Judgment : This is an action taken, knocking at the doors of this Court, to invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (in short ‘the Code’) praying for a direction for investigation, by an agency different from and independent of the one, before whom an information disclosing an alleged commission of a cognizable offence had been laid and within whose jurisdiction, the alleged offence is said to have taken place. 2. Though the point canvassed centers round the limit of jurisdiction to interfere with the investigation of an offence registered at a police station, to pinpoint the contentions, relevant facts may be stated with circumspection, as the case is sub-judice, because any overt or covert expression of opinion on the facts in controversy awaiting adjudication may be censured as judicial impropriety. 3. Factual matrix will highlight the situation. One Andiappan alias Pichai Rajavelu is a Scrap Merchant, residing in Madras. He married one Selvi of Thangammalpuram in Chidambaranar District on 211. 1990. At the time of marriage, it is said, parents of the girl gave double row gold chain, gold necklace weighing six sovereigns, in addition to one pairs of ear-stud, nosescrew and a 1-1/2 sovereign minor chain as dowry. 4. After the marriage, the spouses were said to be living together at No. 18, Ehavani Street, Tharamani, Madras. It appears his hat the husband sustained loss in the course of his business, as a Scrap Merchant and as there was shortage of fluid cash resources in his business, he appeared to have pledged the jewels of his wife against her wish. 5. In course of time, want of cordial atmosphere came to prevail in the matrimonial abode, due to frequent skirmishes and quarrels arising between the spouses, as a consequence of the alleged indiscriminate act of the husband, in pledging the jewels of the wife for the so-called revival of the business, in which serious loss was stated to have occasioned. 6. Despite rumblings between the spouses, she however got conceived; but unfortunately the foetus got aborted quite unexpectedly. The husband, it is said, was alleged to have expressed a desire to perform some rites and ceremonies at the graveyard situate at Velachery-Tambaram Main Road for the aborted foetus. 6. Despite rumblings between the spouses, she however got conceived; but unfortunately the foetus got aborted quite unexpectedly. The husband, it is said, was alleged to have expressed a desire to perform some rites and ceremonies at the graveyard situate at Velachery-Tambaram Main Road for the aborted foetus. Under such pretext, he was stated to have taken his wife from the house to the graveyard, in a bicycle at about 9 p.m. on 3. 1991. He was stated to have carried with him a bag stated to be containing the requisite materials for the performance of the rites. The wife, it is said, did not perceive any foul-play, till she reached the grave-yard. 7. The true form and colour of the husband, it is said, got revealed at the grave-yard. The bag carried by him is said to have actually contained a plastic can filled with kerosene and an iron rod. Wielding the iron rod, he was said to have beaten his wife, with the intention of causing her death and performed repeatedly such a feat by mounting brutal violence on her and she is said to have instantaneously died. 8. Thereafter, he was stated to have removed her ear-stud, nose-screw, thali chain and silver anklet. It is further said that he laid the body into the heap of debris and burnt it by pouring kerosene from the plastic cane carried in a bag from his house, thereby attempted to cause disappearance of evidence in order to screen himself from legal consequences to be flowing from such action. 9. On the information furnished by one P.Lingam, son of one Periasami Nadar of Vijayanagaram, Madras-42 at 10.54 hours on 13. 1991, Station House Officer, J-7 Velachery Police Station, registered a case in Crime No. 168 of 1991 for alleged offence under Secs.302 and 201 of the I.P.C. and further investigation had been taken up. 10. On completion of the investigation, a final report under Sec. 173(2) of the Code had been laid on 21/28. 1991, for the alleged offences under Secs.302 and 201 of the I.P.C. against the husband, namely, Andiappan alias Pichai Rajavelu, as an accused, which was taken on file as C.C.No.5260 of 1991 on the file of the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Madras on 28. 1991. 11. 1991, for the alleged offences under Secs.302 and 201 of the I.P.C. against the husband, namely, Andiappan alias Pichai Rajavelu, as an accused, which was taken on file as C.C.No.5260 of 1991 on the file of the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Madras on 28. 1991. 11. On compliance with the required procedural formalities, the case had been committed to Court of Session, Madras and the same had been taken on file as S.C.No.298 of 1991 and the same is ripe for trial, now. 12. Since records from the Court below were not sent for and made available for perusal, the records available with learned Public Prosecutor, such as Case Diary and other connected records relating to the case had been produced at the instance of the Court and the aforestated facts had been culled out from those records. 13. In the meantime, one T.Paul Durai, brother of the deceased Selvi resorted to the present action before this Court, impleading the Commissioner of Police, Madras; Inspector of Police, J-7 Velachery Police Station, Madras and C.B. C.I.D., Madras respectively as respondents 1 to 3 praying for a direction to the first respondent to transfer the investigation to the third respondent or any other independent authority for the conduct of a fresh investigation, alleging that the investigation in this case by the second respondent, is rather slipshod, perfunctory and not being impartial, in the sense of not making a probe in as to the guilt of the accused for murder and according to the petitioner, the deceased met her end at the hands of her husband, as a result of her not complying with the avaricious wishes of the dowry demand and in such circumstances, it is but proper for the investigation to have proceeded on those lines and a final report to have been filed under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,. 1984 and Secs.304-B and 498-A of the I.P.C. 14. The grounds urged in the petition is deriving support from the affidavit filed by the petitioner. 15. The second respondent alone filed a counter-affidavit stoutly denying the averments in the affidavit of the petitioner, besides stating that the opinion filed before Court is really reflecting the materials collected during the course of investigation. 16. The grounds urged in the petition is deriving support from the affidavit filed by the petitioner. 15. The second respondent alone filed a counter-affidavit stoutly denying the averments in the affidavit of the petitioner, besides stating that the opinion filed before Court is really reflecting the materials collected during the course of investigation. 16. The moot question that falls for consideration is as to whether it is legally permissible for this Court under its inherent power to order for the investigation by an agency different from the one, who is competent to investigate under the provisions of the Code. 17. Axiomatic a proposition of law it is, that the Officer in charge of a police station is haiving the requisite power to register a case and commence investigation, if the first information lodged before him discloses in crystal clear terms and with so much of authenticity, the commission or suspected commission of a cognizable offence, although such an offence was not stated to have been committed by a specified named individual. The police officer’s power to investigate a cognizable crime is engrafted under Sec. 156 of the Code, which prescribes: “156. Police Officer’s power to investigate cognizable case- (1) Any Officer in charge of the police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such stations would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. .(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. .(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Sec. 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.” 18. Once investigation commences on the disclosure of a cognizable offence, it is rather very well-settled that it is the exclusive prerogative of the police to proceed with the investigation and gather the requisite materials for forming an opinion to be reflected in the final report to be filed under Sec. 173(2) of the Code and such an investigation cannot at all be directed to be done in a particular way by the Court. Nor is it permissible for the Court to stop such an investigation and if at all there is any exception to such a rule, such an exception is found traceable to a situation, where the first information launched did not at all prima facie disclose any cognizable offence having been committed. The power of the Court commences at a point when the power of the police to investigate ends in the filing of a final report. After the filing of the final report, it is for the court to accept such final report or reject it. 19. To put it otherwise, the amplitude of the power of the Court is such that it could come to its own conclusion, in the sense of construing such a report filed either as positive or negative, on consideration of the materials disclosed therein. Even subsequent to the filing of the final report, it is legitimately permissible for the police under the amended provisions adumbrated under Sub-sec(8) of Sec.173 of the Code to file a further final report and in such a situation, there is no need for the police to obtain the prior permission for further or reinvestigation for filing such a report and if at a-ll.what is required, as a matter of courtesy, is that the police, in such an eventuality, is to lay an information to the Court, before which, already a final report had been filed as to their taking up further or reinvestigating of the matter for filing further a final report. It may however be pointed out that even subsequent to the filing or the further final report of the police, ultimate residuary power rests with the Court to consider and take cognizance of the report either way, positive or negative. 20. In dealing with a ticklish and subtle question of the extent and amplitude of the powers of the Court to interfere with the statutory rights of the police in the investigation of a cognizable offence, by the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, Privy Council rendered an epoch making judgment in King Emperorv. 20. In dealing with a ticklish and subtle question of the extent and amplitude of the powers of the Court to interfere with the statutory rights of the police in the investigation of a cognizable offence, by the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, Privy Council rendered an epoch making judgment in King Emperorv. Khwaza NazirAhmad, (1945) 46 Crl.L.J 413, and Their Lordships said thus: “Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may beduly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the Police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to into fere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the Polics are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case wher moved under Sec.491 of the Crl.P.C. to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court’s functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. It has sometime been thought that Sec.561-A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers; it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest its hould be considered that theonly powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Crl.P.C. and that no inherent power had sun-ived the passing of that Act.” 21. The section gives no new powers; it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest its hould be considered that theonly powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Crl.P.C. and that no inherent power had sun-ived the passing of that Act.” 21. The said decision of the Privy Council had admittedly been rendered in the pre-constitution era and that perhaps was the reason in making a reference to Sec.491 of the old Code of the year 1898, which contained a salient provision for the issuance of a direction in the nature of a habeas corpus and in the present Code, no such provision had been engrafted for obvious reasons. 22. This view of the Judicial Committee clearly demarcates the functions of the executive and the judiciary in the field of adjudication of crime and its subsequent trial and it would thus appear that the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is ordinarily not to be interfered with by the judiciary. 23. Judicial recognition had been accorded to the view of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the aforesaid decision by the apex court of this country in certain decisons, about which, useful reference may be made herein. 24. In State of West Bengal v. S.N.Basak, 1963 M.L.J. (Crl.) 515: (1963) 2 S.C.J. 428 (1963)1 Crl.L.J 341: (1963)2S.C.R. 52:A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 447, a Sub Inspector of Police, Enforcement Branch, filed a report before the Police Officer-in-charge of a Police Station alleging that the respondent along with three others committed offences under Secs.420, 120-B read with Sec.420,I.P.C. Thereupon, a First Information Report was drawn up and investigation was started. The respondent surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate and he was released on bail. Subsequently, he filed an application in the High Court under Secs.439and 561-A of -the Crl.P.C. to get the case pending before the Judicial Magistrate arising out of the case registered in the police station quashed. This application was granted by the High Court. The appellant, the State of West Bengal then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court by certificate granted by the High Court under Art.134(1)(c) of the Constitution. This application was granted by the High Court. The appellant, the State of West Bengal then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court by certificate granted by the High Court under Art.134(1)(c) of the Constitution. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court.affixing their seal of approval to thedictum of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said thus: "With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court.weare in accord. The High Court was in error therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The investigation will now proceed in accordance with law." 25. In Kehar Singh v. Delhi Administration, 1974 M.L.J. (Crl.) 501: (1974)4 S.C.C. 521:1974 S.C.C. (Crl.) 558:1974 Crl.L.J 802: (1974)3 S.C.R. 794 , a bus belonging to one Indraj and Sukhlal was in the possession of Munshi Ram, the driver, and other servants. The bus was removed from the custody of the said servants by the appellant and one Mr.Pathak Munshi Ram filed F.I.R. disclosing these facts. In pursuance of the information the Police started investigation, arrested Jehan Singh, the appellant and Pathak who were later on released on bail. The bus was seized by the Police. The proceeding in regard to Pathak was quashed by the High Court but not in respect of the appellant. The appellant contended before the apex Court that the F.I.R. did not disclose any offence and therefore, the investigation by Police should be quashed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court whilst dismissing the appeal held (1) that the decision of the Privy Council in Khwaza NazirAhmad’s Case, (1945)46 Crl.L.J 413, and the decision of the Supreme Court S.N.Basak’scase, 1936M.LJ. (Crl.)515: (1963)2 S.C.J. 428 (1963)1 Crl.L.J. 341: A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 447, have settled the law in regard to the High Court’s power of interference at the interlocutory stage. (Crl.)515: (1963)2 S.C.J. 428 (1963)1 Crl.L.J. 341: A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 447, have settled the law in regard to the High Court’s power of interference at the interlocutory stage. The statutory power of the police to investigate the cognizable offence: cannot be interfered with in exercise of the inherent power of the Court under Sec.561-A of the Crl.P.C. In the present case, no charge-sheet or complaint had been filed in the Court and the matter was still at the stage of investigation by the Police; and (2) that the first information report prima facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence by the appellant and his companions. Applying the decision of the Court in R.P.Kapur v. S.Pratap Singh, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 295. Their Lordships held that the High Court was right in not interfering with the police investigation. The interference is justified only if the F.I.R. does not disclose any offence. 26. In S.N.Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and others, (1970)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 81:1970M.L.J. (Crl.) 745: (1970)2 An.W.R. (S.C.) 81: (1970)2 S.CJ. 554: 1970 S.C.C. (Crl.) 468: 1970 Crl.L.J 784: A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 786: (1970)3 S.C.R. 946 , a first information report was lodged in respect of a crime and the appellant, who was the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) was named therein as principal accused. The offences mentioned were cognizable and the Police after registering the case, started investigation. The appellant applied to the Judicial Magistrate for invocation of the provisions of Sec. 159, Crl.P.C. and for conducting preliminary enquiry by the Court itself and for issuance of necessary directions to the Police to stop investigation alleging that a false report had iv.en lodged at the instance of the local police. The Magistrate directed the police to stop investigation and decided to hold the enquiry himself. Thereupon, an application was moved in the High Court under Sec.561-A, Crl.P.C. for quashing the order of the Magistrate as he had no jurisdiction to pass such an order under Sec.159, Crl.P.C. The High Court accepted the application and set aside the Magistrate’s order. Dismissing the appeal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court said: "We, however, feel constrained to hold that the language used in Sec.159 does not permit the wider interpretation put forward by counsel for the appellant. Dismissing the appeal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court said: "We, however, feel constrained to hold that the language used in Sec.159 does not permit the wider interpretation put forward by counsel for the appellant. This section first mentions the power of the Magistrate to direct an investigation on receiving the report under Sec. 157 and then states the alternative that, if he thinks fit, he may at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary enquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case, On the face of it, the first alternative of directing an investigation cannot arise in a case where the report itself shows that investigation by the police is going on in accordance with Sec. 156. It is to be noticed that the second alternative does not give the Magistrate an unqualified power to proceed himself or depute any Magistrate to hold the preliminary enquiry. That power is preceded by the condition that he may do so, “if he thinks fit”. The use of this expression makes it clear that Sec. 159 is primarily meant to give to the Magistrate the power of directing an investigation in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case under the Proviso to Sec. 157(1), and it is in those cases that, if he thinks fit, he can choose the second alternative. If the expression “if he thinks fit” had not been used, it might have been argued that this section was intended to give in wide terms the power to the Magistrate to adopt any of the two courses of either directing an investigation, or of proceeding himself or deputing any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary enquiry as the circumstances of the case may require. Without the use of the expression “if he thinks fit” the second alternative could have been held to be independent of the first; but the use of this expression, in our opinion, makes it plain that power conferred by the second clause of this section is only an alternative to the power given by the first clause and can, therefore, be exercised only in those cases in which the first clause is applicable. It may also be further noticed that, even in Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.156, the only power given to the Magistrate, who can take cognizance of an offence under Sec. 190, is to order an investigation; there is no mention of any power to stop an investigation by the police. The scheme of these sections, thus, clearly is that the power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation, or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case. The power of the police to investigate has been made inde pendent of any control by the Magistrate.” 27. Their Lordships further said: “It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the Power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers. The fact that the Code does not contain any other provision given power to a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must be read in Scc.l59 of thc Code.” 28. In State of Bihar v. J.A.C.Saldanna, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 326, it has been observed: “There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crine detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police depart ment, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is all obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is all obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the court requesting the court to take cognizance of the offence under Sec. 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. On a cognizance of the offence beirg taken by the Court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in Sec. 173(8), there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to dete mine whether an offence has been committed and if so whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the Court, and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court. There is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in the field of crime detection and its subsequent adjudication between the police and the Magistrate.” .29. Similarly in State of West Bengal v. Sampatlal, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 195, it is stated: .“The next aspect to be considered is whether it is open to the Court to interfere with the investigation which is still proceeding. It has been conceded before us and rightly in our view, that investigation is a matter for the police under the scheme of the Code. Judicial opinion seems to be settled and we have several authorities of this Court where interference by the Court into police investigation has not been approved.” .30. It has been conceded before us and rightly in our view, that investigation is a matter for the police under the scheme of the Code. Judicial opinion seems to be settled and we have several authorities of this Court where interference by the Court into police investigation has not been approved.” .30. In the statutory power of investigation of a cognizable offence is nothing but an executive power inhering in favour of the State Government, discharged through police, then the further vexed and moot question that would arise for consideration is as to whether this Court, under its inherent jurisdiction under Sec.482 of the Code, can interfere with the exercise of such a power, in the sense of either ordering for reinvestigation of the case by an agency, different from the one, which is competent to investigate in the normal run of things; or to transfer the investigation to such an agency on the ground that the investigation by the original agency had been proceeded either not impartial or on a slipshod or inperfunct fashion, as a result of either misuse or abuse of exercise of power by the police or mala fides permeating into the entire atmosphere of investigation. .31. At this juncture, I may refer to the very provisions of Sec.482 of the Code, which runs as under: .“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court: Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 32. On a cursory glance and first look of the provisions of the section, as extracted above, it mayappearas if the section consists of three parts, viz., “(i) to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this code; (ii) to prevent abuse of process of any Court; or (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But in reality, such a thinking is not warranted and this is made fluidly clear by the syntax of various clauses therein by the express incorporation and omission of a comma, after the phraseologies,”under this Code” and”process of any Court” respectively in the section. 33. But in reality, such a thinking is not warranted and this is made fluidly clear by the syntax of various clauses therein by the express incorporation and omission of a comma, after the phraseologies,”under this Code” and”process of any Court” respectively in the section. 33. Viewed in the above light, the inherent power is there for the High Court only for two specified purposes, viz., “(i) to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code; or (ii) to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 34. Then comes for interpretation the relative scope and ambit of the aforesaid two clauses. The construction of the first clause by the usage of the language incorporated therein is so simple as to make one understand the meaning conveyed by the clause with ease and grace and without any difficulty whatever. This clause connotes that the inherent power of the High Court can come into free-play for giving effect to any order under this Code. To put it otherwise, the inherent power cannot be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of this code. The language used in the second clause though appears to be as simple as the first clause, yet an insurmountable difficulty is posed in understanding the scope of the clause by extracting its meaning to the surface hidden under the various words couched in the formation of the clause. This clause signifies that the inherent power of the High Court can only be extended to make suitable orders to prevent the abuse of process of the Court, but it does not empower this Court to interfere with the orders passed by the Executive Authorities and the order under the section to secure the ends of justice must be in relation to a proceeding in this Court or any subordinate Criminal Court and that proceeding too must have a judicial c haracter and not of executive or administrative one. 35. 35. A series of Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions being Crl.M.P.Nos.6482,8223,9746, 10608,10628, 10739and 10740of1990 had been filed praying for the release of convicts on parole and taking notice of the divergent views on this subject by two learned Judges of this Court besides there being no authoritative pronouncement by the apex court of this country, a reference had been made and a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Mishra and Govindasamy, JJ., considered the reference and orders had been made by Mishra, J. The question posed for reference, as referred to by the Bench, is couched in the following terms: "The question whether this Court’s power under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’), extends over to any order of an appropriate Government passed under Sec.432 of the Code, or, in other words, whether this CouVt can issue a direction to the appropriate Government exercising its inherent power under Sec.482 of the Code to release a convict on parole has been brought before us on a reference by Janartnanam, J., who has said: The phraseology ‘to secure the ends of justice’, if properly interpreted, as adverted to earlier, would mean in the context that it is in relation to a proceeding in the High Court or any subordinate Court and that proceeding too must have a judicial character and not of an executive or administrative one." Thus, Janarthanam, J. expressed his agreement with the view expressed by a learned Judge of this Court in Rajon v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1987 L.W. (Crl.) 43, and his disagreement with the statement of law in Ramakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1983 L.W. (Crl.) 181, by another learned Single Judge of this Court. 36. Learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, considered the question in an elaborate fashion, by referring to the pronouncements of various High Courts and the apex court of the Judicial Administration of this country and answered the Reference in the following terms: "The law abovesaid thus leaves no manner of doubt that the provisions in Chapter XXXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which includes Sec.432 are like power under Arts.72 and 161 of the Constitution exclusively for the Executive and operate in a field which does not either affect or embrace the judicial functions of the Courts. Howsoever extended meaning the court may intend to give to the words in Sec.482 of the Code, one must always remember that any order to secure the ends of justice or to give effect to the order under the Code does not and cannot mean a supervisory power to the Court over the executive functions of the State Government or the Governor of the State or the Union Government or the President of India. Although included as a provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the executive power of the State to suspend or remit sentence and the power of the Governor and the President to the said extent to accord pardon, etc., are executive powers which are beyond the reach of a regular Court of Law. Sec.483 of the Coce of Criminal Procedure and Art.227 of the Constitution of India together recognise the High Court’s supervisory power over the courts and tribunals including the executive actions which affect any right or interest but they do not cover such powers of the Stale Government or of the Governor which he exercises with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the State of the President which he exercises with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the Union Government. Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure thus is not available to any person or to the Court to interfere with the order passed by the executive Government after the convictior and sentence recorded by the Court. Such orders, however, are not completely free from any judicial control. The Supreme Court ha:, in several judgments said that so long as the question arises whether an authority under the Constitution has acted within the limits of his power or exceeded it it can certainly be decided by the Court. Indeed, it would be its constitutional obligation to do so. The Supreme Court ha:, in several judgments said that so long as the question arises whether an authority under the Constitution has acted within the limits of his power or exceeded it it can certainly be decided by the Court. Indeed, it would be its constitutional obligation to do so. (See: State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1977S.C. 1361 and Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789, Kehar Singh v. Delhi Admnistration, 1974 M.L.J. (Crl.) 501: (1974)4 S.C.C. 521: 1974 S.C.C. (Crl.) 558: 1974 Crl.L.J. 302: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1146, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the question as to the area of the President’s power under Art.72 falls squarely within the judicial domain and can be examined by the Court by way of judicial review, but cautioned that the function of determining whether the act of a constitutional or statutory functionary falls within the constitutional or legislative conferment of power, or is vitiated by self-denial on an erroneous appreciation of the full amplitude of the power s a matter for the Court but not the merits of the case upon which the executive decision is taken. In out considered view, therefore, while a judicial review to the limited extent indicated above will be permissible in exercise of the powers of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, it will not be so permissible in exercise of its inherent criminal Jurisdiction saved under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." 37. Before penning down the final epitaph, I feel impelled to reproduce here, as being quite appropriate what Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had said in the opening paragraph of the Judgment in the case of State of Bihar v. J.A.C.Saldanna, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 326: "Reverence and anxiety to the same degree if not more, to shoot at sight even a remote intrusion into the field preserved for judiciary must inform the judicial approach whenever assistance of the judicial machinery is sought for an unwarranted encroachment into the field of activity reserved for the other branch of Government....." 38. Thus, it seems to be the settled law that the power of the police to investigate into a report, which discloses a commission of a cognizable offence is unfettered and cannot be interfered with by the High Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers under Sec.482 of the Code. Thus, it seems to be the settled law that the power of the police to investigate into a report, which discloses a commission of a cognizable offence is unfettered and cannot be interfered with by the High Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers under Sec.482 of the Code. 39. The petition therefore deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.