JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This is tenants' petition arising from proceedings for eviction from residential accommodation under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (13 of 1972), for short, Act The petitioner has lost before both the authorities below. 2. The dispute in the petition pertains to a portion of Prakash Bhawan, 133/356 situate at Naka Hindola, Police Station Naka Hindola, Lucknow. The landlordopposite party's case was that he required the tenement in question for the occupation of his two sons who were to stay at Lucknow in connection with their education. One of the sons had completed his M.B.B.S. education at King Georges Medical College, Lucknow, and was undergoing internship at the time of moving the application Marriage of this son had been settled with a girl who had also passed M.B.B.S. examination from the same College and the marriage was going to be solemnised in October 1985, The application under Section 21 was filed in August 1985. It was pointed out that earlier the son was residing in hostel but having completed his M.B B.S. examination he had to find out an accommodation for himself especially after marriage. Regarding the other son it was pleaded that he had passed Junior High School examination from Puranpur, District Pilibhit and he had to come to Lucknow for higher education. The landlord belonged to Puranpur, District Pilibhit, where he himself was a Medical Practitioner. 3. After setting up the above bonafide, genuine and pressing need it was pointed out on behalf of the landlord; that the tenantpetitioners owned House No. 281/32 at Mawaiyya, Lucknow, and a portion thereof was in their possession and the other portion was let out On this bans it was sought to be pointed out that the petitioners will not surfer any hardship or inconvenience if they were required to vacate the accommodation in question. 4. The petitioners denied the need set up by the landlords but did not deny the fact that they owned house at Mawaiyya. Of course it was pleaded that in the said House only one room was in their occupation and rest of the rooms were in occupation of tenants. 5. In support of their respective pleas both the parties filed affidavit evidence. Of course it was pleaded that in the said House only one room was in their occupation and rest of the rooms were in occupation of tenants. 5. In support of their respective pleas both the parties filed affidavit evidence. On a consideration of the said evidence the prescribed authority upheld the landlord's plea of genuine need and also held that on a comparison of hardships the landlords will suffer greater hardship than the petitioners in view of the fact that the petitioner had a house of their own while the landlords did not have any house at Lucknow. With these material findings the prescribed authority allowed the application under section 21 and directed petitioners' eviction from the accommodation in question. 6. Aggrieved by the above order of the Prescribed Authority the petitioners preferred appeal before the learned District Judge, Lucknow, which came up for hearing before the V Addl. District Judge, Lucknow. 7. During the pendency of proceedings before the prescribed authority, the landlord's son Dr. Rajesh Kumar Agarwal who was doing internship at the Medical College was married to Dr. Kiran Agarwal. After their marriage they found it difficult to stay in hostel and they shifted to the house of Sri R.P. Gupta, father of Dr. Kiran Agarwal. On these facts it was sought to be argued before the appellate court that the need had disappeared. It was also asserted on behalf of the petitioners that the house in which the landlord's son and daughterinlaw were residing had been gifted by Sri R. P. Gupta to his daughter Dr. Kiran Agarwal. No deed of gift was brought on record and the lower appellate court did not accept the petitioners' allegation. Accordingly it upheld the finding of genuine heed recorded by the prescribed authority. In view of the availability of Mawaiyya house to the petitioners he also confirmed the finding on comparative hardship recorded by the prescribed authority. Before the appellate court it was also urged on behalf of the petitioners that the prescribed authority did not apply its mind to Rule 16 (1) (d) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 under which instead of directing tenants' eviction from the entire accommodation his eviction could be directed from a portion thereof in case that portion was sufficient for the need of the landlord. The appellate court carne to the conclusion that since the petitioners were tenant of a portion of the house the clause was not applicable. With these material findings .the appeal was dismissed. The tenants have accordingly come up before this court through the instant petition. 8. I have heard Sri" M.G. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri R.C. Gupta, learned, counsel for the landlordopposite parties. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even if there was any need as found by the two authorities below the same again disappeared as the landlord's Doctor son is no longer staying at Lucknow but has shifted to Puranpur, Pilibhit, to which place the family belongs. It is submitted that the landlord Dr. Dharmendra Kumar Agarwal is himself a Medical Practitioner at Pilibhit and it is, therefore, natural for his son and daughterinlaw also to practise at Pilibhit. This assertion has been controverted on behalf of the landlords and it has been asserted that the landlord's son could not go on staying in the house of his fatherinlaw indefinitely and that he has every intention to practise at Lucknow and not at Puranpur which is a very small place, specific assertion to this effect has been made in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords. I see no reason to disbelieve this statement. Apart from this it has also been stated in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit that the landlord Dr. Dharmendra Kumar Argarwal met with a serious car accident which resulted in causing of multiple fracture of chest bones and lower limb. He remained admitted in Mission Hospital, Bareilly for a sufficiently long time. The fractured parts were put under plaster but after the removal of plaster it was found that he had not been completely cured. It is stated that in connection with these injuries he has to come to Lko. frequently to consult orthopedic surgeon. This is another reason for requiring the accommodation in question. 10. In respect of the younger son it has been stated in the counter affidavit that in the absence of accommodation at Lucknow he had to take admission in Class 11 at Pilibhit. He will also shift to Lucknow as soon as the accommodation becomes available. 11. This is another reason for requiring the accommodation in question. 10. In respect of the younger son it has been stated in the counter affidavit that in the absence of accommodation at Lucknow he had to take admission in Class 11 at Pilibhit. He will also shift to Lucknow as soon as the accommodation becomes available. 11. It is not disputed between the parties that subsequent events can be taken note of in the proceedings under section 21 of the Act. When the petitioners rely on the subsequent events of the landlord's son leaving Lucknow and going to Pilibhit he cannot deny the right of the landlords to explain the shifting. This shifting has been sufficiently explained, and I see no reason to reject the said explanation. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners did not get sufficient opportunity to meet the explanation offered through the counter affidavit. For this reason he prays that the order of the authority below may be set aside and the case be remanded for fresh trial. Application under Section 21 was filed in the year 1985. Seven years have already passed by. Remand of this case may mean any number of years adding to the agony of the landlords. I do not, therefore, accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners for remand. 12. Rule 16(1) states that in considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the prescribed authority shall, also have regard to the facts mentioned in clauses (a) to (g). Clause (d) on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners reads thus : Rule 16 (1) (d) "where the tenant's needs would be adequately met by leaving with him apart of the building under tenancy and the landlord's needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building ;" The court below was of the opinion that this clause applied only where the entire house had been let out to the tenant. In my opinion, there is no warrant for this view. This clause will apply in both the situations, viz. when the entire building has been let out and when a portion of the building has been let out. In my opinion, there is no warrant for this view. This clause will apply in both the situations, viz. when the entire building has been let out and when a portion of the building has been let out. Accordingly rejection of the petitioners' claim on the ground stated by the court below cannot be sustained. However, it is permissible to this Court to make its own assessment under clause (d). Learned counsel for the landlords has pointed out that there are in all only five rooms in the house occupied by the petitioners. It is also stated that the said rooms are small in size. The landlord's doctor son now has two children. According to the need which has been found established the accommodation in question is now required for occupation by the landlord's doctor son, doctor daughterinlaw and the younger son who will be getting admission to a higher class. Learned counsel for the landlords has rightly pointed out that each of the doctors will require a separate consultation room as the daughterinlaw is a gynaecologist. Thus out of the five rooms, two rooms will be taken away for the professional activities of the doctor son and the doctor daughterinlaw. Considering the status of the Doctors they would require at least one room as a sitting room to receive guests and relations. The doctor son and the doctor daughterinlaw will require one bed room for themselves. Even assuming that their children will also be accommodated in the same room only one room remains out of the five rooms of which the accommodation is comprised. This fifth room will be the only room which would be available for occupation by the younger son who has to be admitted to some higher course at Lucknow. I am, therefore, of the opinion that on the evidence on record it is not establised that the landlords will have any surplus accommodation which may be allowed to be retained by the petitioners. 13. In the following cases this Court itself considered the plea of the tenant based on Rule 16 (1) (d) : (1) 1986 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases 247, Devi Prasad Misra v. II Addl. 13. In the following cases this Court itself considered the plea of the tenant based on Rule 16 (1) (d) : (1) 1986 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases 247, Devi Prasad Misra v. II Addl. District Judge, Bareilly and others ; In this case the plea of Rule 16 (1) (d) was raised for the first time before this Court which was entertained and on an examination of the evidence on record it was found that there was no surplus accommodation which may be allowed to be retained by the tenant The prayer for remand was refused as the parties had already litigated, as in the present case, for almost eight years. (2) 1990(1) Allahabad Rent Cases 157, Pyare Lal v. XIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, (3) 1992(2) Allahabad Rent Cases 141, Smt. Kamla Devi Kakkar and others v. XV Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kanpur and another. 14. Learned counsel for the landlords pointed out that although the case has remained pending for the last seven years no effort has been made by the petitioners to get their house at Mawaiya vacated. In view of this position it was submitted that the petitioners' writ petition deserved to be dismissed. He has cited 1987(1) Allahabad Rent Cases 152, Raghunandan Prasad Sharma v. I Additional District Judge, Moradabad and others, and Smt. Kamla Devi Kakkar and others (Supra). The petitioners indeed do not deserve any sympathy as despite being owners of house themselves they want to continue to occupy a rented accommodation reaping benefit through rent from the house owned by them. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners prayed that in case the writ petition is dismissed sometime may be allowed to vacate the accommodation. In my opinion two month's time will suffice. 16. In view of the above the petition is dismissed with costs to the contesting opposite parties. However, the eviction order shall not be executed for a period of two months.