JUDGMENT G. D. Dube, J. - The respondents bungalow along with surrounding land bearing No. 26/ 14 Hensting Road, Allahabad having an area of 4 acre 2 rod 21 pole equal to 22, 528, square yards was acquired in 1986 by the State of U.P. under the Land Acquisition Act. It is not necessary to give the details of various notifications under the Act for their validity had not been challenged in this appeal. The Special Land Acquisition Officer had valued the property in dispute by his award dated 15-6-1987 and determined the compensation. The land was valued at Rs. 894.64 on the basis of annual rental Rs. 134.14; the building at Rs. 3,18,429.00 and the trees Rs. 23,219.67 P. along with solatium and interest under Section 23A of the Act. Aggrieved by this award the respondents moved a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The Second Additional District Judge Allahabad has awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,19,34,235.24 with interest at the rate of 9% from 8-5-1986 to 7-5-1987 and at the rate of 15% from 8-5-1987 till deposit of the amount in the Court. Aggrieved by this order the State Government has preferred this appeal. The respondents have also filed cross-objection praying that the compensation awarded was very little and it should be increased to the amount claimed in the reference before the lower court. 2. Admittedly the land on which the bungalow of the respondents is situated in a Nazul land. It has not been disputed that the lease in favour of the respondent was only up to 30th September, 1992. Thus on the date of acquisition the remaining period of lease was only 6 years 5 months 8 days. The respondent had alleged before the trial court that the land in dispute was situated in such a locality which had its own potentialities. The bungalow of important persons like Judges, high officers and Advocates are situated around this bungalow. Even the circuit house was situated just adjacent to this building. It was urged that the lease was renewable and therefore, it was in nature of permanent lease. Therefore, the property in dispute ought to have been valued at the market price of the land. The respondent had also alleged that the Special Land Acquisition Officer had not valued the building and the trees properly. 3. It was urged that the lease was renewable and therefore, it was in nature of permanent lease. Therefore, the property in dispute ought to have been valued at the market price of the land. The respondent had also alleged that the Special Land Acquisition Officer had not valued the building and the trees properly. 3. The appellant had contested the matter and alleged that the property in dispute was covered by Urban Ceiling Act, consequently the respondents were not entitled to receive compensation for the land more than to what they were entitled under the Urban Ceiling Act. It was also urged that the respondents lease has almost expired and they have no right to continue after expiry of the period of lease. 4. On the above pleadings the trial court had framed four issues. The first was as to what was the effect of the expiry of the period of lease. Issue Nos. 2 and 3 were regarding compensation. Issue No. 4 was the consequential issue about the relief. 5. The learned Judge had come to the conclusion after assessing the evidence produced by the parties that according to Section 60 of the Easement Act the lease is irrevocable. Hence the lease was in the nature of permanent lease. The Learned Judge had relied upon Union of India v. Ajeet Singh, AIR 1987 Delhi 151, Kachroo Lal Hira Lal Dhoot v. Gurudwara Board Mamdeo, AIR 1979 Bombay 31, Purushottam Das Tandon v. State of U.P., (1987) 13 All LR 92 : ( AIR 1987 All 56 ) and held that the respondent was entitled to compensation in market value of the land. The lower court had determined the rate of compensation at Rs. 500/- per square yard. On the basis of this valuation the price of the land was determined at Rupees. 1,12,64,000.00. The learned Judge had stated that out of this compensation the appellant was entitled to 25% and the respondent to 75%. The price of construction was determined at Rs. 8,33,700.00. The compensation for trees was determined at Rs. 50,000.00. In this way the appellant was held entitled to 1,23,91,986.30. 6. It has been argued by the learned standing counsel that the approach of the trial court was quite erroneous. Since the respondent lease was to expire on 30-9-1992 it could not be deemed to be a permanent lease. 8,33,700.00. The compensation for trees was determined at Rs. 50,000.00. In this way the appellant was held entitled to 1,23,91,986.30. 6. It has been argued by the learned standing counsel that the approach of the trial court was quite erroneous. Since the respondent lease was to expire on 30-9-1992 it could not be deemed to be a permanent lease. The lessee had no right to remain on the land in dispute unless the lease was renewed by the State Government. It was also urged that the learned Judge had relied upon the report of Tara Chand, the Government valuer, who had not been examined in the court below. It was also urged that the trial court has not given reasoning for valuing the trees at Rs. 50,000.00. After enumerating the number and nature of the trees, the trial court had suddenly stated that the price of the trees should be Rs. 50,000.00. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent urged that according to Purshottam Das Tandon v. State of U.P., 1986 UPLBEC 565 : ( AIR 1987 All 56 ) the State Government was bound to renew the lease if the respondents were ready to fulfil the condition laid down by the Government for lease. The respondents would have in all circumstances opted for renewal of the lease and in this circumstance the land should be deemed to be a permanent lease. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that in the context of the above matter the lower court was justified in determining the compensation on the market value of the land. Learned counsel for the respondents took us through the evidence on record and contended that the Allahabad Development Authority was giving land to the allottee on a premium of Rs. 800/- per square yard. The compensation should be less than at the rate of Rs. 800/- per square yard. He prayed that the compensation awarded for the land should be calculated at the aforesaid market price. As regards the building, learned counsel for the respondents urged that, Tara Chand's report had been proved. Since Tara Chand was not available in India, he could not be examined. The report of Tara Chand proved by Ratan Kumar Jain (PW 1) should be deemed to be proved and has been rightly relied upon by the trial court. As regards the building, learned counsel for the respondents urged that, Tara Chand's report had been proved. Since Tara Chand was not available in India, he could not be examined. The report of Tara Chand proved by Ratan Kumar Jain (PW 1) should be deemed to be proved and has been rightly relied upon by the trial court. It was the error of the lower court that it had not given exhibit mark of this paper i.e. a report of Tara Chand, Government valuer. 8. The lower court has committed a basic error in applying the principles of Section 60 of the Easements Act to the facts of the present case. Section 60 of the Easements Act deals with licences. The difference between lease and licence has been clearly stated in Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmindas, (1971) 1 SCC 276 and Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, (1974) 1 SCC 202 : ( AIR 1974 SC 396 ). In the last case, Hon'ble V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. observed (at p. 398 of AIR) : "There is no simple litmus test to distinguish a lease as defined in Section 105, Transfer of Property Act from a license as defined in Section 52 Easemens Act, but the character of the transaction turns on the operative intent of the parties. To put it pithily, if an interest in immovable property, entitling the transferor's to enjoyment, is created, it is a lease; if permission to use land without right to exclusive possession is alone granted, a license is the legal result.". 9. Admittedly, the respondents were lessees of the acquired land. Hence the provision, of Section 60 of the Easements Act are not applicable to their case. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents has cited a case in Spl. L. A. and R. Officer v. M. S. Seshgiri Rao, AIR 1968 SC 1045 . In this case, certain lands were granted to the respondent on the condition that in the event of the Government requiring the land for any reason whatsoever the grantee shall surrender the land to the Government without claiming any compensation. Without exercising powers reserved by the terms of the grant, the Government had acquired the land. It was, therefore, held that the grantees were entitled to the compensation for the land of which the ownership vested in them. Without exercising powers reserved by the terms of the grant, the Government had acquired the land. It was, therefore, held that the grantees were entitled to the compensation for the land of which the ownership vested in them. The measure in that compensation was the market value of the land at the date of the notification and the measure of that market value was what a willing purchaser might at the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, pay for the right in the land subject to the option vested in the Government. 11. The above case law is not applicable to the present matter. The facts of the AIR 1968 SC 1045 case (supra) were quite different. 12. In this case, in hand, the lease was to subsist only for six years and odd. Under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, each of the respondents would not have been entitled to more than 1,500 square metre land as Allahabad city was situate in agglomeration falling within category `C'. Keeping in view this perspective of the title of the respondents in the land in dispute. any purchaser would have been hardly attracted in purchasing such a property which had such a risky title. The lease may or may not have been renewed after 30th September, 1992. Some of the land might have been declared surplus under the aforesaid Ceiling Act, Hence the property in dispute should be valued keeping in view the above special peculiarity in the title of the respondents. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to Purshottam Das Tandon's case (supra) which is also reported in 1986 U.P. LBEC 565 : ( AIR 1987 All 56 ) and urged that according to this case the Government was bound to renew the lease in favour of the respondents after 30th September, 1992. We are unable to accept this contention after a careful reading of the aforesaid case law in Purshottam Das Tandon's case (supra). The Government of Uttar Pradesh had been changing its stand in respect of renewal of leases of Nazul land. We are unable to accept this contention after a careful reading of the aforesaid case law in Purshottam Das Tandon's case (supra). The Government of Uttar Pradesh had been changing its stand in respect of renewal of leases of Nazul land. During 1959 to 1965, the Government had decided to grant fresh lease to the lessees on the terms and conditions that the lessees moved applications for renewal of leases at once or within a reasonable time on the expiry of lease as indicated by the Collector of the district which should not exceed three months from the date of the order of the Government. From 1965 to 1981, the Government had been taking different stand. In 1965, the Government specified the rates of premium and annual rent to be paid by the lessees whose leases were to be renewed. Some payment in instalments was permitted. In March, 1970, a ban was created with regard to renewal of fresh leases. In 1972, this ban was lifted. Ultimately on 19th April, 1981 the Government superseded previous orders and provided for renewal of leases on fresh and new terms. The question arose in Purshottam Das Tandon's case (supra) that the Collector of Allahabad was not renewing the leases of some persons while it was doing so in respect of some lessees, The Collector had failed to issue notices to individual lessees and had refused renewal of leases in some cases. The Division Bench of this Court had considered the propriety of such refusal of leases and had also considered as to how the leases were to be renewed subject to the provisions of Urban Ceiling Act. 14. From the above, it is obvious that the case of Purshottam Das Tandon ( AIR 1987 All 56 )(supra) was based on its peculiar facts. It was difficult to state conclusively on date of acquisition as to what could be the policy of the State Government after six years five months and twenty nine days. The leases could be renewed subject to the provisions of the Urban Ceiling Act. In Purshottam Das Tandon's case (supra) also, this Court had directed the lesses to file the necessary forms etc. within one month of the order of the Court before the Prescribed Authority under Urban Ceiling Act, 1976. The leases could be renewed subject to the provisions of the Urban Ceiling Act. In Purshottam Das Tandon's case (supra) also, this Court had directed the lesses to file the necessary forms etc. within one month of the order of the Court before the Prescribed Authority under Urban Ceiling Act, 1976. On the basis of Purshottam Das Tandon's case (supra), it cannot be held that, in all the circumstances, the Government was bound to renew the leases of the respondents after expiry of the period of lease. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents has also cited Union of India v. Ajeet Singh, AIR 1987 Delhi 151 in support of his contention that in case of lease in perpetuity the compensation was to be granted on the market value of the land and the price should be apportioned at the rate of 25% for the landlord and 75% for the tenant. Admittedly, in this case, the lease was for 99 years. Consequently, it was almost in the nature of a perpetual lease. As we have seen above, the facts of this case are quite different from the facts in this appeal. 16. Reliance was also placed on Kachrulal v. Gurdwara Board, Nanded, AIR 1979 Bombay 31. In this case, the Bombay High Court had come to the conclusion that whether the respondents were permanent tenants or licensees whose licence was entirely irrevocable, were entitled to share in the compensation. The facts of this case are also different from the facts of this appeal and the ratio of this case cannot be applied to the present case. 16A. On study of the case laws cited above and particularly the case of Purshottam Das Tandon ( AIR 1987 All 56 ) (supra), we are of opinion that the lease of the respondents could be renewable for the area permissible under Urban Ceiling Act. In this view of the matter, the appellant could not get more than what they could get under the Urban Ceiling Act. The lower court has not considered this aspect of the matter even though it had mentioned Purshottam Das Tandon's case (supra). Had the learned Judge gone through the case of Purshottam Das Tandon (supra) carefully, then he would not have committed an error of granting compensation in respect of the whole land acquired by the appellant. The lower court has not considered this aspect of the matter even though it had mentioned Purshottam Das Tandon's case (supra). Had the learned Judge gone through the case of Purshottam Das Tandon (supra) carefully, then he would not have committed an error of granting compensation in respect of the whole land acquired by the appellant. According to subsection (6) of Section 11 of Urban Ceiling Act, the compensation payable in respect of vacant land acquired under the Act in no case could exceed rupees two lakhs. Keeping in view the above legal position, the compensation in respect of the land acquired by the appellant should be calculated on two basis. Firstly, the ceiling authorities should consider as to what land would have been available to the respondents under the Urban Ceiling Act. In respect of this land, the respondents could be paid a compensation at the market rate. The second category is that of the land which becomes vacant under the Urban Ceiling Act. The compensation in respect of this land should have been calculated in accordance with the principles laid down under Section 11 of the Urban Ceiling Act. The compensation about the land has not been calculated keeping in view the two categories of land and the ceiling authorities have not determined the excess land which could be declared as vacant land. It becomes necessary for us to remand the case for a limited purpose as indicated below. 17. We feel it desirable to settle the market price of the land in dispute which could be paid to the respondents in respect of the land which they would have been entitled under the Urban Ceiling Act. 18. Both the parties had examined one witness each before the trial court. Some exemplars had also been filed before the trial court. The respondents had examined Rajesh Tandon whereas the appellant had examined Madan Lal Srivastava. Both the witnesses admit that the acquired land and the bungalow were situate in a very posh area. The importance of the land can be attached from this very circumstances that the Circuit House of the city is situate just adjacent to the acquired land. 19. The respondents had filed only some Newspaper cuttings and advertisement and letters of Allahabad Development Authority offering some land to the intending purchasers. These paper cuttings and letter cannot form a primary evidence. 19. The respondents had filed only some Newspaper cuttings and advertisement and letters of Allahabad Development Authority offering some land to the intending purchasers. These paper cuttings and letter cannot form a primary evidence. The respondents ought to have examined some officials of the Allahabad Development Authority who could have stated about the premium rate of land offered to the purchaser. The main stress of the respondents about the market rate of the land was on the basis of these paper cuttings. We do not find these paper cuttings as an admissible evidence for determination of the market value. 20. The respondents themselves had filed a copy of the sale-deed executed by Jai Prakash Singh on 16-1-1985. The market rate of the land sold for this sale-deed comes to Rs. 423-10 P. per square yard. The respondents had themselves filed an answer of question on a questionnaire form the office of District Officer, Allahabad. The Collector had directed that the market value of the land on Hastings Road could not be less than Rs. 250/ - per square metre and should not exceed Rs. 400/- per square metre. 21. The learned Additional District Judge had taken into consideration the paper cuttings. As we have stated above, these paper cuttings not be relied upon as exemplars. The exemplars filed by the respondents themselves indicate that about the one year before the acquisition the price of the land in the locality was not more then Rs. 423.10 P. The learned Additional District Judge has not given any reason as to on what basis he has determining the price of the land at the rate of Rs. 500/- per square yard. 22. From the various pronouncements of the Supreme Court as well as of the various High Courts, it is now settled that the market price of the acquired land should be that price which an intending purchaser would pay for the acquired land on the date of acquisition. In the instant case, the subsisting period of lease of the respondents was less than seven years. Hence any purchaser would have purchased the interest of the respondents which was subject to the risk of refusal of renewal of the lease by the Government. Jai Prakash Singh had sold a free hold right by a sale dated 16-1-1985. In the instant case, the subsisting period of lease of the respondents was less than seven years. Hence any purchaser would have purchased the interest of the respondents which was subject to the risk of refusal of renewal of the lease by the Government. Jai Prakash Singh had sold a free hold right by a sale dated 16-1-1985. Hence the respondents could not claim a better rate of market value than the price received by Jai Prakash Singh. Learned Additional District Judge should have analysed the evidence in the above perspective. The value of the land determined at Rs. 500/ - per square yard was simply based on surmises. 23. The respondents' witness Rajesh Tandon has not stated any fact on the basis of which it could be said that for a land in which owner had a risky title as stated above Rs. 500/- per square yard or Rs. 800/- per square yard was the proper market value. On a consideration of the various exemplars filed by the respondents themselves, the price of the acquired land could not be more than Rs. 423 /- per square yard. We, therefore, hold accordingly that Rs. 423/- per square yard is the proper market value for the acquired land to which the appellant may be entitled under the Urban Ceiling Act. In respect of the surplus vacant land as deter-mined under the Urban Ceiling Act, the respondents would be entitled to compensation under Section 11 of the Urban Ceiling Act. 24. The lower court had determined the market value of the building standing on the acquired land. Tara Chand had valued the price of the building. Rajesh Tandon has proved the signature of Tara Chand on the report. He has stated that Tara Chand was not available for giving evidence in the court as he was away from Allahabad. He was a heart patient also. This fact has not been challenged by appellant in the cross-examination. Rajesh Tandon has stated in his examination-in-chief that his building has seventeen rooms with all modern fittings.The doors are of Teak Wood. 25. On behalf of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, a valuation has been made by the Executive Engineer, Construction Division of Public Works Department, Allahabad. He had calculated in the plinth area of main building at 675.05 square metre. The valuer had not given any detail of the building. 25. On behalf of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, a valuation has been made by the Executive Engineer, Construction Division of Public Works Department, Allahabad. He had calculated in the plinth area of main building at 675.05 square metre. The valuer had not given any detail of the building. A site-plan of the acquired land is attached with the report of the Assistant Engineer. Madan Lal Srivastava (O.P.W. 1) was not able to say as to whose signature appears on the report. This map shows that there was a well and cook house also. The value of the well and cook house was not calculated by the Assistant Engineer. 26. The report of Tara Chand, as proved by Rajesh Tandon (A.M. 1), is in sufficient details. The quality and nature of constructions have been stated. We find that the report of Tara Chand should be accepted. The valuer, Tara Chand has also calculated the depreciation of the main building and the out-houses. After examining the evidence on record, we are of opinion that the lower court has rightly valued the cost of the constructions at Rs. 8,33,700/- 27. The Additional District Judge has calculated the valuation of the trees at Rs. 50,000/- After enumerating the number of trees, the learned Additional District Judge has abruptly stated that the value of the trees is Rs. 50,000/-. Rajesh Tandon (A.W. 1) has also not stated in his statement as to what is the value of each tree. On the other hand, the Forest Department has valued the trees on behalf of the Special Land Acquisition Officer. They are experts. There is no reason as to why their report should not be accepted. 28. It was argued by learned counsel for the respondents that the trees, as shown in the various photographs filed in the case, indicate that the trees are very thick in girth. Hence the value was rightly fixed at Rs. 50,000/ -. These photographs do not give any idea of the girth height etc. of the trees. Some of the trees mentioned are "LISORA". These trees are of little wood value. So are Peepal and Bel trees. The valuation fixed by the Forest Department appears to be very reasonable. The finding in the lower court that the trees were worth Rs. 50,000/ - is erroneous. of the trees. Some of the trees mentioned are "LISORA". These trees are of little wood value. So are Peepal and Bel trees. The valuation fixed by the Forest Department appears to be very reasonable. The finding in the lower court that the trees were worth Rs. 50,000/ - is erroneous. We hold that the Special Land Acquisition Officer had rightly determined the price of the trees at Rs. 23,219-97 P. Before parting with this case, we would like to make it clear that the ratio of the cases in Union of India v. Ajeet Singh (AIR 1987 Delhi 151) and Kachrulal v. Gurdwara Board, Nanded (AIR 1979 Bombay 32) (supra) cannot be applied to this case. In these cases, the leases were almost of permanent nature. In this case, the subsisting period of lease of the respondents was less than seven years. Hence the principle of distribution of market price of the land in dispute between U.P. Government and the respondent at 25 per cent and 75 per cent respectively cannot be applied to the present case. In the instant case, the ratio should be not more than Rs. 50/ - per cent for each of the parties. 29. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The finding of the trial court determining the price of the building Rs. 8,33,700/ - is confirmed. This whole money shall be paid to the respondents. The finding of the trial court fixing compensation for trees at Rs. 50,000/- is set aside. The compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer at Rs. 3,219-97 P. is confirmed. The finding of the lower court determining the market value of the land in dispute at Rs. 500/- per square yard is set aside. The market value of the land in dispute is determined at Rs. 423/ - per square yard. The respondents are directed to submit their statement under the Urban Ceiling Act before the competent authority under the Act within one month from the date of this order making statement as required under the Act. The competent authority shall determine the land which would have been available to the respondents under the Ceiling Act. On determination of the land available to the respondents under the Ceiling Act, the respondents shall be paid fifty per cent of the compensation calculated at the rate of Rs 423/- per square yard. The competent authority shall determine the land which would have been available to the respondents under the Ceiling Act. On determination of the land available to the respondents under the Ceiling Act, the respondents shall be paid fifty per cent of the compensation calculated at the rate of Rs 423/- per square yard. The remaining will be paid to the State. In respect of the land held vacant the competent authority shall determine the compensation payable under the Act. The whole of this amount payable under the Urban Ceiling Act in respect of the vacant land shall be paid to the respondents. The competent authority shall determine area of the vacant land within three months of the filing of statement before him and send his findings to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Allahabad, who shall calculate the compensation as per direction given above. The respondents shall, however, get solatium and interest on the above-mentioned awarded amounts as directed by the lower court. 30. The cross-objection is rejected. Costs shall be easy. It is made clear that any observation about the land available to the respondents under Urban Ceiling Act shall not be binding on the Competent Authority. Order accordingly