Judgment :- Krishnamoorthy, J. The question involved in this writ petition is as to whether an assessment made for the first time by resort to S.147 of Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 is a "Regular assessment" for the purpose of charging interest under S.217 of the above Act. A reference to the Full Bench was necessitated as the Division Bench which heard the matter felt that there is a direct conflict between two Bench decisions of this Court in Gates Foam & Rubber v. Commr. of Income Tax, Kerala (90 ITR 422) and Kerala Kaumudiv. Commr. of Income Tax, Trivandrum (181 ITR 3Q), in regard to the scope and import of the expression 'regular assessment' occurring in S.217 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as' the act). 2. Petitioner is an assessee to income-tax on the file of respondent No. 1. She is a partner of the firm M/S. Thamarapilly Brothers, Cochin and Cochin Wood Industries. For the assessment year 1980-81 (accounting year ending 31-3-1980), petitioner was liable to pay advance tax under the Act. Petit:; ner submitted an estimate of her income, as required under S.209A(1) of the Act, on 15-31980, as she was not an assessee till then; but no payment of advance tax was made in accordance with the estimate. Though the petitioner was bound to submit a return of her income for the assessment year 1980-81 on or before 1st July, 1980, the return could not be filed in time. Later, the petitioner was served with a notice under S.147 of the Act, for submission of the return, which was filed by her on 19-2-1983. Along with the return she produced the challan for having paid self-assessment tax in full. under S.140A of the Act. The 1st respondent issued a notice under S.143(2) and completed the. assessment by Ext. P1 order dated 12-10-1983. While completing the assessment, the 1st respondent levied interest under S.217 in the sum of Rs. 56,368/-. Aggrieved by the levy of interest under S.217, petitioner requested the 2nd respondent-the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Ernakulam, by an application, to reduce or waive interest under S.217, on the ground that such interest could not be levied, and there were circumstances which permitted waiver of such interest pursuant to R.40 of the Income Tax Rules. By Ext. Aggrieved by the levy of interest under S.217, petitioner requested the 2nd respondent-the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Ernakulam, by an application, to reduce or waive interest under S.217, on the ground that such interest could not be levied, and there were circumstances which permitted waiver of such interest pursuant to R.40 of the Income Tax Rules. By Ext. P3 order, the 2nd respondent rejected the application and confirmed the levy of interest. Aggrieved by Ext. P3, petitioner filed a revision petition under S.264 of the Act before the 3rd respondent. The 3rd respondent declined to interfere and dismissed the revision petition by his order (Ext. P5) dated 23-7-1986. Petitioner is challenging the above orders with regard to levy of interest under S.217 of the Act alone. 3. The only ground of attack against the levy of interest under S.217 of the Act raised by counsel for the petitioner is that in order to levy interest under the aforesaid section, the assessment should be a 'regular assessment'. According to counsel, the assessment made by resort to S.147 read with S.148 is not a regular assessment as defined in the Act and accordingly the petitioner is not liable for any interest under S.217. In support of the aforesaid contention counsel relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Gales Foam & Rubber Case (90 ITR 422). According to counsel for the petitioner, assessment for the assessment year 1980-81 having been made by resort to S.147, it is not a 'regular assessment' and accordingly the 1st respondent has no jurisdiction to levy interest as contemplated under S.217 of the Act. Thus, the only question to be considered in this case is as to whether an assessment made for the first time by resort to S.147 of the Act is a 'regular assessment' for the purpose of S.217 of the Act. 4. The main argument of counsel for the petitioner, for contending that an assessment as in the present case is not a regular assessment, is based on the definition of "regular assessment" in S.2(40) of the Act and certain other relevant provisions contained in the Act. 4. The main argument of counsel for the petitioner, for contending that an assessment as in the present case is not a regular assessment, is based on the definition of "regular assessment" in S.2(40) of the Act and certain other relevant provisions contained in the Act. "Regular assessment" is defined in S.2(40) of the Act as follows: "Regular assessment" means the assessment made under S.143 or S.144;" S.147 of the Act deals with income escaping assessment and according to counsel for the petitioner, power is given to the Income Tax Officer to assess such income under S.147 if the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) are satisfied. On that basis counsel contended that an assessment made by resort to S.147 is not an assessment under S.143 or S.144 of the Act. It is his case that a distinction is made in the Act between an assessment under S.143 or S.144 and an assessment under S.147 of the Act and he relied on the provisions contained in S.153 and S.246 for the above purpose. The income escaping assessment has to be assessed subject to the provisions of Ss.148 to 153. S.153 of the Act deals with the time-limit for completion of assessments and re-assessments. According to counsel, a distinction is made in S.153 between an assessment made under S.143 or S.144 and an assessment made under S.147 as they are separately dealt with under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of the aforesaid section. S.246 which confers a right of appeal against an order of assessment also makes a distinction between an order of assessment made under S.143 or S.144 on the one hand and an assessment made under S.147 on the other. S.246(c) provides for an appeal against an assessment under S.143 or S.144 whereas sub-clause (e) provides for an appeal against an order of assessment made under S.147 or S.150. Based on these provisions counsel for the petitioner maintains that there is a distinction between an assessment and a regular assessment and that only an assessment made under S.143 or S.144 will come under the definition of "regular assessment". On the other hand, counsel for the Revenue contended that any assessment made "for the first time", whether it be under S.143 or S.144 or by resort, to S.148, is a regular assessment within the meaning of the Income Tax Act. On the other hand, counsel for the Revenue contended that any assessment made "for the first time", whether it be under S.143 or S.144 or by resort, to S.148, is a regular assessment within the meaning of the Income Tax Act. Counsel for the Revenue further contended that on the wording of Ss.147 and 148 it is clear that any notice under S.148 has to be deemed to be a notice under S.139(2) of the Act and thereafter all the other provisions of the Act shall apply accordingly for the assessment. It is further submitted by him that there is no Section other than Ss.143 and 144 for making an order of assessment and as such the assessment as in the present case has also to be treated as an order of assessment under Ss.143 or 144 thereby making it a regular assessment. Counsel for the Revenue relied on the provisions contained in S.140A of the Act which deals with self-assessment. Sub-s.(1) of S.140A provides that if any tax is payable on the basis of any return required to be furnished under S.139 or S.148, after taking into account the amount of tax, if any, already paid, the assessee has to pay the tax before furnishing the return and the return shall be accompanied by proof of payment of such tax. Whether the return is filed under S.139 or in pursuance to a notice under S.148, the assessee has to pay the admitted tax along with the return, no doubt taking into account the tax already paid by him. Sub-sec. (2) of S.140A provides that after a regular assessment under S.143 or S.144 has been made, any amount paid under sub-sec. (1) shall be deemed to have been paid towards such regular assessment. The provisions contained in S.140A(2), according to counsel for the Revenue, make it absolutely clear that even an assessment made by resort to S.147 is a regular assessment under S.143 or S.144. 5. As far as this case is concerned, we are concerned only with the question as to whether an assessment made for the firs t time by resort to S.147 is a regular assessment or not. It will be advantageous to understand the general scheme of the Act before going into the question and the decisions on that aspect. 5. As far as this case is concerned, we are concerned only with the question as to whether an assessment made for the firs t time by resort to S.147 is a regular assessment or not. It will be advantageous to understand the general scheme of the Act before going into the question and the decisions on that aspect. Under S.139 of the Act every person who is assessable under the Income Tax Act has to file a return of his income within the time stipulated therein. If a person having assessable income omits to file a return and if the Income-tax Officer is of the opinion that such a person is assessable under the Act, he may, before the end of the relevant assessment year, issue a notice and serve the same on him, requiring him to furnish, within 30 days from the date of service of notice, a return of his income verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such "other particulars as may be necessary under S.139(2) of the Act, It is clear from the aforesaid sub-section that notice under S.139(2) has to be issued before the end of the relevant assessment year. Under S.140A of the Act any tax payable on the basis of any return filed voluntarily by the assessee or in pursuance to a notice under S.139(2) has also to be paid along with the return. S.142 deals with the enquiry to be made by the Income Tax Officer before making an assessment on any person who has filed a return. S.143 authorises the Income Tax Officer to determine the sum payable by the assessee and to make an order of assessment. The Income Tax Officer is authorised to pass an order of assessment without requiring the presence of the assessee or the production of any evidence in support of the return or after an enquiry under S.142. S.144 deals with the best judgment assessment and the Income Tax Officer is given power to make a best judgment assessment if a person fails to make a return required by any notice given under sub-sec, (2) of S.139 or fails to comply with any of the terms of a notice issued under sub-sec.(1) of S.142 or even after filing a return the assessee fails to comply with all the terms of a notice issued under sub-sec. (2) of S.143. (2) of S.143. Thus, Ss.139 to 144 deal with the filing of return, enquiry by the Income-tax Officer and the order of assessment to be made by the Income-tax Officer. 6. S.147 of the Act deals with income escaping assessment. According to that Section, if the Income Tax Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the pan of an assessee to make a return under S.139 for any assessment year, or to disclose all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, he may assess a person to income-tax subject to the provisions. Contained in Ss.148 to 153. So also, even if a person has filed a return, if the Income-tax Officer has, on the basis of information in his possession, reason to believe .that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may re-assess such income or re compute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year, subject to-the provisions of Ss.148 to 153,'Thus, under S.147 of the Act, the Income Tax Officer has power and jurisdiction to make an assessment for the first time if a person has not filed any return at all or to reassess the income even if an assessment order has already been made on the basis of the return filed by him, if there are materials available with him to come to the conclusion that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. As stated earlier, in this case, we are concerned only with assessment made for the first time under S.147. S.148 of the Act deals with the procedure to make an assessment by resort to S.147. S.148 enjoins the Income Tax Officer to serve a notice on the assessee containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-sec. (2) of S.139. S.148 further provides that on the issuance of such a notice, all the other provisions of the Act, in so far as they relate to assessment, shall apply as if the notice was issued under sub-sec. (2) of S. 139. Ss.149 to 153 of the Act deal with the time limit for such a notice and other incidental matters. S.148 further provides that on the issuance of such a notice, all the other provisions of the Act, in so far as they relate to assessment, shall apply as if the notice was issued under sub-sec. (2) of S. 139. Ss.149 to 153 of the Act deal with the time limit for such a notice and other incidental matters. Ss.207 to 213 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 deal with the liability, computation and mode of payment of advance tax pay able under the Act. S.214 provides for payment of interest by the Government on the amount by which the aggregate amount of advance tax paid during any financial year, exceeds the amount of tax determined on regular assessment. S.215 provides for payment of interest by the assessee if the advance tax paid by him under S.209A or 212 on the basis of his own estimate, is less than 75% of the tax assessed by the regular assessment. S.216 makes an assessee liable to pay interest if he has underestimated the income. S.217 provides for payment of interest by an assessee where he has not sent the statement or estimate of income as provided in S.209A. S.217, so far as it is relevant to this case, is as follows: "217(1). Where, on making the regular assessment, the Income-tax Officer finds a) that any such person as is referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S.209A has not sent the statement referred to in that clause or the estimate in lieu of such statement referred to in sub-section (2) of that section; or (b) that any such person as is referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.209A has not sent the> estimate referred to in that clause, simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum, from the 1st day of April next following the financial year in which the advance tax was payable in accordance with the said sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) up to the date of the regular assessment shall be payable by the assessee upon the amount equal to the assessed tax as defined in sub-section (5) of S.215." 7. The true ambit and import of the expression "regular assessment" has been the subject-matter of judicial interpretation in various cases, both under the Income Tax Act, 1922 and under the 1961 Act. The true ambit and import of the expression "regular assessment" has been the subject-matter of judicial interpretation in various cases, both under the Income Tax Act, 1922 and under the 1961 Act. Some High Courts have taken the view that an assessment made by resort to S.147 is not a "regular assessment". Some other High Courts have taken the view that an assessment made for the first time by resort to Ss.147 and 148 is a "regular assessment". The Bombay High Court alone has taken the view that an assessment under S.147, whether it be an assessment for the first time or a reassessment, will also be a regular assessment as contemplated under the Income Tax Act. A question has also arisen in interpreting S.214 of the Act as to whether an assessment made in pursuance to an appellate or revisional order will be a regular assessment or not, and all the High Courts, including a Full Bench of this Court in C.I.T. v. G.B. Transports (155 ITR 548 =1985 KLT 908) have taken the view that such an assessment will not be a regular assessment and that only the first assessment will be a regular assessment. Gates Foam & Rubber case (90 ITR 422), CIT v. Ram Chandra Singh (104 ITR 77) (Patna), Smt. Kamala Vati v. CIT (111 ITR 248) (Punjab & Haryana), CIT v. Smt. Jagjit Kaur (126 ITR 540) (Allahabad), CIT v. Ganeshram Nayak (129 ITR 43) (Orissa), Manohar Gidwany v. C.I.T. (139 ITR 498) (Calcutta), Charles D' Souza v. CIT (147 ITR 694)(Karnataka) and CIT v. Padma Timber Depot (169 ITR 646) (A.P.) are cases coming under the first category. Gopalaswami Mudaliar v. ITO (Fifth addl. ) (49 ITR 322) (Madras), Agrl. Marketing Federation v. Union of India (130 ITR 928) (delhi) and C.IT. v. Pratap Singh of Nabha (138 ITR 27) are cases coming under the second category. In Deviprasad Kejriwal v. CIT (102 ITR 180) the Bombay High Court has taken the view that any assessment made in pursuance to a proceeding under S.147, whether it is an assessment for the first time or a re-assessment, will be a 'regular assessment' under the Act. It is not necessary for us to go to the extent of the Bombay High Court for the purpose of this case nor does the question arise in the present case. It is not necessary for us to go to the extent of the Bombay High Court for the purpose of this case nor does the question arise in the present case. Here we are concerned only with the question as to whether an assessment made for the first time by resort toS.147 is a regular assessment or not. 8. In the first category of cases-Smt. Kamala Vati's case (111 ITR 248), Smt. Jagjit Kaur's case (126 ITR 540). Ganeshram Nayak's case (129 ITR 43), Charles' case (147 ITR 694), Padma Timber Depot case (169 ITR 646)-the question arose as to whether an assessment made for the first time by resort to S. 147 is a regular assessment or not. The other cases were cases of re-assessment under S.147. The Division Bench case of our High Court (Gates Foam & Rubber case - 90 ITR 422) was not a case of assessment for the first time under S.147 but a case of re-assessment under S.147. In all the decisions wherein the question regarding assessment for the first time arose, apart from relying on the definition in S.2(40) and the other provisions of the Act, reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision of this Court aforementioned. But it is to be noted that "Gates Foam and Rubber case" (90 ITR 422) was concerning penalty proceedings under S.273 of the Act, and it arose in a proceeding for re-assessment under S.147 of the Act. This Court was considering the case of re-assessment under S.147 and Govindan Nair, J. (as he then was) made it clear that they have not considered the question as to whether any distinction has to be drawn on the basis of the provisions of the Income Tax Act in respect of an assessment for the first time made under S.147. It is pertinent to note the following observations made by the learned judge: "Our attention has been drawn to a decision of the Madras High Court in Natarajan Chettiarv. Income-tax Officer, Karaikudi (42 ITR 29) (Mad.), and a later decision of the same High Court in Gopalaswami Mudaliar v. Fifth Addl. Income-tax Officer, Coimbatore (49 ITR 322). In both these cases the section that was considered was section 18A(6) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Income-tax Officer, Karaikudi (42 ITR 29) (Mad.), and a later decision of the same High Court in Gopalaswami Mudaliar v. Fifth Addl. Income-tax Officer, Coimbatore (49 ITR 322). In both these cases the section that was considered was section 18A(6) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In the former decision the view taken was that 'regular assessment' mentioned in S.18A(6) will refer only to assessment made without resort to S.34 of that Act. This view appears to have been practically dissented from in the decision in Gopalaswami Mudaliar v. Fifth Addl. Income-tax Officer, Coimbatore (49 ITR 322), and a distinction has been sought to be drawn between cases where there has been a previous assessment and cases in which there had been no previous assessments. The decision in Gopalaswami Mudaliar v. Fifth Addl. Income-tax Officer, Coimbatore, related to a case where there had not been any previous assessment and it was held therein that interest can be charged under S.18A(6). In the later decision it was suggested that when there had been no previous assessment, the assessment made by resort to S.34 is a regular assessment and that, therefore, S.18A(6) will apply to such assessment; but that section may not apply to a case where there had been previous assessment, before action was taken under S.34 of the Act. It is not for us to consider whether any such distinction can be drawn on the basis of the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act. 1922, nor are we called upon to consider the correctness of the view taken in Natarajan Chettiar v. Income-tax Officer, Karaikudi (42 ITR 291." (emphasis supplied) It is thus clear from the aforesaid observations that this Court has not considered the question as to whether an assessment made for the first time by resort to S.147 will be a 'regular assessment' or not. This Court has not decided that question as it did not arise and the case before the Division Bench was one of reassessment under S.147. There are certain observations in the said judgment which are of very wide import and may include even assessments which are made for the first time in proceedings under S.147 of the Act. But we should state that the said observations were not germane to the issue involved in that case. 9. There are certain observations in the said judgment which are of very wide import and may include even assessments which are made for the first time in proceedings under S.147 of the Act. But we should state that the said observations were not germane to the issue involved in that case. 9. In Gopalaswami Mudaliar's case (49 ITR 322) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court had to consider the question as to whether an assessment made for the first time by resort to S.34 of the Income-tax Act. 1922 corresponding to the present S.147 is a regular assessment or not. In support of the argument that such assessments cannot be regular assessments, reliance was placed on the decision of Rajamannar C.J. in Natarajan Chettiar v. Income-tax Officer (42 ITR 29). The later Division Bench distinguished that case and held that the above decision must be confined to cases where there has been an initial assessment under S.23 of the 1922 Act which is however reopened under S.34 and a re-assessment made and that those principles will not apply to an assessment for the first time made under S.34. After elaborately considering various corresponding provisions of the 1922 Act, it was held by their Lordships:- "It seems, to us that this decision is only of limited application. It does not lay down any principle that penal interest is not leviable in cases where even the initial assessment of the assessee is made by resort to S.34. As we understand the decision it must be confined to cases where there has been an initial assessment under S.23, which is however reopened under S.34 and a reassessment is made. As we have pointed out, the expression "regular assessment" is used in contrast with a provisional assessment. An initial assessment, though made by resort to S.34, is none the less a regular assessment." 10. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Agrl. Marketing Federation v. Union of India (130 ITR 928) elaborately considered the scope and content of the expression 'regular assessment', in the light of the provisions contained in- the Income Tax Act of 1922 and 1961. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Agrl. Marketing Federation v. Union of India (130 ITR 928) elaborately considered the scope and content of the expression 'regular assessment', in the light of the provisions contained in- the Income Tax Act of 1922 and 1961. Though the case arose under S.214 of the Income Tax Act, dealing with the right of an assessee to get interest on the advance tax paid, the matter was elaborately considered and it was held that an assessment made for the first time by resort-to S.34 of the 1922 Act or under S.147 of the 1961 Act will be a regular assessment. This was followed by the same High Court in Pratap Singh's case (138 ITR 27). The Bombay High Court in Deviprasad's case (102 ITR 180) went further and held that even a re-assessment made under S.34 of the 1922 Act or under S.147 of the 1961 Act would also be a regular assessment for the purpose of S.273. Anyhow it is not necessary to go to that extent as we are concerned in this case only with an assessment made for the first time. 11. After considering the various provisions of the Act and the decisions rendered in the matter, we are clearly or" the opinion that the view taken by the Madras High Court in Gopalaswami Mudaliar's case (49 ITR 322) and that of the Delhi High Court in Agrl. Marketing Federation v. Union of India (130 ITR 928) and Pratap Singh's case (138 ITR 27) lays down the correct law. As stated earlier, this Court has not considered in Gates Foam & Rubber case (90 ITR 422) the content and import of the expression 'regular assessment' vis-a-vis an assessment for the first time made under S.147. A reading of Ss.147 & 148 make it clear that at any rate an assessment for the first time made by resort to S.147 is a regular assessment. S.148 enjoins the Income-tax Officer before making an assessment under S.147 to serve a notice to the assessee, containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of S.139. S.148 enjoins the Income-tax Officer before making an assessment under S.147 to serve a notice to the assessee, containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of S.139. The further provision in that section is very significant which provides that the aforesaid notice has to be treated as if it is a notice under S.139(2) and that all the provisions of the Act shall apply to the subsequent procedure and the final assessment. In other words, the notice issued under S.148 has to be deemed to be a notice under S.139(2) and if the other provisions of the Act have to be applied, an assessment in pursuance to that can be made only under S.143 or S.144. We were not shown any other provision by which the Income-tax Officer is authorised to make an order of assessment under the Act. The provisions contained in S.140A also give an indication that an assessment made in pursuance to a notice under S.148 is a regular assessment under S.143 or S.144, for S.140A (2) provides that any admitted tax paid in pursuance to S.140A(1) shall be deemed to have been paid towards a regular assessment under S.143 or S.144. It is pertinent to note that S.140A(1) deals with a return required to be furnished under S.139 or S.148. That makes the provision clear that an assessment made under S.147 also will be a regular assessment under S.143 or S.144. Accordingly we hold that any assessment made for the first time by resort to S.147 will also be a regular assessment for the purpose of invoking S.217 of the Act. With great respect, we dissent from the view expressed in certain decisions referred to earlier in this judgment which take a contrary view. 12. If this interpretation is not given to the expression' regular assessment' it may lead to an anomalous position. S.217 authorises the Income-tax Officer to levy interest for non-payment of or deficit payment of advance tax under the Act. 12. If this interpretation is not given to the expression' regular assessment' it may lead to an anomalous position. S.217 authorises the Income-tax Officer to levy interest for non-payment of or deficit payment of advance tax under the Act. If an interpretation is given to the expression 'regular assessment' as contended by counsel for the petitioner, the result would be that a person who actually files a return within the assessment year will be liable to pay interest if he does not pay advance tax or if there is deficiency in the amount of advance tax, whereas if a person fails to file a return within the assessment year but files it after the assessment year, he is not liable to pay interest at all under S.217. Courts have to interpret the Sections in a statute in a reasonable manner which would not defeat the avowed object. It should not lead to absurd results and in that view of the matter also, we are clearly of the opinion that an assessment as in the present case will be a regular assessment for the purpose of S.217 of the Income-tax Act. 13. It was pointed out that there is an observation in a Full Bench decision of this Court in G.B. Transports case (155 ITR 548 =1985 KLT 908) to the effect that an assessment or re-assessment under S. 147 is not a regular assessment. That decision was regarding the interpretation of S.214 of the Income-tax Act and the question as in this case did not arise at all therein. Any observation made in a decision has to be understood in the context in which it is made and in the context in which it was made in the aforesaid decision, it was only an obiter dictum and did not actually arise. That decision cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that an assessment made for the first time even if it is by resort to S.147 is not a regular assessment. 14. That decision cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that an assessment made for the first time even if it is by resort to S.147 is not a regular assessment. 14. We make it clear that we have interpreted the expression 'regular assessment' only in the context of an assessment for the first time made under S.147 and for the purpose of S.217 of the Act and that we have not expressed any opinion as to whether the same meaning will have to be given to the case of a 'reassessment' by resort to S.147 or of an assessment under the Act in any other situation. 15. By the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984 sub-sec. (6) was added to S.215 of the Income Tax Act with effect from 1-4-1985 which reads as follows: " Where, in relation to an assessment year an assessment is made for the first time under S.147, the assessment so made shall be regarded as a regular assessment for the purposes of this section and Ss.216,217 and 273". On the basis of the above amendment it was contended that the assessment under S.147 even if it is an assessment for the first time, will be regarded as a regular assessment only from 1-4-1985 and for the assessment year 1980-81 with which we are concerned such assessments cannot be treated as regular assessments. We are not inclined to agree with this contention. In the view that we have taken, even in the absence of sub-section (6) of S.215, such assessments will be regular assessments. Sub-sec. (6) ofS.215 is only a clarification of the earlier law as different High Courts have expressed different opinion on the question and by the inclusion of that sub-section alone it cannot be said that for the assessment year in question such assessments cannot be .treated as regular assessments. 16. In view of what is stated above, the Original Petition has only to be dismissed and we do so, but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.