J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) BY this appeal the appellants have questioned the legality of the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) at Surat in Special Civil Suit No. 84 of 1975 by invoking the aids of the provisions of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Code for short hereinafter) ( 2 ) A resume of the material facts leading to the present appeal may be narrated at the outset so as to appreciate the merits of the appeal and challenge against it ( 3 ) THE present appellants are the original plaintiffs and the present respondents are the original defendants They are hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs and defendants for the sake of brevity and convenience ( 4 ) THE plaintiffs are the Trustees of Surat Parsi Panchayat Funds and Properties Trust who institued the above suit for recovery of Rs. 20 682 with interest and cost against the defendants The plaintiffs are the landlords and the defendants are the tenants The plaintiffs are owners-landlords in respect of immovable properties bearing S. Nos. 70 and 71 of village Umarwada Taluka Choriasi District Surat Out of the above S. Nos. a plot of land admeasuring about 5104 sq. yds. is let out to the defendants on the monthly rent of Rs. 383. 00 The defendants did not pay rent in time as and when it fell due The plaintiffs had filed a Special Civil Suit No. 136 of 1970 on 3-10-1970 which came to be dismissed on 29-9-1973 The plaintiffs further contended that the said suit came to be dismissed on the ground that the determination notice given in that suit was not legal and valid In the earlier suit partial decree was passed in respect of the arrears of rent upto the date of the suit and the same was came to be recovered by filing Special Darkhast No. 36 of 1974 The decree for possession and mesne profit from the date of the suit till the date of possession came to be refused in the earlier suit Therefore the plaintiffs contended that they are entitled to recover an amount of Rs. 20 682 by way of arrears of rent from the defendants According to the case of the plaintiffs they are entitled to recover the rent for more that three years as they had filed the earlier Special Civil Suit No. 136 of 1970 on 3 which came to be dismissed on 29 on technical grounds Therefore the plaintiffs claimed deduction of time by invoking the aids of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 ( Limitation Act for short hereinafter) ( 5 ) THE defendants had resisted the suit by filing written statement at Ex. 13 The defendants inter alia contended that the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act (Rent Act for short hereinafter) are applicable to the suit property and the suit is not maintainable without service of notice under Section 12 (2) of the Rent Act They also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in the present frame and that the suit was also time barred. ( 6 ) IN view of the pleadings of the parties issues came to be settled at Ex. 18 The Trial Court was pleased to decree the suit in part The Trial Court found that the plaintiffs are entitled to an amount of Rs. 13 788 towards the arrears of rent only for the period of three years prior to the date of filing of the suit The Trial Court also held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any amount of arrears or rent for a period from 1-10-1970 to 31-3-1972. It was also found by the Trial Court that notice under Section 12 (2) of the Rent Act is not necessary Being aggrieved by the refusal to decree a part of the amount as claimed by the original plaintiffs they have now come up before this Court challenging its legality and validity ( 7 ) THE point in focus has shrunk down to a narrow compass but it involves a very interesting question relating to the interpretation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Court is confronted with the question as to whether the plaintiffs-landlords are eligible to claim benefit of the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Limitation Act The Trial Court has refused to give such protection and benefit to the plaintiffs It appears from the plain perusal of the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Limitation Act while viewed in the light of the factual set up of the present case that the Trial Court has committed serious error ( 8 ) AT this juncture admitted facts may be mentioned (1) The plaintiffs are landlords (2) The defendants are tenants (3) Demised premises are consisted of agricultural lands bearing Revenue S. Nos. 70 and 71 admeasuring 5104 sq. yds. which are let to the defendants on the monthly rent of Rs. 383/ (4) Defendants had executed rent note (5) Plaintiffs had filed Special Civil Suit No. 136 on 3-10-1970 which was partly decreed and partly dismissed on 29-9-1973 (6) The earlier suit was for arrears of rent possession and mesne profit from the date of the suit till the date of the suit (7) The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to decree for possession and resultant decree for mesne profit from the date of the suit in absence of valid and legal notice (8) In the earlier suit Issue No. 2 was pertaining to the jurisdiction and it was held by the court that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit (9) Issue No. 13 in the earlier suit was related to the validity and legality of the notice and the Trial Court found that tenancy was not determined by a valid and legal notice (10) The suit under appeal came to be filed on 29 which came to be disposed of by the Trial Court on 27-4-1977. ( 9 ) THE dispute is relating to the right of the plaintiffs to recover the rent from 1-10-1970 to 21 The Trial Court decreed the suit partly for an amount of Rs. 13 788 towards the arrears of rent from 1-4-72 to 29-4-1975 The plaintiffs claimed an amount of Rs. 20 682 by way of arrears of rent Thus the Trial Court disallowed the claim of Rs. 6894. 13 788 towards the arrears of rent from 1-4-72 to 29-4-1975 The plaintiffs claimed an amount of Rs. 20 682 by way of arrears of rent Thus the Trial Court disallowed the claim of Rs. 6894. 00 being the arrears of rent for the period from 1-10-70 to 24 ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants/original plaintiffs has raised a contention that the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Limitation Act. This contention is seriously repelled by the learned Counsel for the respondents defendants ( 11 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid submission it would be necessary at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act Section 14 (1) of the Limitation Act reads as under:14 Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction: (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision against the defendant shall be excluded where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it. ( 12 ) IN order to attract the application of this section of the Limitation Act three conditions must co-exist (1) The plaintiff must have been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision against the defendant (2) Two proceedings must have been for the purpose of obtaining same relief and both must have been related to same matter in issue (3) The cause must have been prosecuted in good faith in a court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain itif these conditions are satisfied the period spent by the plaintiff in a court shall be excluded ( 13 ) THE underlying object of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits but failing through the court being unable to give him such a trial. It is clear from the plain perusal of the aforesaid section that the principle is clearly applicable not only to the cases in which a man brings his suit in the court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings the suit in a wrong court in consequence of a bona fide mistake of law or defect of procedure Thus a litigant should not be deprived of his rights by reason of the applicability of the law of limitation when he is diligently and bona fide proceeding to obtain the redress in a higher court also Undoubtedly thus the purport of the legislature in enacting these provisions seems to be not to punish a litigant for mistake of procedure which had been made on wrong advice Therefore the ultimate design of these provisions under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is that the party should be protected where a prior bona fide proceeding proved abortive by reason of want of jurisdiction or some similar cause of like nature ( 14 ) IN the background of the aforesaid factual aspect and legal set-up it will be expedient to examine the contentions raised before this Court in this appeal learned counsel for the respondents/defendants has firstly contended that the subject-matter of both the suits i e Special Civil Suit No. 136 of 1970 and Special Civil Suit No. 84 of 1975 cannot be said to be one and identical It is true that in the earlier suit the plaintiffs claimed mesne profit from the date of the suit till the date of possession as tenancy was terminated before filing the said suit In the subsequent suit arrears of rent have been claimed The period is common in both the suits But the nature of relief is said to be different In fact this contention may be prima facie subtle but not sustainable In reality the subject-matter in both the suits cannot be said to be different The Trial Court in the earlier suit found the notice terminating the tenancy as invalid and illegal and therefore the relief for possession and mesne profit from the date of the suit had been rejected. As the plaintiffs had terminated the tenancy they had claimed mesne profit from the date of the suit. In the subsequent suit under appeal the plaintiffs have claimed arrears of rent for the same period. As the plaintiffs had terminated the tenancy they had claimed mesne profit from the date of the suit. In the subsequent suit under appeal the plaintiffs have claimed arrears of rent for the same period. A different nomenclature in both the suits would not in reality remotely even indicate the subject- matters in both the suits were different. The two proceedings have been for the purpose of obtaining the same relief and they are related to the same matter. Therefore the first contention deserves rejection. ( 15 ) THE second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the defendants is that the plaintiffs have not proved to have exercised due diligence in the suit under appeal. It appears without any shadow of doubt from the plain perusal of Section 14 of the Limitation Act that in order to earn the benefit of the said section the plaintiff has to show that he was prosecuting the earlier civil proceedings with due diligence There is nothing on record to show that there was want of diligence on the part of the plaintiffs in prosecuting the earlier civil proceeding. There is also no any evidence worth the candle to show that the same proceedings were not prosecuted in good faith. In fact from the evidence on record it appears that the plaintiffs had been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding (in earlier suit) and in good faith. The plaintiffs as such are the trustees of a registered Trust and in capacity of landlords they had filed the suit for arrears of rent and possession so also mesne profit. It cannot be contended for a moment in the light of the facts of the present case that there was lack of diligence or bona fide in prosecuting the earlier civil proceeding. It is true that the earlier suit came to be disposed of on 29-9-1973 and the subsequent suit came to be filed on 29-4-1975. However merely on this aspect of delay of one year and seven months it cannot be contended that there was no diligence or good faith in prosecuting that civil proceeding in so far as the plaintiffs are concerned. The Trial Court has committed a seriously error in holding that the plaintiffs did not move the court for a period of one year and seven months and allowed to pass the time without assigning any reason. The Trial Court has committed a seriously error in holding that the plaintiffs did not move the court for a period of one year and seven months and allowed to pass the time without assigning any reason. Prima facie it may be true that the plaintiffs have not explained the delay in filing the subsequent suit late. However relying on this it cannot be contended that the plaintiff had not exercised due diligence and good faith in prosecuting the civil proceedings in the first suit. The mandate of the Section is in computing the period of limitation for any suit the time which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it. ( 16 ) FROM the words of Section 14 of the Limitation Act it is evident that before the plaintiff can get the benefit of this Section he will have to show that he was prosecuting the proceeding in good faith. Good faith has been defined in Section 3 (20) of the General Clauses Act 1897 Section 3 (20) of the General Clauses Act reads as under:a thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or not. Section 2 (h) of the Limitation Act however provides that- nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention ( 17 ) IT is true that the standard of good faith laid down in the Limitation Act is much higher From the evidence on record it cannot be said that the plaintiffs had not acted with care and attention in prosecuting the proceeding in the earlier suit It is an admitted fact that the relief which is claimed by the plaintiffs in the suit under appeal has not arisen during the period of one year and seven months during which the first suit came to be disposed of and the second suit came to be instituted Therefore on both these counts the second contention is also meritless. ( 18 ) THE third limb of submission raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents /defendants is that there is no technical defect like defect of jurisdiction In that it is contended that the refusal of the relief for mesne profit from the date of the suit till decision in the first suit was on the ground of invalid and illegal notice of termination of tenancy Thus it is forcefully contended that the illegality or invalidity of the notice determining the tenancy cannot be said to be a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature. Prima facie this submission would be captivating but not acceptable It must be noted that the defects which are attracted by the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not merely jurisdictional but other causes of like nature The defect must have been the effect of barring the court from entertaining the suit or any other relief Any circumstance legal or factual which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the court the dispute on merit would undoubtedly fall within the ambit of this Section To put it shortly the defect must be of such a nature so as to make it impossible for the court to entertain the earlier suit or application either in its inception or other events as to prevent it from deciding it on merits learned Counsel for the defendants / respondents has placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue UP. reported in AIR 1985 SC 39 . This decision of the Apex Court is inapplicable to the present case In Zafar Khans case (supra) it was found on facts that the previous proceedings did not fail on account of defect of jurisdiction or any other cause of like nature The matter was disposed of on merits In the present case the relief which came to be refused in the earlier suit was not decided on merits. ( 19 ) IT is an admitted fact that the issue of grant of mesne profit in the earlier suit was decided against the plaintiffs on account of the invalidity of the notice determining the tenancy It cannot be said that the earlier suit was altogether misconceived The plaintiffs claim for mesne profit had not been gone into or investigated into in that suit because the court considered that the court was not competent to grant the relief of mesne profit as claimed in the said suit for want of legal and valid notice determining the tenancy It cannot be contended even for a moment that there was adjudication of the suit claim on merits. A copy of the judgment in the earlier suit is produced on the records of the present case at Ex. 35/2 Merely because there was no legal and valid notice the court in earlier suit was not competent to pass decree for possession and the resultant mesne profit from the date of the suit Thus invalidity and illegality of the notice under the rent legislation prevented the Trial Court in the first suit to decide the issue of mesne profit on merits and this defect was of a nature which was to be decided before the merits of the claim could be adjudicated upon As the notice was defective relief of mesne profit was rejected. The Trial Court in the earlier suit was called upon to decide whether the claim relating to the mesne profit was at all entertainable on the frame of the suit and it reached to the conclusion that the court was not competent to pass decree for mesne profit in the suit as the notice was defective and invalid. Thus it is amply clear that the defect was of the nature which was to be decided before the merits of the claim could be analysed and examined in order nor did any occasion or necessity arise of going into or appreciating the merits of the claim relating to mesne profit. ( 20 ) IN the case of India Electric Works v. James Mantosh reported in AIR 1971 SC 2313 it has been held that in a money suit for recovery of damages for illegal occupation a decree had been passed by the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff for the entire claim including the claim for future damages. ( 20 ) IN the case of India Electric Works v. James Mantosh reported in AIR 1971 SC 2313 it has been held that in a money suit for recovery of damages for illegal occupation a decree had been passed by the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff for the entire claim including the claim for future damages. The High Court in appeal negatived the claim for future damages on the ground that no decree could be granted for recovery of compensation after the date of the suit or after the date of the decree in a pure money suit. The plaintiff thereafter filed a suit for damages for the period subsequent to period covered by the earlier suit. For the period beyond three years of the suit protection from limitation was claimed under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and on the general principles of suspension of limitation owing to the tendency of earlier suit. On the question whether the Trial Court was unable to entertain the earlier suit from other cause of a like nature the Supreme Court held that the defect was of a nature which had to be decided before the merits of the claim could be adjudicated upon and it cannot be said that there was a decision on merits. The ratio of the said decision is attracted with all forces to the facts of the present case. Therefore the contention that invalidity or illegality of the notice cannot be said to be a cause of like nature as prescribed in Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be sustained. The relief relating to the claim of mesne profit came to be refused in the earlier suit for want of legal and valid notice. It is a circumstance which inhibited entertainment or adjudication by the court all the dispute on merits and therefore it comes within the scope of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Any aspect legal or factual which operates as an impediment in entertaining or adjudicating all the dispute on merits by the court will fall within the scope of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. This view is fully reinforced by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Roshanlal v. R. B. Mohan Singh Oberai reported in AIR 1975 SC 824 . . This view is fully reinforced by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Roshanlal v. R. B. Mohan Singh Oberai reported in AIR 1975 SC 824 . . ( 21 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances enumerated hereinbefore and keeping in mind the underlying spirit of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. All the conditions prescribed in this Section are fully satisfied. The Trial Court has committed grave error in refusing to afford the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the plaintiffs while refusing the relief of recovery of the amount of ar rears of rent during the period from 1-10-1970 to 29 The plaintiffs are entitled to exclusion of time of proceedings spend in civil proceedings in earlier suit by invoking the aids of the provisions of Section 14 (1) read with explanation (c) of the Limitation Act. The Trial Court ought to have decreed the entire claim of the plaintiffs. The Trial Court has only decreed the amount being the ar rears of rent from 1 to 24-7-1975 and has committed serious error in refusing the claim amount towards the arrears of rent from 1-10-1970 to 29-4-1972. In the opinion of this court the plaintiffs are entitled to full decree as claimed with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the suit till realisation with proportionate costs. The appellants/original plaintiffs have claimed Rs. 6894/ - towards the arrears of rent with interest. In the facts of the present case the appeal is required to be allowed. ( 22 ) IN the result the appeal is allowed. The suit is decreed in full The respondents /defendants shall pay an amount of Rs. 6894. 00 to the plaintiffs with running interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of the suit till realisation thereof with costs all throughout. Decree shall be drawn accordingly. (ISS) Order accordingly .