ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) ). The petitioner, who was a Superintendent of prohibition and Excise (Class-11) seeks to challenge the impugned order dated 9/04/1986 removing him from service. ( 2 ) ). By charge-sheet dated 1/09/1982 issued against the petitioner, it was alleged that the petitioner had committed misconduct on the following counts enumerated in the charge-sheet : (1) While he was serving as temporary Prohibition and Excise Superintendent and was in In-Charge of Amreli District, he had issued D. S. VII licence for holding 350 bottles of alcohol and molasses for the period from 19-5-1981 to 31-3-1982 to one Jitendra Vasantrai Parikh and thereby flouted the instructions which were given by the Government for not issuing any such new dealers licence in respect of molasses and alcohol. (2) That he had issued D. S. VII licence to one Rameshchandra Somaya, resident of Tibi, Taluka Jaffrabad, Dist. Amreli on 29/03/1981 for selling denatured spirit. (3) Though an application made by one Girishkumar Manilal at Kunkavav for obtaining Poppy-2 licence in October 1980 was ordered to be filed pursuant to his statement dated 9/01/1981, the petitioner had issued Poppy-2 licence to him on 10/04/1981. (4) That he had issued D. S. VII licence to one Ranaji Vastaji for selling denatured spirit in bottles contrary to rules. (5) That he had issued Poppy 2 licence to Mansukhlal Vrajlal of Amreli, without making an enquiry, within a day with a view to favour the applicant. ( 3 ) ). The Special Enquiry Officer for Gazetted Officers, Ahmedabad, submitted his report dated 30/07/1983 after holding an enquiry against the petitioner on the above charges which were detailed in Schedule a of the Memorandum dated 1-9-1982 at Annexure c to the petition. The enquiry Officer found that all the charges which were levelled against the petitioner were established from the material on record. The record discloses that the petitioner was given an adequate opportunity of being heard during the enquiry. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and issued the show cause notice dated 2 2/12/1983 to enable him to show cause as to why the proposed action of dismissal from service should not be taken against the petitioner. The report of the Enquiry Officer was duly supplied to the petitioner with the second show cause notice. The petitioner responded by his reply dated 28/01/1984. The report of the Enquiry Officer was duly supplied to the petitioner with the second show cause notice. The petitioner responded by his reply dated 28/01/1984. It appears that he was given a personal hearing on 16- 7-1984 and he also gave further grounds for consideration under his communication dated 16/07/1984. The disciplinary authority, after considering the relevant papers, passed the impugned order dated 9/04/1986 at Annexure g to the petition dismissing the petitioner from service. ( 4 ) ). It was contended on behalf of the petitioner by the learned Counsel mr. B. I. Mehta that the petitioner was exercising statutory powers in the matter of granting licences and was therefore not bound by the executive instructions issued by the Government by its communication dated 22/04/1984 at Annexure b to the petition for not granting licences to new dealers for alcohol and molasses. In this connection, the learned Counsel referred to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 4 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, which reads as under :"4 (3 ). The (State) Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint any person other than the Collector to exercise in any district or place (all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the duties all the duties and functions as are assigned by or under this Act to a Collector subject to such control, if any, in addition to that of the (Director) and of the (State) Government as the (State) government may from time to time direct. "it was submitted that, pursuant to the powers conferred by sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 4 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, which includes powers under Sees. 28, 31 and 52 of the said Act and the Rules enumerated in Item VI of the bombay Denatured Spirit Rules, 1959, the Government of Gujarat had issued a Notification dated 5/12/1962 as amended on 7/04/1963 appointing the officers specified in column 1 of the Schedule appended thereto, to exercise within their respective jurisdictions, the powers as are assigned by or under the provisions of the said Act or Rules, regulations or orders thereunder to the Collector and specified in column 2 of the said Schedule and to perform all duties and functions connected with the exercise of such powers subject to the conditions specified in column 3. Under Rule 35 of the Bombay denatured Spirit Rules, 1959, the Collector is empowered to issue a licence in Form D. S. VII. Accordingly, the Superintendent of Prohibition and Excise could exercise powers of granting permits and licences under the rules mentioned in column 2 of the said notification, a copy of which is at Annexure a to the petition. It was submitted that when the petitioner exercised powers of issuing licences by virtue of the said Notification by which the powers. of the Collector under Sec. 4 (3) were exercisable by the Superintendent of prohibition and Excise, if any one was aggrieved by such order, an appeal could be filed under Sec. 137 (2) of the said Act. It will be seen from the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 4 that when any person other than the collector is appointed to exercise in any district or place the powers of the Collector and to perform his functions and duties, such person cannot claim an unbriddled and uncontrolled exercise of powers because the provision itself envisages that the exercise of such power or function is, inter alia, subject to such control of the State Government as the State Government may from time to time direct. It is, therefore, not open to the petitioner to contend that the State Government could not regulate the exercise of power by him after issuance of a Notification under sub- sec. (3) of Sec. 4 of the Act. It may also be noticed that, under the general powers of the State Government in respect of licences etc. , under Sec. 139 of the said Act, the State Government is empowered by a general or special order to prohibit the grant of any kind of licences, permits, passes etc. , throughout the State or in any area as provided in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) as also to direct that no licence, permit, pass etc. , of the kinds specified in its order shall be granted without the previous approval of the State Government. It is, thus, clear that the powers which are entrusted to the officers notified in the Gazette under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 4 are subject to the Control of the State Government and the officers exercising such powers cannot claim any unrestricted power on the ground that it is statutorily vested in them and can brook no executive interference. It is, thus, clear that the powers which are entrusted to the officers notified in the Gazette under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 4 are subject to the Control of the State Government and the officers exercising such powers cannot claim any unrestricted power on the ground that it is statutorily vested in them and can brook no executive interference. The statutory provisions themselves recognise executive control on the power of the officers in the matter of issuance of licences as is clear from the provisions of Sees. 4 (3) and 139 of the said Act. Apart from this, even if the power is to be treated as of quasi judicial nature its abuse amounting to misconduct cannot be immuned from disciplinary action. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that, while exercising powers statutorily conferred by a Notification under Sec. 4 (3) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, the Superintendent of Prohibition and Excise is not bound by the executive instructions issued by the Government in the matter of exercise of such powers including issuance of licences, permits, etc. , under the Act or Rules and regulations framed thereunder. Even under the Gujarat Poppy Capsules Rules, 1963 which have been framed in exercise of powers under Sec. 143, it has been provided in sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 that the powers of the licensing authority of granting of licence in form poppy-2 is subject to the orders of the State Government and the Director. Thus, the authorised officer under Sec. 4 (3) of the said Act as also the licensing authority under sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Gujarat Poppy Capsules Rules, are bound by the instructions which may be issued by the State Government and the Director as envisaged in the statutory provisions themselves. ( 5 ) ). It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, though during the enquiry and before passing the impugned order, the petitioner was given an adequate opportunity of being heard and that there was no violation of principles of natural justice so far as an opportunity of hearing is concerned, the impugned order is bad on the ground that the preliminary enquiry which was held in the matter before instituting the enquiry against the petitioner was made by an officer Mr. Ladva, who was junior to the petitioner and therefore there was a possibility that mr. Ladva, who was junior to the petitioner and therefore there was a possibility that mr. Ladva might have given his preliminary report for holding an enquiry against the petitioner, actuated by a desire to stealing a march over the petitioner in the matter of future promotions. The Enquiry Officer found that there was no substance in this contention, that the contention was Vaguely taken and that it was not shown as to why Mr. Ladva should concoct any facts against the petitioner. In other words, the contention which was sought to be raised on the basis of Mr. Ladva having held preliminary enquiry did not find favour with the Enquiry Officer. The respondents have placed on record the seniority list of Superintendents of Prohibition and central Excise (Class II) as on 27/09/1981 at Annexure 2 to the affidavit filed on 18/12/1991 which shows that Mr. Ladva was senior to the petitioner as he was appointed to the post on 26/05/1985 while the petitioner was appointed to the post on 25/06/1985. In the affidavit filed by the respondents on 3rd Dicember, 1991, it was stated in paragraph 4 (e) that the irregularities committed by the petitioner were noticed by one Mr. Muliyana, the then Superintendent of Prohibition and Excise (Class I), vigilance during the inspection made by him. After the transfer of Mr. Muliyana, Mr. Ladva was directed to hold an additional charge of the post of Superintendent (Class I) vigilance. It is stated that in the Commissionerate of Prohibition and Excise, all preliminary enquiries are conducted by Vigilance Cell and since Mr. Ladva was in-charge of the post of Superintendent (Class I), Vigilance, he had held the preliminary enquiry. It is denied that, Mr. Ladva was immediate junior to the petitioner. It is also stated that Mr. Ladva had merely to find out facts by perusing record and it was for the disciplinary authority to examine whether there was a prima facie case or not. On the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner, it is difficult to draw any inference that Mr. Ladva was actuated by any evil design against the petitioner and that the preliminary enquiry which he had held was vitiated by any malice on his part. The preliminary enquiry held by Mr. On the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner, it is difficult to draw any inference that Mr. Ladva was actuated by any evil design against the petitioner and that the preliminary enquiry which he had held was vitiated by any malice on his part. The preliminary enquiry held by Mr. Ladva was only a fact finding enquiry and no decision was to be taken by him on the basis of the record which indicated the involvement of the petitioner in respect of the charges which ultimately came to be levelled against him. The enquiry was conducted by an independent officer against whom the petitioner has no axe to grind. The Special Enquiry Officer appointed to hold a departmental enquiry against the petitioner had independently recorded evidence during the enquiry and come to his own findings. There is no reason whatsoever to infer that the Special Enquiry Officer was in any way influenced by Mr. Ladva. The findings of the Enquiry Officer are not based upon the preliminary enquiry of Mr. Ladva and are arrived at on the basis of the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Report Officer himself. The final decision was taken by the disciplinary authority on perusal of the material which came on record during the departmental enquiry and on consideration of the report of the Enquiry Officer. Thus, not only malice is not established against mr. Ladva who had held a preliminary enquiry but the allegations made against Mr. Ladva have no relevance whatsoever in view of the fact that the enquiry was conducted by an independent officer who arrived at his own findings on the basis of the material which came on record during the enquiry, and, on his report and such material, the disciplinary authority, after giving an adequate opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, passed the impugned order. Therefore, there was no scope of transmission of any malice on the part of Mr. Ladva to the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be said to be suffering from any legal mala fides as was sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner. ( 6 ) ). It was lastly contended on behalf of the petitioner that, earlier the petitioner was exonerated in a similar enquiry in the matter of issuance of licences and therefore he could not be held guilty of similar charges again. ( 6 ) ). It was lastly contended on behalf of the petitioner that, earlier the petitioner was exonerated in a similar enquiry in the matter of issuance of licences and therefore he could not be held guilty of similar charges again. There is no substance in this contention because the charges levelled against the petitioner on 31st May, 1981 in the earlier enquiry were not proved against him and therefore he was exonerated. The earlier enquiry report is brought on record at Annexure i to the affidavit dated 1 8/12/1981 filed by the respondents. From the report, it appears that the D. S. VII licence, which was issued, was not a licence issued to a new dealer and therefore it was found that the petitioner had not committed any breach of the policy of the Government. Even as regards the other charges, it was found that the enquiry did not disclose any violation of the procedure by the petitioner in issuance of Poppy-2 licence because it was not established that the petitioner had issued such licence without the opinion of the District Committee as alleged. Therefore, exoneration of the petitioner on earlier charges, which were not established, cannot be a bar against holding a separate enquiry in respect of instances which are entirely different. The enquiry which has been held against the petitioner in this case is on the aforesaid five counts which have been narrated in complete details in the Schedule a to the charge-sheet dated 1-9- 1982 at Ann. c to the petition. On comparison of the particulars contained in the said charge-sheet with the nature of the earlier charges, it is clear that the present enquiry is an enquiry altogether on different charges from the earlier enquiry in respect of which the petitioner was exonerated. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the petitioner that because earlier on a charge which was similar to one of the present five charges, the petitioner was exonerated, he should again be exonerated or that no enquiry can be held against him under the same head of misconduct even if the instances are entirely different. ( 7 ) ). In view of the above discussion, it is clear that there is no substance in this petition. Rule is, therefore, discharged with no order as to costs. .