JUDGMENT M.L. Bhat, J. - The petitioner prays for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 2-5-1988 passed by the respondent No. I, along with its covering letter dated 20-5-1988. A direction is sought to the respondent No. 2 to treat the petitioner in continuous service and to give the petitioner service benefits and emoluments under the rules. The resume of the facts relevant for the purpose of decision of this writ petition may be given as under : 2. The petitioner's case is that he was appointed by the respondent No. 2 as Store Munshi on 1-5-1980 at Allahabad unit. From 1-5-1980 upto November, 1981 the petitioner is said to have worked in Allahabad Unit. Thereafter Banda, which was a part of Allahabad Unit, was separated and a new Unit was created there and the petitioner's services were transferred to that Unit, where he served continuously upto 1-3-1985. To this effect he has produced a certificate of Assistant Engineer, a copy whereof is placed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. On 2-3-1985 in connection with a holiday on account of Assembly elections the petitioner is said to have gone to his village. On his return he was refused permission to join the unit and his name was deleted from the muster roll on 3-3-1985. The petitioner is said to have lodged a report against the Assistant Engineer on 9-3-1985. He has placed a copy of this complaint on record as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. A copy of the report was sent to the labour Inspector also, which is reflected by Annexure-3 to the writ petition. He is said to have approached the Managing Director of respondent No. 2 and made a complain to the Collector, Banda giving details of his case. No action was taken on these complaints. He ultimately filed a conciliation application on 21-8-1986. The case was registered as case No. 30 of 1986. This is reflected by Annexure-6 to the writ petition. The respondent No. 2 had contested this application and filed a reply alleging therein that the petitioner had absented from duty. There was no reconciliation of the dispute, therefore the respondent No. 3 is said to have referred the matter to the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court the respondent No. 2 filed their written statement. The respondent No. 2 had contested this application and filed a reply alleging therein that the petitioner had absented from duty. There was no reconciliation of the dispute, therefore the respondent No. 3 is said to have referred the matter to the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court the respondent No. 2 filed their written statement. The petitioner could not attend the proceedings before the respondent No. 1, because there was some strike in 1988 and he is said to have fallen ill thereafter upto 30-4-1988. On 2-5-1988 when he went to Agra to enquire about the proceedings of the case he was told by his Advocate that the respondent No. I had proceeded ex parte against the petitioner had pronouncement of the award had been reserved. The petitioner was served with the award by registered post on 23-9-1988 which is said to have been delivered on 20-9-1988. 3. The respondent No. 2 had alleged that the petitioner's employment was to continue only upto 28-2-1985. This is altogether a new case and (his contention was unfounded and incorrect. It was not stated before the Conciliation Officer. The court of respondent No. 1 is said to have remained closed due to strike of State employees. The respondent No. 1 was obliged to inform the petitioner of his case and he could not pass the award ex parte without hearing the petitioner. The petitioner had requested the respondent No. 1 that he has filed documentary evidence before the Conciliation Officer, which may be perused. The respondent No. 1 failed to peruse those documents, which has caused great injustice to the petitioner. For absence f;om duty disciplinary action could be taken against the petitioner in accordance with law. His services could not be terminate without enquiry. The petitioner was in continuous service for more than four years and this fact was amply proved by the certificate contained in Annexure-I to the writ petition. The petitioner's termination of service was in contravention of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as `the Act.' 4. The respondent No. 2 has filed his affidavit, It is said that the petitioner was a daily wage worker in the service of the Bridge Corporation. He was not a regular employee. The respondent No. 2 has also denied that the petitioner was ever transferred from Allahabad Unit to Banda Unit. The respondent No. 2 has filed his affidavit, It is said that the petitioner was a daily wage worker in the service of the Bridge Corporation. He was not a regular employee. The respondent No. 2 has also denied that the petitioner was ever transferred from Allahabad Unit to Banda Unit. He is said to have been employed as daily wage worker in Banda Unit December, 1981. The certificate contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition about his continuous service is said to be unauthentic. He is said to have worked in Banda upto 28-2-1985 and there after he was not in service. The daily wage worker is not entitled for regular employment in the establishment. The petitioner is said to have returned after 15 or 20 days to join the work and demanded continuation of his service, which could not be accepted. He was asked to join his duty which he did not agree. He wanted continuation of service from 1-3-1985, which was not possible. The petitioner is said to have no. prosecuted his case diligently. The proceedings of the case were postponed number of times but the petitioner did not appear. A restoration application was filed by the petitioner, which was fixed or. 30-7-1988 and the petitioner was directed to supply a copy of the said application to the respondent No. 2. On 30-7-1988 the said application was dismissed for non-prosecution as neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared before the respondent No. 1. 5. The petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavit also. He has controverted the assertions of the respondent No. 2. It is said that he was not allowed to work from 1-3-1985 though he was entitled to resume the work, it is also stated that his employment was not for a fixed term but it had continued for more than four years and on account of his illness he could not attend the Court of respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 passed the award ex parte and rejected his application for setting aside of the award mainly on the ground that the award had been published. 6. The respondent No. 1 passed the award ex parte and rejected his application for setting aside of the award mainly on the ground that the award had been published. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on any authority reported in 1986 UPLBEC 667 Shailendra Nath Shukla and others v. The Vice-Chancellor Allahabad University and others The authority lays down that when a daily wage worker has completed 240 days work within a period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of termination without paying to him the retrenchment compensation or following the procedure provided under law the said termination would be void which entitles the workman to claim not only reinstatement but also a declaration for continuing in service with back wages. In this case also the daily wage workers, who had completed 240 working days, were removed from the rolls and their services were terminated without following the procedure established in law, but the High Court gave the aforesaid direction. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on an authority of this Court reported in 1991 (1) UPLBEC 576, Anil Kumar Misra and others v. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishadr, U.P. It was held that casual employees, who had completed more than 240 days of work within one year immediately preceding the termination of their service could not terminated from service unless the procedure established by law was followed. 7. The award is an ex parte award. From the perusal of the counter-affidavit it appears that on the date when the case was fixed for proceedings before the respondent No. 1 there was employees strike and the next date fixed was 28-3-1988. Normally, when the case was not taken up on 22-2-1988 for no fault of the petitioner, the respondent No. 1 should have issued a notice about the next date of hearing. On the next date of hearing, which was 28-3-1988 the Presiding Officer himself was absent and in his absence the case was fixed for 24-4-1988. The respondent No. 1 should not have passed ex parte award, in view of the case having been adjourned and in view of the respondent No. 1 not being present without affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. His application for restoration also seems to have been dismissed mainly on the ground that the award has been published. The respondent No. 1 should not have passed ex parte award, in view of the case having been adjourned and in view of the respondent No. 1 not being present without affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. His application for restoration also seems to have been dismissed mainly on the ground that the award has been published. If the respondent No. 1 had considered the minutes recorded by its office in the main petition, it probably would have been inclined to restore the petition and recall the award and passed appropriate orders after hearing the petitioner. The petitioner's very valuable right was being taken away in violation of law'. Therefore, it was not proper to find out a slip-shod manner to dismiss the petition. 8. The petitioner admittedly had worked for more than four years, may be as daily wage worker. His name was removed from muster-roll, which would amount to retrenchment of the petitioner. The retrenchment of the petitioner could be done only after the following the procedure prescribed under Section 25-F of the Act. That procedure has not been followed, therefore, the petitioner's retrenchment was illegal and bad in law. He was entitled to be given one month's notice or one month's wages in lieu of notice and also retrenchment compensation. It is admitted case of the parties that the petitioner has worked for more than four years. Therefore, even as a daily wage employee he could not be thrown out without following the procedure under Section 25-F of the Act. 9. The award ex parte suffers from serious legal infirmity. The respondent No. 1 has completely ignored this aspect of the matter and has not considered the case of the petitioner in accordance with law. There has been total non-application of mind on the part of the respondent No. 1 in deciding the matter. Even if the respondent No. 1 was inclined to decide the matter ex parte he should have decided the matter correctly in accordance with law. Ex parte order cannot be issued in violation of law. The ex parte order also has to conform to the requirements of law. 10. The respondent No. 2 has not proved that the petitioner's services were for a fixed term upto 28-2-1988. Their case before the Conciliation Officer has been that the petitioner remained absent for more than 15-20 days. Ex parte order cannot be issued in violation of law. The ex parte order also has to conform to the requirements of law. 10. The respondent No. 2 has not proved that the petitioner's services were for a fixed term upto 28-2-1988. Their case before the Conciliation Officer has been that the petitioner remained absent for more than 15-20 days. That was the case of the respondent No. 2 before the Labour Court also. If that was so, the petitioner could have been thrown out only after the enquiry was held against him for his unauthorised absence. If he was removed or retrenched without enquiry he was to be given benefit of Section 25-F of the Act. Neither enquiry is held nor is there any compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Therefore, the award of the respondent No. 1 is vitiated. 11. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the award passed by the respondent No. 1 dated 2-5-1988 with its covering letter dated 20-9-1988 is hereby quashed. By a writ of mandamus the respondent No. 2 is directed to reinstate the petitioner with back wages and pay him the wages in future so long as he continues to work as a workman with the respondent No. 2 in accordance with law. The order will, however, not prevent the respondent No. 2 to exercise its power of termination of service of the petitioner after holding enquiry or after following the procedure established by law as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act.