These two revision petitions are filed by the common plaintiff in two suits who is the common respondent in two appeals. Revision petitioner herein filed two suits against the common defendant under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, seeking eviction of the defendant from the premises in question. The trial Court decreed the suits. Defendant had not adduced any evidence in the case because, it is stated, the request for adjournment on his behalf was rejected. The defendant filed two appeals before the Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh. The learned Assistant District Judge did not go into the merits of the case but considered the submission of the defendant that the trial Court made an error in not granting him an opportunity to adduce evidence, found the submission justified and set aside the decrees and judgments in the two suits and remanded the suits for further trial on merits. The learned Assistant District Judge also directed the parties to bear cost of the appeals. The common judgment in the two appeals is now challenged in the two revisions under section 115 CPC. 2. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the sole ground on which remand was ordered is that the trial Court was in error in refusing to the defendant, that adjournment is naturally a matter of discretion of the Court and the appellate Court was not justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion by the trial Court. Learned counsel also submitted that on the last date on which the suits were posted, the defendant could have examined himself and his witnesses through his counsel with the permission of the trial Court. It is necessary to refer to few facts to appreciate this contention. 3. The suits were filed in 1980 and 1981 respectively. The suits stood posted for trial on 25.1.83 on which date it was adjourned on the ground that the defendant's Advocate could not conduct the case on account of head ache due to eye trouble. Adjournment was granted on payment of cost of Rs.30/-. Cases were adjourned to 23.2.83 on which date the Court could not take up the cases evidently on account of strike by Court staff. On 23.2.83 the Court fixed the date of trial as 22.3.83, plaintiff and two witnesses were examined and were cross examined and plaintiff's evidence was closed. Defendant requested for time to adduce evidence.
Cases were adjourned to 23.2.83 on which date the Court could not take up the cases evidently on account of strike by Court staff. On 23.2.83 the Court fixed the date of trial as 22.3.83, plaintiff and two witnesses were examined and were cross examined and plaintiff's evidence was closed. Defendant requested for time to adduce evidence. He also filed an application to produce some documents and another application to call for some records. The Court received documents produced but dismissed the latter request as well as the prayer for adjournment and adjourned the case to 11.4.83 for argument. On 11.4.83 the defendant was absent. On his behalf an application signed by the junior to his lawyer was filed stating that defendant's Advocate could not come to Court on account of illness and requesting for an adjournment. The Court dismissed the application and posted the case to 13.4.83 for argument. On this date defendant's Advocate was present and filed an application seeking to review the dismissal of the application on 11.4.83. It appears the defendant and his son were not present. The Court took the view that no cause was shown for the absence of the defendant on 11.4.83 and attempt was made only to explain the absence of the lawyer and no attempt was made to explain the inability of the defendant to engage another lawyer. On this ground the review application was dismissed. Thereupon the defendant's lawyer withdrew from the case and declined to address the argument. The Court heard argument of the plaintiff and adjourned the case for judgment and ultimately decreed the suits. 4. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner has invited my attention to the Proviso to Rule 1 of Order 17 CPC introduced by Amendment Act 104 of 1978. Proviso (a) states that when the hearing of the suit has commenced it shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds that for the exceptional reasons to be recorded by it, the adjournment of the hearing beyond the following day is necessary. According to Proviso (b), no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party. Proviso (c) states that the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment.
According to Proviso (b), no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party. Proviso (c) states that the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment. Proviso (d) which is relied upon reads thus - "Where the illness of a pleader or his inability to conduct the case for any reason, other than his being engaged in another Court, is put forward as a ground for adjournment, the Court shall not grant the adjournment unless it is satisfied that the party applying for adjournment could not have engaged another pleader in time." While the proviso declares that the fact that the pleader of the party is engaged in another Court is not a ground for adjournment, it recognises that illness of the pleader or his inability to conduct the case for any reason, other than his being engaged in another Court could be sufficient ground for adjournment, subject to the satisfaction of the Court that the party applying for adjournment could not have engaged another pleader in time. When the, Court considers the question whether the party could have engaged another pleader, regard shall be had to various circumstances including the nature of the litigation, the nature of the contentions raised by the party and the opposite party, the stage at which the litigation is pending and the work which remains to be done from that date. Different considerations may arise depending on the stage at which the adjournment is sought such as, long before commencement of trial, or immediately before commencement of trial or whether trial has already commenced and some witnesses have been examined or evidence is complete and argument alone remains. All relevant circumstances may be weighed by the Court before deciding to grant or refuse adjournment on the ground of illness of the pleader or his inability to conduct the case for reasons which preclude him from attending Court. 5. None of these considerations has been borne in mind by the trial Court in declining the request for adjournment oil Lie previous day and in declining to review its order on the succeeding .day. The matter has been considered at a `considerable length by learned Assistant District Judge.
5. None of these considerations has been borne in mind by the trial Court in declining the request for adjournment oil Lie previous day and in declining to review its order on the succeeding .day. The matter has been considered at a `considerable length by learned Assistant District Judge. Defendant could not have adduced evidence on a day on which the Court had posted the case for argument. It is not submitted before me that the Court was prepared to allow defendant to adduce evidence on that day, though the case stood posted for argument. It can not be said that the appellate Court interfered with any discretion exercised by the trial Court since the order refusing adjournment was not directly in challenge before it. I am not persuaded to hold that there is any error of jurisdiction of the nature contemplated under section 115 CPC calling for interference with appellate order. 6. However, I find that the learned Assistant District Judge has completely ignored one aspect of the matter, namely, the suffering which the plaintiff in the two suits had undergone on account of various circumstances referred to above for which he was not at all responsible. The plaintiff filed the two suits seeking reliefs at the hands of the Court. When the suits came up for trial he was ready with his evidence and was prepared to adduce evidence. He was ready on earlier occasions also as can be seen from the order sheet. For no fault of his the suits filed by him in 1980 and 1981 were to be remanded for disposal. The manner in which the suits have been dealt with in the trial Court is really distressing. It is not unnatural for the parties to ask for time on the ground of sudden illness of the parties or the counsel or for other reasons. When the ground urged is sudden illness of the defendant or the counsel, and where the Court is, inclined to grant time, the Court should bear in mind the nature of illness before fixing the date for further proceedings. If nature of illness was such that it requires a long period for cure, the party should engage another lawyer and time could be granted to him for that purpose. I find that every time the suits were adjourned, they were being adjourned to dates beyond three or four weeks.
If nature of illness was such that it requires a long period for cure, the party should engage another lawyer and time could be granted to him for that purpose. I find that every time the suits were adjourned, they were being adjourned to dates beyond three or four weeks. This happened even after plaintiff's evidence was recorded. That should never have been done. On 25.1.83 the plaintiff was present with his witnesses and adjournment was granted on account of sudden illness of the defendant's counsel and the suits were adjourned by nearly 4 weeks which should not have been done by the Court. The Court should have granted short adjournment so that witnesses could remain and could be examined. The same thing happened when the case came up on 22.3.83. It was adjourned by 3 weeks. This contributed to the delay in the progress of the suits. 7. In the above circumstances, the learned Assistant District Judge should have weighed the couduct of the two parties and considered whether the defendant would have to be put on terms in ordering remand. It would be open to this Court to send the matter back to the learned Assistant District Judge to consider this aspect, but that would subject both the parties to further suffering and harassment and, therefore, I refrain from doing so. Having regard to the facts which have been adverted to, I feel that the learned Assistant District Judge should necessarily have put the defendant on terms before remanding the two suits. Instead of directing him to consider this matter, I think it is proper that I should impose the terms. 8. The two revision petitions stand dismissed on condition that respondent pays revision petitioner a sum of Rs.250/- as cost in each of the suits or deposits the same in the trial Court for payment to the petitioner within 3 weeks from today; on the respondent's failure to pay or deposit the cost as indicated above, the revision petitions shall stand allowed and the impugned judgments/orders stand set aside and the appeals stand remanded to the lower appellate Court for fresh disposal on merits. The suits/appeals, as the case may be shall be called in the trial Court/appellate Court, as the case may be on 24.2.92 depending on whether costs ordered now is paid or deposited within the time allowed.