JUDGMENT T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. 1. Petitioner is a member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly. He claims to be "a public spirited citizen, interested in eliminating corruption from public life." He has filed the Original Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India challenging the amendment to S.18 of the Kerala Public Men's Corruption (Investigations and Inquiries) Act, 1987 (Act 24 of 1988) (the Act) by Ordinance No. 8 of 1991. Before its amendment, S.18 had provided that where after investigation, the Commission constituted under the Act was satisfied that an allegation against a public man of the nature specified in the various sub clauses of S.2 had been substantiated and that such public man should not continue to hold the post held by him, the Commission shall make a declaration to that effect in Its report submitted under S.17(1), whereupon the competent authority shall accept the declaration and intimate the acceptance to the public man immediately, and then, the public man shall, with effect from the date of intimation resign his office if he is the Chief Minister or a minister or a member of the Legislative Assembly, and be deemed to have vacated his office in the case of other public men. After the amendment, the position is that if the commission is satisfied that the allegation against the public man has been substantiated and proved that he has committed corruption and that he should not continue to hold the post held by him, the Commission shall make a declaration to that effect in its report regarding its findings and recommendations, and communicate it along with the relevant documents, materials and other evidence to the Governor and thereupon the Governor may either accept the 'declaration or reject it; if the declaration is accepted, the Governor shall intimate the fact of acceptance to the public man to be followed by his resignation or vacating of office as under the pre amendment section. The vital difference between the provisions before and after the Amendment is that while there was no option for the competent authority regarding the acceptance of the declaration made by the Commission under the original provision and he was bound to accept it, under the amendment, the declaration in the report of the Commission was made to the Governor, with all relevant documents, materials and evidence, and It was open to the Governor to accept or not accept the declaration. The declaration made by the Commission ceased to have the binding effect, which it had on the competent authority under the unamended provision. Petitioner's submission is that the vesting of such a discretion which according to him is unbridled and uncontrolled, even in a high dignitary like the Governor, defeats the rule of law enshrined in the Constitution besides being arbitrary and discriminatory. It is his case that the Governor may In a given case even act capriciously or unreasonably or arbitrarily or on his whims, in the absence of any guidelines in the provision as to when he should accept, or when he may reject the declaration. For these reasons which have been elaborated in the Original Petition, petitioner seeks a declaration that the amendment to S.18 brought about by Ordinance No. 8 of 1991 is unconstitutional and void. Some other reliefs of general nature following out of this main relief are also prayed for. 2. Petitioner relies or various decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his contention regarding the unconstitutionality and Invalidity of the amended S.18. He has also filed and additional affidavit to establish that as a person Interested in the purity of public life, he has the necessary locus standi to maintain the petition. 3. It may be that the writ petition is maintainable at the instance of the petitioner. But the question is whether it is necessary to entertain it at this stage. Admittedly the petitioner has not made any complaint about any public man before the Commission, nor has he any case that he has been deterred from moving the Commission because of the amendment, (assuming that that provides a sufficient cause of action for moving this writ petition - something with which I am not prepared to agree). There is no relief claimed by him which will enure to his benefit. There is no relief claimed by him which will enure to his benefit. What he seeks to achieve is to provide against future possibilities and contingencies by the Governor choosing to act in a particular manner: There is no concrete case nor even an occasion, for that matter at this stage - where the Governor has acted in the manner apprehended by the petitioner. The petitioner has put forward various contentions regarding the vires of the amended section, but he has no case that the Governor has refused to accept any declaration made by the Commission under the powers vested in him under the amended S.18 to entitle him to approach this court with this petition. In fact no such occasion has arisen in as much as the erstwhile commission ceased to function on the promulgation of the Ordinance and no new Commission had been appointed at the time the original petition was filed. The petitioner has filed this original petition only as a safeguard for the future, of the possibility of the Governor acting arbitrarily or capriciously, which will shake the very credibility and the functioning of the system discouraging potential complainants from approaching the Commission with any case. 4. The question of the vires of S.18 or the scope of the powers of the Governor thereunder will arise for decision only if and when a declaration made by the Commission is not for any reason accepted by the Governor in exercise of his powers. Till such a else arises and the Governor chooses to decline acceptance of the declaration, any consideration of the vires or the constitutionality of the amended S.18 will be purely premature, academic, and a theoretical exercise which may have no "application at all at any point of time. This court does not in exercise of its powers under Art.226 of the Constitution embark on such theoretical exercises for the decision of purely academic issues. This court need not anticipate questions of constitutionality and decide on them, unless it be necessary for the decision of a specific dispute or case which has actually, arisen and is before it for adjudication. This court cannot go on a rampage looking for alleged unconstitutional enactments, adjudicating on their validity, and striking them down to avoid their being applied in any distant future. No such duty is cast, nor is it proper. This court cannot go on a rampage looking for alleged unconstitutional enactments, adjudicating on their validity, and striking them down to avoid their being applied in any distant future. No such duty is cast, nor is it proper. What this court is concerned with are only issues arising out of specific cases which have arisen and which are presented before it, and not hypothetical issues which may or may not arise for consideration at all. 5. In Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 803 , the Supreme Court observed the caution, as a settled practice, "to decide no more than what is absolutely necessary for the decision of a case". Frankfurter, J. put the matter succinctly in his opinion in Coleman v. Miller 1939 (307) U.S.433 at page 460, that it is not the exercise of judicial power "to write legal essays or to give advisory legal opinions", that properly "a judge never gives a decision until the facts necessary for that decision have arisen" and that courts should not do so because "the imagination of judges, like that of other persons, is limited, and they are not able to put before their minds all the complex circumstances which they ought to have in their minds when giving a decision". None can improve upon the clarity or the emphasis which the learned judge has brought to bear on this enunciation of the scope of the judicial power. 6. Questions as to constitutionality of a statute will not be passed upon unless they are essential to the decision of the case, meaning the resolution of a real live controversy, necessary to give relief to the petitioner. In Sheoshankar v. Madhya Pradesh State Government, AIR 1951 Nagpur 58, a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court (Hidayatullah, Mangalmurthi and Mudholkar, JJ.) speaking oil this aspect through Hidayatullah, J. observed that advisory opinions or declaratory judgments on the constitutionality of legislation cannot be given under Art.226, apart from some concrete injury or controversy, and that even in other countries, such judgments are not rendered unless the petitioner can show some injury or some imminent injury to himself as a cause of action. In Abanindra Kumar Maity v. A K. Majumdar, AIR 1956 Cal. In Abanindra Kumar Maity v. A K. Majumdar, AIR 1956 Cal. 273 , a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court speaking through Chakravarthi, C. J. laid down that the jurisdiction under Art.226 "can properly be invoked only for the purpose of obtaining relief and not for the purpose of having the validity of Acts adjudged in the abstract .....". P. B. Mukhaji and S. A. Masud JJ of the Calcutta High Court had occasion to speak about the approach to the court under Art.226 to lay the foundation for future claims. Mukhaji, J. put the matter thus in characteristically felicitous language . "We are of opinion that Art.226 of the Constitution should not be used and was not intended to be used as a medium or means for declaratory orders or declaratory reliefs declaring acts and orders invalid even though aa relief could be granted to the petitioner, The court under Art.226 of the Constitution should not issue writs of consolation or writs propounding theories and theses. That is not the function, scope and purpose of Art.226 of the "Constitution" (General Manager, Eastern Railway v. Kashirode Chandra Khasmobis, AIR 1966 Cal. 601 ). Precisely this is what the Supreme Court did in Kundu and Kadam v. K. K. Soman, AIR 1980 SC 881 where the writ petition was dismissed as premature, when the authority concerned was yet to take a decision on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission (per Krishna Iyer, J., para 3). (See also Chanan Singh v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab. AIR 1976 SC 1821 , paras 5 and 6 and Tirlok Singh and Co. v. District Magistrate Lucknow, AIR 3976 S C. 1988, para 13). In fact, courts have held their hands in dealing with constitutional issues unless their decision was necessary for the decision of the case. - Konduri Buchi Rajalingam v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 Hyderabad 1 (FB), Pannalal Lahoti v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1952 Hyderabad 187 (FB). 7. It is unnecessary to multiply minorities It is not the function of the court to give advisory or declaratory opinion on matters which may not in reality arise for decision at all. Its function is not to "annual or veto a law" unless it is necessary for the determination of a controversy based on concrete facts, placed before it for adjudication. Its function is not to "annual or veto a law" unless it is necessary for the determination of a controversy based on concrete facts, placed before it for adjudication. There are many its and buts before any question of constitutionality of S.18 arises at all. A declaration of the nature envisaged in S.18 has to be made by the Commission, the Governor should reject it and the action of the Governor should be vitiated for any of the reasons mentioned by the petitioner. Unless and until all these circumstances coincide, the question of validity of S.18 may sot arise for consideration at all. For instance if in a given case, the action of the Governor was well justified on the facts, the validity of S.18 may not have to be gone into. Therefore, and as things stand at present, the writ petition is based on assumed possibilities of aa uncertain future on the basis of which this court need not embark upon, an enquiry into the constitutional validity of S.18 as amended. I therefore decline to entertain this original petition and it is accordingly dismissed in limine.