C. M. Nayar, J. ( 1 ) THIS bunch of writ petitions is directed against theorders of the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority, under thepayment of Gratuity Act, 1972, hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Act. These petitions raise the common question of law and I will proceed to dispose of thesame by one common order. ( 2 ) IT will only be necessary to give broad facts, with regard to the firstpetition, to determine the nature of controversy between the parties. Respondent No. 1 joined the service of the petitioner company, which was at that timeknown as Birla Textiles on 1/01/1943. On Jan 2/01/1964 he wasallotted quarter in the premises of the said Mill. The respondent retired fromservice on 16/06/1983. The petitioner alleged that respondent No. 1 wasallotted quarter on the basis of the licence fee of Rs. 3. 75. 00 per month, on thecondition that he will vacate the accommodation within" 4 days of the cessationof the service, from the management, but he did not do so nor he obtained"no Objection Certificate" from the Estate Department, for clearance of hisdues. Therefore, his dues, including the gratuity amount, could not be released. The respondent No. 1 on 14/04/1986, applied to the Controlling Authority,under the Act, claiming a sum of Rs. 18,360. 00, as gratuity amount and 9 percent compound interest on the last drawn pay of Rs. 800. 00 per month. He alsomoved an application for condonation of delay in filing the application fordirections for payment of his gratuity. The petitioner Management filed repliesto both the applications. The Controlling Authority ordered the payment ofgratuity on the ground, that there is no provision in the Act, where it is provided that in the event of failure of the vacation of the quarter by the workman,the amount of gratuity can be withheld. Taking into consideration the facts,stated in the order and 40 years of service, which respondent No. 1 had put inwith the Company, respondent No. 1 was held entitled to payment ofrs. 17,076. 92 as gratuity. The Controlling Authority further awarded paymentof interest at the rate of 10 per cent on the said amount of gratuity. The petitioner company felt aggrieved by the order of the Controlling Authority, andfiled an appeal under Section 7 (7) of the Act. 17,076. 92 as gratuity. The Controlling Authority further awarded paymentof interest at the rate of 10 per cent on the said amount of gratuity. The petitioner company felt aggrieved by the order of the Controlling Authority, andfiled an appeal under Section 7 (7) of the Act. The Appellate Authority held thatthe Management failed to comply with the provisions of law, by not paying theamount of gratuity, due to the respondent No. 1 and the said gratuity amountcannot be withheld, simply on the ground of delay. The finding of the Controlling Authority that the amount of gratuity cannot be linked with the vacation ofthe quarter, was also affirmed by the Appellate Authority. The respondent No. I was held entitled to the payment of gratuity, as awarded by the Controllingauthority, along with 10 per cent simple interest. ( 3 ) THE same or similar relief was granted to the other respondentworkmen and the petitioner company has impugned the same by means of thisand other writ petitions before this Court. The petitioner company has statedthat the gratuity of certain workmen was withheld because they did not vacatethe company s quarters, and some workmen were not entitled to the samebecause they had resigned from the service of the company and the workmenwere also not entitled to the same because they had moved the Authority bymeans of belated applications. ( 4 ) THE following questions have been raised by learned Counsel for petitioner, for the consideration of this Court : (I) The Controlling Authority, as well as, the Appellate Authorityunder the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, has no jurisdiction to accept an application for direction by the respondent, foradjudication on merits, when the application has admittedlybeen filed beyond the period of limitation, as specified in therules. (ii) The Authorities have further erred in exercising their discretionto condone the delay, as they did not consider the importantaspect that the conduct of some of the workmen, in refusing tovacate the Company s quarters, after the cessation of service,was improper and no discretion was liable to be exercised intheir favour. (iii) The important question of law, which arises in some of the writpetitions is, whether, the respondent workmen have voluntarilyresigned from their service and, as such, they were not entitledto claim gratuity under the Act, on the basis of the judgment ofpunjab and Haryana High Court in. (iii) The important question of law, which arises in some of the writpetitions is, whether, the respondent workmen have voluntarilyresigned from their service and, as such, they were not entitledto claim gratuity under the Act, on the basis of the judgment ofpunjab and Haryana High Court in. M/s Darshan Engineeringworks, Amritsar v. The Controlling Authority, Amritsar andothers, 1983 Labour Industrial Cases 1451, which held the provisions of Section 4 (1) (b) of the Act providing for payment ofgratuity on resignation from service, after putting in only 5 yearsas qualifying period for the said payment as violative of Article19 (l) (g) of the Constitution of India. (iv) The Controlling Authority, as well as, the Appellate Authorityhave clearly gone against the judgment of the Hon ble Supremecourt as reported in Charan Singh v. M/s. Birla Textiles and Am. , air 1988 SC 2022 , with regard to the interest. The said judgment categorically held that prior to the coming into force ofsub-section 3 (A) of Section 7 of the Act, providing for the firsttime for payment of interest on the withheld amount of gratuity,there was a lacuna in the Act and the amended provisions havingcome into force with effect from 1/10/1987, could not beapplied retrospectively by the Authorities. The law laid down bythe Hon ble Supreme Court is binding all over India, underarticle 141 of the Constitution and the grant of interest infavour of the respondents, whose services came to an end priorto 1/10/1987, by applying the amended provisions ofsection 7 (3a), is illegal and without jurisdiction. (v) The wrongful withholding of the company s quarters by some ofthe respondents, would clearly dis-entitle them to the grant ofgratuity and as this amounts to breach of faith and trust, depriving the serving employees from the use of the quarter as thequarters had been constructed by the petitioner managementeven though it was under no legal obligation to do so. ( 5 ) I will now proceed to deal with the respective contentions of learned Counsel for petitioner. Limitation ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel has contended that the Controlling Authority has allowed the belated application erroneously and the fact that the Act, being social welfare legislation, cannot be a criteria for condoning the delay. Ingeneral Manager M/s Haji Latif Gani Bidi Manufacturers, Nagpur and Anotherv. Limitation ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel has contended that the Controlling Authority has allowed the belated application erroneously and the fact that the Act, being social welfare legislation, cannot be a criteria for condoning the delay. Ingeneral Manager M/s Haji Latif Gani Bidi Manufacturers, Nagpur and Anotherv. Abdul Rashid and Another, AIR 1964 Bombay 89, the Division Bench of thebombay High Court, while dealing with the provisions of Payment of Wagesact, came to the conclusion that where, the Authority under the said Act,postpones the decision on the question of condonation of delay for consideration with the merits of the application under Section 15 of the Payment ofwages Act, there is not merely a procedural error but the order is in flagrantdisregard of the Rules of procedure. The High Court would, therefore, interferein the exercise of its powers, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution,by quashing the order and to direct him to proceed in accordance with law. The condonation of delay in the present case is, therefore, against the provisions of law and cannot bs sustained. The period of limitation is specificallyprovided in Rule 10 of the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972, whereina claimant, in case of dispute, is required to move an application for directionbefore the Controlling Authority within 90 days of the occurrince of the cause. The said provision may be reproduced as follows : "10 Application to controlling authority for direction- (1) If anemployer- (i) refuses to accept a nomination or to entertain an applicationsought to be filed under Rule 7, or (ii) issues a notice under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 either specifying anamount of gratuity which is considered by the applicant less thanwhat is payable or rejecting eligibility to payment of gratuity,or (iii) having received an application under Rule 7 fails to issue anynotice as required under Rule 8 within the time specifiedtherein,the claimant employee, nominee or legal heir, as the case may be,may within ninety days of the occurrence of the cause for the application, apply, in Form n to the controlling authority for issuing adirection under sub-section (4) ofSection 7 with as many extra copiesas are the opposite parties :provided that the controlling authority may accept any application under this sub-rule, on sufficient cause being shown by theapplicant, after the expiry of the specified period. (2) Application under Sub-rule (1) and other documents relevant to such an application shall be presented in person to the controlling authority or shall be sent by registered post acknowledgmentdue. " ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for respondents have contended that there is noprovision under the Act, providing limitation for filing the application, exceptrule 10, that the application for payment of gratuity may be filed within 90 daysof the occurrence of the cause. It was further submitted that Rule 7 (5) of therules leaves no manner of doubt that Legislature intended that the claimant sapplication for gratuity of the employee, should not be dismissed on technicalground and the Authority should be very liberal in condoning the delay. Therelevant provision, incorporated in Rule 7 (5) may be reproduced as follows: " (5) An application lor payment of gratuity filed after the expiryof the periods specified in this rule shall also be entertained by theemployer, if the applicant adduces sufficient cause for the delay inpreferring his claim, and no claim for gratuity under the Act shall beinvalid merely because the claimant failed to present his applicationwithin the specified period. Any dispute in this regard shall bereferred TO to the controlling Authority for his decision. " ( 8 ) THE Appellate Authority has also REFERRED TO to the provisions ofsection 7 (2) of the Act which provides that "as soon as the gratuity becomespayable, the employer shall, whether an application REFERRED TO to in Sub-section 1has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice inwriting to the person, to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the Controlling Authority, specifying the amount of gratuity, so determined. Sub-section 3of Section 7 of the Act further provides that the Employer shall arrange to paythe amount of gratuity, within such time as may be prescribed to the person towhom the gratuity is payable. The Appellate Authority came to the conclusionthat the Management has failed to comply with the provisions of law by not paying the amount of gratuity, due to the respondent, or intimated to the Controlling Authority in this regard. The Management has also failed to reply to theapplication of the workman for payment of gratuity. The Controlling Authorityalso observed that the payment of gratuity, being a social legislation, cannot bewithheld on account of late filing of the application by the workmen. The Management has also failed to reply to theapplication of the workman for payment of gratuity. The Controlling Authorityalso observed that the payment of gratuity, being a social legislation, cannot bewithheld on account of late filing of the application by the workmen. Theappellate Authority has come to the conclusion that the Management itself hasfailed to comply with the provisions of law, by not paying the amount ofgratuity due to the respondent workman. ( 9 ) THE question of providing the period of limitation for making anapplication under the Act was considered by the Division Bench of the Bombayhigh Court in J. V. Dalal v. Plastpeel Chemicals and Others, 1979 (1) LLJ 409. The Court did not accept the contention that no time was prescribed by law forthe employees application to the Competent Authority. It was impossible tohold that the Act did not contemplate prescribing of the period of limitation. The facts in this case would however indicate that the petitioner therein didnot make any application for condoning the delay before the Controllingauthority. The Bench, therefore, directed the Controlling Authority to consideron merits, if any application for condoning the delay was made by the petitioner. This judgment will, therefore, indicate that although the period of limitation may be prescribed by statute, it was open to the Controlling Authoritycondone the same on the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 10 ) IN Sitaram Ramcharan and Others v. Nagrashna (M. N.) Authorityunder the Payment of Wages Act for Ahmedabad Area) and Others, 1960 (1) LLJ29, the Hon ble Supreme Court was considering the point of limitation wherethe Authority considered the case under the Payment of Wages Act and heldthat the appellants therein had failed to prove sufficient cause for not makingtheir applications within the prescribed period. Reference may be made to thefollowing passage: "the proviso with which we are concerned has prescribed thelimitation of six months for the institution of the application itselfand so the principle laid down in Lingley case (supra) can have noapplication to the question which we have to decide. Indeed, thepresent proviso is in substance similar to the provision in Section 5of Limitation Act, and Mr. Phadke has fairly conceded that there isconsensus of judicial opinion on the question of the construction ofsection 5. Indeed, thepresent proviso is in substance similar to the provision in Section 5of Limitation Act, and Mr. Phadke has fairly conceded that there isconsensus of judicial opinion on the question of the construction ofsection 5. It cannot be disputed that in dealing with the question ofcondoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the party hasto satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferringthe appeal or making the application within the prescribed time, andthis has always been understood to mean that the explanation has tocover the whole of the period of delay (vide Ram Narain\. Joshiparmeswar Narain Mahta and Ors, 1903 I. L. R. 30 Cal. 309 ). Therefore, the finding recorded by the authority that the appellants havefailed to establish sufficient cause for their inaction between 2ndmay 1952, and the respective dates on which they filed their presentapplications is fatal to their claim. That is why we think it unnecessary to consider the larger question of law which Mr. Phadke soughtto raise before us. " ( 11 ) IN Gopinathan Nair (A) v. N. Radha Bal and Others, 1988 (1) LLN1030, the Single Bench of Kerala High Court, while interpreting the provisionsof Rules 7 and 10 of Kerala Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1973, held that theapplication for gratuity, filed beyond the period of limitation, can be treated asvalid only for condonation of delay. Sufficient cause for delay is aconditionprecedent for acceptance of application by the Controlling Authority and theemployee therein, was held not entitled to gratuity, as no sufficient cause wasshown for delay in filing the application. The same view was expressed by asingle Judge of the Madras High Court in Madura Coats Ltd. , Tuticoriny. Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Peleyambattai and Ors. , 1988 (11) LLN 126. ( 12 ) IN the present cases, the applications by the employees were madebefore the Controlling Authority, beyond the period of limitation. For instancein Civil Writ No. 1110 of 1989, the respondent employee retired from theservices of the petitioner company on 16/06/1983, after putting in more than40 years of service. He filed the Application on 14/04/1986. This respondentaverred that he sent latters to the management on 6/07/198 3/08/1983,. 16/10/1984 and 5/04/1986, but the Management did not give anyreply to the aforesaid letters, nor paid the amount of gratuity. He furthersubmitted that there was delay in filing the application, on account of ignorance of law. He filed the Application on 14/04/1986. This respondentaverred that he sent latters to the management on 6/07/198 3/08/1983,. 16/10/1984 and 5/04/1986, but the Management did not give anyreply to the aforesaid letters, nor paid the amount of gratuity. He furthersubmitted that there was delay in filing the application, on account of ignorance of law. The Controlling Authority considered all these factors andholding that the Gratuity Act is a social welfare legislation and the workmancannot be deprived of the same on account of late filing ofthe application bythe workman, decided the issue accordingly and held the workman entitled tothe same. The Appellate Authority upheld the findings of the Controllingauthority and dismissed the appeals of the petitioners. The Controllingauthority, as well as, the Appellate Authority have exercised their discretionin condoning the delay. The exercise of discretion in condoning the delay isjust and proper and no interference is called for in res pect of the same. Resignation ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel for petitioners has argued that the workmen,who voluntarily resigned from the services of the company, cannot claim gratuity under the provisions of the Act. Reference is made to the Divisionbench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s Darshanengineering Works, Amritsar v. The Controlling Authority, Amritsar and others,1983 Lab. I. C. 1451, wherein the relevant provisions of Section 4 (l) (b) of theact, prescribing only 5 years as qualifying period for payment of gratuity onvoluntary resignation, was held to be violative of Article l9 (l) (g) of the Constitution. The following passage s may be quoted herein ; "in British Paints (India) Limited s case (AIR 1966sc 732) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under (atpp. 734-35):"we now turn to the gratuity scheme. Two points have beenurged on behalf of the company in this connection. The tribunal hasfixed five years minimum service in order to enable a workmanto earn gratuity. This has been provided in the event of- (a) death ofan employee while in service of the company, (b) discharge orvoluntary retirement of an employee on grounds of medical unfitness, (c) voluntary retirement or resignation before reaching the age ofsuperannuation (d) retirement on reaching the age of superannuation, or (e) tarmination of service by the company for reasons otherthan misconduct resulting in loss to the company in money andproperty. The management objects to the minimum period beingfive years in the case of voluntary retirement or resignation beforereaching the age of superannuation. It is contended that gratuityschemes usually provide for a longer minimum of service in the caseof voluntary retirement or resignation before reaching the age ofsuperannuation. We think that there is substance in this connection. The reason for providing a longer minimum period for earninggratuity in the case of voluntary retirement or resignation is to seethat workmen do not leave one concern after another after puttingthe short minimum service qualifying for gratuity. A longer minimumin the case of voluntary retirement or resignation makes it moreprobable that the workmen would stick to the company where theyare working. That is why gratuity schemes usually provide for alonger minimum in the case of voluntary retirement or resignation. We may in this connection refer to the Express Newspaper (Private)Ltd v. Union of India, ( AIR 1958 SC 578 at p. 629), where ashort minimum for voluntary retirement or resignation was struckdown. Again in Garment Cleaning Works v. Its Workmen, (AIR 1962sc 673 at p. 675)10 years minimum was prescribed to enableanemployee to claim gratuity if he. resigned. In Management of Wenger and Co. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1964sc 864, a distinction was made between termination of service bythe employer and termination resulting from resignation given by anemployee. In the first case, the minimum was fixed at 5 years, inthe second the minimum period was fixed at 10 years by this Court. In Express Newspaper (Private) Limited s case (supra) theprovisions contained in Section 5 (l) (a) (iii) of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955,prescribing 3 years as qualifying period for payment of gratuity onvoluntary resignation was struck down as unconstitutional beingunreasonable. In the remaining cases discussed above, their Lordships examined the gratuity schemes directed to be introduced bythe Industrial Tribunal. The schemes providing for 15 years asqualifying period for payment of gratuity on voluntary resignationwere not interfered with. The schemes providing for less than 10years as qualifying period for payment of gratuity on voluntaryresignation were modified and the qualifying period in such caseswas increased to 10 years. It is in this background that we are toexamine if Section 4 (l) (b) of the Act to the extent of providinggratuity on voluntary resignation is unconstitutional being ultra viresarticle 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution or not. It is in this background that we are toexamine if Section 4 (l) (b) of the Act to the extent of providinggratuity on voluntary resignation is unconstitutional being ultra viresarticle 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution or not. A gratuity is essentially a retiring benefit. payable to a workman which under the statute (Section 4 (l) (b) of the Act) has beenmade payable on voluntary resignation as well. Gratuity is a rewardfor good, efficient and faithful service rendered for a considerableperiod. It is necessary that a long minimum period for earning gratuity in the case of voluntary resignation should be prescribedto curb the tendency on the part of the workman to changeemployment frequently after putting in minimum service qualifyingfor gratuity. A workman gains experience during his tenure ofemployment. An experienced workman is capable of securing anotheremployment with better emoluments. He can also be tempted byother employers with more lucrative salary. The exit of an experienced workman would surely be a loss for his employer. It has beenaptly observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Britishpaints (India) Limited s case ( AIR 1966 SC 732 ) (supra) that "alonger minimum in the case of voluntary retirement or resignationmakes it more probable that the workmen would stick to the company where they are working. That is why gratuity schemes usuallyprovide for a longer minimum in the case of voluntary retirement orresignation. Keeping in view the intrinsic object for making provision forpayment of gratuity to a workman on his voluntary resignation andthe ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court detailed above, thereis no escape from the conclusion that the minimum period of qualifying service for five years by a workman for being eligible forgratuity on voluntary resignation under Section 4 (l) (b) of the Actcannot be stamped (as ?) sufficient long minimum. in the context ofmaking him stick to his existing employer and it does impose anunreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the employer tocarry on business and is, therefore, violative of Article 19 (l) (g) ofthe Constitution. "the above judgment of the Division Bench was followed by a subsequentjudgment of the Single Bench in Victory Public Hill Motor Transport Co. (P),ltd. v. Controlling Authority Under Payment of Gratuity Act and Others (1986)69 F. J. R. 401. ( 14 ) IN the Management of Wenger and Co. and Others v. Theirworkmen, AIR 1964 S. C. 864. "the above judgment of the Division Bench was followed by a subsequentjudgment of the Single Bench in Victory Public Hill Motor Transport Co. (P),ltd. v. Controlling Authority Under Payment of Gratuity Act and Others (1986)69 F. J. R. 401. ( 14 ) IN the Management of Wenger and Co. and Others v. Theirworkmen, AIR 1964 S. C. 864. the Hon ble Supreme Court dealt with the question of resignation and it was held that "a distinction must be made betweenthe termination of service, caused by the employer, and the termination resulting from the resignation, given by the employee for the eligbility of the employeeto receive the gratuity. It was provided that for termination of service, causedby the employer, the minimum period of service for payment of grantinggratuity would be 5 years. If the termination of service is the result ofmisconduct, which has caused financial loss to the employer, the loss should befirst compensated from the gratuity payable to the employee and the balance,if any, should be paid to him. If, the emplyee resigns, he would be entitledto get gratuity only if he has completed 10 years of service or more. " Thesupreme Court, therefore, provided in regard to resignation that if the employeeresigns, he would be entitled to gratuity only if, he has completed 10 yearsservice or more. In the present case, the respondent workman, admittedly,has put in large number of years and it has been conceded by the Counsel for petitioner that none of the workmen have put in less than 10 years ofservice. ( 15 ) IN Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd. and Another v. The Unionof India and Others, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 578, the Hon ble Supremecourt REFERRED TO to various judgments of the Court and noticed that even in thosecases, where gratuity was awarded on the employee s resignation from service,it was granted only after the completion of 15 years continuous service and notmerely on a minimum of 3 years service as in that case. The gratuity being areward for good, efficient and faithful service rendered for a considerableperiod, there would be no justification for awarding the same, when anemployee voluntarily resigns and brings about a termination of his serviceexcept in exceptional circumstances. The gratuity being areward for good, efficient and faithful service rendered for a considerableperiod, there would be no justification for awarding the same, when anemployee voluntarily resigns and brings about a termination of his serviceexcept in exceptional circumstances. In that context, the Court concluded thatthere will be no justification, whatever for awarding gratuity after a period ofonly 3 years and any such provision of the type, which has been made insection 5 (l) (a) (iii) of the Act, would certainly be unreasonable, as it imposesa unreasonable restriction on the petitioners right to carry on business and washeld liable to be struck down as unconstitutional. ( 16 ) THE present cases would be covered by the judgments of thehon ble Supreme Court in Management of Wenger and Co. (supra) and Expressnewspaper (Private) Ltd. and Another (supra), as the workmen have put in notless than 10 years of service and even much more and they cannot be deprivedof their statutory right of gratuity; simply on the ground that they voluntarilyresigned their positions. There is no force in the contention of the Counselfor petitioner and the same is accordingly rejected. Non Vacation of Company s Quarters ( 17 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has contended that some ofthe workmen did not vacate the quarters of the company, as allotted to themand, therefore, withholding of the gratuity was justified. The Controllingauthority observed in his order that there was no provision in the Act,where it was provided that in the event of failure of the vacation of the quarterby the employee, the amount of gratuity can be withheld. The said finding wasupheld by the Appellate Authority. The Counsel has reiterated that the quarterswere allotted to the concerned employees and regular deductions were madefrom their wages and, therefore, the employees were under legal obligationto vacate the said quarters before the gratuity amount could be disbursed tothem. ( 18 ) IN Kareparambil T. Lakshmanan and Others v. Air India, 1986 (52)F. L. R. 327, the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court refused togive relief to the workman, on his refusing to vacate the official accommodation. He held : "it is impossible to imagine that the employer should beforced to give such facilities to a recalcitrant employees, who were openlyflouting the undertaking given by them. He held : "it is impossible to imagine that the employer should beforced to give such facilities to a recalcitrant employees, who were openlyflouting the undertaking given by them. In my judgment, exercise of discretionary power in favour of such petitioners would lead to chaos in theadministration and I, therefore, refuse to assist the petitioners. " ( 19 ) IN Ramjlal Chimanlal Sharma v. M/s. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mill Co. Ltd and Another, 1984 Lab I. C. 1703, it was held ; "the Submission of Shri Boghani that the petition should not beentertained as the petitioner has come to the Court with uncleanhands cannot be accepted. The learned Counsel submitted that thepetitioner is in occupation of the premises belonging to the employerand which were allotted to him while he was in employment. Thelearned Counsel relied upon the agreement signed by the petitionerwhile securing the possession of the premises on 13/01/1967and submitted that in spite of the retirement, the petitioner hasdeclined to vacate the premises and has raised a false claim oftenancy driving the employer to institute proceedings for eviction inthe Court of Small Causes. Shri Boghani submits that the petitionernot only sat tight over the premises, but has not paid a single paisato the employer for his wrongful occupation right from the year1973 onwards. Shri Boghani submits that in view of the conduct ofthe petitioner he should not be granted any relief in these proceedings. The contention cannot be accepted, because the right to theamount of gratuity is not circumscribed or made dependent on theconduct of the employee subsequent to the date of his retirement. A right to secure gratuity amount cannot be defeated or cannot beused as lever by the employer for securing back possession of thepremises from the petitioner. It is not permissible under thepayment of Gratuity Act to withhold the amount for any reason,and if my judgment, even though the conduct of the petitioner inholding back possession of the premises is not very praiseworthystill that is not a sufficient reason to deprive him of the right ofgratuity. I put my displeasure to the learned Counsel appearingfor the petitioner and on taking instructions. Miss Pradhan statedthat the petitioner is willing to give an undertaking to this Courtthat he would vacate the premises and hand over vacant and peacefulpossession to the employer within a period of three months fromthe date of receipt of gratuity amount, if so ordered. I put my displeasure to the learned Counsel appearingfor the petitioner and on taking instructions. Miss Pradhan statedthat the petitioner is willing to give an undertaking to this Courtthat he would vacate the premises and hand over vacant and peacefulpossession to the employer within a period of three months fromthe date of receipt of gratuity amount, if so ordered. . Miss Pradhanstated that the petitioner is willing to file an undertaking in thiscourt to that effect. In these circumstances, it would not be properto deprive the petitioner of the right to claim gratuity. " ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for respondents has argued that no-doubt,the holding of the quarter was not a praiseworthy act on the part of theemployee, even then it is not a sufficient ground to deprive him, with regardto the right of gratuity and interest. The remedy, in any case, lies with thecivil Court. I am also informed that civil proceedings are going on betweenthe parties and an application, filed by the petitioner management, undersection 630 of the Companies Act, with regard to the respective quartersis also pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate. ( 21 ) I am also informed that only some employees have retained thecompany quarters and the matter is subjudice in the different Courts. I willexpress my strong displeasure at the attitude of those employees, who haveleft the service of the company but continue to retain the company s quarters. The only defence, which is being put by Counsel for the respondent is thatthe Management is proceeding according to law and no relief can be grantedin the present writ petitions. ( 22 ) THE Division Bench of this Court on 7/12/1988, in C. W. PNo. 2149/88 (Birla Textiles v. Bhagwat Singh) also dealt with the contentionof the management and concluded that there was no condition which willentitle the management to withhold the payment of gratuity in the event ofquarter being not vacated. No rule or condition of service was brought tothe notice of the Bench to hold otherwise. The relevant passage of the interimorder may be reproduced as follows : "it is also urged that the Management has a right to withhold thegratuity payable to the employee, who has not vacated the allottedquarter. We have seen the copy of the letter dt. 15/04/1962. The relevant passage of the interimorder may be reproduced as follows : "it is also urged that the Management has a right to withhold thegratuity payable to the employee, who has not vacated the allottedquarter. We have seen the copy of the letter dt. 15/04/1962. There is no condition -in that letter, the petitioner is entitled towithhold the payment of gratuity in the event of the quarter beingnot vacated. No rule or condition of service has been brought toour notice which entitles the petitioner to withhold the amount ofgratuity in the event of quarter not being vacated. " ( 23 ) IN the circumstances of these cases, the findings of the Controlling Authority, as well as, Appellate Authority are affirmed and gratuityof the employees cannot be withheld for the non vacation of the company squarters. ( 24 ) THE contention, raised by Counsel for the petitioner, in this regardis that the Hon ble Supreme Court having held in the case of Charm Singh (supra), that prior to the coming into force of Sub-section 3 (A) of Section 7of the Act, providing for the first time for payment of interest, on the withheld amount of gratuity, there was a lacuna in the Act and the amendedprovisions have prospective effect only w. e. f. 1/10/1987. The law, laiddown by the Supreme Court, has been clearly ignored by the Controllingauthority, as well as,. by the appellate authority. In Charan Singh s case (supra) the services of the employee had come to an end on 24/05/1983 andthereafter, since his gratuity was not paid to him, he had filed an applicationfor direction before the Controlling Authority, which was allowed along withcompound interest, but the Appellate Court in the appeal, filed by the management, struck down the order, as regards payment of interest only and Charansingh thereafter approached the Hon ble Supreme Court. During the pendencyof the appeal, the amended provisions came into force with effect from 1/10/1987 and the Court came to the conclusion that the said provisionwas prospective and dismissed the appeal of Charan Singh. It may be noticedthat the determination was made by the Controlling Authority on 3/12/1984, before the amended Act came into force. During the pendencyof the appeal, the amended provisions came into force with effect from 1/10/1987 and the Court came to the conclusion that the said provisionwas prospective and dismissed the appeal of Charan Singh. It may be noticedthat the determination was made by the Controlling Authority on 3/12/1984, before the amended Act came into force. I may refer to-thefollowing paragraph in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Charan Singh s (supra) case: "there was no provision in the Act for payment of interest whenthe same was quantified by the controlling authority and before thecollector was approached for its realisation. In fact, it is on theacceptance of the position that there was a lacuna in the law thatact 22 of 1987 brought about the incorporation of Sub-section (3a)in Section 7. That provision has prospective application. " ( 25 ) IN the present case, the Controlling Authority determined theamount, payable to the petitioner vide order dated 23/02/1988, i. e. subsequent to the date of passing of the amended provisions with regard tointerest. The Appellate Authority upheld the grant of simple interest at therate of 10 per cent by order dated 13/03/1989. ( 26 ) IN Sadhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. , andors. , AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1064, the Hon ble Supreme Court granted theinterest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum, from. the date amount of gratuityfell due till payment and full costs of the case throughout. ( 27 ) THE pension and gratuity as held by the Hon ble Supreme Courtin State of Kerala and Others v. M. Padmanabhan Nair, A. IR l985 Supremecourt 356, are no longer any bounty to be distributed to the employees ontheir retirement but are valuable rights and property in their hands and anyculpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with thepenalty of payment of interest at the current market rate till actual payment. The Supreme Court has further held that the penalty to pay penal interest onthese dues, at the current market rate, commences at the expiry of 2 monthsfrom the date of retirement. The present case speaks of total inaction on thepart of the petitioners as they continued to withhold the payments of gratuityto various employees, who worked in the establishment for years. The present case speaks of total inaction on thepart of the petitioners as they continued to withhold the payments of gratuityto various employees, who worked in the establishment for years. Theemployees had to run from one Court to the other and could only get somerespite when the matters came before this Court on several writ petitions, filedby the petitioner management. The gratuity amounts were directed to bereleased by orders of this Court. The management, has, therefore, escapedwith simple interest at the rate of 10 per cent in most cases and no penalinterest has been awarded by the Controlling Authority, as well as, by theappellate Authority. There is no force in this contention of the petitionerand the same is rejected. The respondents, in all the cases, are, therefore, heldentitled to the amount of gratuity as awarded, along with simple interest at therate of 10 per cent per annum. The last contention, which is sought to beraised, for the first time in this Court is, that in some cases, the amount ofinterest will turn out to be more than the gratuity amount and this is violativeof the proviso to Section 8 of the Act. The point was never urged before theauthorities below and no material has been placed on record. It is notnecessary for me to entertain this plea, which is raised for the first time. ( 28 ) THE writ petition is accordingly dismissed and the Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.