JUDGMENT D.S. Sinha 1. By means of this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Ganganath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Moti Lal Nehru Park, Allahabad, the petitioner seeks to assail the validity of the award of the Labour Court, Allahabad dated 23rd/26th April, 1982, rendered in Adjudication Case No. 154 of 1989 and a copy whereof is to be found as Annexure-10 to the petition. 2. Madan Lal, the respondent no. 1, worked with the petitioner as a part time sweeper during the period between 1st February, 1970 and 31st October, 1975. Thereafter, he worked as a full-time sweeper on daily wages during the period between 1st November, 1975 and 36th May, 1977. With effect from 30th May, 1977 he started functioning as a wholetime employee of the petitioner till his services were terminated by means of the order dated 4th July, 1979. This led to a reference by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the respondent no. 3, to the Labour Court, Allahabad, the respondent no. 2, under section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter called the Act. The contention on behalf of the respondent no. 1 was that neither any notice nor pay in lieu of the notice nor retrenchment compensation was given to him. Thus the provisions of section 6-N of the Act were violated. The petitioner did not dispute the non-compliance of the provisions of section 6-N of the Act. However, it tried to resist the case of the petitioner by asserting that it was not an industry amenable to the provisions of the Act, and that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction. 3. The Labour Court rejected the submissions of the petitioner. After rejecting the submissions with regard to amenability to the provisions of the Act and lack of Jurisdiction, the Labour Court considered the case on merits and came to the conclusion that the termination of the respondent no. 1 was bad as it was not brought about after complying the mandatory requirements of provisions of section 6-N of the Act. The Labour Court, therefore, rendered the impugned award directing the petitioner to reinstate the respondent no. 1 and grant continuity of service alongwith other benefits. 4. Heard Sri Rakesh Dwivdl, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri K. P. Agarwal learned Senior Advocate, representing the respondent no. 1, at length and in detail. The Labour Court, therefore, rendered the impugned award directing the petitioner to reinstate the respondent no. 1 and grant continuity of service alongwith other benefits. 4. Heard Sri Rakesh Dwivdl, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri K. P. Agarwal learned Senior Advocate, representing the respondent no. 1, at length and in detail. Sri Dwivdi, learned counsel for the petitioner, tenders the following two submissions for consideration of this Court ; (a) that the impugned award is totally without jurisdiction in as much as the dispute was not an industrial dispute as envisaged by the Act ; and (b) that, in any case, the finding of the Labour Court that there has been violation of section 6-N of the Act is wholly erroneous. 5. To buttress the first submission, Sri Dwivedi relies upon the provisions of Clause (1) of section 2 of the Act. He contends that the industrial activity carried on by the petitioner is carried on under the authority of the Central Government and as such it will not be covered by the expression 'Industrial Dispute' defined by clause (1) of section 2 of the Act. S. Clause (1) of section 2 of the Act excludes from the purview of the expression "Industrial Dispute" every industrial dispute concerning any Industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. Undoubtedly, if it is a fact that the industrial activity carried on by the petitioner is carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, as contended by the learned counsel, the provisions of the Act would not be attracted. But, then the question as to whether the Industrial activity carried on by the petitioner is, in fact, being carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government cannot be decided without cogent and convincing evidence. On the material before the Court it cannot authoritatively be held that the industrial activity of the petitioner is, in tact, being carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. This apart, the objection is being taken for the first time before this Court. It was neither pleaded nor raised before the Labour Court. For all these reasons, the first submission raised on behalf of the petitioner deserves to be rejected and it is so rejected. 6. This apart, the objection is being taken for the first time before this Court. It was neither pleaded nor raised before the Labour Court. For all these reasons, the first submission raised on behalf of the petitioner deserves to be rejected and it is so rejected. 6. Now comes the second submission of the petitioner with regard to the finding of the Labour Court about the violation of the provisions of section 6-N of the Act. It is not disputed that the respondent no. 1 continuously worked with the petitioner during the period between 1st February, 1970, and 4th July, 1979, firstly as a part-time sweeper, then as a whole-time sweeper on dally wages and thereafter as a full-time employee on monthly salary. It is also not in dispute that before the order of termination dated 4th July, 1979 was passed neither a notice nor pay in lieu thereof nor any retrenchment compensation was paid to the respondent. In these circumstances, the finding of the Labour Court that there was violation of the provisions of section 6-N of the Act is prefect and no umbrage can be taken. However, Sri Dwivedi contends that in view of the fact that simultaneously at the time of passing of the Impugned order of termination the respondent no. 1 was offered employment on daily wage basis the termination brought about by the order dated 4th July, 1979 would not amount to retrenchment as there was no cessation of relationship of master and servant between the respondent no. 1 and the petitioner, rather it was attempted to be continued but was deliberately frustrated by the respondent no. 1 on account of his refusal to accept the offer. The contention of Sri Dwivedi is utterely misconceived. The order dated 4th July, 1979 instantaneously snapped the relationship of employee and employer between the respondent no. 1 and the petitioner and amounted to retrenchment contemplated in clause (S) of section 2 of the Act. The alleged offer of alternative employment would not have the effect of diluting the fatal infirmity in the retrenchment caused by the Impugned order of termination. The offer of alternative employment cannot exclude the termination from the ambit of the expression "retrenchment" envisaged in clause (S) of section 2 of the Act. 7. In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.