ORDER M.L. Bhat, J. - The petitioner prays for quashing of the order of the respondent No. 1 dated 25-5-1991. By this order the respondent No. 1 has reversed the order of the Prescribed Authority under the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act of 1972. hereinafter called as 'the Act'. 2. The landlord, who is respondent No. 2 in this case, seems to have applied for eviction of the tenant-petitioner from the building under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act. The Prescribed Authority had found that the landlord's need for the house was not bona fide and had also held that the petitioner will be put to a great hardship if he was evicted from the premises in question. On appeal the respondent No. 1 reversed the findings of the Prescribed Authority on both counts. It held that the need of the petitioner (or respondent No. 2 - Ed.) was bona fide and the landlord would face hardship if the tenant is not evicted from the premises in question. The question of comparative hardship was, therefore, found in favour of the respondent No. 2. 3. The tenant has now started a third inning by filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is averred that the landlord's need is not genuine or bona fide because he has sufficient accommodation in the house of his father which he can use for his residential purpose. This argument is apparently based on the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority whereby he rejected the claim of the landlord. It is pleaded that no portion of the house is dilapidated. The first floor of the house is alleged to have been damaged by the landlord, which was ordered to be repaired by a competent authority under S. 28 of the Act. The view taken by the appellate authority with regard to the comparative hardship is also said to be bad because it is completely contrary to the factors which, according to the petitioner, and guidelines under R. 16 of the rules framed under the Act. The landlord is said to have alternative accommodation whereas the tenant has none. It is submitted that the findings of the respondent No. 1 are illegal and contrary to law. The findings of the Prescribed Authority are said to be perfectly legal, which could not be disturbed. The landlord is said to have alternative accommodation whereas the tenant has none. It is submitted that the findings of the respondent No. 1 are illegal and contrary to law. The findings of the Prescribed Authority are said to be perfectly legal, which could not be disturbed. The question of bona fide need and question of comparative hardship have been decided in favour of the landlord in violation of the provisions of the Act and the rules. It is stated that the respondent No. 1 has relied on some evidence, which is not admissible. 4. Counter affidavit is filed by the landlord. He has denied the averments made in the writ petition and stated that before the Prescribed Authority he had made an application for appointment of a Commissioner so that spot inspection of the house could be conducted. In the sale deed also the house was said to be dilapidated and in bad condition. The Prescribed Authority had ignored this from consideration but the appellate authority relied on it. Therefore, there is no illegality committed by the appellate Court. The report of the Nagar Adhikari in respect of the condition of house is said to be not bad but was made on the application of the landlord. It is also contended that in view of the dilapidated condition of the house the house-tax was exempted on the house. On other questions of fact also there is variance between the landlord and tenant and both have tried to interpret the facts emerging from the pleadings before the trial court and before the appellate Court according to their own convenience. 5. It may be mentioned, though not stated by the petitioner in his writ petition, that the landlord's application for eviction was dismissed on a previous occasion also by a judgment dated 13-8-1987 of the Prescribed Authority. On appeal the case was remanded back to the prescribed authority for deciding the application in accordance with law. 6. In this writ petition this Court cannot go into the question of fact which have been concluded by the appellate court. It is not the case of the tenant that the appreciation of evidence by the appellate court is perverse. The appellate court is within its right to appreciate the evidence and come to a different finding than arrived at by the prescribed authority. It is not the case of the tenant that the appreciation of evidence by the appellate court is perverse. The appellate court is within its right to appreciate the evidence and come to a different finding than arrived at by the prescribed authority. The appreciation of evidence is the prerogative of the prescribed authority and the appellate court. The appellate court has not agreed with the findings of the prescribed authority and it has given reasons for its disagreement. Therefore, on the findings of fact this court cannot interfere. In writ jurisdiction it will not he permissible to reappreciate the evidence and find out for one party or the other whether or riot the need of the landlord is bona fide and who is to face hardship in the, event of eviction or otherwise. These are the questions of fact which have been concluded by the judgment of the appellate court. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that while determining the question of comparative hardship the appellate court has not taken the factors mentioned in Rule 16 of the rules framed under the Act into consideration and it has drawn inferences about the house being dilapidated on some material, which could not be drawn. It is also contended that some documents were taken on record at the appellate stage without giving opportunity to the petitioner to rebut those documents. 7. This Court can interfere with the findings of the appellate court only if there is a fundamental error committed by the appellate court in arriving at the conclusions. which are contained in his judgment. If no fundamental error is shown to have been committed by the appellate Court, it will not be possible for this Court to interfere with the judgment of the appellate court even if it is erroneous in some respect. If the judgment is not perverse and does not suffer from any, error apparent on the face of the record, this Court in its writ jurisdiction will be loath to interfere with the judgment. However, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to non- consideration and non-application of the factors given in Rule 16 of the rules is a legal question which could be gone into in this petition. However, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to non- consideration and non-application of the factors given in Rule 16 of the rules is a legal question which could be gone into in this petition. Rule 16(1) of the rules lays down that in considering the requirement of personal occupation for the purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family the prescribed authority shall have regard to the various factors, which are given in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g). If no regard is given to the factors given in Rule 16 of the rules then the judgment impugned in this writ petition is liable to be quashed. Reliance is placed on an authority of the Supreme Court, Bishan Chand v. V Addl. District Judge, Bulandshahr, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1230 (1) : 1982 All LI 882 (1). In this case the appellate court had recorded that in the absence of any additional circumstances indicating that preference could be shown to the ejectment order in his favour could not be made. The provisions of Rule 16(2) of the Rules framed under the Act were not considered at all by the appellate court. The case was, therefore, remitted to the appellate court to take into consideration the factors to the earlier agreement, the offer of the appellant before the Court to give back his own shop to the respondent, equities arising in the case. However, we do not know the facts of this case but from the reading of the brief judgment it appears that the offer by the landlord to the tenant whereby he had offered his own shop to him was not at all considered and the landlord's application for eviction was rejected. This authority would not be applicable to the facts of this case because it was given on a different set of facts. 8. Before eviction order is granted it is to be considered by the courts whether the tenant's need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's need would be served by releasing the other part. In that case the other part alone is to be released. This is provided under sub-clause (b) of Rule 16(1) of the rules. In that case the other part alone is to be released. This is provided under sub-clause (b) of Rule 16(1) of the rules. The appellate court has held that the first floor of the building is dilapidated and in fact the whole building is in a dilapidated condition. What is left in occupation of the tenant is a very small portion. Therefore, on these findings it is not possible to hold that there can be partial eviction of the tenant from the premises in question because the premises do not admit of partitioning it for the purposes of eviction. It is a dilapidated house, which is found by the appellate court and that is a finding of fact. It needs to be reconstructed and rebuilt. Therefore, there is no non-consideration of clause (d) of Rule 16(1) of the rules. Under clause (e) of Rule 16(1) of the Rules the consideration is to be given to the number of tenants if living separately and occupying a, block of tenaments and the landlord desires their eviction on ground of his personal need whether suitable accommodation is likely to be available to such tenants. From the examination of this clause it is clear that it applies to a case where there are number of tenants separately occupying a block of tenaments of one landlord. In the present case the sole tenant is sought to be evicted. Assuming that this clause applies to the tenant then the tenant has to lead such evidence which would persuade the prescribed authority to give a finding in his favour that no suitable alternative accommodation is likely to be available to him. The tenant after having received the notice from the landlord has not moved his little finger to search for alternative accommodation, which is not to be searched by the landlord for him, and if on search he was not able to get it, he should have led cogent evidence to enable the lower court to give a finding in his favour under clause (e) of Rule 16(1) of the rules. There is no violation of Rule 16(1)(f) of the rules because the landlord's need for eviction can be considered liberally if he offers to the tenant alternative accommodation reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family. There is no violation of Rule 16(1)(f) of the rules because the landlord's need for eviction can be considered liberally if he offers to the tenant alternative accommodation reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family. If the landlord has no suitable accommodation available, the question of his offering such accommodation to the tenant would not arise. 9. The factors mentioned in Rule 16 of the rules which are to be considered by the courts while considering the requirement of personal occupation of the landlord in respect of building are not exhaustive. They are only illustrative. They will operate only in a given situation. As finding of fact the appellate court has found that the landlord has only one dilapidated house which he had purchased in a dilapidated condition and that house is not actually fit for human residence. It needs to be reconstructed and in fact it is a plot of land, which is sought by the landlord for his personal use. It is also found by the appellate court that the landlord's father had house, which could not be said to belong to. the landlord. The landlord's residence with his father would not make the father's residence available to him when he had purchased the property in question for his separate living. In respect of the tenant not getting alternative accommodation it is for the tenant t,, lead evidence in this regard. 10. In the case of Mst. Eega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, reported in AIR 1979 SC 272 , the High Court had dismissed the claim of eviction because in the opinion of the High Court eviction would cause greater hardship to the tenant than to the landlord, if the same was refused. The Supreme Court upset this finding and has said as under in this. regard (para 20): "Let us now probe into the extent of the hardship that may be caused to one party of the other in case a decree for eviction is passed or is refused. It seems to us that in deciding this aspect of the matter each party has to prove its relative advantage or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants and that they were remediable." 11. It seems to us that in deciding this aspect of the matter each party has to prove its relative advantage or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants and that they were remediable." 11. Each party in the eviction litigation has to adduce evidence to show what hardship would be caused to him by granting or refusal of a decree and it will be for the appellate court to determine whether the suffering of the tenant would be greater in case a decree was made than the suffering of the landlord in case decree was refused. If the landlord proves his bona fide needs even then a decree for eviction may be refused in his favour if the tenant adduces such evidence on which he would be able to persuade the court to hold that greater hardship would be caused to him by passing a decree than by refusing to pass it. Merely because the tenant would suffer inconvenience by eviction would not be a valid ground for refusing eviction unless the tenant produced such evidence which would establish that the comparatively greater hardship would be caused to him by eviction. Therefore, without any evidence on the record the petitioner cannot now in this Court urge that he would suffer greater hardship by eviction than the landlord if the eviction is refused. 12. The factors mentioned in Rule 16(1) of the rules appear to have been taken note of if the judgment of the appellate court is read as a whole. The landlord does not have any alternative accommodation which he could suffer to the petitioner-tenant, therefore, it was not required to be considered. Rule 16(1) of the rules is couched in a broad language and takes care of all the situations and eventualities, which may arise in litigation of this type. All provisions under Rule 16(1) of the rules would apply in different situations. It depends on the facts of each case as to what factors should be given consideration by the Court, which is seized of the matter of eviction. 13. The documents, which are relied upon by the appellate court were on record-of the court. It is not stated by the appellate court that they were produced at the appellate stage. It depends on the facts of each case as to what factors should be given consideration by the Court, which is seized of the matter of eviction. 13. The documents, which are relied upon by the appellate court were on record-of the court. It is not stated by the appellate court that they were produced at the appellate stage. It is stated that during the proceedings of eviction these documents were produced. Therefore, the inference drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner that these documents were produced at the appellate stage without giving him an opportunity of rebutting the documents does not appear to be correct. The documentary evidence, which has been relied upon by the appellate court consists of the report of the Nagar Adhikari and the copy of the sale deed. Even if the report of the Nagar Adhikari is excluded from consideration the copy of the sale deed along with the evidence of the landlord was sufficient for the appellate court to hold that the house was in dilapidated condition and a portion of it was already demolished. It was submitted that the demolition was caused by the landlord for which proceedings under S. 28 of the Act were taken and the application was allowed. Section 28 of the Act empowers the prescribed authority to enforce the obligations of the landlord regarding repairs etc. If he fails to do so, the tenant is then given permission to effect repairs on the conditions mentioned in S. 28 of the Act. The proceedings under S. 28 of the Act having been taken and the order also having been made under that section would indicate that the house was in a dilapidated condition and the finding of the appellate Court does not seem to be incorrect in any way in this regard. 14. It is held by the appellate Court that the house-tax was exempted because the house was in a dilapidated condition. This argument is seriously controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is stated that the exemption can be granted under S. 221 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. That section lays down that a house may be exempted from tax for a period not exceeding one year. This argument is seriously controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is stated that the exemption can be granted under S. 221 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. That section lays down that a house may be exempted from tax for a period not exceeding one year. If a person who is in its opinion by reason of poverty unable to pay the tax or if a special resolution passed by M.P. is confirmed by the State Government, it can exempt the payment of tax for any portion of it or it may be exempted by any order of the State Government. 15. In the matter of the exemption of the tax none of the conditions of S. 221 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam would apply to the facts of this case because according to the respondent No. 2 the house-tax was exempted on account of the dilapidated condition of the building. By getting exemption from payment of house-tax for any reason the appellate court was not right in drawing an inference that the house-tax on the building was exempted because of its dilapidated condition. No such inference could be drawn. The reasoning of the appellate court in this regard does not seem to be correct. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is well-founded in this regard. 16. However, even if we exclude this finding from consideration, the recitation in the sale deed and the evidence of the landlord together with the order of the prescribed authority under S. 28 of the Act would make it abundantly clear that the house was in a dilapidated condition. This is essentially a question of fact, which is based on evidence. If the evidence is sifted and inadmissible evidence excluded even then there was a basis for the appellate court to come to this finding. The finding in this regard is not perverse in any manner. 17. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any force in this writ petition and no interference is warranted with the appellate judgment of the I Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur, dated 25-5-1991. 18. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, Jere will be no order as to costs.