S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE three petitions are between the same parties and arise from common order passed by Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal and hence they are heard and disposed of together by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE petitioner in each petition is the General Co-operative Bank Limited a duly constituted Co-operative Bank under the provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961 and it is aggrieved by the judgment and order of Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal passed in the Revision Applications No. 27 58 and 59 of 1990 dated 20/08/1990. Such order of Tribunal is challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by present petitions. ( 3 ) THE relevant facts giving to the present petitions are as under: 1 The General Co-operative Bank in the table given here under:- Lavad Case No. Amount due and payable by Respondent Nos. 1 2 and 4 Arbitration Case No. 3678 of 1985 Rs. 731. 181. 86 as on 30/11/1985 Arbitration Case No. 3679 of 1985 Rs. 74566. 86 ps. as on 30/11/1985 Arbitration Case No. 3682 of 1985 Rs. 74566. 86 ps. as on 30/11/1985 ( 4 ) THE aforesaid suits/lavad cases were filed by the petitioner against the partnership firm and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 on the allegation that the petitioner bank has advanced various amounts to the partnership firm and that subsequent thereto there was chance in the constitution of the partnership firm whereby respondent No. 4 came to be indicated as a new partner and respondent Nos. S and 6 who were initially partners in the partnership firm retired from the partnership firm. It was also stated in the plaint that the liabilities of respondent No. 1 were taken over under the deed of retirement by the continuing partners and newly inducted partner viz. respondent No. 4. It was also stated in the plaint that as per the document or retirement retiring partners - viz. respondents Nos. 5 and 6 herein were not liable to pay any amount to the petitioner bank. It was also stated in the plaint that the retiring partners have retired after settlement of account with continuing partners and as per the document and as per the last deed of partnership which was given to the bank by the partnership firm defendants Nos. 2 to 4 continued to be the partners of defendant No. 1-firm. It was also stated in the plaint that the retiring partners have retired after settlement of account with continuing partners and as per the document and as per the last deed of partnership which was given to the bank by the partnership firm defendants Nos. 2 to 4 continued to be the partners of defendant No. 1-firm. It was further averred that the original partners of defendant No. 1 firm were liable to pay the dues of the plaintiff bank and in case of need the original partners of defendant No. 1 of partnership firm shall be impleaded in the said suit and the right of the plaintiff bank to amend the suit accordingly is reserved. ( 5 ) ON service of summons of the suit which were instituted only against respondents Nos. 1 to 4 (defendants Nos. 1 to 4 in the suit) they appeared in the suit and filed their written statements. ( 6 ) THE original defendant No. 4 has filed identical written statements in all the suits and from the written statement filed by defendant No. 4 it becomes clear that he contended in his written statement that retiring Partners has obtained loans from plaintiff bank and therefore they were primarily liable to pay the amounts due and payable to the plaintiff bank and that the retiring partners were liable to be impleaded as party defendants in the suit and that deliberately they were not impleaded as party defendants by the plaintiff bank and therefore the suit of the plaintiff bank was liable to be dismissed for not impleading necessary parties. The said written statement is filed in the month of July 1987. ( 7 ) BASED on the pleadings of the parties the Board of Nominees framed the necessary issues in the month of September 1987. It appears that the Board of Nominees thereafter proceeded to record the examination-in-chief of the first witness of the plaintiff bank. Immediately thereafter before the evidence of the said witness could be completed the plaintiff bank submitted application in all the three suits under Section 99 (3) (c) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act read with Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading as party defendants Nos. Immediately thereafter before the evidence of the said witness could be completed the plaintiff bank submitted application in all the three suits under Section 99 (3) (c) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act read with Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading as party defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in every suit i. e. (1) Vasumatibehn Rameshchandra Mehta and (2) Hemalatabehn Hareshchandra and for amendment of the plaint by introducing para 3a after para 3 of the plaint. By the said paragraph the petitioner bank wanted to introduce avernments effect that the defendant No. 1 was the partnership firm of which defendants Nos. 2 to 4 are the partners and of which newly added defendants Nos. 5 and 6 were partners at the time of such transaction and therefore for the dues of the plaintiff bank they were jointly and severally liable. ( 8 ) SAID application for amendment and/or impleading respondents Nos. 5 and 6 as party defendants to the respective suit was fixed for hearing and the learned Member of the Board of Nominee vide order dated 19th of September 1989 granted the said application of the petitioner bank directing the petitioner bank to implead Vasumatibehn Rameshchandra Mehta and Hemalatabehn Hareshchandra as party defendants Nos. 5 and 6. ( 9 ) THE order passed by the Member of Board of Nominee came to be carried out and respondents Nos. 5 and 6 are impleaded as party defendant the plaint of the aforesaid three suits. Date: 27-4-1991 ( 10 ) BEING aggrieved by the order passed by the Member of the Board of Nominees the newly added parties viz. respondents Nos. 5 and 6 before me referred a revision application to Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal and the Tribunal by its judgment and order dated 20th of August 1990 was pleased to allow the revision application quashing and setting aside the order of the Board of Nominees dated 19th of September 1989 allowing amendment and impleading respondents Nos. 5 and 6 as party defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in the aforesaid lavad suits. ( 11 ) BEING aggrieved by the judgment and order of Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal (original plaintiff) has preferred these petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 12 ) MR. 5 and 6 as party defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in the aforesaid lavad suits. ( 11 ) BEING aggrieved by the judgment and order of Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal (original plaintiff) has preferred these petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 12 ) MR. M. I. Patel learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has mainly submitted that once an application for amendment of plaint was granted by the Trial Court and when amendment was carried out by impleading present respondents Nos. 5 and 6 as party defendants there was no jurisdiction and/or authority in Co-operative Tribunal to quash and set aside such order especially when the order passed by the Board of Nominees cannot be said to be unjust or improper order. They have further submitted that the Co-operative Tribunal has materially erred in appreciating the proposed amendment on merits and in rejecting the application for amendment only on the ground that such an amendment cannot be granted because on merits the respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were not liable for the transaction and therefore they were not required to be impleaded as party defendants. ( 13 ) IN the submission of Mr. M. I. Patel it is well settled that while deciding an application for amendment and/or an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code that Court should not decide the amendment on merits and should not decide as to whether proposed amendment is ultimately liable to be accepted or rejected. The Board of Nominees who granted amendment has undoubted jurisdiction and authority to grant it and if order of granting amendment was within the competence of the Board of Nominees there was no illegality or impropriety in the order which called for exercise of revisional power under Section 159 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act. He therefore submitted that the order passed (b) the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal is required to be quashed and set aside and order of the Board of Nominees allowing amendment is required to be restored. ( 14 ) MR. Y. S. Lakhani learned Advocate appearing for respondents Nos. 5 and 6 has submitted that the application was given by the petitioner plaintiff under Section 199 (3) (c) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act for impleading respondents Nos. ( 14 ) MR. Y. S. Lakhani learned Advocate appearing for respondents Nos. 5 and 6 has submitted that the application was given by the petitioner plaintiff under Section 199 (3) (c) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act for impleading respondents Nos. 5 and 6 as party defendants to the lavad suits and for making necessary amendment in the plaint of each lavad suit. In his submission such an application should not be treated as an application for amendment of the plaint but it should be treated as an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. He further submitted that from the documents which were produced before the Co-operative Tribunal and those which were produced by the plaintiff bank along with its plaint it was established that petitioner plaintiff has no cause of action whatsoever against respondents Nos. 5 and 6 and that such a claim was liable to be dismissed even on merits and therefore Co-operative Tribunal was justified in examining the claim of petitioner-plaintiff on merits and in coming to the conclusion that respondents Nos. 5 and 6 who were sought to be impleaded as defendants Nos. 5 and 6 were already discharged from liability and were not liable for the suit claim and therefore in holding that the applications for amendment were liable to be rejected. ( 15 ) THE law on the subject of granting amendment is well settled by catena of the decision of the Supreme Court. In a case of Prigonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and Others reported in A. I. R. 1957 Supreme Court 96j3 the Supreme Court ruled that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) not working injustice to the other side and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should of refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. Amendments should of refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation the amendment must be refused; to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test there remains the same can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side or can it not? ( 16 ) IN another case of L. J. Leach and Co. Limited v. M/s Jardine Skinner and Co. reported in A. I. R. 1957 Supreme Court p. 357 the Supreme Court in the context of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code observed that it is no doubt true that Courts would as a rule decline to allow amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it if that is required in the interests of justice. To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions and without exhaustive reference to such decisions of the Supreme Court it can be stated that ordinarily all amendments to the pleadings are to be granted. ( 17 ) THE power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice the law of limitation notwithstanding. But exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the Court. The power of amendment is granted to the Court in the larger interest of doing full justice to the parties. But exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the Court. The power of amendment is granted to the Court in the larger interest of doing full justice to the parties. The general rule therefore is that all amendment are allowed which do not purport to set up a new case and which would not work in justice to the other side and which will be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. The object of Rule 17 of Order 6 is that the Court would act and try the merits of the case that comes before them and should consequently allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties without causing injustice to other side. ( 18 ) WITH the aforesaid general statement of law as to power to grant amendment in pleadings it is required to be seen whether at the time of entertaining and deciding an application for amendment of pleading the Court is required to go into the merits/demerits of the amendment sought. It is required to be decided as to whether the court at that stage can undertake the exercise of deciding the issue raised by proposed amendment of the pleading so as to decide the very claim sought to be introduced by such an amendment. ( 19 ) IN the case before me by way of proposed amendment the petitioner bank has moved the Board of Nominees for amendment of plaint by impleading respondents Nos. 5 and 6 as party defendants on the allegation that at the time of suit transaction they were the partners and that they were therefore required to be impleaded as party defendants. The petitioner bank has already liberty to itself to introduce necessary averments in the plaint to implead respondent Nos. 5 and 6 as party defendants to the suit in case contention is taken that old partners of the firm were liable. In the plaint the bank averred that the defendant No. 1 was a partnership firm of which defendants Nos. 2 to 4 were partners and that at the time of suit transaction the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 as party defendants to the suit in case contention is taken that old partners of the firm were liable. In the plaint the bank averred that the defendant No. 1 was a partnership firm of which defendants Nos. 2 to 4 were partners and that at the time of suit transaction the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 (proposed to be impleaded as party defendants) were also partners and therefore for the suit transaction they were jointly and severally liable. By proposed amendment the petitioner bank wants to implead respondent Nos. 5 and 6 as defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in the plaint and also consequential amendment in the averments so as to make respondents Nos. 5 and 6 answerable for the suit claim. It may be mentioned that this amendment is moved after the issues were framed and evidence of the first witness of the plaintiff has just commenced. The evidence of the plaintiff was not over and only the examination-in-chief of the first witness of the plaintiff was in progress. At that stage the amendment is moved. ( 20 ) THE aforesaid amendment as stated hereinabove was granted by the Board of Nominees while the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal allowed the revision and quashed and set aside the order of Board of Nominees so as not to allow amendment of the pleadings by introducing necessary averments in the plaint and by impleading respondents Nos. 5 and 6 as party defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in lavad suits. The main reason which has weighed with the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal for not granting amendment is that according to the Tribunal on merits the claim sought to be put forth by the petitioner bank was liable to fail inasmuch as according to the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal respondents Nos. 4 and 5 (defendants Nos. 5 and 6) were not in any way liable to the petitioner bank because all the averments made in the new partnership deed suggest that respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were discharged from all liabilities including for debts of the Bank and further because of the fact that petitioner-bank has discharged the said two defendants from their liability by their conduct as could be seen from contemporaneous documentary evidence. 5 and 6 were discharged from all liabilities including for debts of the Bank and further because of the fact that petitioner-bank has discharged the said two defendants from their liability by their conduct as could be seen from contemporaneous documentary evidence. The Tribunal has further undertaken exhaustive study of the law of contract and as to when a partner can be said to be discharged of his liability. Ultimately it has come to the conclusion that respondents Nos. 5 and 6 who were proposed to be added as defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in the suit had already walked out of partnership and new incoming partners have taken over liability of continuing partners and therefore liability of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 if any was taken over by defendants Nos. 2 to 4 and therefore proposed amendment was on merit not required to be granted because according to Tribunal even on merit also the said amendment was likely to fail. The Tribunal has therefore by reference of various documents which were produced before it for the first time in revision proceeded to decide the merits of the amendment and ultimately it reached the decision that even on merits the plea raised by amendment was liable to fail. The Tribunal therefore allowed the revision application and quashed and set aside the order of Board of Nominees allowing the amendment. From the aforesaid approach of the Tribunal it shall have to be seen as to whether it is open to the Tribunal to undertake the exercise of examining the merits of the amendment while deciding an application for amendment. . ( 21 ) MR. M. I. Patel learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner bank has vehemently urged that the Court exercising power of amendment under Section 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not expected to decide the merits of the amendment and to decide such amendment finally without first permitting the amendment to be carried out and thereafter permitting the trial to proceed in accordance with law. In the submission of Mr. Patel the proper approach of the Court would be to allow the amendment and to leave the parties to establish the justness or otherwise of the claim sought to be introduced by way of amendment. In the submission of Mr. Patel the proper approach of the Court would be to allow the amendment and to leave the parties to establish the justness or otherwise of the claim sought to be introduced by way of amendment. The Court should not at the stage of deciding an application for amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure proceed to decide the merits of the amendment so as to reject the amendment outright on the ground that even on merit the amendment was not required to be granted. Therefore at the stage of consideration of application for amendment of the pleading the Court is not to consider the merits of the proposed amendment excepting for the limited purpose of satisfying itself that proposed amendment is not frivolous vexatious mala fide in character and is not intended to over-reach the Court. In my opinion it is not open to the Court deciding an application for amendment to investigate the tenability or otherwise of the case which is sought to be made out by proposed amendment without even allowing the amendment. While deciding an application for amendment the Court is not supposed to go into the merits and demerits of the amendment and express any opinion one way or the other. That could be the subject-matter of the scrutiny after the amendment is allowed. Where amendment of pleading is sought in order to implead new parties to the suit to whom reference was already made in the plaint and liberty was reserved by the plaintiff to implead them at the appropriate saw the Court cannot consider whether persons sought to be impleaded were liable for the suit claim. It cannot proceed to decide as to whether they were already discharged from liability. In my opinion at the stage of considering an application for amendment it is not the function of the Court to go into the question of merits /demerits of the amendment and to reject the application for amendment on the ground that amendment sought was liable to be rejected on merits. This is in my opinion not a permissible approach. The Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal has precisely undertaken this exercise and has proceeded to allow the revision application so as to set aside the order granting amendment of the plaint. This is in my opinion not a permissible approach. The Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal has precisely undertaken this exercise and has proceeded to allow the revision application so as to set aside the order granting amendment of the plaint. As stated hereinabove the suits were at the stage of evidence the issues were framed and evidence of first witness of the plaintiff has just commenced and at that stage an application for amendment was moved to implead respondents Nos. 5 and 6 as party defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in each suit and such application for amendment was granted by the Board of Nominees. In revisional jurisdiction I fail to understand as to how the Tribunal could have found the order to be absolutely illegal or improper so as to call for its intervention. Even otherwise the approach of the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal was absolutely illegal and was one which reflected a cavalier approach to an application for amendment. ( 22 ) THE position of law is well established by decisions of various High Courts. In the case of Mangal Das Sant Ram Gauba v. Union of India and Others reported in AIR 1973 Delhi p. 96 the learned single Judge of Delhi High Court has taken the view that where an amendment of a plaint is sought in order to take up a new ground the Court at that stage cannot consider whether the ground is available to the plaintiff or not and the amendment cannot be refused on the ground that the new ground is not available to him. In fact appropriate procedure to be followed by the Court in such situations as stated by learned single Judge of Delhi High Court is first to allow the amendment frame issue or issues thereon if necessary and allow both the parties to adduce relevant oral and documental evidence thereon. Thereafter the Court should proceed to record its findings on the merits of the plea sought to be raised by way of amendment and then it may proceed to disallow the case sought to be introduced by party seeking amendment in the pleadings. Rejecting application for amendment at the stage of considering the application for amendment without providing the party an opportunity of actual trial is in my opinion not permissible. Rejecting application for amendment at the stage of considering the application for amendment without providing the party an opportunity of actual trial is in my opinion not permissible. ( 23 ) IN the case of M. K. Krishna Rao v. Sri Gangadeswarar Temple reported in AR 1949 Madras page 433 an application for amendment of the written statement given by the defendant was rejected by straightway recording of finding on the issues sought to be raised by amendment of written statement. The learned single Judge of Madras High Court while allowing Civil Revision Application against the order held that the lower courts ought not to have given its findings on the contention in the amendment without first allowing the amendment and framing the issues thereon and allowing the parties to adduce the relevant oral and documentary evidence and the arguments they desire. The Court also observed that it is desirable that the proper procedure should be followed in all proceedings in public interests and that an intended amendment should not be discussed and found against even before it is allowed to be incorporated and issues framed thereon and evidence adduced on it. ( 24 ) IN the case of Dharmalinga Chetti v. A. M. Krishnaswami Chetty reported in AIR 1949 Madras page 467 the learned single Judge of Madras High Court once again examined the power of the Court to grant amendment. The main objection to the proposed amendment was on merits of the amendments and while rejecting such objection the Court observed as under:the alleged falsity of his case in the amendment need not and should not be gone into now. Doubtless if it is false he will fail in the suit itself with costs. This is not the stage where we can canvass the truth or falsity of the allegations in the plaint or written statement or amendment. ( 25 ) SIMILARLY in the case of T. P. Palaniswamy and Another v. Deivanaiammal and Others reported in AIR 1984 Madras p. 19 Justice Nainar Sundaram of the Madras High Court has an occasion to consider the scope of the powers of the Court while considering an application for amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. While rejecting the application for amendment the Trial Court adjudicated upon the merits of the amendment. While rejecting the application for amendment the Trial Court adjudicated upon the merits of the amendment. While disapproving the order of the Trial Court the learned single Judge found that while deciding an application for amendment it is not an amendment of pleadings. It is not open to the Trial Court to investigate the tenability or otherwise of the case which would arise on amendment without even allowing the amendment. The Court observed as under:it is well settled that while deciding an application for amendment the court is not supposed to go into the merits and demerits of the amendment and express an opinion one way or the other. That could be the subject-matter of scrutiny after the amendment is allowed applying the well accepted principles therefor and after the defendant files the additional written statement and after appropriate additional issue is framed and that issue is tried after the parties placed the requisite evidence therefor and submitted arguments in support of their respective cases. ( 26 ) SIMILARLY in the case of Dhirendra Kumar Pandey v. Smt. Rashmani Devi reported in AIR 1986 Orissa page 133 the learned single Judge of Orissa High Court while dealing with the order of the Trial court rejecting an application for amendment found that the Trial Court has attempted to ascertain whether the facts sought to be introduced by the proposed amendment were correct or not. He also found that the Trial court was under an impression that unless the proposed amendment is sound on merits it cannot be allowed. While allowing the civil revision application against the order of the Trial court the learned Judge observed as under:this is an erroneous approach. Allowing an amendment of pleadings does not mean that the averments introduced by such amendments stand proved. That can be ascertained only at the trial of the suit after evidence is led by both the parties. Therefore at the stage of consideration of an application for amendment of the pleadings the Court is not to consider the merits of the proposed amendment excepting for the limited purpose of satisfying itself that it is not frivolous vexatious mala fide in character and is intended to over-reach the Court. Therefore at the stage of consideration of an application for amendment of the pleadings the Court is not to consider the merits of the proposed amendment excepting for the limited purpose of satisfying itself that it is not frivolous vexatious mala fide in character and is intended to over-reach the Court. It has been held in numerous decisions that provisions under Order 6 Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code vest wide discretion in courts to allow all amendments relevant and necessary for proper adjudication of the case and for the ends of justice Unless the court comes to a conclusion that allowing the amendment would occasion gross injustice to the other side or it would encourage a mala fide attempt by the applicant the amendment should be allowed. At the cost of the repetition it may be stated that even if amendment of the pleading is allowed the party concerned may fail to establish the same at the trial and the stand taken by him may be rejected by the court. But the Court cannot pre-judge the merits of the proposed amendment at the stage of considering the application under Order 6 Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code. ( 27 ) IT is thus clear that under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code the Court may at any stage of proceedings allow either party to amend his pleadings and all such amendment shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. While considering an application for amendment it will be inappropriate for the Court to adjudicate upon the questions which would arise on the amendment being granted. Such stage will come only later after the amendment is allowed issues are framed and the parties are permitted to adduce evidence on such issues. It is not open to the Court to pre-judge the issue at the threshold and to reject the amendment on the ground that it is ultimately liable to fail. In my opinion despite this well established position of law the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal has unfortunately in its revisional jurisdiction undertaken an exercise of considering the proposed amendment on merits and in disallowing the amendment the approach is totally illegal and erroneous. In my opinion despite this well established position of law the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal has unfortunately in its revisional jurisdiction undertaken an exercise of considering the proposed amendment on merits and in disallowing the amendment the approach is totally illegal and erroneous. It was not the sanction of the Tribunal to go into the merits of the amendment and to reach a finding that the proposed amendment was liable to fail and on that ground to reject the application for amendment it would be in my opinion forestalling the issue because parties did not have any opportunity to establish correctness or otherwise of the facts without leading appropriate evidence the approach of the Tribunal was thus contrary to well accepted principle of law. In fact the Trial Courts has straightway proceeded to decide the merits of the proposed amendment by reference to documents produced before it and it has thus fallen into serious error of jurisdiction. ( 28 ) THE provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code vest wide discretion in courts to all amendments relevant and necessary for proper adjudication of the case and for the ends of justice. Unless the Courts comes to a conclusion that allowing the amendment would occasion gross injustice to the other side or it would encourage a mala fide attempt by the applicant the amendment should be allowed. It may be stated that even if amendment of the pleadings is allowed the party concerned may fail to establish the same at the trial and the stand taken by him may be rejected by the Court. But the Court cannot pre-judge the merits of the proposed amendment at the stage of considering the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code excepting for the limited purposes stated hereinabove. ( 29 ) IN the result all the three petitions succeed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no order as to costs. (RPV) Rule made absolute to the extent indicated. .