JUDGMENT : M.L. BHAT, J. 1. The revisionists were the defendant in a suit for eviction filed by the Respondent No. 2 u/s 20 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act of 1972, hereinafter called as 'the Act'. By a judgment dated 10-4-1992 the suit has been decreed in favour of the Respondent No. 2 and the Petitioners are evicted from the premises. Decree for arrears of rent also is passed. 2. In the plaint filed before the Court below the Respondent No. 2 seems to have sought the eviction of the Petitioners on the ground of default in payment of rent but the Petitioners came to be evicted u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act. It is held by the Court below that the Petitioners have denied the title of the Respondent No. 2, therefore, they are liable to be evicted from the suit premises. Clause (f) of sub-section (2) of section 20 of the Act reads as under : 20(2)(f) -- that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord, and the latter has not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. 3. This ground for eviction appears to have been furnished to the Plaintiff by the Petitioners by alleging in the written statement that the Plaintiff is not the exclusive owner of the premises in question. This ground of eviction was not urged in the plaint. However, when the written statement was filed, the Plaintiff filed a replica and in para 2 of the said replica the Plaintiff stated as under : 2. That the Defendants have renounced their character as tenants of the Plaintiff. The Defendants have further denied the title of the Plaintiff (landlord) and the Plaintiff has not condoned the conduct of the Defendants occasioned by their denial of title and the Plaintiff has not waived his rights of re-entry. The Plaintiff has thus acquired a right u/s 20(2)(f) of Uttar Pradesh Act No. XIII of 1972 to evict the Defendants on this ground also. 4. The Court below has framed six issues and the issues No. 1 and 4 have been decided together. These two issues relate to the plaintiff's status as owner and landlord of the premises under the occupation of the Petitioners and the effect of the defendants' denial of title of the Plaintiff. 4. The Court below has framed six issues and the issues No. 1 and 4 have been decided together. These two issues relate to the plaintiff's status as owner and landlord of the premises under the occupation of the Petitioners and the effect of the defendants' denial of title of the Plaintiff. Both these issues have been decided in favour of the Plaintiff-Respondent No. 2. The issues regarding damage caused to the property by the Petitioners and the Petitioners having committed default in payment of rent were decided against the Respondent No. 2 and in favour of the Petitioners. Issue No. 5 on which the suit was initially founded has also been decided in favour of the Petitioners. 5. The sole question to be decided in this revision petition is whether the assertion made by the Petitioners in para 17 of their written statement would amount to denial of the plaintiff's title over the suit property and whether the Petitioners would be liable to be evicted u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act on the basis of the said assertion. 6. The learned Counsel for the revisionists and for the Respondent No. 2 were heard at length. It was requested by the learned Counsel for the parties that without admitting the revision petition, the same may be decided on merits at admission stage. The request of the learned Counsel for the parties was granted and they were given ample opportunity to argue the case at admission stage. The learned Counsel for the revisionists has stated that the revisionists have not denied the title of the Plaintiff as landlord over the suit premises nor have they renounced their own character as tenants of the suit property. It was contended that the assertions contained in para 17 of the written statement were made in a different context and those assertions were bonafide because the property of which the suit premises is a parcel was purchased by a number of vendees and portion of the suit premises such as entire land appurtenant to the suit premises and the garage were not included in the sale deed of the Plaintiff Respondent No. 2. It was stated that revisionists were the tenants of a large chunk of land appurtenant to the suit premises and they were also in occupation of the garage, therefore, they were within their right to say that the Plaintiff was not the exclusive owner of the suit premises. They have not denied the title of the landlord as such. However, they have only stated that the Plaintiff was not the exclusive owner of the suit property, which does not amount to denial of title of the landlord. It is contended that the revisionists have attorned to the Respondent No. 2. They have paid the rent also which was in arrears upto certain dates. The revisionists are said to have sent the rent which had fallen due against them and it is stated by the rivisionsts that in January, 1989 the Respondent No. 2 had informed them that he had purchased the entire portion of tenancy in question from its landlord and also demanded the rent from the revisionists. The revisionists had believed the Respondent No. 2 in good faith and in a bonafide manner they sent the rent due for the month of July, 1988 to November 1988 at the rate of Rs. 130/ -- per month through money order and thereafter a further amount of Rs. 260/-was sent on account of rent for the month of December, 988 and January, 1989 on 1-4-1989. Both these amounts are said to have been received by the Respondent Not. 2. It is said by the revisionists that later on it was revealed that the entire premises under tenancy and occupation of the revisionists was not covered by the sale deed executed by the then landlord in favour of the Respondent No. 2. The revisionists stopped payment of further rent to the Respondent No. 2 with an idea to pay the rent proportionately for the share purchased by the Respondent No. 2 as in the opinion of the revisionists Rs. 130/- as rent payable was for the entire portion, which was not purchased by the Respondent No. 2. There is some controversy about the boundaries of the suit premises. 130/- as rent payable was for the entire portion, which was not purchased by the Respondent No. 2. There is some controversy about the boundaries of the suit premises. On the basis of the aforesaid pleas the revisionists have stated that the Respondent No. 2 had no right to terminate the tenancy of the Defendants and the notice given by the Plaintiff for payment of rent and terminating the tenancy of the revisionists was baseless and without an authority. At the end of para 17 they have asserted that the Plaintiff was not the exclusive owner of the suit premises. In the opinion of the trial Court this was a denial of title of the Respondent No. 2 over the suit property by the revisionists and on this ground they were liable to be evicted and had in fact ordered their eviction. 7. The Court below has relied on an authority of this Court, Narain Das Khanna, v. Dr. Jawahar Lal Bhatia 1983 (9) ALR 143, This authority, in turn, is based on a judgment in Hashmat Husain, v. Sagir Ahmad AIR 1958 All. 842. The defendant in this case had stated in the written statement that the property in the case had devolved on the death of the plaintiff's father upon the plaintiffs mother, brothers and sisters. The Division Bench was of the opinion that the defendant in that case did not admit the Plaintiff to be the sole owner/landlord of the accommodation, which the defendant was occupying. This assertion was said to be sufficient to constitute a ground for eviction u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act. 8. The learned Counsel for the revisionists have referred to certain authorities to show that the one line assertion made in para 17 of the written statement would not construe the renunciation of their character as tenants or denial of landlord's title. Reliance is placed on the case of Smt. Bela Das and Others Vs. Samarendra Nath Bose, AIR 1975 SC 398 . The Supreme Court was considering the form and effect of denial of title by the tenant of his landlord. It was a case in which the defendant had admitted that he was a tenant under the plaintiffs but was merely asserting that there were some more landlords of the premises under his tenancy in question. The Supreme Court was considering the form and effect of denial of title by the tenant of his landlord. It was a case in which the defendant had admitted that he was a tenant under the plaintiffs but was merely asserting that there were some more landlords of the premises under his tenancy in question. This assertion was factually correct and it was held by the Supreme Court that it was not a case of denial of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 9. The learned Counsel for the revisionists has also relied on the case of Shyam Lal Chhibbar v. Special Judge (E.C. Act)-Additional District Judge, Kanpur 1988 (2) ARC 28. The tenant in that case had asserted that the Plaintiff was not only the owner but there were other co-owners, who should have been made parties to the suit. It was held that this would not amount to renunciation of the tenant's character as such. The tenant was held to have admitted the Plaintiff as landlord, who had asserted that there were other co-owners of the property and they should be made parties to the suit. In those circumstances, this assertion would not fall u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act. In the case of Mohd. Aleem v. Mohd. Abrar 1989 (1) ARC 329 it was held that in order to attract the provisions of section 20(2)(f) of the Act two conditions must co-exist These two conditions are : (i) There should be denial of landlord's title by the tenant ; and (ii) the re-entry arising from denial should neither be waived nor the conduct of tenant be condoned. 10. The first condition alone was not held to be sufficient to pass a decree for eviction under clause (f) of section 20(2) of the Act. The decree for eviction under clause (f) of section 20(2) of the Act was set aside by the High Court on the ground of non compliance with condition (ii) of clause (f) of section 20(2) of the Act. In the case of Mohd. Arif v. IV Addl. The decree for eviction under clause (f) of section 20(2) of the Act was set aside by the High Court on the ground of non compliance with condition (ii) of clause (f) of section 20(2) of the Act. In the case of Mohd. Arif v. IV Addl. District Judge, Aligarh 1984 (2) ARC 255, it was held that in order to succeed under clause (f) of section 20(2) of the Act it was not only necessary for the landlord to prove that the tenant had denied the title of the landlord but it was further necessary to allege and prove that the landlord had not waived his right of re-entry and condoned the conduct of the tenant. In that case there was no finding on the second condition of clause (f) of section 20(2) of the Act, therefore, the case was sent back to the trial Court for deciding the same according to law. 11. Mr. Jain, appearing for the other side along with Mr. S.G. Budhwar, has contended that the revisionists had attorned to the Respondent No. 2 as their landlord and paid the rent also twice before the institution of the suit. They could not thereafter turn round and deny the title of the landlord. It was further submitted that denial of title of the Respondent No. 2 as landlord by the revisionists would attract the provisions of section 20(2)(f) of the Act. Reliance is placed on the case of Narain Das Khanna v. Dr. Jawahar Lal Bhatia (supra). He has also relied on the case of Hashmat Husain v. Sagir Ahmad and others (supra). This case was decided on the basis of section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. The tenant had set up title in respect of the suit property in third person. Therefore, it was held that the tenant had forfeited the status of being a tenant and he was liable to be evicted on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy. In the case of Param Sukh v. III Addl. District Judge, Jalaun at Orai 1986 (2) RCR 462. A suit for eviction seems to have been dismissed. However, the suit for arrears of rent was decreed. A revision was taken to the revisional Court, which allowed the revision add passed a decree for eviction u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act. In the case of Param Sukh v. III Addl. District Judge, Jalaun at Orai 1986 (2) RCR 462. A suit for eviction seems to have been dismissed. However, the suit for arrears of rent was decreed. A revision was taken to the revisional Court, which allowed the revision add passed a decree for eviction u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act. The High Court in its writ jurisdiction found that the finding given by the trial Court on the issue whether the tenant denied the title of the landlord or not was a finding of fact. The revisional Court could not reassess the evidence on the issue whether the tenant had denied the title of the landlord or not. 12. In the case of Tej Bhan Madan Vs. II Additional District Judge and Others, AIR 1988 SC 1413 the tenant had denied the title of the landlord and his vendee. It was held that the tenant could not deny the derivative title of the vendee to the property. He had attorned to the landlord and the landlord had sold the property to another person. The tenant was informed by the landlord as also by the vendee. He had not denied the title of vendee alone. He stated that the person from whom the vendee had purchased i.e. the original landlord of the tenant had no title and their ownership over the suit; property occupied by the tenant was void. On this basis it was held by the Supreme Court that the denial of title was complete and affirmed the judgment of this Court whereby the Appellant in that case was ordered to be evicted on the ground of denial of title of the landlord. 13. Mr. Jain has also relied on the case of Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by Lrs., AIR 1989 SC 2187 for the proposition that denial of landlord's title need not be anterior to the filing of the suit. It can be subsequent to the filing of the suit as in that case also the tenant had denied the title of the landlord in the written statement and on that basis an issue was framed, which was decided against the tenant. It can be subsequent to the filing of the suit as in that case also the tenant had denied the title of the landlord in the written statement and on that basis an issue was framed, which was decided against the tenant. A distinction was drawn by the Supreme Court between the provisions in respect of eviction on the basis of denial of title of the landlord by the tenant and forfeiture of tenancy rights u/s 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. 14. The trial Court has framed issue No. 4 with regard to the denial of title of the Plaintiff by the tenant and its effect. The trial Court should have framed a further issue and allowed the parties to lead evidence on that issue as to whether the landlord has not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenants. This should have been a specific issue and finding on this was definitely to be given by the trial Court. The trial Court has construed the one line of para 17 of the written statement as amounting to denial of title of the Respondent No. 2 as landlord by the revisionists over the suit property. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 that the assertion made by the revisionists was absolutely false and baseless. It was contended that the garage, which was claimed by the revisionists as part of the tenanted property, and the land, which was said to be included in the tenanted property was taken in possession by the other co-vendees of the entire property, on which the tenanted property is only a parcel. The revisionists had not denied this fact nor was there any evidence led that the garage or the said land, which the revisionists claim to be their tenanted property, was in their possession. On the other hand, the garage and the land, which the revisionists claim to be included in the tenanted premises, is not so included and the portion occupied by the revisionists was purchased by the Respondent No. 2 and the revisionists had the knowledge that the Respondent No. 2 alone was the owner of the portion, which was under the tenancy of the revisionists. Therefore, the claim of the revisionists was not bonafide. Therefore, the claim of the revisionists was not bonafide. In other words, it would mean that if the assertion is bonafide with regard to the Respondent No. 2 not being the exclusive owner of the premises then the provisions of section 20(2)(f) of the Act would not be attracted. In order to ascertain this fact it was necessary for the trial Court to allow the revisionists' application and examine the erstwhile landlord, who had alienated the property in favour of a number of vendees by a composite sale deed to ascertain the extent and measurement of the premises held by the revisionists under their occupancy. The trial Court seems to have rushed through and ignored certain documents from consideration and has arrived at a findings which is not in accordance with law. The trial court's jurisdiction to arrive at a conclusion is not disputed but the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court must be based on cogent, reliable and relevant evidence, otherwise there is likelihood of miscarriage of justice in a case of this nature. 15. An application was moved by the revisionists on 8-4-1992 before the trial Court for summoning the original landlords, the vendees of the Respondent No. 2, which was summarily dismissed by the trial Court. The prayer contained in the said application should have been considered because the revisionists had placed on record a document purported to have been signed by the original landlord to the effect that the motor garage was still in possession of the revisionists. This document purports to pertain to 27-1-1975. The notice given to the revisionists by the erstwhile landlord on 11-7-1988 informing the revisionists that they have sold the portion of the building consisting of one room 16' x 20', second room 10' x 13.9' third room 8.9' x 13.9' and one hall 38' in length along with verandah, bath-room on the western side of the main building and the land in front of it, the width of which is 40 meters, to the Respondent No. 2. In this notice there is no mention of the motor garage, which, according to the Respondent No. 2, has been enclosed by another co-vendee and the measurement of the land sold by the original landlord to the Respondent No. 2 was also required to be taken as to how much land was in possession of the revisionists as tenant and how much was sold. All these questions have been left unanswered by the trial Court and it has at once jumped to the conclusion and passed a decree of eviction u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act. 16. The trial Court has failed to ascertain the real composition of the tenanted property, which is under the tenancy of the revisionists. If the assertion of the revisionists, as stated by them in para 12 of their written statement, before the trial Court was correct, then the revisionists' contention that the Respondent No. 2 was not the exclusive owner of the suit premises would not amount to denial of title of the landlord as contemplated by section 20(a)(f) of the Act. Therefore, a proper issue was required to be framed and parties were required to be put to strict proof as regards the extent of the tenanted premises under the occupation of the revisionists as tenants. The revisionists' contention in para 17 of the written statement to the effect that the Plaintiff is not the exclusive owner of the premises in question is not to be read in isolation nor can that assertion be divorced from the context. The revisionists are sought to be evicted from the suit premises on the ground of denial of title of the landlord. The ground of denial of title of the landlord should have been considered in a real perspective, which would mean that the revisionists bonafides to assert the aforesaid contention in para 17 of the written statement was to be tested. If it was true and bonafide then possibly the provisions of section 20(2)(f) of the Act would not apply to the facts of the present case. But if the assertion made in para 12 of the written statement was ruse or a pretext and the document produced by the Petitioners were not correct, then they would at once be liable for eviction u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act. 17. But if the assertion made in para 12 of the written statement was ruse or a pretext and the document produced by the Petitioners were not correct, then they would at once be liable for eviction u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act. 17. I have no hesitation in saying that the trial court's judgment suffers from legal infirmity for it has not considered the relevant material and necessary points, which would entail in eviction of a tenant on the ground of section 20(2)(f) of the Act. It was necessary for the trial Court to consider the bonafides of the revisionists in ascertaining that the Plaintiff was not the exclusive owner of the suit premises. Law postulates that the tenant should not deny the title of landlord at the inception of the tenancy. It does not prevent a tenant to deny the title of the owner if he is not the landlord. Assuming that the owner and landlord in the present case is one and the same, as contended by Mr. Jain, even then the trial Court was bound to consider whether the assertions of the revisionists were bonafide or not. 18. It is true that the revisionists have attorned to the Respondent No. 2 as tenants and have paid the rent to him but the revisionists have explained the circumstances under which they paid the rent to the Respondent No. 2. They have not renounced their character as tenants. It is admitted by them that they are the tenants of the premises but the Respondent No. 2 will be entitled only to receive such rent, which is proportionate to his ownership rights over what portion of the property in question the Respondent No. 2 had acquired ownership rights was to be ascertained in the light of the pleadings of the parties and the documents placed on record. In this regard it was just and proper to record the statement of the landlords or anyone of them and also to scrutinise the documents on record critically. It is important to note that in respect of major portion of the tenanted premises the landlord's title has not been denied by the revisionists. They have not denied the title of their erstwhile landlords at the inception of the tenancy or even now. It is important to note that in respect of major portion of the tenanted premises the landlord's title has not been denied by the revisionists. They have not denied the title of their erstwhile landlords at the inception of the tenancy or even now. The composite sale deed in favour of different vendees would give tenant a right to know the extent, composition and the measurement of the Respondent No. 2's share in the property so as to enable him to pay the rent to the vendee-landlord proportionate to his ownership right over the property. If the assertion in para 17 of the written statement is made in this context, it may not fall within the mischief of section 29(2)(f) of the Act. The parties are at variance regarding the boundaries of the tenanted premises and about its true composition. If the assertion of the Petitioners with regard to the Respondent No. 2's ownership rights over the suit premises not being exclusive are bonafide and honest, then it may not amount to denial of title. Each case in which denial of title is basis of eviction has to be decided on its own merits. 19. The suit initially was on default of payment of rent and eviction could be ordered u/s 20(4) of the Act if the tenants did not comply with the requirements of that section. They are held to be not defaulters but they are evicted on the ground of section 20(2)(f) of the Act. Before ordering their eviction something more was required to be done by the trial Court. It has ignored to consider the relevant material and omitted from consideration the relevant factors, which would bring the revisionists within the mischief of section 20(2)(f) of the Act. Even if the denial of title of the landlord by the revisionists is proved, the trial Court had to give a finding that the landlord had not waived his right of re-entry and had not condoned the conduct of the tenants. That finding has not been given, 20. The authority reported in 1983 ALR (9) 143 (supra) was decided on a different set of facts. In that case the tenant had stated that the plaintiff's mother, brother and sisters were owners of the property, which was held to be a denial of title. That finding has not been given, 20. The authority reported in 1983 ALR (9) 143 (supra) was decided on a different set of facts. In that case the tenant had stated that the plaintiff's mother, brother and sisters were owners of the property, which was held to be a denial of title. In the present case we are faced with factual difficulty as to the extent and composition of the premises under the occupation of the revisionists and more so, the revisionists have not denied the title of the original owners of their tenancy. The exclusive or joint ownership of a premises may be possible if there is a sale and the property is purchased by one sale deed. The authority reported in Hashmat Husain Vs. Saghir Ahmad and Others, AIR 1958 All 847 also has no application to the facts of the case because that was a case in which the tenant had denied the title of the landlord and set up the title in a third person, which was forfeiture of the tenancy u/s 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. The ground mentioned for eviction was anterior to the filing of the suit as is required under the Transfer of Property Act. In the case reported in Tej Bhan Madan Vs. II Additional District Judge and Others, AIR 1988 SC 1413 the tenant had denied the title not only of the vendee but of the original landlord also to whom he was paying rent and had asserted that the title of his landlord was void, which was held to be a ground for eviction u/s 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act of 1947. There was a total denial of the landlord's title and vendee's derivative title was also denied. The Supreme Court held that the principle, in its basic foundations, means no more than that under circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to approbate and reprobate. It was a clear case, which attracted the grounds of eviction u/s 3(1) of the said Act. It was held in that case that the tenant in fact renounced his character as tenant under the landlord to whom he was paying the rent. 21. It was a clear case, which attracted the grounds of eviction u/s 3(1) of the said Act. It was held in that case that the tenant in fact renounced his character as tenant under the landlord to whom he was paying the rent. 21. The revisionists have made feeble attempt to challenge the jurisdiction of the Respondent No. 1 in deciding the matter However, the argument about the jurisdiction of the Respondent No. 1 to decide the matter does not seem to be well-founded and is, therefore, over-ruled. 22. It is necessary to remand this case to the Respondent No. 1 for disposal afresh and he is directed to frame additional issues with regard to the Respondent No. 2 not having waived his right of re-entry and not having condoned the conduct of the revisionists. The trial Court shall also frame an issue with regard to the extent, limit and composition of the tenanted property under the occupation of the revisionists and ascertain with reference to para 12 of the written statement and the documents on record whether there is some other property also in possession of the revisionists over which the Respondent No. 2 has no ownership. It shall also frame an issue as to whether the assertions made by the revisionists in para 17 of their written statement with regard to the Respondent No. 2 not being the exclusive owner of the suit premises are bonafide assertions or not and what is its effect either way. 23. The trial Court shall also allow the revisionists and the Respondent No. 2 to adduce such evidence in support of their respective contentions as they may desire to adduce. It will be proper also if the statement of the landlords or one of them is recorded to ascertain the bonafides of the revisionists' contention contained in para 17 of the written statement and para 12 of the written statement. The trial of the suit shall be concluded within a period of six months as far as possible from the date of receipt of this judgment by the trial Court. 24. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial Court dated 10-4-1992 is hereby set aside and the revision is allowed to the extent indicated above. The trial Court is directed to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of (he observations made hereinabove. 25. 24. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial Court dated 10-4-1992 is hereby set aside and the revision is allowed to the extent indicated above. The trial Court is directed to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of (he observations made hereinabove. 25. The learned Counsel for the parties shall cause the presence of their respective clients before the trial Court on 27th November, 1992.