JUDGMENT : G.B. Pattnaik, J. - In these two appeals while the application for interim direction had been listed for orders, the learned single judge being of the opinion that the High Court has no power to pass any order either by way of appointment of receiver or injunction during the penency of the Second Appeal in this Court in view of Sub-section (3) of sec 74 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act (hereinaftei to as the Act') referred the matter for decision of a larger Bench as another learned single Judge in Misc. Case No. 177/90 arising out of Misc. Appeal No. 88/90 had taken the view that the High Court has the power to grant such interim relief. The question that arises for consideration therefore, is that whether during the pendency of an appeal in the High Court under Sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Act against an order of the Commissioner in exercise of power under Sub-section (1) of Section 44, the High Court can pass any interim order by way of appointment of receiver or injunction because of the embargo contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 74 of the Act. For better appreciation of the point in issue. Section 44 and Sub-section (3) of Section 74 are quoted hereinbelow in extenso : "Section 44 (1) : Any person aggrieved by any order passed by the Assistant Commissioner u/s 41 or Sub-Sections (1) and (6) of Section 42 or Section 43, may, within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order u/s 41 or Section 43 or from the date of the publication of the order u/s 42, as the case may be, appeal to the Commissioner. (2) Any party aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner under Sub-section (1J or under Sub-section (1) or (6) of Section 42 may appeal to the High Court within thirty days from the date of the order of publication therreof, as the case may be." "Section 74 (3) : The Court hearing an appeal from the order of the Commissioner may direct further enquiry or modify or set aside such order as the Court may deem fit and unless the appeal is summarily dismissed the Commissioner shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the order passed by him is interfered with in any manner : provided that the operation of the order of the Commissioner shall not be stayed pending the disposal of the appeal." 2. A bare perusal of Section 44 (1) of the Act indicates that an appeal lies to the Commissioner against any order passed u/s 41 or Sub-section (1) and (6) of Section 42 or Section 43 and a Second Appeal lies to the High Court under Sub-section (2) of Section 44 against the appellate order of the Commissioner passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 44. Section 74 of the Act deals with procedure at enquiries and appeals and under SubSection (3) of Section 74, the Court has been given the power to direct further enquiry or modify or set aside such order as the Court may deem fit and if the appeal is not dismissed summarily, then the Commissioner will be given an opportunity of being heard before the final order is passed. Proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 74, however, puts an embargo on the Second appellate authority to the effect that the operation of the order of the Commissioner shall not be stayed during the pendency of the appeal. Our brother Justices. C. Mohapatra, J. while referring the matter to a larger Bench has entertained a view that in view of the restriction on the power of this Court with regard to the granting of any stay of the Commissioner's order, the Court will not be justified in passing an order for appointment of receiver or injunction which would have the effect of staying the operation of the order of the Commissioner and, therefore, disagreed with the view expressed by our brother Jagdeb Roy, J., in Misc. Case No. 177/90. Case No. 177/90. Justice Mohapatra, however,has not given any detailed reasonings for his disagreement but all the same referred the matter for decision of a larger Bench as this question would crop up in all Second Appeals before the High Court where the appeals are directed to this Court under Sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Act. The power of the High Court in an appeal under Sub-section (2) of Section 44 is very wide and is in general terms. The appeal can be both on facts and on law and though it is a Second Appeal against the appellate order of the Commissioner but the restrictions contained in Section 100 C. P. C. would not apply. 3. The Supreme Court in the case of (Sadasib Prakash Brahmchari, Trustee of Mahiparakash Math etc. v. The State of Orissa etc.) ( AIR 1956 SC 432 ) white considering the constitutional validity of several provisions of the Act including Sections 44(2) and 74(3) thereof came to the conclusion that the right of appeal is given in very wide and general terms. Obviously the appeal can be both on facts and on law and would relate not merely to the merits of the scheme but also to all basic matters whose determination is implicit in the very framing of a scheme. Applying their mind to the provisions contained in Section 74(3) of the Act it was observed that though by virtue of the said provision operation of the order of the Commissioner framing a scheme is not to be stayed pending disposal of the appeal but that by itself cannot be taken to be an unreasonable restriction. They cannot, there- fore, be any two opinions on the question that the order of the Commissioner cannot be stayed during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. But when an application for appointment of receiver is made and a receiver is appointed of an application for injunction is filed and certain prohibitory orders are passed, does it amount to staying the operation of the order of the lower Court and that is the question which we have to answer. 4. A receiver when appointed in any proceeding is an officer of the Court and the possession of the receiver in law amounts to possession of the Court itself. 4. A receiver when appointed in any proceeding is an officer of the Court and the possession of the receiver in law amounts to possession of the Court itself. A Court appoints a receiver when it thinks that it would be just and convenient to appoint such receiver. The power is a discretionary one and the discretion has to be exercised according to well established legal principles. A receiver is appointed to protect the property from destruction or damage. Appointment of receiver in respect of the disputed property does not amount to stay of the order of the Commissioner. Similar when an application for injunction is filed to restrain the unauthorised interference of somebody, the appellate Court if satisfied with regard to the necessity of passing an order of injunction, it can pass an order of injunction so long as the order does not in effect amount to staying the order of the Commissioner. While, therefore, the statute prohibits against passing any order of stay of the Commissioner's order and, therefore, the High Court will not be justified in staying the said order but during the pendency of the Second Appeal, in appropriate facts and circumstances of a given case the High Court can pass an order either appointing receiver or passing an order of injunction so long as such order does not amount to staying the operation of the order of the Commissioner. Such power of appointment of receiver and order of injunction must be held to be there with the High Court while exercising the power of Second appellate authority as otherwise the property in question may be damaged or destroyed during the pendency of the Second Appeal and yet the second appellate authority would not be in a position to save the same. The question has been considered by the Madras High Court in the case of Muthuswami Gurukul v. Ayyasami Theyan and Ors. (1985)(I)MLJ 256]. The question that arose in the aforesaid case was that in view of the provisions contained in Section 62(1) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act imposing the ban of staying the order of the Commissioner whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant any interim relief by way of injunction. (1985)(I)MLJ 256]. The question that arose in the aforesaid case was that in view of the provisions contained in Section 62(1) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act imposing the ban of staying the order of the Commissioner whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant any interim relief by way of injunction. The learned Judges after discussing the purpose and object for which an order of injunction is passed and considering the language used in Section 62(1) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act came to hold that the ban imposed by Section 62(1) of the Madras Act can be applied only to the extent warranted by the language of that statutory provisions and, therefore, in a suit instituted under See. 62(1) of the Act, the Civil Court will have the jurisdiction to grant the interim relief by way of injunction. The aforesaid decision would apply to the power of the High Court in Second Appeal against the appellate order of the Commissioner under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act. We would, therefore, answer the question posed by the learned single Judge to the effect that the High Court has the jurisdiction to pass an interim order by way of appointment of receiver or injunction so long as the said order does not have the effect of staying the operation of the order of the Commissioner. Whether in a particular case a receiver would be appointed or an order of injunction would be granted would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and further whether there is any justification for passing such order. The cases may now be posted before the learned single Judge who will decide as to whether it would be just and convenient to pass any interim order or not. A. Pasayat, J. 5. I agree.