JUDGMENT K.T. Thomas, J. 1. The two questions raised in this Original Petition are (1) whether q fourth respondent is competent to file revision against grant of variation of a stage carriage permit; (2) is it necessary that Regional Transport Authority should give reasons for granting such variation. 2. Facts: Petitioner was operating stage carriage service on the route Thayyur - Thrissur via. Kunnamkulam and Kechery, for which he has a regular stage carriage permit. He applied for a small variation in respect of the route by curtailing a portion and diverting it at another portion. By this variation, no change in the trips, timings or mileage is involved. The matter came up for consideration before the Regional Transport Authority, Thrissur (for short the Transport Authority') in the meeting held on 3-12-1991 and then no body objected. The Transport Authority passed the following order "Heard the applicant. Variation granted''. Fourth respondent, who is another operator of bus service on the route Thayyur - Thrissur, filed a revision under S.90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act') before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal'). His competence to file the application for revision was questioned by the petitioner, but the Appellate Tribunal held that he Ss competent on the premise that he is an aggrieved person. However, Appellate Tribunal set aside Transport Authority's order on the ground that it is "a non speaking order" and directed the Transport Authority to reconsider the matter afresh. Ext. P6 is the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal. This Original Petition filed under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution is in challenge of Ext. P6. 3. The revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal can be invoked only when an application is filed in that behalf by a person aggrieved. It is true that under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the old Act') revisional power could be exercised either on application or on its own motion. Corresponding provision of the new Act is S.90 which made a slight change that such revisional powers can be exercised only an application made to it. Proviso to S.90 of the new Act says that Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of the Transport Authority unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order. Proviso to S.90 of the new Act says that Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of the Transport Authority unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order. The proviso, thus, makes the position abundantly clear that no suo motu revision is envisaged and that the person who invokes revisional powers must be "a person aggrieved" by the order. 4. The contention here is that since fourth respondent did not raise any objection before the Transport Authority or make any representation against the grant applied for, he cannot be regarded as a person aggrieved. As per the scheme of the new Act, no special facility is created for any person to make representation against the grant of an application. Under the old Act, on receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit, the Transport Authority was obliged to make the application, available for inspection by others interested and also to publish the substance thereof inviting representations and to inform the time and place at which such representation would be considered. The procedure for consideration of such representation was laid down in S.57 of the old Act. The corresponding provision in the new Act (S.80) does not provide for any representation 5. Even under the old Act, with all provisions enabling Interested persons to raise objections, different High Courts have adopted differing views on the consequences of not raising objections or representations at the first stage of consideration. It was held in Hardutt Singh v. S. T. Authority (AIR 1967 Rajasthan 208) that where a party has not chosen to file objections against applications for permit, revisional authority could decline to exercise jurisdiction. But Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jesram v. S.T. Authority (AIR 1961 M.P.81) took a different view by holding that failure of a person making representation would not disentitle him to invoke revisional jurisdiction. Rajasthan High Court again considered this question in Bherulal v. S. T. A.T. Rajasthan (AIR 1977 Rajasthan 29) and doubted soundness of the principle that a party who could file an appeal could be allowed to file a revision. I do not think that it is correct to hold that a party who did not raise objections at the time of consideration cannot be regarded as a person aggrieved for the purpose of moving for revision. 6. I do not think that it is correct to hold that a party who did not raise objections at the time of consideration cannot be regarded as a person aggrieved for the purpose of moving for revision. 6. The term "aggrieved person" is not defined in the Act. Nor is there any indication of the kind of grievance which may qualify a person to complain. Mere fanciful or sentimental grievance would not suffice. It must be such a grievance as the law can recognise or appreciate. It can approximately be termed as legal grievance and not a stat pro ratione voluntas. Quoting Earl of Reading, C. J. in Rex v. Richmond (1921-1 KB 248) and also Lord Alverstone, C. J. in Rex v. Groom (1901-2 K. B. 157), Rajamannar, C. J. speaking for the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has observed in S. M. Transport v. R & Raman ( AIR 1961 Mad. 180 ) that the true principle was to determine whether the applicant had an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law being wrongly administered. It was a case under the old Motor Vehicles Act. The dictum was profitably followed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Thiruvengadam v. Muthu Chettiar ( AIR 1970 Mad. 34 ) and a wider connotation was afforded for the expression "aggrieved person". If a person has a particular or special interest in the subject matter supposed to be wrongly decided, apart from the general interest as a member of the public, such person can be treated as an aggrieved person, according to the Division Bench. 7. Here the fourth respondent, who filed the revision petition, is admittedly an operator on the same route. He can legitimately feel aggrieved by a change or variation of the stage carriage service operated by another permit holder on the route, if such change or variation affects his service. In view of this, I am inclined to hold that fourth respondent is competent to file the application for revision. 8. The next question is whether Transport Authority should have given reasons for granting the permit. In view of this, I am inclined to hold that fourth respondent is competent to file the application for revision. 8. The next question is whether Transport Authority should have given reasons for granting the permit. S.80(3) of the new Act says that if the variation applied for relates to any of the matters enumerated in the sub-section, the application shall be treated as one made for the grant of a new permit, except when the application is to increase the frequency of a singular service on the route. In all other cases the Transport Authority shall consider the application in the same manner as it considers an application for the grant of a new permit. Second proviso to sub-s.(3) which imposes some restrictions on the Transport Authority while considering such application reads thus : "Provided further that, (i) in the case of variation, the termini shall not be altered and the distance covered by the variation shall not exceed twenty four kilometres; (ii) In the case of extension, the distance covered by extension shall not exceed twenty four kilometres from the termini, and any such variation or extension within such limits shall be made only after A the transport authority is satisfied that such variation will serve the convenience of the public and that it is not expedient to grant a separate permit in respect of the original route as so varied or extended or any part thereof." The termini rule or twenty four kilometres distance rule (referred to in the sub-section) does not apply to this case. But Transport Authority can grant variation only if it is "satisfied" that (1) such variation will serve the convenience of the public and (2) It is not expedient to grant a separate permit In respect of the original route as so varied or extended. Satisfaction envisaged in the section is not subjective satisfaction. Objectivity is the hallmark of, such satisfaction. A statutory functionary conferred with power to pass orders has to act bona fide and reasonably (vide Halsbury (3rd Edition) Vol. 30 at page 688 - Para.1327 also In Remana v. I. A. Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). As satisfaction envisaged in the provision must reflect in the order or proceedings or at least in the minutes of the proceedings, Transport Authority cannot conceal the reasons for reaching satisfaction. If reasons remain undisclosed. 30 at page 688 - Para.1327 also In Remana v. I. A. Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). As satisfaction envisaged in the provision must reflect in the order or proceedings or at least in the minutes of the proceedings, Transport Authority cannot conceal the reasons for reaching satisfaction. If reasons remain undisclosed. It is not possible for supervisory or appellate authorities to discern whether objective satisfaction was arrived at. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner Invited my attention to the decision in M. S. R. T. Corporation v. B. R. M. Service ( AIR 1969 SC 329 ) in which a Transport Authority granted permit to some applicants through the order which at the first instance was oral and no reasons were Immediately given, but in a subsequent letter detailed reasons were given. The following observations in the said decision were read out by the learned counsel in support of the argument: "Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rules either expressly or by necessary implication we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Phadke that there is any general principle that a statutory tribunal should always give its judgment in writing and should always give reasons thereof immediately with the pronouncement of the judgment". In spite of the said observations the Supreme Court decided the case like this: "We are therefore of the opinion that in the absence of any statutory provision there is nothing wrong in principle if an administrative tribunal gives a decision orally and subsequently reduces to writing the reasons thereof and communicates It to the parties". Thus, the said decision cannot be understood as laying down a proposition that quasi judicial functionaries need not disclose reasons for the orders passed. 10. Learned counsel also referred me to the observations of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. E. G. Nambudiri ( 1991 (2) LLJ 594 ). "But the principles of natural justice do not require the administrative authority to record reasons for its decision as there is no general rule that reasons must be given for administrative decision. Order of an administrative authority which has no statutory or implied duty to state reasons or the grounds of its decision is not rendered illegal merely on account of absence of reasons. It has never been a principle of natural justice that, reasons should be given for decisions". Order of an administrative authority which has no statutory or implied duty to state reasons or the grounds of its decision is not rendered illegal merely on account of absence of reasons. It has never been a principle of natural justice that, reasons should be given for decisions". The facts of the said case stand on its own. One government officer made certain adverse remarks about his subordinate and the latter made representation against those remarks. Government rejected the representation in regard to some of the remarks without assigning any reason. Supreme Court decided the case on those facts and observed further that "though the principles of natural justice do not require reasons for decision, there is necessity for giving reasons in view of the expanding law of judicial review to enable the citizens to discover the reasoning behind the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review. Under our Constitution, an administrative decision is subjected to judicial review if it affects the rights of a citizen. It is therefore desirable that reasons should be stated". A closer reading of the said decision would, thus, show that obligation to state reasons for an order is not dispensed with even for an administrative order if it affects the rights of another person. Obligation is greater, when a quasi judicial functionary passes the order, particularly when the order is liable to be challenged in appeal or revision. 11. The view of the Appellate Tribunal that the order impugned before it is bereft of reasons, therefore, does not warrant any interference. I dismiss this Original Petition without any order as to costs.