B. N. DASH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code'), seeking to quash the order of taking cognizance of an offence under S. 376, IPC. ( 2 ) ON the basis of the FIR of the victim girl M. Ellama dt. 22-1-90, Nandapur P. S. Case No. 5/90 corresponding to G. R. Case No. 57/90 was registered and after completion of investigation charge-sheet under S. 376, IPC was submitted against the accused K. Nageswar Rao (petitioner herein) on 11-6-1991 in the court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Koraput. After perusal of the police case diary and other connected papers the S. O. J. M. took cognizance of the offence under S. 376, IPC and directed issue of warrant against the accused. Being aggrieved by such order, the accused-petitioner has approached this Court. ( 3 ) IT is submitted by Shri M. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned S. D. J. M. went wrong in taking cognizance of the offence u/s. 376, IPC against the petitioner inasmuch as the prosecution case is absurd and inherently improbable when the allegations in the FIR are read in conjunction with the evidence of the witnesses recorded by the police u/s. 161 of the Code. ( 4 ) THE allegations in the FIR are that on 17-1-1990 while the victim girl, a dealer in fish, was there in the hotel of one Sitamma at Nandapur village at about 7 p. m. the accused-petitioner came there and when she was inside a room of that hotel, he came there and asked if she would not go to her village and when she replied that she would return to the village if bus would be available, he pounced upon her and committed rape. According to the informant, she was made to stay in the hotel for 2 days i. e. 17-1-90 and 18-1-90 and on the following Thursday i. e. 19-1-90 she was taken to the house of her relative in another village by name Anakadoli where she was left. Subsequently when the parents of the victim girl arrived there she returned to her house. Subsequently when the parents of the victim girl arrived there she returned to her house. The owner of the hotel M. Sitamma and her mother M. Arnapurna and another witness by name Uma Shankar Das were examined before a Magistrate and their statements u/s. 164 of the Code were recorded. Their evidence do not support the prosecution case about the rape of the victim girl by the petitioner. Shri Misra, for the petitioner invites my attention to the evidence of the. victim girl recorded by the police where she has stated that on the date in question at about 5 p. m. she took tea in the hotel and when she went behind the hotel for the purpose of passing urine the petitioner took her to a room, bolted the door from inside and committed rape on her. On the following morning she came out of the room when the owner of the hotel opened the door. As requested by the owner of the hotel, she stayed in the hotel for the next day and went to the house of her relative in another village on 19-1-90 and contends on a comparison of such evidence with the averments in the FIR that the victim girl developed the case at the time of her examination by the police and when the medical evidence did not support the prosecution case, the chance of conviction of the petitioner was very bleak and, therefore, the learned S. D. J. M. should not have taken cognizance of the offence u/s. 376, IPC against the petitioner. On the other hand, the learned Addl. Government Advocate submits that while exercising power u/s. 482 of the Code, this Court has very limited jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence. According to him, even if there is some embellishment in the statement of the victim girl the same cannot be taken into consideration at the stage of taking cognizance and the learned S. D. J. M. was quite within his limit in taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioner. ( 5 ) SECTION 190 (1) of the Code deals with cognizance of the offence by a Magistrate. ( 5 ) SECTION 190 (1) of the Code deals with cognizance of the offence by a Magistrate. It says that subject to the provisions of Chapter XIV, any Magistrate of the First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered on in this behalf under Sub-Sec. (2), may take cognizance of any offence (A) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge; that such offence has been committed. It is, thus, seen that a Magistrate has got very wide power in taking cognizance of offences and such power is subject to the provisions contained in Chapter XIV of the Code. When more power is vested under the Code there should be more restraint in the exercise thereof, but that does not mean that the High Court should interfere frequently in the exercise of such powers. The question of interference by the High Court will arise when it is found that the exercise of such power has been arbitrarily done and is capricious and thereby an accused has been unnecessarily put to trial. It is not possible to lay down any precise and inflexible guidelines where interference by the High Court becomes necessary in the matter of taking cognizance of offences by a Magistrate. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind some observations of the Apex Court in this regard. ( 6 ) IN the case of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992 Cri LJ 527), this point came up for consideration and at page 629 (of AIR) : (at pp. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind some observations of the Apex Court in this regard. ( 6 ) IN the case of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992 Cri LJ 527), this point came up for consideration and at page 629 (of AIR) : (at pp. 551-52 of Cri LJ) it has been stated by the Apex Court as under :"in the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Art. 226 or the inherent powers under S. 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence justifying an investigation by police officers under S. 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of S. 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155 (2) of the Code. 5. 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155 (2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him duo to private and personal grudge. ( 7 ) SHRI Misra, for the petitioner, relies on sub-paras 3 and 5 in support of his contention that the order taking cognizance is liable to be quashed. The observation made in sub-para 5 is not applicable to the present case because the FIR which clearly discloses commission of the offence of rape can never be said to be absurd or inherently improbable. So far as the observation made in sub-para 3 is concerned, I may say that therehere may not be corroborating evidence to the commission of the offence of rape by the petitioner. But there is evidence of the victim girl which, if goes uncontroverted, will disclose the commission of the offence of rape. At this point of time, it cannot be said that the chance of conviction will be very bleak in which case there can be interference by this Court. ( 8 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, I hold that the application is without merit and the same is dismissed. Application dismissed.