JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava 1. Feeling aggrieved by a decree of ejectment and revovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation pendente lite and future passed against the petitioner by the Judge Small Cause courts which was affirmed by respondent no. 1 In revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act he has approached this court seeking quashing thereof. 2. The brief facts shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case are that the plaintiff respondents had filed a small cause suit against the petitioner praying for his ejectment from the premises in dispute and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The assertions made in the plaint were that the building in question had been newly constructed in the year 1983 and fell out side the per view of the provisions contained in U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of getting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). It was further asserted that the defendant was tenant of the accommodation in dispute at the rate of Rs. 65/- per month. It was further asserted that liability for the payment of the water fax in respect of the accommodation in dispute also rested on the defendant. The plaintiff further asserted that inspite of the notice of quit and payment of arrears of rent having been served on the defendant he had neither paid off the arrears of rent nor had vacated the premises, hence the suit. The plaintiff claimed pendente lite and future damages for use and occupatlon/mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 600/- per month on the assertions that the premises in dispute could be let out at a monthly rent of Rs, 600/- per month. The aforesaid suit was contested by the defendant denying the plaint allegations and asserting that it had been filed on incorrect facts. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the tenant petitioner moved an application, paper No 65-C requesting that an advocate Commissioner be appointed who should be required to submit report regarding the period of construction of the shop in dispute. The trial court heard the counsel for the parties on the merits of the aforesaid application on 5-2-1991 and fixed 14-2-1991 for orders On 14-2-1991, the application, paper no. 65-C was rejected by a detailed order. The trial court heard the counsel for the parties on the merits of the aforesaid application on 5-2-1991 and fixed 14-2-1991 for orders On 14-2-1991, the application, paper no. 65-C was rejected by a detailed order. After rejecting the application, the trial court fixed 25-2-1991, for evidence. On 25-2-1991, as the order sheet shows, the case was called out repeatedly but nobody responded for the defendant. This date had been fixed for the defendant's evidence. Neither the defendant cor his counsel was present to give the evidence. In this circumstances, the trial court closed the evidence of the defendant and heard the arguments of counsel for the plaintiff and fixed 27-2-1991 for judgment. 4. After considering the evidence on the record and the oral evidence of Rajendra Shankar, PW 1 who had not been cross-examined inspite of repeated opportunities having been afforded to the defendant, the trial court decreed the suit as claimed. The trial court determined the rate of damages for use and occupation for the premises in dispute to be Rs. 600/- per month on the basis of the statement of PW 1 to the effect that if the premises in dispute is let out then it may fetch a rental of Rs. 600/- per month. From the sequence of facts indicated above, it will be apparent that inspite of the notice of 14th February, 1991, which was the date fixed in the case and on which date 25-2-1991 had been fixed for the defendant's evidence, the petitioner did not appear to attend the case on the date fixed for hearing and did not lead any evidence in support of his case. The suit was therefore, decreed exparte on 27-2-1991. In such a state of affairs two courses were open to the defendant. He could either move an application under order 9 rule 13 Civil Procedure Code, seeking the setting aside of the exparte decree making out the sufficient cause for his non appearance on 25-2-1991 or he could straight away challenge the decree passed by the Judge Small Cause Courts in a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The petitioner in the present case, chose to avail the remedy of a revision envisaged under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 5. The nature of the two remedies indicated above and the scope of the interference thereunder are quite different. The petitioner in the present case, chose to avail the remedy of a revision envisaged under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 5. The nature of the two remedies indicated above and the scope of the interference thereunder are quite different. In the proceedings for setting aside the exparte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code while seeking the setting aside of the exparte decree, the petitioner could lead evidence to show that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing on 25-2-1991. In the proceedings under section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, however the revisional Court could only consider as to whether the decree passed by the Judge Small Cause Courts was In accordance with law and could be sustained on the evidence and the materials already on the record. 6. It has been urged by the Counsel for the petitioner that, In the circumstances of the case, since 14-2-1991 was not a date fixed for hearing of the case it was not necessary for the defendant on his counsel to attend the court on that date and since 25-2-1991 had been fixed for the hearing of the case, It was incumbent on the part of the trial court to inform the defendant about the said date, which was not done. It was urged that a duty stands cast upon the court to inform the parties about the date fixed for hearing of the case and since in the present case, the trial court has fatted to discharge this duty, the impugned decree deserves to be set aside. It was further urged that la any view of the matter, there could be no Justification for determining the quantum of damages at the rate of Rs. 600/-per month as there was no material on the record, which could justify this finding. In this connection, it has been pointed out that the trial court had purported to act upon the opinion of the PW 1 to the effect that premises In dispute If let out could fetch the rental of Rs. 600/- per month. No evidence was led which could establish that the accommodation in dispute could fetch such an income. In this connection, it has been pointed out that the trial court had purported to act upon the opinion of the PW 1 to the effect that premises In dispute If let out could fetch the rental of Rs. 600/- per month. No evidence was led which could establish that the accommodation in dispute could fetch such an income. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents on the other hand has asserted that a duty stood cast upon the defendant to attend the date fixed in the case and since he did not appear on 14-2-1992, the notice of the date of hearing fixed on that date will stand imputed on him and the defendant can not be heard to say that he had no notice of 25-2-1991 as a date fixed for hearing and leading of his evidence. It has further been asserted that the trial court had believed the statement of PW 1 and the finding on the question of the rate of damages is based on appraisal of evidence, which could not be disturbed, while exercising the revisional Jurisdiction envisaged under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. It has been pointed out that the revisional court had endorsed the findings recorded by the trial court about the amount of rent, which was found to be due against the defendant and has rightly dismissed the revision. 7. I have heard Sri Janardan Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents and have considered their rival contentions. 8. Order 17 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with the adjournment and provides that, if sufficient cause is shown, the court may at any stage of the suit grant time to the parties or to any of them and may from time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit, in which case it shall six a date for the further hearing of the suit and may make such orders as it thinks fit with respect to the costs occasioned by the adjournment The jurisdiction envisaged under ORDER 17 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Code has to be exercised subject to the limitations envisaged under the provisions (a) to (e) of ORDER 17 rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The under lying principle appears to that there the existence . The under lying principle appears to that there the existence . of the suit has been brought to the notice of the defendant by due service of summons on him, it is his duly thereafter to inform himself of what is to be done In the case. There is no role which imposes liability on the parties to enquire the date of hearing, but taking into consideration the principle of natural Justice, the court is bound to inform the date of hearing of the case fixed by it to the parties. However, once the parties are informed about the date of hearing fixed in the suit, they have to make arrangement for their own presence on the date fixed or make an arrangement of the presence of the counsel so as to be informed of the date of the suit regularly. This is however subject to one exception Where there is an interruption in the hearing either on account of any stay order of superior court or an order of transfer of the suit from one court to other in that event, the first hearing resumed after Interruption has to be taken as the first date on which the case again starts, the notice Where of should be sent by the court resuming the interrupted proceedings. It is not the practise, much less a rule of procedure where under an adjourned date of hearing subject to the above exception is to be intimated to an absent party. If therefore, the petitioner by his own negligence in being absent on 14-2-1991 did not know of the adjourned date, he has to thank himself. Moreover, there is nothing to show because the petitioner has not offered to give evidence that he was prevented by sufficient cause from being absent on 14-2-1991. He should have been present in court or should have taken necessary steps for the conduct of the case on 14-2-1991 or 25-2- 1991. In such cases, no duty stands cast upon the court to Inform the defendant of the adjourned date when he was not conformed to the imperative duty of being present in court In the circumstances, therefore, the procedure adopted by the trial court could not be deemed to be vitiated by any error of law, which could justify any interference by the revisional court. 9. 9. However, so far as, the question of demages/mesne profits in question is concerned, it may be noticed that according to the plaintiff's own case, the premises in dispute had been assessed after reconstruction on 1-4-1983. The notice terminating the tenancy of the petitioner had been issued on 13-7-1987. The suit for the ejectment of the defendant had been filed in the year 19S7 and was decreed on 27-2-1991. The trial court has determined the rate of damages pendente lite and future to be Rs. 600/- per month. The sent on which the premises in dispute had been let prior to the filing of the suit was Rs. 65/- per month only. While arriving at the figure of Rs. 600/- per month, the trial court has relied upon the statement of PW 1; wherein it was asserted that in case the premises in dispute was let out It could fetch a rental of Rs. 609/- per month. No evidence appears to have been led in support of such a case of escalation of rental in the area, where the premises in dispute is situated In its decision in the case of D. C. Oswal v V. K. Subbaiah, AIR 1992 SC 184 , the Apex Court has observed that a judicial notice could be taken of the fact that rental had escalated every where. However, in that case taking the judicial notice of the general escalation in rentals, the Court had raised the rent by about 50% the accommodation in that ease of being used partly for residential and partly for commercial activities. In the present case, the accommodation in dispute is being used exclusively for commercial activity. The rate of damages fixed at the rate of Rs. 600/- per month appears to be clearly arbitrary and based on pure conjecture. The rate of damages in the present case, taking the judicial notice of the general escalation of the rent as indicated in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court referred to above, should not have gone above about 50% approximately. In the circumstances, therefore, the damages for use and occupation/mesne profits ought to have been determined at figure of Rs. 100/- per month. 10. In view of the conclusions Indicated hereinbefore, the writ petition succeeds In part. In the circumstances, therefore, the damages for use and occupation/mesne profits ought to have been determined at figure of Rs. 100/- per month. 10. In view of the conclusions Indicated hereinbefore, the writ petition succeeds In part. The decree of eviction passed against the petitioner is maintained however, the decree for recovery of damages for use and occupation/mesne profits is modified to the extent that the amount of Rs. 600/- per month as determined by the trial court is substituted by Rs. 100/-per month. No orders as to costs. Petition allowed.