JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has challenged the order dated October 22, 1990 (Annexure 4) terminating his appointment as Addl. Public Prosecutor attached to the court of Addl. District Judge, Deeg, and appointment under the same order of respondent No. 4 Shri Kashmir Arora, as Addl. Public Prosecutor. Before I take up the grounds of challenge, it is necessary to give few facts which Are these.The petitioner is a practising advocate at Deep (Bharatpur) and there is a Court of Addl. District and Sessions Judge located at Deeg (Bharatpur). The petitioner was appointed as Addl. Public Prospector under order dated July 30, 1988 under Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and paras 12 and 14 of the Law and Judicial Department Manual, 1952 (for short, the Manual). The initial appointment of the petitioner was for a period of six months which should have come to an end on January 29, 1989, but it appears that the term of the petitioner was extended and the last extension was under order dated September 13, 1990 under which the term of appointment of the petitioner was extended upto December 31, 1990. It was sometime in the month of February, 1990 that the new Government took over and by and large it appears to be the practice that by the change of the Government the Addl. P.Ps/P.Ps with the courts attached to the Addl. District Judges/District Judges are changed. The Legal Remembrancer, Law and Judicial Department, Jaipur issued a wireless message No. F.8(20) State/Litigation/85 dated June 13, 1990. The said wireless message reads as under : "Please send a panel for appointment of Public Prosecutors/Addl. Public Prosecutors with the consultation of Distt. & Sessions Judge." Copies of this message were forwarded to all the Collectors, except Jaipur. As the process of preparation panel takes the time, it appears to me that the appointment of the petitioner was extended under order Annr. 3 dated September 13, 1990 till December 31, 1990. It can also be said that a panel of five names for appointment as Addl. Public Prosecutor in the Court of Addl. District Judge, Deeg, was called for by the Joint Legal Remembrancer under his letter No. F. 8 (20) State/Liti. 85 dated July 7, 1990 (this letter has been shown to me by the Addl. Advocate General from the file concerned). Public Prosecutor in the Court of Addl. District Judge, Deeg, was called for by the Joint Legal Remembrancer under his letter No. F. 8 (20) State/Liti. 85 dated July 7, 1990 (this letter has been shown to me by the Addl. Advocate General from the file concerned). The names of as many as 5 advocates were received and in the panel, the name of the petitioner as well as that the respondent No. 4 were also included. Under the impugned order, whereas the services of the petitioner as Addl. Public Prosecutor were terminated, the respondent No. 4 was appointed as Addl. Public Prosecutor. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order Annexure 4 dated October 22, 1990 on the ground that the term of the petitioner had been extended upto December 31, 1990 and, therefore, prior to that date, the term of his appointments could not have been abruptly brought to an end and more so when there is a provision in the Manual contained in para 16(1) thereof that the Government may at any time and without assigning any reason, dispense with the services of a Public Prosecutor after giving him one month's notice. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the person who holds the office of Public Protector/Addl. Public Prosecutor is holder of a public office and, therefore, his term could not be brought to an end and he is entitled for consideration of renewal of his term as provided under Clause 15 of the Manual. Learned counsel contends that when the term of appointment of a Public Prosecutor/Addl. Public Prosecutor is going to expire, it is necessary to first examine as to whether renewal should be granted to him or not and the renewal should depend on the performance of a Public Prosecutor/Addl. Public Prosecutor and if the renewal is not granted, the question of' making fresh panel will arise. In short the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no material on record that the work and conduct of the petitioner as Addl. Public Prosecutor was not satisfactory and the fact that, as it appears from the panel sent by the Collector that the name of the petitioner appears therein, goes to show that the work and conduct of the petitioner was satisfied and the petitioner's term should have been renewed as Addl. Public Prosecutor was not satisfactory and the fact that, as it appears from the panel sent by the Collector that the name of the petitioner appears therein, goes to show that the work and conduct of the petitioner was satisfied and the petitioner's term should have been renewed as Addl. Public Prosecutor for a period of three years and the appointment should not have been given to the respondent No. 4 much less, there could not be any pre-mature termination of the petitioner's service which was upto December 31, 1990. In support of his contention that one who holds an office of Addl. Public Prosecutor is an holder of public office, learned counsel has referred to two cases, (i) Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., 1990(6) SLR 1 : 1991(1) SCT 575 (SC) and (ii) Manak Chand Jain v. State of Rajasthan, WLR 1991(8) Raj. 362. In the case of Ku. Shrilekha Vidyarthi (Supra) the Apex Court Was considering the general order of the U.P. Government under which the appointments of all Government Counsel (Civil, Criminal and Revenue) in all the districts of the Uttar Pradesh w.e.f. February 28, 1990 were terminated and a direction was issued for preparation of fresh panel. The Apex Court was considering the various provisions of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual, 1975 Edition, more so, para 7 thereof and by reference to the aforesaid provision the Court said that the provisions clearly show that the Government counsel in the district are treated as Law Officers of the State who are holders of an 'office' or 'post'. The Apex Court further said referring to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - "There can be no doubt that this function of the Public Prosecutor relates to a public purpose entrusting him with the responsibility of so according only in the interest of administration of justice. The Apex Court further said referring to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - "There can be no doubt that this function of the Public Prosecutor relates to a public purpose entrusting him with the responsibility of so according only in the interest of administration of justice. In the case of Public Prosecutors, this additional public element flowing from statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, undoubtedly invest the Public Prosecutors with the attribute of holders of a public office which cannot be whittled down by the assertion that their engagement is purely professional between a client and his lawyer with no public element attaching to it." The apex Court in para 17 of the judgment further said - "We have already indicated the presence of public element attached to the 'office' or 'post' of District Government Counsel of every category covered by the impugned circular. This is sufficient to attract Article 14 of the Constitution and bring the question of validity of the impinged circular within the scope of judicial review." Having said so, the Apex Court further said that the power of judicial review is available even without that element i.e. the holder of an office or post of District Government counsel has public element on the premise that after the initial appointment the matter is purely contractual. Applicability of Article 14 to all executive actions of the State being settled and for the same reason its applicability at the threshold to the making of a contract in exercise of the executive power being beyond dispute, can it be said that the State can thereafter, cast-off its personality and exercise unbridled power unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 in the sphere of contractual matter and claim to be governed therein only by private law principles applicable to private individuals whose rights flow only from the terms of the contract without anything more. The court further said that there is no hesitation in saying that the personality of the State requiring regulation of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Article 114 does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirement of Article 14 and, contractual obligations are alien concepts which cannot co-exist. It is not as if the requirement of Article 14 and, contractual obligations are alien concepts which cannot co-exist. This circular being arbitrary was struck down by the Apex Court. Construing the provisions of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual of U.P., the Court said that they have to be continued for a period of three years and then their case has to be considered for renewal in accordance with the terms of Manual. The Court said - "In the case of existing appointees, a decision has to be first reached about their non-suitability for renewal before deciding to take steps for fresh appointments to replace them." In that case no such step was taken and ultimately the Apex Court not only struck down the circular of the Law Ministry but also said that it will result in restoration of status quo ante as on February 28, 1990 the date from which that circular was made effective. In the case of Manak Chand Jain (supra) Mehta, J. as he then was, considered the aforesaid case of the Apex Court and said that there is no relationship of 'master' and 'servant' between a State and a Public Prosecutor appointed by the State. The relationship between the Government Counsel and the State is that of an advocate and client and not of the master and servant. He also said that the office of the Public Prosecutor is statutory office and carries with it heavy duties and rights and for this reason consultation envisaged by Section 24(3) Criminal Procedure Code with the Sessions Judge is necessary. Learned Judge further said that the services of the Public Prosecutor cannot be terminated without expiry of tenure and in cases of public servants when the appointment is made for a fixed tenure, the public servant is entitled to hold the office till expiry of that tenure. In that case, because the term had not come to an end, it was held that Manak Chand Jain was entitled to continue till the end of the term of his appointment and the appointment of another Public Prosecutor was set aside. Justice G.S. Singhvi, though agreed with Mehta, J. added his own view but he too held that Manak Chand Jain was entitled to continue till the end of his tenure. Justice G.S. Singhvi, though agreed with Mehta, J. added his own view but he too held that Manak Chand Jain was entitled to continue till the end of his tenure. Therefore, all that can be said is that once a Public Prosecutor is appointed for a particular period, his services cannot be terminated and his tenure cannot be cut-short.4. In the instant case I have already given the facts and it appears that the petitioner was initially appointed under Annexure-1 dated July 30, 1988 for a period of 6 months. Though, it is not mentioned that the appointment is on probation but there is a reference to Clauses 12 and 14 of the Manual has been made therein and a perusal of Clause 14(1) of the Manual will show that every Public Prosecutor has to be appointed for a period of six months at the end of which period of the District Magistrate has to submit a report through the District and Sessions Judge and the Divisional Commissioner to Government upon his conduct and ability and if the report of the District Magistrate is satisfactory, he shall be confirmed. It further appears under Clause 15 of the Manual term of the Public Prosecutor shall be three years including the period of probation. It will therefore be clear that as provided in the Manual a Public Prosecutor has to be initially appointed for a period of six months and, thereafter, in cast his work is found to be satisfactory he shall be appointed for a period of three years including the period of probation. In other words, the term of appointment of a Public Prosecutor has to be 3 years, neither more nor less. Therefore, though as said earlier, there is no mention that the petitioner is appointed for a period of six months on probation, but he shall be deemed to have been appointed on probation a period of six months. Thereafter, he does not appear to have been confirmed but the period of his appointment was extended. From a perusal of para 14(1) of the Manual it will be clear that a Public Prosecutor has to be appointed on probation for a period of six months, and for any sufficient reason the Government may extend the period of probation. There is no outer limit, but it can be extended for a reasonable period. From a perusal of para 14(1) of the Manual it will be clear that a Public Prosecutor has to be appointed on probation for a period of six months, and for any sufficient reason the Government may extend the period of probation. There is no outer limit, but it can be extended for a reasonable period. It appears that after first appointment of the petitioner for six months, the period was extended for six months again. There is no mention that the work of the petitioner was unsatisfactory and therefore, the period of probation was extended. As said earlier the term of a Public Prosecutor could have been three years and the appointment of the petitioner would have been for three years, but the petitioner has not come out with a case nor he has sought any declaration that his appointment shall be deemed to have been for three years after his initial appointment. A look at the prayer made in the writ petition will show that beside the prayer that impugned order dated October 22, 1990 may be quashed, a prayer has also been made that the petitioner may be allowed to continue on the post of Addl. Public Prosecutor. The term of the petitioner, as said earlier, was to expire December 31, 1990. The petitioner's term as abruptly brought to an end under Annexure 4 dated October 22, 1990 and that too without giving one month's notice which was pre-requisite as provided in para 16(1) of the Manual. In my opinion, therefore, the term of the petitioner could not have been put to an end prior to December 31, 1990 and the petitioner had a right to continue at least till December 31, 1990. 5. In the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) as said earlier, the Apex Court was considering the provisions of Legal Remembrancer's Manual of U.P. and there were elaborate provisions contained in para 7.08 in respect of renewal of the term and the said para provided that at least three months before the expiry of the term of a District Government Counsel, the District Officer shall after consulting the District Judge and considering this past record or work, conduct and age, report to the Legal Remembrancer, together with the statement of work down by him in Form No. 9 whether in his opinion the term of appointment of such counsel should be renewed or not. A copy of the opinion of the District Judge should also be sent alongwith the recommendations of the District Officer. There were provisions providing elaborate procedure for considering the case of renewal. So far as Manual is concerned, it will appear that all that is provided in para 15 is that the Public Prosecutor shall be appointed for a period of three years, including the period of his probation, and may be reappointed for further periods not exceeding three years at a time. The word 'may' has been used which is discretionary. That apart, it appears that the petitioner has not claimed the right of renewal on the post of Addl. Public Prosecutor.6. I am of the opinion that the petitioner was entitled to continue as Addl. Public Prosecutor till December 31, 1990. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the strength of the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) is that the position as on October 22, 1990, when the services of the petitioner were terminated, should be restored. In my opinion' when the term of the petitioner was to expire on December 31, 1900 be could not continue as Addl. Public Prosecutor beyond that date and all that the petitioner is entitled is that he should he paid retainship amount on the post of Addl. Public Prosecutor till December 31, 1960.7. Consequently, I part allow this writ petition only to the extent that the petition is entitled to the amount of retainership as Addl. Public Prosecutor of the court of Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Deeg upto December 31, 1990. The respondents are directed to pay the aforesaid amount to the petitioner as early as possible but in no case later than two months. The petitioner shall also be entitled to costs of Rs. 1000/- and the respondents are directed to pay Rs. 1000/- as costs to the petitioner because the termination of the appointment of the petitioner before his term has been found to be illegal.Petition partly allowed. *******