JUDGMENT - Dr. E.S. DA SILVA, J.:---This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Panaji, dated 4th February, 1987 in Regular Civil Suit No. 24 of 1972 which has affirmed the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Mapusa in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. 2. The late Francisco Souza who was the husband of the respondent No. 1 and predecessor of the respondents Nos. 2 to 9 filed a suit against the original defendant Maria Lobo and her husband who are predecessors-in-title of the appellant No. 1 Celine and respondent No. 10 onwards. The appellant No. 2 is the husband of the late Maria Lobo and also the original defendant No. 2 in the suit. The litigation is in respect of two neighbouring properties situated at Mapusa. Both the parties claim to be the owners of these adjoining properties being one claimed by the plaintiffs known as "Onsabhat" or "Ambeachem Batulem". The plaintiffs have got their house situated in their property. This property was described in the plan as being registered in the Land Registration Office under No. 14667 in Book No. 36. It was stated by the plaintiffs that on the south-west of their property lies the property of the defendants who have also their residential house in their property. In between the appellants' house and the respondents' house there is a strip of land about 1.60 metres in width and 1.40 metres in length which is common between the appellants and the respondents. To the extreme east of the same strip there is a well and the water of that well is being used by both the parties and for the purpose of drawing water from the well the respondents are having a window to their kitchen and the appellants also have their window to their kitchen. The well has a quadrangular shape. The northen and southern faces of the well correspond to the southern wall of the respondent's house and the northen wall of the appellants' house respectively. On the north-west corner the well has some steps for access to the interior of the well and these steps are found on the northern face and western face of the well. The northen and southern faces of the well correspond to the southern wall of the respondent's house and the northen wall of the appellants' house respectively. On the north-west corner the well has some steps for access to the interior of the well and these steps are found on the northern face and western face of the well. On the extreme west of the suit strip there is a wall and the same has a door which permits the access to the said strip from the western side. The respondents have an access to the same strip through the door which is more or less on the north-west corner of the strip and this door gives access to the strip from the verandah of the respondents' house. On the top of the verandah on the first floor there is a gallery which is open towards the west as well as towards the south, i.e. towards the side of the suit strip and the appellants are having access to the said strip through a door which exists on the northern wall of their kitchen and which stands more or less at the middle of the strip. The appellants are having a window facing the suit strip which is near the gate of the respondents. The cavesdrop of the appellants' house as well as that of the respondents' house are falling in the suit strip. The appellants have also a storey and in the said storeyed portion there are two windows which are facing the suit strip and are having shades for the last about one year. The southern side of the gallery is also having a shade at least for the last about 35 years. The rainy waters accumulated in the suit strip from the roof of the appellants' and the respondents' house have their way out through an outlet existing underneath the said gate and more precisely on the north-west corner of the suit strip and the outlet is through the compound of the appellants' house. The appellants and the respondents are in common enjoyment of the said strip as well as the well without disturbance or objection from anybody for the last about at least more than 35 years. 3. The appellants and the respondents are in common enjoyment of the said strip as well as the well without disturbance or objection from anybody for the last about at least more than 35 years. 3. According to the respondents (original plaintiffs in the suit) the cause of action for the suit is the fact of the appellants (original defendants in the suit) having started the construction of a staircase and some other constructions partly located in the suit strip common to both the plaintiffs and the defendants. It is their case that the appellants are carrying out some modifications in their old house for the purpose of building a staircase. They have dug steps at the west of the gate as well as on some portion to the east of the gate and within the suit strip. The appellants want to erect a pillar on which the staircase is supposed to rest. The staircase will occupy almost the entire width of the suit strip and it appears that it is ascending from west to east. It was further stated that the appellants are not entitled to raise any construction in the suit strip without permission or consent from the respondents. The respondents have a right to one half of the suit strip and if it is found that it is not so they have at least acquired the prescriptive title to use the suit strip since they have been in continuous possession of the same since more than 35 years peacefully and without anybody's disturbance. 4. When the suit was filed the staircase was substantially erected but not completed. A prayer was made in the plaint for an injunction to restrain the original defendants from proceeding with the construction of the staircase and any other construction without the permission or consent of the plaintiffs. There was also a prayer for mandatory injunction to pull down the construction already done. The defendants/appellants filed their written statement and also their reply to the application for temporary injunction. 5. It was alleged by the appellants that the suit strip is an integral part of their property and that they are in possession of the same continuously openly and peacefully from the date of their forefathers, namely, Antonio Gonsalves. The defendants/appellants filed their written statement and also their reply to the application for temporary injunction. 5. It was alleged by the appellants that the suit strip is an integral part of their property and that they are in possession of the same continuously openly and peacefully from the date of their forefathers, namely, Antonio Gonsalves. To the extreme east of the so-called suit strip there exists a bathroom of the appellants and the well is situated between the appellants' bathroom and the so-called suit strip. The well is entirely belonging to the appellants and was constructed by the father of the first husband of the appellant No. 1 and the well is located in the appellants' property. The respondents and the members of their family are enjoying the water of the well due to tolerance from the appellants. The respondents have no title and interest whatsoever over the well. The gate existing within the property of the appellants was kept in order to enable an access to the servants of the house without disturbing the members of the family of the appellants. The gate has nothing to do with the suit strip. It is true that there is a door on the boundary wall to the southern side but originally there was a small entrance with no door. That entrance was turned into a door during the appellants' absence in Bombay. They denied that the said door in any way was meant to give access to the respondents to the so-called strip. They denied that the gallery of the respondents is opening towards the south, that is to say, towards the suit strip, that the cavesdrop of the respondents' house are falling in the suit strip, that it is false that the windows of the respondents' house are having shades for the last about one year and that those shades to protect the windows were fixed in 1935 when the upper floor was built. The appellants contended that not a single drop of rain water from the gallery of the respondents fall in the suit strip. The appellants contended that not a single drop of rain water from the gallery of the respondents fall in the suit strip. The water of the roofing of the respondents' house also does not fall in the suit strip because that water is carried by a metallic channel and is discharged directly into the public gutter although for the last 3 to 4 years when a small portion of the said channel rusted and got spoiled it was not replaced by the respondents. The appellants denied that the respondents or any other person directly or indirectly have ever enjoyed any land within the compound wall of the respondents including the so-called suit strip or any part thereof. They contended that the suit strip is integral part of the appellants' property and the appellants are in exclusive possession thereof. It was further stated that the respondents are not entitled to get a declaration since there is already an "Auto de demarcacao" in the survey signed by the predecessors-in-title of the respondents. 6. In their plaint the plaintiffs/respondents did not mention that both the properties have been surveyed in the old cadastral survey, that the cadastral survey of the plaintiffs' property was 148 while the number of the survey of the defendants' property was 147. It was also not mentioned that there had been a demarcation between the two properties conducted by the Survey Department by a competent "Auto de demarcacao". 7. On receiving the application for temporary injunction the learned trial Court granted to the respondents ex parte relief which was subsequently vacated after hearing the appellants. Thereafter the plaint was amended and some more prayers of declaration were included in the plaint. Prayer (a) was to the effect that the plaintiffs be declared lawful owners of half of the suit strip and that such right of ownership had been created, if not otherwise, by way of prescription. In prayer (b) it was sought to be obtained that the plaintiffs be declared as lawful owners of the compound wall lying on the north of the staircase and that the plaintiffs had a right to maintain and repair the compound wall, namely, its southern space towards the plaintiffs' property going through the door of the gate. In prayer (b) it was sought to be obtained that the plaintiffs be declared as lawful owners of the compound wall lying on the north of the staircase and that the plaintiffs had a right to maintain and repair the compound wall, namely, its southern space towards the plaintiffs' property going through the door of the gate. It was also prayed that the defendants/appellants should be ordered to restore the southern edge of the compound wall towards the staircase in the appellants' property to its original condition by pulling down the corresponding parapet on the other side of the staircase. Prayer Clause (c) is to the effect that the staircase built should be pulled down. In the alternative a prayer was made that even if the suit strip was to be held to be of the appellants/defendants the parapet built on the southern side of the gallery be pulled down for being contrary and violative of the respondents/plaintiffs' rights in terms of section 2325 of the Portuguese Civil Code. 8. The learned trial Judge thereafter on recording evidence and carrying on a site inspection by the impugned judgment allowed all the respondents' prayers and decreed the suit accordingly. 9. Shri Mulgaonkar, learned Counsel for the appellants, has first submitted that admittedly the main dispute between the appellants and the respondents is regarding the co-ownership of the suit strip claimed by the respondents as well as of the compound wall in respect whereof the respondents claim to be the exclusive owners. In this respect the learned Counsel invited my attention to the pleadings of the parties so as to see as to how the suit strip has been described by them. In para 3 of the plaint it is seen that the respondents/plaintiffs have situated the said strip as being located between the two houses, of the plaintiffs and of the defendants. In its turn the defendants/appellants in para 6 of their written statement although admitting the existence of the strip, however, did not agree with its exact location and differently claimed that the same is integral part of the defendants' property being situated between the defendants' house and the southern boundary of the plaintiffs' property. In its turn the defendants/appellants in para 6 of their written statement although admitting the existence of the strip, however, did not agree with its exact location and differently claimed that the same is integral part of the defendants' property being situated between the defendants' house and the southern boundary of the plaintiffs' property. Shri Mulgaonkar has also submitted that there had been a demarcation between the two properties somewhere in 1942 by a competent "Auto de demarcacao" and at that time plans were prepared by the Survey Department which clearly show the suit strip between the appellants' property. The said "Auto de demarcacao" and the demarcation carried on by the surveyor at that time was accepted by the respondents who also agreed with the plans prepared and which have been referred to in the concerned "Auto de demarcacao". The learned Counsel therefore made a grievance that both the courts below totally misread the said plans and overlooked the importance and the conclusive value of these pieces of evidence by relying on testimonial evidence which was not able to make any case regarding of possession of the respondents in respect of the suit strip so as to enable the Court to come to a conclusion that on the basis of such possession the respondents had acquired any prescriptive title on the suit strip. 10. The learned Counsel has also pointed out that the trial Court had even gone to the extent of giving a wrong and incorrect finding that the suit strip was lying between the two compound walls when the plaintiffs themselves have said that it was lying between the walls of the two houses. The learned Counsel urged that the oral evidence of the plaintiffs and their two witnesses was totally inadequate and a bare perusal of their testimonies would clearly suggest that they have just deposed on the user of the strip by the respondents and their families for the purpose of drawing water from the well. Obviously such evidence which would never establish user could not by any stretch of imagination be relied to set up a right of prescription. Obviously such evidence which would never establish user could not by any stretch of imagination be relied to set up a right of prescription. Therefore at the most what the plaintiffs' witnesses have deposed in their reference could make out a case for a easementary right in respect of the drawing of the water of the well and may be also regarding the cavesdrop falling on the suit strip from the roofing of the plaintiffs' house. This evidence could not be used by the plaintiffs to establish any right of prescription. Even this easementary right of cavesdrop or of drawing of water through the suit strip has not been sought to be protected by the plaintiffs in the suit since there was no such prayer made by them in their pleadings and the only prayer was referring to the easementary right of light and air. The learned Counsel has also contended that the respondents have adduced no evidence to prove that the suit strip being common was belonging to both the plaintiffs/respondents and defendants/appellants in equal shares or even that the same was common. As such according to the learned Counsel the judgements given by both the courts below appear to have been passed essentially on a wrong assumption of facts which had never been admitted and on the contrary were always contested by the appellants. At the same time both the courts have also overlooked or missed the significance of important documentary evidence consisting of the said "Auto de demarcacao" and the survey plan prepared on that occasion. Being so no prayer for mandatory injunction in respect of the construction of the staircase or an injunction to restrain the respondents from carrying on any construction in the so-called suit strip could be justified or granted by the trial Court in the facts and circumstances of the case. At the most Shri Mulgaonkar conceded, an injunction, if any, would be available to the respondents so as not to affect or violate their easementary right of light and air only assuming that they were so enjoying. Hence there is no scope to order the demolition of the staircase and as far as the demolition of the parapet is concerned that could be allowed to the extent of that much portion of the parapet which had caused actual obstruction to the respondents' easementary right of air and light. 11. Hence there is no scope to order the demolition of the staircase and as far as the demolition of the parapet is concerned that could be allowed to the extent of that much portion of the parapet which had caused actual obstruction to the respondents' easementary right of air and light. 11. All these submissions made by Shri Mulgaonkar have sought to be countered by Shri Usgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, who has contended that the respondents' claim of co-ownership in respect of the suit strip is based not only on physical features as well as on the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Referring to the physical features the learned Counsel has based his arguments on the existence in the suit strip of a well as well as to the door on the wall of the respondent's house from the verandah and the gate fitted in the wall across the suit strip. With regard to the well the learned Counsel stated that there was clear admission on the part of the respondent that he and his family members were drawing water from the said well although admitting that they were doing it by mere tolerance on their part. The learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the fact that the existence of the window on the kitchen of their house which was open towards the well had not been disputed although the appellants have claimed that this would at the most create an easementary right of the use of the water of the well by the respondents through the said window. However, Shri Mulgaonkar contended that it was not the respondents' case that this drawing of water was by way of an exercise of any easementary right but instead as a matter of right as the owners or as co-owners and possessors of the suit strip. To this effect he pointed out that from the fact of existence of the window on the wall of their house as an appropriate device to draw water from the well since the time the plaintiffs/respondents' house was constructed one should lead to the conclusion that the said use of the water from the well could not be termed as a permissive use but instead as a matter of right. Similarly the existence of two sets of steps leading to the bottom of the well and both on the side of the suit strip which lies towards the plaintiffs' house, that is to say, on the northern face and on the western side were also pointers to suggest that the well was not being used by the respondents by mere tolerance of the appellants but instead because the same was belonging to them. It was contended by the learned Counsel that such steps were being utilized by the respondents to clean the said well being a fact that there was no step of this type on the portion of the well situated on the appellants' side. When confronted with the proposition advanced that the existence of steps towards the plaintiffs' side of the well could mean at the most that the well was belonging to them, the learned Counsel submitted that if the well was belonging to the respondents necessarily the suit strip where the well was located should also belong to them. Besides from the pleading that there was a door on the wall of the plaintiffs' house towards that side of the well when there was no such door on the wall of the defendants/ appellants' house leading to the suit strip the only conclusion available would be that the suit strip where the well is located was belonging to the respondents. The learned Counsel has also mentioned that on the gate situated across the suit strip the opening latch was also located on the side of the plaintiffs/respondents' house. This fact has been brought by the evidence of P.W. 2 Augusto Nazare without any denial on the part of the appellants. 12. All these facts according to the learned Counsel would help to infer that the well and the suit strip was belonging to the respondents in co-ownership. This fact has been brought by the evidence of P.W. 2 Augusto Nazare without any denial on the part of the appellants. 12. All these facts according to the learned Counsel would help to infer that the well and the suit strip was belonging to the respondents in co-ownership. However, the learned Counsel conceded that bearing in mind that admittedly the wall of the appellants' house towards the strip has three windows being one in the kitchen from where the water of the well is being drawn and two more towards the northern side and also admittedly the eavesdrop of the roof of the appellants' house were falling on the suit strip the question of any exclusive ownership of the suit strip either by the respondents/plaintiffs could not arise and the only conclusion should be that the respondents and the appellants were joint owners of the said strip. With regard to the respondents' claim that the suit strip should be acknowledged as belonging to both of them in equal shares the learned Counsel relied on the provisions of Article 2342 of the Portuguese Civil Code, which with reference to Article 2341 provides that when the demarcation of a common property cannot be done on the basis of titles or possession then the said demarcation should be effected by dividing the land which is the subject-matter of the dispute in equal shares. Also with regard to the channel allegedly referred to by the appellants as 'ponel' and allegedly fitted on the roof of the verandah of the plaintiffs' house which according to the appellants would suggest that no water from the roof of the respondents' house would fall on the suit strip and instead was flowing through the said channel or 'ponel' to the gutter lying on the eastern side of the property of both the appellants and respondents it was contended by Shri Usgaonkar that the said 'ponel' apart from being located on the ground floor of the house along the verandah was only restricted to that portion of the ground floor which was necessary to prevent the waters to fall on the well and instead to enable them to flow them to the suit strip only. In this respect he drew my attention not only to the inspection memo recorded by the trial Court on two occasions being one at the time the application for temporary injunction in 1972 and the other at the time of the final disposal of the suit in 1984 wherein it has been expressly mentioned that the valley gutter attached to the roof of the plaintiffs' house at the place of the well is meant to carry on the rain water upto the drain. According to Shri Usgaonkar all these physical features were sufficient by themselves to enable the Court to come to the conclusion that the suit strip should be held as belonging in common to both the plaintiffs/respondents and the defendants/appellants. Being so the construction of the staircase admittedly put up by the appellants in the said suit strip was no doubt violative of the respondents' rights. 13. There is a lot of substance in the submissions of Shri Usgaonkar with regard to his contention that the physical features of the suit strip point out to the fact that the same appears to belong and is also in possession of both the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit. The admission of the appellants that the respondents and their family members are drawing water from the well is an important aspect to substantiate the respondents' claim of co-ownership and possession of the suit strip. The appellants have not been able to explain in their evidence as to since when and who has granted to the respondents permission to draw water from the well as an act of mere tolerance and being so the question of only an easementary right having been constituted by them in favour of the respondents does not appear to arise. The respondents are claiming that the drawing of the water by them is a matter of right. They have pointed out that for that purpose not only the well appears to be belonging to them but in fact they are drawing water from the said well through the window on the wall of their house to which the well is touching on one side but also that the respondents alone are doing the work of cleaning and repairing of the said well. They have impressed upon and the evidence of record also so suggests that the only steps loading to the bottom of the well, otherwise two sets of steps, are both located towards the side of the plaintiffs/respondents' house while there are no such steps on the side of the house of the appellants. This fact by itself strengthens the weight of the respondents' arguments that the well belongs and is being looked after exclusively by them. This fact by itself also leads to the conclusion that the land where the said well is situated seems to belong to them. But there is more and this is also the existence of the door on the wall of the respondents' house leading to the suit strip towards that side while no similar door exists on the wall of the house of the appellants towards the side of the suit strip. Further the evidence on record shows that the eavesdrops from the roof of the plaintiffs/respondents' house fall on the suit strip as it happens also in the case of eavesdrops of the roof of the house of the appellants. There is also the existence of the gate across the suit strip and its latch on the side of the plaintiffs' house which upto a certain extent goes to help the case sought to be made out by the plaintiffs with regard to the enjoyment and possession of the suit strip of land together with the appellants. 14. On the other hand the reliance placed by Shri Mulgaonkar on the survey plan prepared at the time of demarcation and the so-called "Auto de demarcacao" does not appear to take the learned Counsel's case any further. A correct reading of the said plan on the strength of the contents of the said "Auto de demarcacao" suggests that the said plan depicts the boundary line between the two properties as well as the existence of the compound wall on both the properties of the plaintiffs/respondents and the appellants/defendants by their conventional signs being the boundary line represented in black by lines and dots while the compound wall and their ownership is represented by spikes or vertical traces in red. In this light and taking into consideration the above mentioned conventional signs it is seen that in both the plans prima facie the location of the boundary line appears to suggest that the suit strip makes part of the appellants' property. However, from the contents of the "Auto de demarcacao" both in respect of the property of the plaintiffs/respondents bearing Survey No. 148 as well as of the defendants/appellants' property bearing Survey No. 147 it is clear that the said "Auto de demarcacao" was not aimed at finally demarcating the boundary line between the two properties but was executed at the time of the organisation of the cadastral survey being the plans prepared contemporary to the survey. This conclusion is based on the fact that both the "Auto de demarcacao" speak of the fact that the same were carried on without the presence of not only some of the owners of the plots meant to be demarcated but also some of the owners of the plots adjoining to them and this also when these owners had not even been given notice of the said demarcation. This by itself is sufficient to disclose that the demarcation and the "Auto de demarcacao" drawn at that time was only a provisional attempt on the part of the concerned authorities to prepare the survey records which is another document on record although not exhibited by the parties but which the Court is inclined to take notice of the contents being a public document it is clearly referred that the survey prepared at that time has not been so far promulgated. This fact by itself leads us to conclude that the plans and the "Auto de demarcacao" need not be necessarily believed for the purpose of establishing the correct boundary line between both the parties and that the evidentary value of the physical features which could be found on the suit strip should be relied more than the said survey plan. Being so and since on the strength of such physical features I am prepared to accept Shri Usgaonkar's argument that the suit strip is to be deemed as jointly belonging to both the plaintiffs/respondents and the defendants/appellants. Being so and since on the strength of such physical features I am prepared to accept Shri Usgaonkar's argument that the suit strip is to be deemed as jointly belonging to both the plaintiffs/respondents and the defendants/appellants. I am also in agreement with him that by virtue of operation of Article 2340 of the Portuguese Civil Code in the absence of any conclusive title to determine the portion of the said suit strip which belongs to each of the joint owners in possession of the same should be held as belonging to both the plaintiffs and the defendants in equal shares. These answers also the other grievance made by Shri Mulgaonkar that the staircase and the parapet erected by him admittedly lying in part on the portion of the suit strip towards the side of the plaintiffs/respondent's house while the parapet is attached to the compound wall does not violate any proprietory rights of the plaintiffs/respondents. As far as the parapet is concerned I will refer to it at a later stage while dealing with the question of the alleged obstruction on account of that parapet of the easementary rights of the plaintiffs/respondents of air and light. 15. It was next submitted by Shri Mulgaonkar that the plaintiffs' claim that the compound wall exclusively belongs to them is also not correct. It is the learned Counsel's case that the said compound wall is common to both the plaintiffs and the defendants and the same lies on the boundary line between the two properties. There is no evidence or admission on the part of the appellants that the said compound wall is in line of the plaintiffs' house or the same is of the same nature of the compound wall existing on the western side of the plaintiffs' property. On the contrary the evidence on record suggests that the said compound wall has different nature on both sides. Therefore the finding of the Court that the compound wall is exclusively of the plaintiffs/respondents because it touches the wall of their house is based on no evidence and instead on mere surmises or conjectures and inferences. Both the courts below have wrongly shifted the burden of proof on the issues which were required and supposed to be proved by the plaintiffs/respondents exclusively. Both the courts below have wrongly shifted the burden of proof on the issues which were required and supposed to be proved by the plaintiffs/respondents exclusively. In this respect Shri Usgaonkar has again tried to bring home the existence of clear physical features on the site pointing out to the fact that the said compound wall was in fact and could be held as belonging exclusively to the plaintiffs/respondents. The learned Counsel has submitted that usual inspection of the site shows that the said compound wall touches the plaintiffs' house on one side, i.e. on the eastern side while it goes to link with the compound wall of the plaintiffs existing on the western side. This fact according to the learned Counsel has been also acknowledged by the witness of the appellants themselves, namely, D.W. 3 Escolastica who has admitted in cross-examination that the compound wall was touching the house of Caetan Paul. The notes of inspection prepared by the trial Court also refer to the fact that the said compound wall touches the compound wall of the plaintiffs on the western side. It therefore follows that the physical features of the suit compound wall reveal that on one side the said wall leads to the wall of the plaintiffs' house while on the other side connects with the western compound wall of the plaintiffs. On the basis of these findings, the learned Counsel submitted that if the said wall is in line on the wall of the house of the plaintiffs it is not the case of the appellants that the wall of the house is also common. By acknowledging that it belongs exclusively to the plaintiffs the logical conclusion is that either the compound wall which touches and is in line of the compound wall belongs exclusively to the plaintiffs also and also the wall of the house of the plaintiffs deemed to be common to both the plaintiffs and the defendants. 16. The learned Counsel has also urged that this inference with regard to the fact that the wall is to be deemed as belonging to the plaintiffs alone finds support also in the very survey plan relied by the appellants. With the help of the learned Counsel I have minutely observed the said plan and have taken notice of the conventional signs represented therein. With the help of the learned Counsel I have minutely observed the said plan and have taken notice of the conventional signs represented therein. From the aforesaid observations I am satisfied that first of all the contention of the appellants that the compound wall falls along the boundary line between both the properties of the plaintiffs/respondents and the defendants/appellants is not correct. The very plan negativates such contention because the said plan depicts not only the alleged boundary line but also the existence of the wall all around both the properties of the plaintiffs and the defendants. As far as the suit compound wall is concerned it is shown clearly with spikes or vertical traces in red represented along the line of compound wall which are all pointing towards the property of the plaintiffs. This by itself is a conclusive proof that the compound wall is to be held as exclusively belonging to the plaintiffs and there is no amount of evidence which can negativate this finding based on the existence of the physical features on the site. It is true that as it was said above the said survey has not been promulgated and as such the plans are not to be treated as finalised but until and unless the said plans are changed on the basis of any objection of the parties we have to presume the said plans as genuine and correctly representing the true landmarks existing on the site. 17. Further from a more minute and close scrutiny of the said plan the same reveals that on the northern side of the property of the plaintiffs/respondents the boundary line and the compound wall is represented in three different sections out of which two show compound walls belonging to the plaintiffs' neighbours towards the north while one portion is shown as belonging to the plaintiffs on the eastern side. Similarly on the southern side the compound wall shows the spikes in red colour projecting in both the directions which means that on that side the compound wall is common. Shri Mulgaonkar has fairly conceded that he was not able to say anything against this position with regard to the correct representation of the plans on the strength of the conventional signs depicted therein. Shri Mulgaonkar has fairly conceded that he was not able to say anything against this position with regard to the correct representation of the plans on the strength of the conventional signs depicted therein. Therefore I am fully convinced that the correct reading of the plan leads to the inescapable conclusion that the suit compound wall is represented in the plan as belonging to the plaintiffs/respondents alone. Being so the amended prayer made by the plaintiffs to the effect that they should be declared as owners of the compound wall was to be allowed and the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court having so held no fault can be assailed by the appellants against such findings. 18. It was lastly submitted by Shri Mulgaonkar that there is no evidence to suggest that the parapet erected by them along the staircase and admittedly resting on the compound wall is obstructing the easementary right of air and light claimed by the plaintiffs. In view of my finding that the compound wall is to be held as belonging exclusively to the plaintiffs the very admission of Shri Mulgaonkar that the parapet rests on the compound wall or is at least attached to it is by itself sufficient to show that the proprietary rights of the plaintiffs to the said compound wall have been grossly violated by the appellants. Further the contention of Shri Mulgaonkar that there is no expert opinion to point out that the erection of the parapet has obstructed the free flow of air into the gallery as well as its lighting does not appear to be sound or justified. The plaintiffs in the plaint had given detailed measurement of both their gallery as well as of the parapet and on the basis of such measurements it is obvious that the parapet as it stands will necessarily block the ventilation into the said gallery and also obstruct the light into the same. 19. Against such measurements and pleadings on the part of the plaintiffs/respondents the stand taken by the appellants is of a total denial and it was alleged by them that the parapet is situated much below the plaintiffs' gallery. However, the photographs produced by Shri Usgaonkar which was not otherwise objected by Shri Mulgaonkar totally negativate the case sought to be made by the appellants and proves otherwise. However, the photographs produced by Shri Usgaonkar which was not otherwise objected by Shri Mulgaonkar totally negativate the case sought to be made by the appellants and proves otherwise. The inspection notes of the trial Judge dated 20-6-1984 are also making a mention to the obstruction of the easementary right of air and light claimed by the respondents. Hence in my view no expert opinion appears to be required to be produced by the plaintiffs to substantiate the correctness of the factual position of this issue. Further the very evidence of the witnesses of the appellants has also brought some force to the case sought to be made by the plaintiffs in this regard. The testimony of D.W. 3 Escolastica and D.W. 4 Evaristo clearly suggests that on account of the construction of the parapet the free flow of the air and light in the gallery of the plaintiffs has been obstructed. This by itself clinches the issue and I do not think that more evidence would be required to be adduced by the plaintiffs to substantiate their claim with this regard. 20. Now and with regard to the prescriptive title claimed by the plaintiffs, it is to be noted that the same appears to have been made only as an alternate option in case the other points raised by them were not to be accepted. In my view and consequent upon the findings given by me on the other issues the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court suffers from no infirmity and therefore the question of prescription need not be considered at this stage. 21. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. *****