A. N. RAY, J. ( 1 ) IN this suit the plaintiff claims for possession of the two separate portions of premises No. 83/1, Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta by reason of expiry of the demised terms. ( 2 ) THE brief of documents in this case was marked by consent of parties as Ext. A. The first document in Ext. A is a copy of lease dated 6/05/1966 by way of which one portion of the said premises was demised for a term of 21 years. The term was agreed to commence from the 1st of July 1966 and was due to expire with the expiry of the 30/06/1977. It cannot be disputed that on the day this lease was executed, it was outside the purview of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER on the 5/03/1969, the parties executed two other Deeds - both of which are registered. These two deeds of the same date form documents 2 and 3 of Ext. A. Manmatha Krishna Mitra, the plaintiff, who came to give evidence, even though he was 88 years old, said that he did not remember which of the two deeds was executed first. But the only way to give a meaningful interpretation to the two deeds would be that. the second document in Ext. A was executed prior to the third. ( 4 ) THE said second document in Ext. A is another lease dated 5/03/1969 in respect of one shop room which was previously occupied by one M/s. Ganguly and Co. This lease was for a period of 19 years and was agreed to commence from the 1st of July 1968. Parties thus agreed that the duration of both of the aforesaid leases of 1966 and 1969 were to run out simultaneously, i. e. , with the expiry of 30/06/1987. ( 5 ) NEXT on the 5th March, the deed of consolidation was executed which was also a registered deed. The main issue in this suit is whether by reason of the said deed of consolidation, the two earlier tenancies were consolidated into one or whether the two earlier tenancies continued to be separate and running concurrently for the two different terms of 21 years and 19 years respectively. The main issue in this suit is whether by reason of the said deed of consolidation, the two earlier tenancies were consolidated into one or whether the two earlier tenancies continued to be separate and running concurrently for the two different terms of 21 years and 19 years respectively. ( 6 ) THE crucial importance of determination of this point lies in the fact that though a lease for 21 years would be outside the purview of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, a lease for 19 years would not be outside the scope of the said Act. Mr. Bachawat for the plaintiff has pressed before me for eviction and a decree for possession in respect of the portion demised under the lease of 1966 for 21 years. The deed of consolidation of 5/03/1969 states in the fourth recital clause that the tenancies created by the two principal deeds of 6/05/1966 and 5/03/1969 shall be treated as one and the rents reserved thereunder shall be paid together at the aggregate sum of Rs. 3400. 00. ( 7 ) THE separate rents reserved under the two leases of 1966 and 1969 were Rs. 3000. 00 and Rs. 400. 00 respectively. The consolidation of the tenancy as well as of the rent was mentioned not only in the fourth recital clause of the deed of consolidation, but was repeated in the operative part of the said deed, in clause 2 thereof. ( 8 ) AS the entire suit turns on an interpretation of the clauses of this deed of consolidation, I set out below clauses 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the said Deed :"l. The lessee shall close the entrance from the main gate and also remove all advertisement boards and other fittings fixed on the walls of the main gate as also in the portion inside the main gate and shall not have access through and over the passage shown and delineated in the map or plan annexed hereto in the thatchet blue colour as soon as the opening through the front portion demised under the said Indenture of lease dated 5/03/1969 are complete and being used by the lessee. 2. 2. The tenancy created under the aforesaid indenture of lease dated 6/05/1966 and indenture of lease dated February 1969 in respect of the different portions of the premises No. 83/l, Cornwallis Street (Now Bindhan Sarani) described in schedule to the said indenture of lease dated 6/05/1966 and the schedule to the said indenture of lease dated 5/03/1969 shall be deemed and considered as one tenancy and the rents payable under the aforesaid two principal deeds being the indenture of lease dated 6/05/1966 and the indenture of lease dated 5/03/1969 shall be paid together at the aggregate sum at Rs. 3400. 00 (Rupees three thousand and four hundred) being the sums reserved under the indenture of lease dated 6/05/1966 and the indenture of lease dated 5/03/1969. 3. The premises demised under the aforesaid indenture of lease dated 6/05/1966 and the said indenture of lease dated 5/03/1969 has been fully described in the schedule hereunder written and shown and delineated in the map or plan annexed hereto and marked in border with colour red and the schedule to the said two indentures of leases dated the 6/05/1966 and indenture of lease dated 5/03/1969 shall be substituted and modified by the schedule hereunder written : 5. The aforesaid indenture of lease dated 6/05/1966 and the indenture of lease dated 5/03/1969 and the covenants conditions and provisions therein contained, shall henceforth operate and have effect as if the covenants, powers and provisions herein contained have been embodied thereon and shall be altered and modified and deleted accordingly, but shall in all other respect remains in force and unaffected by these presents. "8-A. The larger area was demised in 1966 itself. The new lease of 1969 which was executed upon M/s. Ganguly and Co. vacating was in respect of a shop room indicated in the plan measuring 21' 0" X 19' 7". The first clause of deed of consolidation states that the entrance of the defendant-bank would be changed and that the old entrance shown in the blue colour in the plan would give way to a new entrance in the front portion. This would be through the portion vacated by M/s. Ganguly and Co. Clause 1 also states that the earlier main gate would be closed and advertisement boards and fittings would also be removed. This would be through the portion vacated by M/s. Ganguly and Co. Clause 1 also states that the earlier main gate would be closed and advertisement boards and fittings would also be removed. 8-B. To my mind, this first clause is an indication of consolidation of the two tenancies though it is not a conclusive indication towards that end. If the defendant at some point of time happens to lose the tenancy of the shop room measuring 21' 0" X 19' 7", it would, by reason of clause 1, be deprived of any possible entrance to the other portion of the tenancy also. Parties do not usually so arrange their affairs that a forfeiture as to one independent right would in effect render certain other bigger independent rights wholly useless. If the two tenancies are to be construed independent and separate, then it would indicate that the parties permitted this possibility to remain, that the small tenancy in the front portion could be forfeited separately, leaving the larger tenancy in tact in law, but wholly unuseable in practice, because the same would become land-locked and without entry for the bank defendant. ( 9 ) THE second clause quoted above, to my mind, is an important indication of the consolidation of the tenancy. Parties in no uncertain terms stated that there would be one tenancy. They stated so in regard to two previous tenancies one 3 years old and another not even one day old. It might be a little odd for the parties to enter into a consolidated tenancy immediately upon the execution of a fresh tenancy, incorporating the fresh tenancy in the consolidation deed itself, on the same date that the deed for the fresh tenancy itself was executed. It might be odd, but it is not contrary to law. If parties intend and say that they shall be governed by one tenancy, then so they shall be. ( 10 ) THE plaint in paragraphs 4 and 5 repeats this statement of the tenancy being one and it is said that the leases in respect of different portions would be deemed and considered as one tenancy. ( 11 ) THE consolidation of rent by itself might not be sufficient conclusively to indicate a consolidation of the tenancy itself. Mr. ( 11 ) THE consolidation of rent by itself might not be sufficient conclusively to indicate a consolidation of the tenancy itself. Mr. Bachawat has relied in this regard on the Division Bench Judgment of Mahindra and Mahindra reported in (1989) I Cal HN 1 : (AIR 1989 Cal 200 ). Indeed the case is a good authority for the proposition that change of rent by even a registered instrument, would not necessarily mean that the lease itself was being changed from time to time along with the change of rent. Though rent is an essential part of a lease, yet change of rent does not necessarily change the lease itself. It should be borne in mind that a lease is a transfer of property and the right to obtain rent is a contractual right. Breach of such a contract might ultimately have effect on the rights and liabilities in relation to the property itself, but a variation in regard to the contractual term alone does not necessarily change the incident of the transfer of property itself, parties might change a written agreement to pay rent by another written agreement, but to change the lease, normally a registered instrument would be needed, unless it is within the possible low value or low term exceptions. ( 12 ) IN this case, however, there is no change of rent but that there is a consolidation of rent. Such consolidation is again an indication of the intention of the parties to consolidate the tenancy but is not conclusive in the matter. If parties merely consolidate the rent and leave the tenancy apart, then the major result would be that non-payment of any part of the rent would render the lessee liable to action in respect of both parts of the leased premises. If, on the other hand, the tenancies themselves are consolidated, then any other breach apart from non-payment of rent with regard to any portion of the consolidated property would render the lessee liable for action in respect of the whole of the demised premises. ( 13 ) REGARDING the third clause contained in the said deed of consolidation, it should be noticed that the deed of consolidation contains a schedule describing and delineating the entire portion of the premises demised and states that such schedule is to be taken as incorporated in the two earlier leases dated 6-5-66 and 5-3-69. ( 13 ) REGARDING the third clause contained in the said deed of consolidation, it should be noticed that the deed of consolidation contains a schedule describing and delineating the entire portion of the premises demised and states that such schedule is to be taken as incorporated in the two earlier leases dated 6-5-66 and 5-3-69. The only indication therefrom can be this, that the parties intended the entire property to be treated as one and indivisible in regard to the leasehold rights. The combined terms and effect of the agreements dated 6/05/1966 and the two agreements dated 5/03/1969 would govern the rights of parties in relation to the entirety of the demised portion of the premises, after the execution and registration of the deed of consolidation. The effect is this that as from 5/03/1969, there is one lease in respect of entirety of the premises as shown in plan annexed to the deed of consolidation dated 5/03/1969 and as described in the schedule thereto. The transfer or assurance of property in regard to the said entirety of the demised premises takes place in the deed of consolidation itself, and this is a transfer of property, and the deed of consolidation is thus in reality a deed of lease. However, the contractual terms governing this lease are not contained in their entirety in the deed of consolidation, but are to be had on a total construction of all the three deeds mentioned above, namely the one of 6-5-66 and the two deeds of 5-3-69, but that the terms of the deed of consolidation cum lease shall prevail in case of conflict, this is because of clause 5. ( 14 ) THIS intention of the parties that the contractual terms of the two lease documents of 6-5-66 and 5-3-69 would remain operative is clear from the 5th clause of the deed of consolidation. It is stated there that the earlier terms of contract would remain but that the terms in the consolidation deed would be read as embodied therein, that is, in the two earlier deeds of 6-5-66 and 5-3-69. ( 15 ) ACCORDINGLY on the 5/03/1969, a new single tenancy came into being comprising the entire described schedule of property given in the said deed of consolidation as well as shown in the plan annexed thereto. ( 15 ) ACCORDINGLY on the 5/03/1969, a new single tenancy came into being comprising the entire described schedule of property given in the said deed of consolidation as well as shown in the plan annexed thereto. This entire property had never formed the subject-matter of any earlier lease though two separate parts of it had been leased out previously. Since the parties were entering into a compendious lease covering both the portions which had separately been earlier lease out, there is no escape from the conclusion that two earlier leases were being surrendered. There would otherwise be separate leases for the same current period in respect of the same portion of property, which cannot co-exist in law. There cannot be a lease for portions A and B together, as well as another lease again for portion B, and yet another lease again for portion A. If the consolidating lease covers portions A and B together, then the said lease automatically brings to an end the leases separately granted in respect of separate portions A and B. There is, with respect a precise statement as to the law in this regard in the 5th paragraph of the judgment in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra (AIR 1989 Cal 200) (Cal) REFERRED TO above. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act has also been REFERRED TO therein and I need not separately refer to the same again. ( 16 ) I have all the sympathy for the old man who is the plaintiff and who came to give evidence. I tried my best to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff but I am unable to do the same consistently with keeping my judicial conscience clear. Most reluctantly I come to this conclusion that the lease operative between the parties is a lease which was executed on 5/03/1969 and was to determine with the expiry of the 30/06/1987. I have also not placed much reliance on the oral answers to question as given by the plaintiff from the box though those seem to support the case of a merger of the two leases. Since the period is not outside the purview of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act the suit as framed would not be maintainable. I have also not placed much reliance on the oral answers to question as given by the plaintiff from the box though those seem to support the case of a merger of the two leases. Since the period is not outside the purview of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act the suit as framed would not be maintainable. The learned Receiver in this matter has been collecting rents from the defendant and has also been collecting money in respect of corporation rates and dues up to the month of February, 1992, the collection in the hands of the learned Receiver is Rs. 1,78,224 on account of rent and Rs. 35,424 on account of corporation rates and taxes. The learned Receiver shall hand over the said sums to the plaintiff within four weeks from date hereof. The learned Receiver was discharging her duties for the benefit of both the parties as an Officer of Court and in my opinion the defendant should pay the learned Receiver a balance remuneration of Rs. 5,000. 00. A Nationalised Bank is succeeding on a hyper-technical defence in an eviction suit where they do not have general substantial merits in regard to the claim for eviction in regard to the portion originally demised under the deed of 6/05/1966. In my opinion, the costs in this suit should not follow the result and that the defendant should pay the costs of this suit assessed at Rs. 20,000. 00. The costs and the balance remuneration of the Receiver should be paid within four weeks hereof save as aforesaid, there shall be no other decree on this suit. Order accordingly.q