Ahammed Kabeer v. Salma Beevi — 1992 DIGILAW 142 (KER)

Judgment :- John Mathew, J. Respondents 2 to 4 in a Rent Control Petition for eviction are the revision petitioners. The landlady who is the respondent herein filed the Rent Control Petition for eviction of the tenants on the ground of arrears of rent under S.11(2)(b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', and also on the ground that the original tenant had transferred his right under the lease (S.11(4)(i) of the act). 17 respondents who were the legal representatives of the original tenant were impleaded in the Rent Control Petition as respondents. The revision petitioners herein who were respondents 2 to 4 in the petition alone contested the petition. The Rent Control Court ordered eviction under both grounds. That order was confirmed by the appellate Authority (Rent Control). In this Civil Revision Petition respondents 2 to 4 are challenging the orders of the authorities below under S.20 of the Act. 2. The petition schedule room is a shop room bearing QMC 21/45 which is the western corner room of a building in Sy.No. 8611 of Kollam Village, Kollam Taluk. The landlady obtained the building from her father. Originally the building belonged to the landlady and her sisters. At that time it was being enjoyed by their mother. She let out the building to the predecessor of the respondents in the R.C. (O.P.) A Kunju Maitheen Kunju, hereinafter referred to for convenience as Kunju, as per Ext. Al rent deed dated 17-5-1965. One of the conditions in the rent deed was that the tenant should not transfer or assign the shop room to anybody without the written consent of the landlady. In 1979 the rent was enhanced to Rs. 400/-. In 1982 the rent was enhanced to Rs. 500/-. As per the partition in the landlady's family on 20-1-1980 the landlady became the sole owner of the room. Kunju died in 1980. Since the respondents kept the rent in arrears from June, 1983, the landlady sent registered notices dated 24-10-1985 to all the legal representatives of the-deceased tenant directing them to pay arrears of rent and calling upon them to execute a fresh rent deed. To those notices only respondents 2 to 4 in the Rent Control Court, hereinafter referred to as the revision petitioners, sent Ext. A2 reply dated 8-11-1985. The others did not send any reply. From Ext. To those notices only respondents 2 to 4 in the Rent Control Court, hereinafter referred to as the revision petitioners, sent Ext. A2 reply dated 8-11-1985. The others did not send any reply. From Ext. A2 the landlady came to know that Kunju constituted a partnership and it was carrying on business in the petition schedule room and subsequently Kunju retired from partnership and that the petition schedule room had been assigned to the revision petitioners and their deceased brother, Basheer. On coming to know of this unlawful transfer the landlady caused to issue Ext. A4 lawyer's notice dated 20-2-1986 pointing out the unlawful transfer and demanding arrears of rent to all the legal representatives of the original tenant. To that notice also only the revision petitioners sent a reply. That reply is Ext. A5 dated 25-3-1986. According to Ext. A5 the arrears of rent from May, 1983 to January, 1985 was paid to the Income Tax Authorities as per demand made by them. In the Rent Control Petition the landlady stated that any such payment to the Income tax Department cannot be taken into account. Accordingly the petition was filed on the ground of arrears of rent and also on the ground that the tenant unauthorisedly transferred his right under the lease. 3. Revision petitioners in their objections contended as follows: Eventhough Ext. A1 rent deed was executed by Kunju, the shop room was taken for partnership business of M/s. A. Kunju Maitheen Kunju which partnership came into existence as per Ext. B4 partnership deed dated 1-1-1140 M.E. (16-8-1964). In 1964 the 4th revision petitioner was a minor. Subsequently by agreement dated 18-9-1968 he was also included as a partner. The firm was paying the rent to the landlady. The landlady was aware of the existence of the firm. When the assets of Kunju were partitioned the business of firm M/s. A Kunju Maitheen Kunju was given to the revision petitioners and their deceased brother Abdul Basheer. Kunju and his elder son Thajudeen retired from the firm at that time. Ext. B5 dated 7-4-1972 is the document by which Kunju retired from the partnership. On that date a new partnership firm was constituted as per Ext. B6. From that time onwards the business in the petition schedule room was being conducted by the revision petitioners. The rent was enhanced in 1979 and 1982. Ext. B5 dated 7-4-1972 is the document by which Kunju retired from the partnership. On that date a new partnership firm was constituted as per Ext. B6. From that time onwards the business in the petition schedule room was being conducted by the revision petitioners. The rent was enhanced in 1979 and 1982. The rent up to 7-4-1972 was paid by Kunju. Thereafter the rent was being paid by the firm. Kunju died on 26-6-1980. One of the partners, Basheer, died on 31-10-1980. His legal representatives were given ther shares and an agreement was executed whereby revision petitioners became the sole partners of the firm. Rent for the period from May, 1983 to March 1986 was remitted by the firm in the Income Tax Office towards the arrears of tax due from the landlady's deceased father. Kunju has not transferred his tenancy rights. The tenancy right has become vested with the revision petitioners. The other respondents have no right over the tenancy right or over the business, The revision petitioners sent a pay order for Rs. 4,602/- along with Ext. A2 reply notice dated 8-11-1985 being the arrears of rent, cost and interest. The landlady refused to accept the pay order. Thus there is no arrears of rent. 4.' The court guardian of minor respondents 14,16 and 17 filed a separate objection stating that after the death of Kunju his tenancy right vested with the respondents. The minor respondents have no knowledge about the transfer of tenancy right. Minor respondents were not bound to pay any arrears of rent. 5. On behalf of the landlady Exts. Al to A5 were produced and landlady's husband was examined P. WJ, She also examined the Karyasthan (agent) of landlady's mother as P.W.2. The revision petitioners produced Exts. B1 to B17. The 1st revision petitioner was examined as CPW1. 6. Although this is a revision petition under S.20 of the Act wherein this Court has only to examine the records relating to the orders of the authorities below for the purpose of satisfying whether the orders are legal, regular or proper, we thought that jt may be necessary to refer to the pleadings for considering the various points urged by Shri. S. Venkatasubramonia Iyer, learned counsel for the revision petitioners. The only point to be considered is whether the orders passed by the authorities below are legal, regular or proper. 7. The only point to be considered is whether the orders passed by the authorities below are legal, regular or proper. 7. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners relying on S.21 of the Act contended that although any order passed for eviction of the tenant will be binding on sub tenants, such order will not bind any assignee of tenancy unless they are specifically impleaded in the proceedings. According to learned counsel, revision petitioners were impleaded only as legal representatives of Kunju. Learned counsel further contended that on the death of Kunju, all his legal representatives including revision petitioners have become tenants as provided in S.2(6)(i) of the Act. Therefore, the contention is that nobody has been impleaded in the proceedings as assignees of the tenancy rights. So much so, the further contention is that the orders of the authorities below are not binding on the revision petitioners in their capacity as partners of a firm or as assignees of tenancy right. No such contention was raised by the revision petitioners before the authorities below or in the Memorandum of Civil Revision Petition. 8. The revision petitioners are in the array of parties in the Rent Control Petition. They are having duel capacity as partners of a firm as well as legal representatives of Kunju. Any order passed in the Rent Control Petition will bind them both as legal representatives of the deceased tenant as well as in their capacity as partners of the firm. So the contention is without merit. 9. Then the question is whether the tenant transferred his right under the lease without the consent of the landlady. Ext. Al was executed by Kunju on 17-5-65. That was after the commencement of the partnership by Ext. B4 dated 16-8-1964. A reading of Ext. Al will show that it was executed by Kunju in his personal capacity and not as a partner of the firm. The recitals were to the effect that Kunju personally took the shop room on rent and he alone was responsible for the payment of rent. He was to keep the room in his possession. There was also a specific clause to the effect that without the written consent of the landlady he will not assign or sublet the room for the use of anybody else. Kunju and his assets were also made liable for any arrears of rent. He was to keep the room in his possession. There was also a specific clause to the effect that without the written consent of the landlady he will not assign or sublet the room for the use of anybody else. Kunju and his assets were also made liable for any arrears of rent. On 16-8-1964 Kunju had formed a partnership as seen from Ext. B4. If the shop room was taken on rent for the partnership, the rent deed could have been taken in the name of the partnership. But it was taken in the name of Kunju and the rent deed contained a specific prohibition against assignment of tenancy right. Thus there is no illegality in the findings of the authorities below that the shop room was taken on rent by Kunju in his personal capacity and not- for the partnership. 10. As per the evidence of P.W.I, he was the Managing Partner of the firm right from its inception in 1964. Till Ext. B5 (7-4-1972) Kunju continued as a partner. Admittedly on that date he retired from the partnership and the partnership was reconstituted by Ext. B6. The question to be decided is whether the tenant transferred his right under the lease. Essentially this is a question of fact. Both the authorities below have come to the conclusion that Kunju transferred his tenancy right to the partnership. 11. It is well settled that partnership is not a juristic person. (See The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Messrs. A.W. Figgis & Co. and others - AIR 1953 SC 455 and Munshi Ram and others v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta -AIR 1979 SC 1250 para.18). It is also well settled that there is no transfer of assets when a partnership is dissolved. (See M/s. Madras Bangalore Transport Company (West) v. Inder Singh and others - AIR 1986 SC 1564 & Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and others - AIR 1987 SC 1782). But the law of partnership will apply to the partnership alone and not to the landlord -tenant relationship which is governed by the Rent Control Act. The tenant is not entitled to violate any of the provisions of the Rent Control Act relying on any partnership agreement that the tenant may enter into with others. The provisions of the Rent Control Act alone will govern the relationship between the tenant and the landlord. The tenant is not entitled to violate any of the provisions of the Rent Control Act relying on any partnership agreement that the tenant may enter into with others. The provisions of the Rent Control Act alone will govern the relationship between the tenant and the landlord. There is no doubt that if the tenant is a partner in a firm, his relationship with the other members of the partnership will be governed by the law of partnership. However, as far as the right of the landlord to seek eviction under any of the provisions of the Rent Control Act is concerned, the main question will be whether there are any grounds under the Rent Control Act entitling the landlord to get eviction. 12. In D.N. Sanghavi v. AJ. Das (AIR 1974 SC 1026), the Supreme Court held that a landlord who is a partner in a firm could seek eviction of a tenant for conducting his partnership business in the premises provided he is not a sleeping partner in the business. This judgment was followed by Poti, J. (As he then was) in Govinda Pai v. sarvotf7amaflao (1981 KLT 330) and by M.P. Menon, J. In Jameela v. Moosa (1981 KLT 791). However, the Supreme Court in Shantilaly. Chimanlal (AIR 1976 SC 2358) doubted whether occupation by a firm, of which the landlord is a partner, would amount to occupation by himself. That was a case under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House, Rates Control Act, 1947. But the said question was not decided in that case. The case was disposed of on the assumption that it would amount to occupation of the landlord. If the original lease was in favour of a firm and on its dissolution a new partnership, is formed including the original tenants, that will not amount to subletting (Way; P. Mamma v. Abdurahiman Basha -1986 KLT 1250). So also if a partnership firm, of which the tenant was a partner, was carrying on the business of the firm in the premises let out to the tenant, that will not amount to subletting (Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and others - AIR 1987 SC 1782 and Vishwa Nath v. Chaman Lai - AIR 1975 Del. 117). So also if a partnership firm, of which the tenant was a partner, was carrying on the business of the firm in the premises let out to the tenant, that will not amount to subletting (Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and others - AIR 1987 SC 1782 and Vishwa Nath v. Chaman Lai - AIR 1975 Del. 117). It is true that a partnership business may be carried on in a property belonging to one of the partners and that property will not automatically become partnership property or asset. It all depends on the intention of parties (See Dwijendra Nath Muilick and another. Rabindra Nath Chatterjee and others - AIR ! 987 Cal 289, Gian Singh & Co. v. Devraj Nahar and others - (1965) 1 W.L.R, 412, MM Prasad v. Parasnath Prasadand others - AIR 1967 Pat. 191 and M/s. Boda Narayana Murthy and Sons v. Va/luri Venkata Suguna and others - AIR 1978 A.P. 257). However in a case where the tenant is a firm constituted by two of its partners and after death of one of the partners the surviving partner is given all the rights of the deceased partner, this would not amount to transfer (Shyam Sunder and others v. Brij Lai Chaman Lai Purani and others '- AIR 1968 Punj. 28). Unless the individuality of the original tenant and the partnership is different and distinct, taking in of a partner does not amount to assignment as a partnership has no distinct personality. (Mehta Jagjivan Vanechand v. Doshi Vanech and Harakhchand and others - AIR 1972 Guj. 6). - 13. In Varid v. Kamalam (1985 KLT 1066) there was no evidence to show that the landlord was aware of the partnership arrangement entered into between the lessee and a stranger. The lessee himself was conducting the business and managing all the affairs of the firm till his death. Only after the death of the tenant the stranger carried on the business. In that case the legal heirs of the tenant had not obtained any interest belonging to him. The lessee himself was conducting the business and managing all the affairs of the firm till his death. Only after the death of the tenant the stranger carried on the business. In that case the legal heirs of the tenant had not obtained any interest belonging to him. On a consideration of the evidence, our learned brother Sreedharan, J. held that the taking over of the premises by the stranger on the death of the original tenant amounted to a transfer from the original tenant as far as the landlord was concerned, although division of assets between the partners at the time of dissolution of a partnership will not amount to a transfer as between the partners. On the facts of that case the decision that taking over of the premises by the stranger can only be by a transfer from the original tenant as far as the landlord was concerned, was correct and therefore there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that the said decision requires clarification. 14. S.11 of the Act starts with a non-obstante clause by which it is made clear that the provisions in the said section apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract. Eviction of a tenant can be ordered only in accordance with the provisions of that section, the relevant portions of which section are as follows: "11(1): Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (4) A landlord may apply to the rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, (i) if the tenant after the commencement of this Act, without the consent of the landlord, transfers his right under the lease or sub-lets the entire building or any portion thereof if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so. Provided that an application under this clause shall not be made for the first time in respect of one and the same tenancy unless the landlord has sent a registered notice to the tenant intimating the contravention of the said condition of the lease and the tenant has failed to terminate the transfer or the sub-lease, as the case may be, within thirty days of the receipt of the notice or the refusal thereof. Explanation:-Where on the partition of a joint family or of the rights of co-tenants or on the dissolution of a firm, the right of the joint family or the co-tenants or the firm under a lease is vested in a member of the joint family, or a co-tenant or a partner, as the case may be, whether by act of parties or otherwise, no transfer by the tenant of his right under the lease shall be deemed to have taken place within the meaning of this clause". (Rest of the Section omitted). 15. Thus a tenant can be evicted from the premises if he sublets or transfers his right under the lease of the entire or any portion of the premises without the consent of the landlord, if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so. However, the eviction petition is not maintainable unless the landlord sends a registered notice as required under the proviso. The latter part of the proviso confers a right on the tenant to terminate the subletting or the transfer of his right under the lease within thirty days of the notice. These two conditions are cumulative, (See Ramankutty v. Krishna Iyer, 1976 KLT 331 and AbdureWm Salt v. Sahul Hameed, 1981 KLT 289). The initial onus to prove the existence of subletting or transfer of the right under the lease is on the landlord. When there is a transfer of possession or subletting, the terms and conditions are known only to the tenant and his transferee. In such a case it is for the tenant to establish the jural relationship between him and the transferee. Since those facts are within the special knowledge of the tenant. (Sri. Sreepathy Poti v. Vertkitasubramonia Iyer -1976 KLT 256 and Kunhikrishnan v. Madhavi 1991 (1) KLT 515). In such a case it is for the tenant to establish the jural relationship between him and the transferee. Since those facts are within the special knowledge of the tenant. (Sri. Sreepathy Poti v. Vertkitasubramonia Iyer -1976 KLT 256 and Kunhikrishnan v. Madhavi 1991 (1) KLT 515). In case the tenant who takes the premises on rent converts his concern into a limited company in which he has the controlling interest (see Vishwa Nath v. Chaman Lai - AIR 1975 Del. 117), or where a tenant takes new partners into his partnership (see Man; Ram v. Satpal - AIR 1972 J & K. 37), or if he converts his business into a partnership (see VirBhan v. Kunj Lai - AIR 1971 P & H. 456), there is no subletting or transfer. This is because the possession of the premises by the company or the firm, as the case may be, is considered to be possession of the tenant (see PJ. Jacob v. T.J. Jacob -1977 KLT 224). This will be so, as long as the tenant continues to have the controlling interest in the company or partnership. But the position will be different when he retires or severs his connection with the partnership. (See Niranjan Kumar v. Dhyan Singh - AIR 1976 SC 2400). The explanation to the clause makes it clear that there is no transfer when the premises is leased out to a firm and on dissolution of that firm it becomes the share of one of the partners. (See also Kanahiya Lai v. Labhu Ram - AIR 1971 Del 219). 16. On an examination of the various authorities placed before us, we are of the view that the following passage of MP.Menon, J. in Jameela v. Moosa (1981 KLT 791) sets out the correct test: 1111 in my opinion the proper approach would be not to generalise any lay down theories in the abstract, but to tackle the facts of each case and see how they operate. If the question arises under S.11(3), the attempt should be to find out whether the partnership set up by the landlord is one where he could really occupy the premises himself; and if it arises under S.11(4)(i), the attempt again should be to find out whether the tenant's partnership is one where he effectively continues to occupy the premises notwithstanding the formation of the partnership. That is the approach made by the Supreme Court in Sang/jaw's case, and by this Court to Ganapathi poti' s case. In construing a given arrangement, the general purpose of Rent Control legislation can be kept in view and subterfuges, if resorted to, could be exposed." The finding that the tenant assigned his tenancy right to the partnership without the consent of the landlady is accordingly confirmed, 17. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that the revision petitioners have an alternate contention that they are not liable to be evicted since they are the legal representatives of the original tenant. No doubt, in paragraph 14 of the objections to the rent control petition they have raised such a ground. However, since the original tenant retired from the partnership and did not own any right in the property at the time of his death, he held no leasehold right to be inherited by his legal representatives at the time of his death. So much so, this contention is without merit. 18., Another contention raised by learned counsel for the revision petitioners is that the landlady accepted the revision petitioners as her tenants. The rent was enhanced subsequent to the death of the original tenant. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the landlady is not entitled to any relief on the ground of assignment of the tenancy right. In support of this contention learned counsel referred to the judgment in AS. Sulochana v. C. Dharmalingam (AIR 1987 SC 242). In that case there was nothing on record to show that subletting was unlawful. The sub-tenant was openly in occupation. Reference was also made to Reoti Pershad v. Ajai Pal Singh and others (1979 (2) ro 11). There it was proved that landlord had knowledge of the subletting for a long period. On a perusal of the order of the Rent Control Court, it is clear that the revision petitioners did not argue this point before the authority. A perusal of the judgment of the appellate Authority also would show that this point was not argued before that authority. On a perusal of the order of the Rent Control Court, it is clear that the revision petitioners did not argue this point before the authority. A perusal of the judgment of the appellate Authority also would show that this point was not argued before that authority. On an examination of the evidence, both the authorities below have held that the landlady was not aware of the partnership formed by the original tenant Even after the death of the original tenant she had no reason to suspect that the revision petitioners who are some of the sons of the original tenant were paying the rent in their capacity as partners of a firm. She came to know of the partnership only on receipt of Ext. A2 reply notice. It may also be noticed that in Ext. A2, the stand taken by the revision petitioners was that there was a subsequent lease in favour of the firm. The revision petitioners failed to prove that allegation. Therefore the contention that the landlady accepted the revision petitioners as her tenants, is without any merit 19. In this view the landlady was not bound to receive any rent offered by the partnership. The payment made by the partnership to the Income tax Department will not amount to discharge of the liability to pay rent to the landlady. In this connection it has also to be noticed that by Ext. B3 letter dated 2-2-1987 the attachment order was withdraw by the Tax Recovery Officer. The contention of the landlady that the revision petitioners effected payments to the Income-tax Department without informing the landlady only to create some documents in their favour, was rightly accepted by the authorities below. The authorities below have found that the rent is in arrears. Therefore, eviction on the ground of arrears of rent was also justified. 20. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.S. Sulochana v. C. Dharmalingam - AIR 1987 SC 242, learned counsel for the revision petitioners contended that the provision for eviction on the ground of unauthorised assignment or subletting is a penal provision and so it must be construed strictly. Accordingly to learned counsel, the assignment or subletting must be by the tenant sought to be evicted himself and not by his predecessor. The further argument is that since the alleged assignment of tenancy was by the original tenant viz. Accordingly to learned counsel, the assignment or subletting must be by the tenant sought to be evicted himself and not by his predecessor. The further argument is that since the alleged assignment of tenancy was by the original tenant viz. deceased Kunju, that will-not be a ground available against his legal representatives. In A.S. Sulochana v. C. Dharmalingam (Supra) the original lease was in 1952 which was granted by the father of the appellant in favour of the father of the respondent. The father of the appellant as well as the father of the respondent were dead before the proceedings for eviction. The respondent was accepted as a tenant on the death of his father. The suit was filed for eviction on the ground of unlawful sub letting by the appellant who inherited the property from her father. In that case neither the appellant nor the respondent had any personal knowledge about the terms and conditions of the original lease. They had also no personal knowledge as to the circumstance under which the respondent's father created a sub tenancy. They had also no personal knowledge as to whether or not the sub tenancy was created with the written consent of the landlord. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of that case the Supreme Court observed that there was nothing on record to show that the subletting was in violation of the relevant provisions of law. There was no evidence in that case to prove that the lease did not confer on the father of the respondent the right to create a sub tenancy or that it was done without the written consent of the father of the appellant who was the then landlord. Therefore, it was held that the appellant cannot successfully evict the respondent on the ground of subletting. In this context the Supreme Court held as follows: "When the statute says the tenant who is sought to be evicted must be guilty of the contravention, the Court cannot say (sic) will suffice guilt of his predecessor in interest. The flouting of the law, the sin under the Rent Act must be the sin of the tenant sought to be evicted, and not that of his father or predecessor in interest. Respondent inherited the tenancy, not the sin, if any, of his father. The flouting of the law, the sin under the Rent Act must be the sin of the tenant sought to be evicted, and not that of his father or predecessor in interest. Respondent inherited the tenancy, not the sin, if any, of his father. The law in its wisdom seeks to punish the guilty who commits the sin, and not his son who is innocent of the rent law offence. It being a penal provision in the sense that it visits the violator with the punishment of eviction, it must be strictly construed, for it causes less misery to be sheltered in a jail." As far as the present case is concerned, most of the legal representatives of the original tenant are not contesting the petition for eviction. Out of the 17 legal representatives of the original tenant, only three have contested the rent control petition. They alone are the revision petitioners. There is a specific clause in the rent deed against the assignment of tenancy right or subletting. Both sides are aware of the terms in the registered rent deed (Ext. A1). the revision petitioners' claim cannot be treated as the claim by the legal representatives of the deceased tenant, but only as partners of a firm. According to them, the building was taken on rent for the purpose of the partnership even though the rent deed was executed in the name of their predecessor. It must, therefore, be deemed that those of the legal representatives who are not contesting have no objection to the prayer for eviction, and thus there is no merit in this contention. 21. At this stage the contention based on the proviso to S.11(4)(i) of the Act may be considered. Under that proviso the tenant is given the right to terminate the transferor the sublease, as the case may be, within thirty days of the receipt of the notice or the refusal thereof. The contention is that even in case it is taken that the tenant transferred his right under the lease, his legal representatives are entitled to terminate the transfer within thirty days of the notice. According to learned counsel, since the revision petitioners are also legal representatives of the original tenant, they are unable to terminate the assignment of the lease in their own favour and so the petition was not maintainable. According to us, there is a fallacy in this argument. According to learned counsel, since the revision petitioners are also legal representatives of the original tenant, they are unable to terminate the assignment of the lease in their own favour and so the petition was not maintainable. According to us, there is a fallacy in this argument. On the death of the original tenant it may be taken that all his legal representatives notionally inherited the leasehold right for the purposes of the proviso to S.11(4)(i) of the Act. Even though the leasehold right was assigned to the partnership, there is a fictional inheritance of that right by all the legal representatives of the tenant. They have a statutory right to terminate the transfer of the lease in favour of the partnership. But they did not exercise that right in spite of notice. All the legal representatives did not even send any reply to the notice. Only the revision petitioners replied to the notice in which reply (Ext. A2 ) they claimed leasehold right as partners of the firm. Since the other legal representatives did not send any reply or file any objections in the rent control petition, it must be deemed that they are accepting the position that the leasehold right was assigned to the partnership and that they had no right as legal representatives of the original tenant. Therefore, we hold that the revision petitioners are not entitled to claim any relief in their capacity as the legal representatives of the original tenant. 21. Thus there is no illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the orders of the authorities below justifying interference under S.20 of the Act. However, since the revision petitioners are conducting a trade in the room in question, it is only proper to grant them four months' time to vacate the premises. Accordingly the order of eviction passed by the authorities below is confirmed and the C.R.P. is dismissed. The revision petitioners are given four months' time from this date to vacate the premises. There will be no order as to costs.