probationer irrespective of the fad that the maximum period of probation had expired. 43. It is also a well settled principle of law that if the facts and circumstances of the case indicate and disclose or that the order parse indicates or that substance of the order is that termination is by way of punishment, the officer or employee working on probation is also entitled to the protection of Article 311 and is entitled to get reasonable opportunity of being heard. The substance of the order and not the form will be decisive. Shri K.N. Furnandis v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1971 SC 908 ) and Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1974 SC 2193) vide relevant paragraph 66, it has further been laid down as under: If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, inefficiency, or other similar reasons without proper inquiry and without his getting reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge, it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 44. That the Ext. 44. That the Ext. 14 i.e. order dated 1674 says that on 19574 there had been a scuffle and a marpeet between plaintiff appellant and Ram Chandra Chaukidar and that the plaintiffappellant knowing full well the consequences acted in an indiciplinary manner and his conduct amounted to a grave misconduct and indiscipline on the spot and that further there have been several instances of indiscipline and serious misconduct and grave negligence towards the duty on the part of plaintiffappellant, irrespective of several warning given to him and, as such, on the basis of the above mentioned facts of indiscipline and grave misconduct and negligence of duties the services of plaintiff appellant had been terminated or determined by Ext. Ka. 14 i.e. order dated 1674. Applying the test as laid down above, in Shamsher Singh's case (Supra) when I examine the order impugned dated 1674 it parse appears to be an order of penal or punitive nature and amounts to dismissal or removal from service. It cannot be said to be a simple order of termination based on the ground of unsuitability. After having found that the order is penal or punitive in nature, it has to be looked and considered if the record shows, proves or establishes in particular the defence plea that plaintiffappellant was given reasonable opportunity of showing cause and hearing before the passing of the order dated 1674. The teamed courts below have taken the viewthat regulations no. 31 to 37 did not apply to plaintiffappellant who was a Class IV employee. 45. The courts below, no doubt, have recorded the concurrent findings of the fact that ample opportunity had been given to the plaintiffappellant before the passing of order dated 161974. That as regard regulations 31 to 44 which provide for punishment and inquiry, the court below have taken the view that in view of explanation to Regulation 24 which deals with the termination of services, the plaintiffappellants have not been entitled to benefits of rules 31 to 44. Rules 31 to 44 provide for the punishment, inquiry and suspension of an employee and the proceedings to be taken in course of inquiry and indicate that what opportunity is to be given to the employee. Rules 31 to 44 provide for the punishment, inquiry and suspension of an employee and the proceedings to be taken in course of inquiry and indicate that what opportunity is to be given to the employee. Explanation to Regulation 24 as it then was reads as under: Regulation24: Explanation Unless the context otherwise requires the word employee in this and the following regulations of the Chapter shall mean the teacher, principal or Headmaster. 46. On the basis of specific explanation of the expression employee given in this explanation to Regulation 24 that an employee means a teacher, principal and headmaster for the purpose of regulation 24 as well as regulations thereafter contained in Chapter III, it was argued by learned Counsel for respondents that in the regulation 24 and all other regulations thereafter contained in Chapter III till the explanation did exist and was not removed, expression employee means teacher, principal and the headmaster only and none else and as such the learned courts below were not wrong in holding that regulations 37 to 44 did not apply to an employee of the grade of Clause 3 or 4. That as explanation aforesaid has been deleted vide notification dated March, 1975 there is no need to express any opinion. The question is, is it open to Authorities to act arbitrarily ignoring all rules of conduct and principles of natural justice if these provisions did not apply, did it mean that the principal of the College or any authority competent to punish or to pass a punishing order, can pass an order of punishment against an employee without giving him opportunity to explain his conduct complained of and to show cause against the order in respect of the action proposed to be taken. 47. Rule of law is the soul and bone of Democratic Society or Democratic basis of Society or nation. All actions arbitrary in nature and character are negation of rule of law and the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 47. Rule of law is the soul and bone of Democratic Society or Democratic basis of Society or nation. All actions arbitrary in nature and character are negation of rule of law and the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. Any order, even an administrative order, having civil consequences or penal in nature has to be passed after having followed the principles of natural justice and fair play i.e. by giving the officer or employee concerned, who is going to be punished or condemned, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the charges levelled against him or against the intended punishment or punitive order before the order is passed. If for technical reasons or because of explanation to regulation 24 the provision of regulations 31 to 44 did not apply to a Chaukidar or to the case of peon that is to say, to the case of a fourth class employee, it does not mean that he should be punished otherwise than after having given him reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. When the power to dismiss or remove from service is derived from statute or under statutory regulation, there exists a duty on the part of dismissing or removing authority to observe rule of natural justice and the existence of such duty is to be presumed, as has been laid down in the case U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijai Narain (AIR 1980 SC 844). Where Rules or statutes or Acts are silent, the principles of natural justice and fair play will operate and, therefore, as it is the requirement of rule of natural justice that if a person or employee is sought to be punished for certain charges, then charges against him should be brought to the notice of the delinquent employee, the charge as well as the material forming the basis of charge and intended to be used to prove the charges should be brought to his notice and he should be given opportunity to show cause by filing a reply to each charge and if the employee concerned denies those charges levelled against him then the inquiry should be held and in that case evidence in proof for the charges should be produced before him and he should also be given opportunity to put that evidence to the test of veracity thereof and to show that evidence is false and is not worthy of reliance and credence by means of crossexamination etc. and any material including the inquiry officer's report if Investigating Officer is a different person from the punishing authorities, should also be afforded to him before punishing authority makes up his mind as to allege guilt, fault or charges levelled against the employee and as to the punishment to be inflicted, so as to enable him to explain his case or cogent reasons with reference to the inquiry report as well. He should also be given opportunity to produce his defence evidence, if he so likes. These are the broad principles of requirements for the compliance of principles of natural justice to the effect that before a person is punished he should be given reasonable opportunity of explaining his conduct and dislodging or disproving the charges levelled against him by crossexamination as well as by producing his evidence. These are the broad principles of requirements for the compliance of principles of natural justice to the effect that before a person is punished he should be given reasonable opportunity of explaining his conduct and dislodging or disproving the charges levelled against him by crossexamination as well as by producing his evidence. In the case of U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vinai Bajpai (Supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court had laid down the law to the same effect as above and further the law laid down is as under: The rule of natural justice in the circumstances of the case required that the respondents should be given reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt, to defend himself and to establish his innocence which means and includes an opportunity to examine the witnesses relied upon by the appellant corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence of charges as also to show cause notice for proposed punishment. 48. In the case of Union of India v. T.P. Verma (AIR 1957 SC page 882 at page 885), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, laid it down as under: Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence and that he should be given the opportunity of crossexamining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the inquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed. 49. Reference in this regard may also be given to the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another ( AIR 1986 SC 1571 ) and to the Full Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Ravindra Nath v. Mandi Samiti, Sitapur reported in ( AIR 1989 All 154 ). Reference in this regard may also be given to the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another ( AIR 1986 SC 1571 ) and to the Full Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Ravindra Nath v. Mandi Samiti, Sitapur reported in ( AIR 1989 All 154 ). That on the basis of the test, laid down on the above cases, when I consider the facts of the present case, I find that the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below to the effect that the plaintiffappellant had been given opportunity before the order of punishment dated 161974 was passed, is vitiated by error of law as the said finding appears to be based on nonconsideration of material evidence on record as well as nonapplication of mind thereto. The plaintiffappellant who appeared as PW1 had deposed that no chargesheet was given to him nor was he given any reasonable opportunity of showing cause or hearing or explaining. He deposed that suspension order dated 19574 was passed, firstly, and thereafter without giving chargesheet or opportunity of hearing, his services had been terminated on 1674. The material words are that MATTHER IN HINDI 50. In his crossexamination he further deposed that till the time of determination of his services by order dated 161974, no charges were levelled against him. MATTHER IN HINDI 51. P.W. 1 clearly stated that no reasonable opportunity of hearing was given to him before passing the impugned order dated 1674. The plaintiff's representation dated 13674, Ext. 3 is on record and paragraph 3 thereof further supports and proves the allegations of the plaintiff that he was not given opportunity. The plaintiffappellant had raised these objections against the order dated 1674 in his representation 13674 Ext. 3 addressed to the Manager of Bapu Balika Vidyalaya. There is another letter dated 24674 Ext. 4 on record and the paragraph 2 thereof further fortifies and proves the allegation of the plaintiffappellant that the impugned order dated 174 which is punitive in nature and whereby the services of the plaintiff had been determined by his removal, had been passed without giving him any opportunity of showing any cause against the same. Ext. Ka. 16, the reply of the Principal i.e. defendant no. 1 dated 581974 to the letter dated 8774 of R.I.G.S., IX Region, Faizibad Ext. Ka. Ext. Ka. 16, the reply of the Principal i.e. defendant no. 1 dated 581974 to the letter dated 8774 of R.I.G.S., IX Region, Faizibad Ext. Ka. 2 further shows that the plaintiffappellant was not given opportunity of showing cause and with respect to this grievance of the appellant which he had made to the Regional Inspectress of Girls School, Faizabad, the respondent's i.e. Principal's reply has been that in view of regulation 24, the provisions of regulations 31 to 44 did not apply to Class IV employees and, therefore, according to oppositeparties there did not arise any occasion for her to issue the chargesheet or show cause notice or to follow the provisions and regulations referred to above. The explanation of the oppositeparties had been that as the regulations 31 to 44 of Chapter 111 and framed under U.P. Intermediate Education Act did not apply to Class IV employees, there was no question nor did any occasion arise to follow those directions i.e. to serve upon the Class IV employees, the chargesheet and to callupon his explanation and to give him opportunity to explain. I have perused the deposition of Smt. Vijai Srivastava (DW 1) the Principal of Bapu Balika Vidyalaya. She has nowhere denied the allegations of the plaintiff made on oath nor has she deposed that any opportunity of show cause had been given to the plaintiffappellant by serving upon him any chargesheet and calling upon him to show cause. Neither the records shows that any charge sheet was issued to plaintiff appellant or that he was given opportunity to show cause before the order dated 1674 was passed against him nor is there assertion of defendant's witness to witness box to the effect that proper and reasonable opportunity was given to plaintiff to show cause nor is their any denial of plaintiff's case or assertion of PW 1. 52. In this view of the entire state of affairs emerging from the material on record I do find and hold that plaintiffappellant has established that no reasonable opportunity of hearing was given to the plaintiffappellant in compliance with the requirements of the principles of natural justice and fair play before passing the order which is in the nature of the penal order of removal, i.e., the order dated 1674. I find that the findings recorded by the two courts below in this regard to the contrary are vitiated by the substantial error of law, apart from the order dated 1674 being void, null and void on account of having been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. No doubt, it is well settled principles of law as regard Second Appeal that a finding on a question of fact recorded by the two courts below concurrently, howsoever grossly erroneous it may be, it need not be interfered with under Section 100 of the C.P.C. until and unless the error in finding is of the nature then it can be said to be error of law of substantial nature. A finding of fact which has been arrived at and has been recorded by the courts below without applying their mind to the material on record and without considering the evidence on record is a finding vitiated by substantial error of law. A finding of fact which is based on no evidence or a finding which has been arrived at after having ignored the material, oral or documentary evidence or circumstantial evidence emerging from the record of the case is not a finding binding on the High Court in Second Appeal. Such a finding as in the present case which has been arrived at without considering, and as well as after having ignored the material evidence on record which has been referred to above in this judgment cannot said to have been a finding arrived at after considering all material evidence on record. That in such circumstances, the finding recorded by court below having been arrived at without considering the material evidence of PW 1, DW 1 i.e. nondenial of DW 1 and the other documentary evidence on record is open to interference under Sec. 100 C.P.C. as the said finding is vitiated by substantial error of law in view of the well settled principles of law in this regard. I am fortified in recording this finding by the following observations and the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra reported in (AIR 1988 SC page 1858) where Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid down as under: It is true that the High Court while hearing the appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. has no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and reverse the conclusion reached by the First Appellate Court, but at the same time its power to interfere with finding cannot be denied if, when the learned lower appellate court decides in issue of fact, a substantial question of law arises. The court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record & if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue, and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the findings. 53. This is the situation as to error which has arisen in the present case as I have mentioned earlier and the error of law is of the magnitude giving rise to substantial question of law and so findings of the Courts below noted above as to giving of reasonable opportunity of hearing and showing cause by respondent to plaintiffappellant is and has been liable to be set aside and has been so set aside and reversed. 54. 54. In view of above discussion and consideration, I hold that though plaintiffappellant continued to be a probationer on 161974 the date on which punitive order against him was passed, but when a punitive order or an order terminating his service on the basis of alleged misconduct of the plaintiffappellant was passed on 1674 without giving him reasonable opportunity of showing cause and hearing as the evidence on record shows and that the contrary finding recorded by the courts below is vitiated by substantial error of law indicated above, the judgment and decree passed by the courts below in the suit dismissing the suit for declaration are liable to be setaside and the plaintiffappellant is held entitled to get the decree declaring that the order dated 1674 has been illegal, null and void whereby services of plaintiffappellant were terminated, as the order was punitive and had been passed in violation of principles of natural justice and fair play. The order dated 171974 having been held and declared to be illegal, null and void, the plaintiffappellant continues to be in service without any break and he is further declared to be continuing in service and is entitled to get all the consequential rights and benefits including the salary for the period from the date of order dated 161974 upto date including all increments and benefits which have so far been given to Class IV employees in the school. The plaintiff has further claimed the relief that any other relief which the Court thinks fit and proper in the interest of justice be also awarded to the plaintiff against defendant. That, as such, the direction in the nature of mandatory injunction is also issued to the oppositeparties to allow him to work and to provide him with all the consequential benefits including the plaintiffappellant's salary up to date with all increments within a period of two months, on the failure of which the plaintiff will henceforth be entitled to an interest thereon at the rates payable on Government Securities for the period from the date of decree upto the date of actual payment. The appeal is, thus, allowed in terms as above and the judgment and decree of the Courts below are setaside and the suit is decreed in terms as above. The appeal is, thus, allowed in terms as above and the judgment and decree of the Courts below are setaside and the suit is decreed in terms as above. That the defendantrespondent shall also be liable to pay and shall pay to the plaintiff, the plaintiffappellant's cost of two courts below as well as of this Second Appeal in terms of decree. (Appeal allowed.)