JUDGMENT V. D. GYANI, J. - Both these petitions are closely connected. The petitioners are registered Government contractors engaged in drilling and boring of tube-wells and registered as such under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, as well as under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. Their claim and contention is that under the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act [section 8(3)(b)] a registered dealer who is a manufacturer as defined under the State Act is entitled to purchase any goods or raw material incidental to and connected with the manufacturing process at concessional rate on production of C form provided that such goods or materials are declared and mentioned in the registration certificate issued to him. 2. By these petitions the petitioners seek to challenge orders dated January 8, 1988, passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Indore (Circle 4), filed as annexure "D" in the petitions and the order dated November 3, 1988 passed in revision by respondent No. 3, filed as annexure "F" in both the petitions. 3. By order dated November 30, 1990, a show cause notice was ordered to be issued to the respondents calling upon them to show cause as to why these petitions be not admitted. Accordingly the learned Additional Advocate-General has filed his reply to the show cause notice. It was for this reasons thought proper to hear the petitions finally. These petitions were thereafter listed on November 3, 1991, November 18, 1991 and November 25, 1991. On January 8, 1992, they were finally argued on merits although the petitions were still at the stage of admission. 4. The short point that arises for determination and decision in these petitions is whether the drilling of tube-wells can be said to be manufacturing of water. 5. It was contended by Shri Mehta on behalf of the petitioners that the order annexure "D" passed by the Sales Tax Officer, is palpably wrong as it is based on an erroneous view and interpretation of the term "processing" and "manufacture". 6. Going through this order annexure "D" it would be seen that the Sales Tax Officer has not only referred to certain cases, but also the dictionary meanings of the term. The cases of Chowgule & Co. 6. Going through this order annexure "D" it would be seen that the Sales Tax Officer has not only referred to certain cases, but also the dictionary meanings of the term. The cases of Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [1981] 41 STC 124 (SC) and Calcutta High Court judgment in Om Prakas Gupta v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1965] 16 STC 935 (Cal) have been considered. 7. The Sales Tax Officer has properly discussed the above case law and his reasoning cannot be faulted with on any legitimate ground. 8. Shri Mehta, however, strenuously urged that the petitioners being engaged in drilling of tube-wells is a manufacturer as he extracts water and is rightly entitled to the benefit of section 8(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Shri Singh, learned Additional Advocate-General, contended that drilling of tube-wells and resultant outcome of water can by no means be said to manufacture or processing of water. 9. Whether drilling of tube-wells amounts to manufacture of water ? The petitioners are registered dealers under section 7 of the Central Sales Tax Act as per registration certificate, annexure "A". Their activity as declared by them and mentioned in annexure "A" is "contractor" - Tube-well drilling-ply-casing pipes. 10. Shri Mehta has heavily banked upon the expression "for use by him in the manufacturing or processing of goods for sale" as occurring in sub-section (3)(b) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act and contended that the casing pipes are used by the petitioners in their process of drilling for manufacturing of water. It may be noted at this stage itself that the Sales Tax Officer has arrived at the finding (further affirmed in revision) that it depends on the party engaging the tube-well drilling contractor to take pipes from him or purchase his own and this finding of fact cannot ordinarily be allowed to be challenged in a writ petition. At any rate there is no material placed on record by the petitioners to take a different view. Thus, on facts, at least the impugned orders cannot be interfered with on this ground. 11. Adverting to the question of "manufacture" the term in its ordinary meaning and connotation, as widely accepted means making of goods or articles or materials, commercially different from the basic components, by physical labour or mechanical process. Thus, on facts, at least the impugned orders cannot be interfered with on this ground. 11. Adverting to the question of "manufacture" the term in its ordinary meaning and connotation, as widely accepted means making of goods or articles or materials, commercially different from the basic components, by physical labour or mechanical process. It presupposes that as a result of undergoing the process a different commercial commodity different from the raw materials come into existence (see [1969] 23 STC 385 (SC); AIR 1969 SC 499 Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sukh Deo and AIR 1982 SC 844 Municipal Council, Damoh v. Vraj Lal Manilal and Co.). 12. The term "manufacture" varies in its meaning and connotation in the context in which it is used. As for example manufacture in relation to drugs and cosmetics which involves process of making, altering, finishing, packing and even ornamenting or treating or adapting any drug with a view to its sale and distribution, but would not include mere compounding or dispensing of drug [see section 3(7) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940]. In relation to insecticides the term "manufacture" has almost similar meaning [see section 3(j) of the Insecticides Act, 1968]. 13. Manufacture implies a charge but every change is not manufacture. There must be such transformation that a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character and use (see South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 922 ). 14. It has been held by the Karnataka High Court that preparation of coffee powder by roasting and grinding coffee-seeds is not manufacture (see Meghraj v. B. Seshagiri Rao AIR 1977 Kar 163 ). 15. Viewed in the light of and applying the principles as discussed, it cannot be said that the resultant flow of water, as a result of drilling of tube-well is manufacture of water. 16. Shri Singh, learned Additional Advocate-General, rightly pointed out that one of the essential conditions to be fulfilled for taking benefit of sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Act, is the resale of the goods processed or manufactured. It cannot be said that the outcome of drilling namely, water is of goods for resale by the drilling contractor. 17. 16. Shri Singh, learned Additional Advocate-General, rightly pointed out that one of the essential conditions to be fulfilled for taking benefit of sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Act, is the resale of the goods processed or manufactured. It cannot be said that the outcome of drilling namely, water is of goods for resale by the drilling contractor. 17. Admittedly before passing the impugned order a show cause notice, annexure "B", dated December 14, 1987 was issued to the petitioner calling upon them to show cause as to why the disputed items be not deleted from the registration certificate. The petitioners had declared themselves as manufacturers although they on their own showing as averred in the petitions, para 1, are dealing in drilling and boring the tube-wells. The petitioners submitted their reply, annexure "C", to the show cause notice. However, the respondents No. 2 by his order dated January 8, 1988, annexure "D", rejected the petitioner's contention and directed deletion of disputed items retrospectively and also started penalty proceedings. This order has been maintained in revision by the respondents No. 3. 18. Shri Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the respondents-authorities having accepted the declaration for all these years, could not have deleted the entries with retrospective effect and ordered initiation of penalty proceedings. It was strenuously urged that the penalty proceedings should not be made retrospectively. 19. This point was also raised before the revisional authority and it has been rightly pointed out that the petitioners can well raise this point in the penalty proceedings (see revisional order dated November 30, 1991 filed as annexure "F" to the petition). Since it is open to the petitioners to raise this point before the appropriate authority, we do not comment any more on this aspect of the matter. It is open to the petitioners to raise this point before the appropriate authority, if they so choose. 20. For the foregoing reasons these petitions are liable to be dismissed. They are accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 1,000, if certified. Petitions dismissed.