MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN this group of petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution the petitioners who are carrying on business in various articles in the City of Rajkot have made a common grievance against the respondent-Corporation which is a statutory body functioning under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (the Act for short) in connection with refund of various octroi amounts paid by them to the for a writ directing the Respondent to refund the amount of Octroi. (Only a part of the Judgment approved for reporting is published.) corporation. They brought their goods within the municipal limits which according to them were re-exported out of municipal limits and hence, the petitioners were entitled to refund of these octroi amounts. ( 2 ) THE petitioners contend that the respondent-Corporation can collect octroi only on those goods which are brought within the municipal limits for consumption and use or sale and the sale would cover any sale for consumption or use within the municipal limits. But if the imported goods are exported outside municipal limits without change of hands or even with change of hands, the goods would not be liable to bear any octroi and would be entitled to get refund of duty paid on them as such sale within municipal limits would not be a sale for consumption or use within the municipal limits but it would be a sale to an outsider within the municipal limits who will use or consume them beyond municipal limits. The learned Advocates for the petitioner in this connection placed strong reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of TELCO Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the city of Thane, decided by a bench consisting of A. M. Ahmadi, V. Ramaswami and K. Ramaswami, jj. on 22-11-1991 in Civil Appeal No. 4702 of 1991 reported in JT 1991 (4) SC 322 : AIR 1992 SC 645 . V. Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Supreme court considered the question of payment of octroi duty on goods imported within municipal limits of Thane Municipality for consumption, use or sale therein. on 22-11-1991 in Civil Appeal No. 4702 of 1991 reported in JT 1991 (4) SC 322 : AIR 1992 SC 645 . V. Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Supreme court considered the question of payment of octroi duty on goods imported within municipal limits of Thane Municipality for consumption, use or sale therein. Section 105 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 was considered and while interpreting the words sale therein as employed in Sec. 105 of the said Act, it was observed as under :"since the goods were sold by the company to outside purchasers and the goods under the transactions of sale, were intended to be exported and were in fact exported, for consumption or use outside the Municipal limits, no octroi duty was leviable and the octroi duty paid on entry into the Municipal limits was, therefore. liable to be refunded. "in this connection, it was further observed :"in the case of impost of Octroi the taxable event is the entry of goods which arc meant to reach an ultimate use or consumer in the area. Mere physical entry into the Octroi limits would nor attract levy of Octroi. When the goods are brought in not for consumption within the area but for temporary detention and eventual export, octroi is not leviable. But in order to ensure, in such circumstances, that the goods are exported and to prevent evasion of Octroi on goods consumed inside the Octroi limit, Rules provide for deposit of a certain sum of money or the actual Octroi duty payable subject to a right to get a refund of the same when the goods are exported. When the goods in respect of which Octroi was paid arc exported, the Octroi became refundable and that is the very scheme of the levy of Octroi. The Oetroiable event in such a case shall be deemed not have happened. Right to refund arises because the goods are not consumed inside the area but exported and the tax becomes not leviable. The rules merely regulate the system on which refunds shall be allowed. The procedure prescribed and the need to adhere to the procedure shall have to be considered In the light of these legal incidence and nature of Octroi duty. The rules merely regulate the system on which refunds shall be allowed. The procedure prescribed and the need to adhere to the procedure shall have to be considered In the light of these legal incidence and nature of Octroi duty. "dealing with the question whether sale of imported goods within the municipal limits by itself would attract the incidence of octroi duty, it was observed as under;"having regard to the nature and incidence of Octroi unless the Octroiable goods are consumed or used or are meant to reach an ultimate use or consumer in the Octroi area no Octroi is leviable. Ihe words sale therein in the words consumption, use or sale therein in the definition Octroi means sale of Octroiable goods to a person for the purpose of consumption or use by such person in the Octroi area. If sale was intended for consumption or use in the Octroi area whether the purchaser actually consumed inside or outside Octroi area is irrelevant. Rules 24 to 30 and the forms in the system of levy of Octroi are, intended to regulate the procedure for collection, identification of dutiable goods and correlation of goods exported with the goods imported for the purpose of refunds of Octroi collected. In view of Constitutional bar. Octroi is not leviable if the goods are not brought into the Octroi area for purposes of consumption or use in the area but for export and in fact exported by the importer himself or the sale by him occasions the export. Compliance with the procedure prescribed in the rules for filing claims of refunds are not conditions precedent for the right or eligibility for refund of the liability to refund but are provisions regarding proof of export of the goods imported and are not meant to be exhaustive either. They are to be interpreted and understood in that sense. The object of the rules fixing a period of limitation for export however is different. The expott cannot be put in perpetual doubt and the goods may be considered to have come to a repose if they were not exported within a particular period provided in the rules -. Applying these principles to the instant case, on facts the rejection of refund applications on the ground that Rule 25 (3) (d) had not been complied with was illegal. . . . Applying these principles to the instant case, on facts the rejection of refund applications on the ground that Rule 25 (3) (d) had not been complied with was illegal. . . . If the goods are mixed up and unidentifiable due to breaking bulk and repacking in smaller and assorted packages before export the principle that the first export was of the goods first imported subject to any evidence available to the contrary, may be applied and the six months period prescribed for export may be determined accordingly. " (Emphasis supplied) it may be noted that in the present case also, the Act entitles the Corporation to levy octroi as defined by Sec. 2 (42) which provides that octroi means a cess on the entry of goods into the limits of a city for consumption, use or sale therein. This provision is identical to the provisions of the Maharashtra municipalities Act with which the Supreme Court was concerned in the aforesaid judgment. It must, therefore, be held that if the goods which are brought in after paying octroi, are sold not to local consumers for use but are sold to outside purchaser and subjected to the procedure laid down in the rules for refund, octroi collected on such re-exported goods is to be refunded and it will be no defence for the respondent-Corporation to submit that if the goods changed hands after import and were sold to outside purchaser, the importer would not be entitled to refund as he ceases to be the, owner of the goods prior to their export if they are clearly identifiable as having gone out of municipal limits without being used or consumed within the municipal limits. However, Mr. Tanna for the respondent was right when he contended that there is a statutory provision under sec. 147 of the Act laying down a statutory presumption to the effect that until the contrary is proved any goods imported into the city shall be presumed to have been imported for the purposes of consumption, use or sale therein unless such goods are conveyed from the place of import to the place of export by such routes, within such time, under such supervision and on payment of such fees therefor as shall be determined by the standing orders. Thus, it will be for the claimant to show that the goods which be bad imported were not for purposes of consumption, use or sale within the municipal limits and to rebut such statutory presumption, which will otherwise arise on account of operation of the said provision. It is not the case of the petitioners that the goods which they have imported have gone out of municipal limits at the relevant time by following prescribed route and within prescribed period under the supervision of the municipal authorities and on payment of such fees therefor as shall be determined by the standing orders. However, the learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that this statutory presumption has been rebutted by them by showing to the authorities in support of their claim for refund that they were armed with export certificates issued by the octroi clerks who were working at the octroi outposts at the relevant time when the goods were exported beyond municipal limits. They also submitted that these export certificates were issued by the octroi clerks on being satisfied on the basis of the documents furnished to them that these goods which were brought in, were the same goods which were being exported to outside purchasers as a result of sale in their favour. It was also contended that the statutory presumption is also rebutted by them by being armed with orders passed by the octroi officer who had made endorsement below the bills prepared for payment of refund amount to the concerned petitioners to the effect that purchase bills and sale bills of the businessmen were checked and they were found to be in order and that octroi amount was refundable as per the rules. Mr. Mr. Tanna for the respondent-Corporation on the other hand submitted that this statutory presumption under Sec. 147 was not rebutted by the petitioners for the simple reason that the export certificates which were relied upon by the petitioners in support of their refund applications were not found to be supported by relevant export notings which could have furnished proper material for issuing such export certificates by the octroi clerks and the octroi clerks seem to have issued such export certificates in a careless fashion without due verification and hence, no reliance can be placed by the petitioners on these export certificates, and they should have shown that the goods were the same goods which were being exported and, therefore, they were entitled to refund. It was further contended that even though some endorsements were made on the bills by the octroi officer as aforesaid, they were not binding on the respondent-Corporation which was the competent authority to grant such refund on being satisfied about the genuineness of the refund claims. In fact, in some of the cases the claim applications were granted, where the respondent-Corporation found that they were genuine claims. But so far as the present refund claims are concerned, they were rightly rejected as the goods imported were not shown by the petitioners to have been exported and unless that identity is established, no refund can be granted even on the basis of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision. It was further submitted by the respondent-Corporation that the contentions raised by the petitioners raise highly disputed questions of fact which cannot be gone into in these proceedings under art. 226 and the petitioners, if at all, have to approach Civil Court; and prove their case on merits on evidence. In fact, they had filed such suits but had withdrawn the same and had filed the present petitions in this court. For all these reasons, therefore, submitted the learned Advocate of the respondent, the petitions should be dismissed. It was also submitted by the learned Advocate of the respondent-Corporation, placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Indore Municipal Corporation v. Caltex (India) Ltd. , AIR 1991 SC 454 that whenever claim for refund of octroi is put forward on the ground that the goods were brought for temporary period for being taken out later, burden of proof is on the claimant and not on the respondent-Corporation. In that case, it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that when the refund was claimed on ground that goods were brought in for temporary period for being taken out later, the burden of proof that goods were not sold to consumers within the Corporation limits and that they were sent out lies on the respondent-Company having special knowledge and not on the Corporation. There cannot be any dispute about this proposition and in fact, in the present cases, there is a clear section to that effect as we have seen earlier. However, the contention which requires serious consideration in the present cases is to the effect that the respondent- corporation while rejecting various refund claims by the impugned orders at Annexures d and g collectively had given some reasons which at least were irrelevant for rejecting the refund claims. Even though various amounts have been claimed by way of consequential relief in the prayer clause, ultimately, the learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that they would not claim any money decree against the respondent-Corporation but all that they want is that the respondent-Corporation may be called upon to reconsider the entire question of refund in the light of the aforesaid decision of the supreme Court in TELCO case (supra ). ( 3 ) HAVING given our anxious consideration to these rival contentions, we have reached the conclusion that the impugned orders passed by the respondent- corporation at Annexures d and g collectively in all these petitions are passed at least partly on irrelevant grounds and, therefore, it would be in the fitness of things to direct the respondent-Corporation to reconsider the refund claims of the petitioners in accordance with law and that the petitioners are not entitled to any further relief in the present case. Reasons are obvious. If we turn to the impugned orders, we find in the first group of orders at annexure d collectively which are all passed in: 1988 rejecting the refund claims till that time that, three grounds are mentioned which do not appear to be well sustained. Ground No. 3 is that the importer has not signed the refund application. If we turn to the impugned orders, we find in the first group of orders at annexure d collectively which are all passed in: 1988 rejecting the refund claims till that time that, three grounds are mentioned which do not appear to be well sustained. Ground No. 3 is that the importer has not signed the refund application. So far as this ground is concerned, as held by the Supreme court in the aforesaid decision, even if importer sells the goods within municipal limits and exports it to an outside purchaser, he would be entitled to refund if identity of the goods is established. Therefore, whether he has signed the refund application or not would pale into insignificance. In ground no. 4 is mentioned the reason that export certificates are not annexed to the refund application. The petitioners were in a position to point out that in some of the refund applications, such certificates were annexed. This shows that mind was not properly applied by the concerned authorities while relying upon the said ground. Same is the position with ground No. 8 which stated that while applying for refund, import bills were not produced. The learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that in so many refund applications, such bills were produced and the difficulty arose because the refund applications were disposed of without hearing the petitioners or their representatives and, therefore, such factually incorrect ground came to be mentioned. Be that as it may, at least these grounds which have weighed with the authorities for rejecting the refund applications are found to be unsustainable and even though there may be some substance in other grounds, exercise will have to be re-done by the authorities at their end in accordance with law. The orders rejecting the refund applications as per orders at Annexure "d* collectively will, therefore, have to be quashed and set aside only on this ground. ( 4 ) WHEN we turn to the second batch of orders rejecting the refund applications at Annexure g collectively, the position appears to be still worse. As many as 17 grounds have been mentioned in the orders passed in January 1990. At ground No. 3, it is mentioned that importer and exporter are not the same persons and the importer has wrongly mentioned while applying for export certificate that he is the exporter and has thus obtained a false export certificate. As many as 17 grounds have been mentioned in the orders passed in January 1990. At ground No. 3, it is mentioned that importer and exporter are not the same persons and the importer has wrongly mentioned while applying for export certificate that he is the exporter and has thus obtained a false export certificate. In ground No. 4, it is mentioned that the purchaser who has purchased these goods has not submitted any particulars that he has purchased the same for his own consumption. There is no evidence that he has purchased it for his own consumption. In ground No. 8, it is mentioned that because of delivery of movable property, ownership gets transferred. Hence, on handing over movable property by delivery, applicants right to export is extinguished and hence, it cannot be said that he has exported the goods. In ground No. 15, it is mentioned that after the goods are imported within Rajkot limits they are subjected to sale and thereafter exported, hence refund cannot be given. Second part of ground No. 12 mentions that exporter has not shown that after importing the goods, there is no sale to any one within the municipal limits and that it is in his possession. These grounds clearly show that the respondent-Corporation had not kept in view the correct legal position and these grounds, to say the least, fly in the face of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in TELCO case (supra ). It is now well settled that the goods which are imported within the municipal limits if are exported even after undergoing sale within the municipal limits provided the outside purchaser utilises them outside the municipal limits, octroi duty on the said goods will be required to be refunded if identity of the goods is established. Consequently, the aforesaid grounds, amongst others, relied upon by the respondent-Corporation in the impugned orders at Annexure g collectively must be held to be irrelevant and impermissible in law, for rejecting the refund claims. Further grounds pressed in service by the respondent-Corporation may be valid, but the entire exercise being one and composite, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and would call for fresh decision in accordance with law by the respondent-Corporation in connection with even these refund claims which are covered by the rejection orders at Annexure g collectively. Further grounds pressed in service by the respondent-Corporation may be valid, but the entire exercise being one and composite, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and would call for fresh decision in accordance with law by the respondent-Corporation in connection with even these refund claims which are covered by the rejection orders at Annexure g collectively. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent-corporation. Special Officer Mr. S. C. Pavagati lias filed the affidavitin- reply opposing these petitions. Identical affidavits arc filed in all these petitions and identical stand has been taken for supporting the rejection orders. In para 4 of the affidavit, it has been pointed out that :"the most shocking aspect in this petition is that there is deliberate suppression of fact inasmuch as the petitioner after importing the goods in the City of Rajkot has sold the goods between the period of import and export to someone outside rajkot, However, the admitted position is that the goods are sold at Rajkot after import. Not only that, but dispute between the seller and the buyer is subject to Rajkot jurisdiction which clearly proves that transaction of sale had taken place after import of goods in Rajkot Municipal Corporation area. Export has been made thereafter and these facts were not stated neither to the Officer while importing the goods nor was communicated to the Officer of the Corporation while export was made. Not only that, but in refund application, deliberately this important fact has not been stated. . . . . . Attention of this Court is drawn to the order passed by the competent authority of the Corporation where while pointing out the grounds, it has been pointed out that after the goods are imported in Rajkot if the same has been sold while the goods were is Rajkot and thereafter (he export is made, refund was not permissible. "ln the same para, proceeding further, it has been averred : "that the goods were sold after they were imported and admittedly the sale had taken place in Rajkot Municipal area. " The transaction had thus taken place between the date of import and export. Therefore, it is quite clear that the petitioners were not entitled to refund. "ln the same para, proceeding further, it has been averred : "that the goods were sold after they were imported and admittedly the sale had taken place in Rajkot Municipal area. " The transaction had thus taken place between the date of import and export. Therefore, it is quite clear that the petitioners were not entitled to refund. The aforesaid stand of the respondent-Corporation also reveals that the main basis for rejection of the refund applications was the fact that the petitioners had after importing these goods into the municipal limits had sold them to outside purchasers and thus they were exported beyond the municipal limits. In short, according to the respondent-Corporation, the claim of refund cannot be granted as the goods were sold within the municipal limits after import. Now, as held by the Supreme Court, mere sale of imported goods within municipal limits would not disentitle the importer from claiming refund on the goods if the purchaser of the imported goods does not consume or use them within the municipal limits and the goods are meant to be sent out for such purpose to outside purchasers. Thus, the main basis of the respondent- corporations stand for rejecting the claim for refund gets knocked out. For all these reasons, therefore, the respondent-Corporation is required to reconsider the entire aspect in accordance with law keeping in view of course, the statutory burden of proof which lies on the claimant as laid down by Sec. 147 of the act and as per the Rules and Regulations of the respondent-Corporation and as per the settled legal position. It has to be kept in view that unless the claimants establish that the goods exported were the same goods which were imported, Whether they had changed hands or otherwise, the claim for refund obviously cannot be granted. But if on the other hand, it is proved to the satisfaction of the respondent-Corporation that goods imported were the same goods which went out by way of export, whether they in the meantime ceased to belong to importer and were purchased by outside purchaser, the claim for refund would naturally remain well sustained subject to other legally permissible provisions as per the Rules and Regulations and if there is no other legally valid reason for rejecting such claims. We may also observe in this connection one contention of the learned Advocate of the petitioners. We may also observe in this connection one contention of the learned Advocate of the petitioners. It was submitted that as per the octroi standing orders framed by the respondent-Corporation, the octroi clerks who are stationed on spot give certificates indicating that the imported goods were being exported and such certificates would be conclusive proof of identity of goods and, therefore, once claim applications were supported by export certificates, granted by the octroi clercks, the matter should end so far as the issue about identity of the goods is concerned and the respondent authorities cannot, after number of months or years, dig up a dispute and contend that the goods imported were not exported beyond the municipal limits at the relevant time and cannot reject the claim for refund on such ground or contend that export certificate issued by the octroi clerk is invalid. It is true that whether the goods which were exported years back, were the same goods or not which were imported earlier, would raise a question which would be very difficult to answer at the stage when the refund applications are being considered of adjudicated upon. But we cannot forget the statutory presumption which operates against the claimants as per Sec. 147 of. the Act and for rebutting such presumption, claimants have to be armed with export certificates which are properly issued. If the respondent-Corporation finds that export certificates are not properly issued, it would certainly be open to them to require importer to establish his claim for refund independent of such certificate. It is only when it is found that export certificates were properly issued as per the Rules and Regulations, that it can be said that initial statutory burden of proof which lies on the importer may get displaced. but not otherwise. In this connection, it is interesting to refer to the octroi standing order No. 16 framed by the respondent-Corporation which lays down detailed procedure for exporter to claim export certificate and the relevant documents which he has to produce before the octroi clerk before the octroi clerk can grant such certificate. but not otherwise. In this connection, it is interesting to refer to the octroi standing order No. 16 framed by the respondent-Corporation which lays down detailed procedure for exporter to claim export certificate and the relevant documents which he has to produce before the octroi clerk before the octroi clerk can grant such certificate. Of course, so far as the standing order is concerned, to the extent to which it requires the exporter to show that goods imported were not sold in the meantime before export, such a requirement would not survive and nor can it stand scrutiny in the light of the aforesaid supreme Court decision, but on the other aspects, the standing order would remain operative. As per Clause 16 (c) of the Standing Order, export clerk shall not issue export certificate save and except on being satisfied about the requirements mentioned in Clause (d ). When we turn to Clause (d), we find that amongst others, the claimant has to furnish to the octroi clerk, export note in duplicate. As per schedule V to the Standing Orders, export note which is to be furnished in duplicate has to be in the prescribed form laid down therein which, amongst others, requires mentioning of the number and date of import bill, original marks of imported goods, type and quantity of imported goods and their weight or quantity, value and special notes in that connection and must bear the signature of importer/exporter. It, therefore, becomes a moot question whether at the time when the export certificates were issued to the petitioners by the export clerk when the goods were exported and for which claims for refund are made, the octroi clerk was furnished export notes in duplicate by the claimants and after scrutinising the same, the export clerk had issued such export certificates or not. In short, if all the statutory requirements for issuance of export certificate were satisfied, then only, resultant export certificate can be legitimately relied upon by the exporter for supporting the claim and for rebutting the statutory presumption of Sec. 147 of the Act. Mr. Tanna for the respondent-Corporation submitted that in the present case, export certificate produced by the petitioners were not issued by the clerks after following due requirements of Standing Order 16 and they were not supported by export notes. Mr. Tanna for the respondent-Corporation submitted that in the present case, export certificate produced by the petitioners were not issued by the clerks after following due requirements of Standing Order 16 and they were not supported by export notes. The learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that even though export certificates might not have been issued after furnishing of export notes in duplicate, as per the proforma in Schedule V, as per the trade practice which was accepted by the respondent-Corporation over years, necessary details by way of CHALAV or voucher were treated to be equivalent to export notes. All these questions cannot be examined by us. Once we direct the respondent- corporation to reconsider the claims for refund in accordance with law and rules and Regulations and in the light of the legal position, it will be for the respondent-Corporation to consider these contentions in accordance with law. For all these reasons, therefore, these petitions are partly allowed. The impugned orders at Annexures d and g collectively in all these petitions are quashed and set aside. The respondent -Corporation is directed to reconsider these refund claims in accordance with law and in the light of the Rules and Regulations and in the light of the settled legal position and to inform the result thereof to the petitioners. (Rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.) .