K. G. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) AT 1. 30 p. m. on 21/07/1982 an automobile collision occurred within the Indian Petrochemicals Limited (IPCL for short) campus near Baroda. In the collision two vehicles were involved. One was a scooter bearing registration No. BHC 1206 of the ownership of Respondent No. 1 Singh Sata Singh and the same at the time of collision was driven by that Respondent No. 1. The other vehicle was an ambassador car bearing registration No. GTH 5198 which belonged to the appellant herein and was being driven by the driver of the appellant. In that ambassador car certain persons were travelling. As a result of the accident Respondent No. 1 suffered some injuries. He sustained a fracture of the left femur bone and he also sustained some other injuries. Some of the passengers travelling in that ambassador car also sustained some injuries. The car was also damaged; so also was the scooter damaged. ( 2 ) BEFORE the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Vadodara five compensation cases under Section 110 A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (for short the Act) came to be filed. Three of those claim petitions were filed by the passengers travelling in the motor car who claimed compensation in respect of personal injuries sustained by them. The fourth claim petition was filed by the present appellant against the present Respondent No. 1 claiming compensation in respect of the damage to his car. However in the present appeal we are not concerned with these four claim cases. The fifth claim was laid by the present Respondent No. 1 against the present appellant its driver and the Insurance Company-Respondent No. 2 with which at the time of the accident the motor car in question was insured for third party risk. Respondent No. 1 in his claim petition laid a claim for compensation in the sum of Rs. 70 0 on the allegation that the accident occurred solely because of the rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the motor car in driving the car. Respondent No. 1 contended that as a result of the accident he sustained fracture and some other injuries and he was required to take long-term treatment. He has been left with permanent partial disability. His earning capacity has decreased. He was required to spend large sums of money on treatment etc. Respondent No. 1 contended that as a result of the accident he sustained fracture and some other injuries and he was required to take long-term treatment. He has been left with permanent partial disability. His earning capacity has decreased. He was required to spend large sums of money on treatment etc. ( 3 ) ALL the aforesaid five compensation cases came to be consolidated by the Tribunal ( 4 ) AS said above we are not concerned in this appeal with the other four claim cases Therefore we will confine our attention to the claim petition filed by Respondent No. 1 ( 5 ) THE driver of the ambassador car did not enter appearance though duly served The present appellant the owner of the car contended that the accident occurred solely of rashness and negligence on the part of Respondent No. 1 the scooterist. The insurer of the Ambassador car being Respondent No 2 inter alia contended that it is not responsible to satisfy the judgment and award that may be passed in the case on the ground that the place where the accident occurred was not a public place ( 6 ) THE learned Member of the Tribunal on evidence found that both the scooterist as also the car driver were equally guilty of negligence in the matter of driving their respective vehicles and their share of the blame was equal on the question of quantum of compensation the Tribunal worked out Rs. 15 0 as damaged which normally would be payable to Respondent No. 1 under the head of pain shock and suffering. Similarly Rs. 2 0 was worked out under the head of expenses for medical treatment and Rs. 1000. 00 was worked out as expenses for special diet. Respondent No. 1 was at the time of the accident serving in Gujarat Refinery as an Electrical Engineer and was getting the total emoluments of the order of Rs. 2 600 per month The Tribunal found that Respondent No. 1 could not attend to his duties for three months therefore he lost the earning to the tune of Rs. 7 800 The Tribunal also found Respondent No. 1 must have been required to spend about Rs. 600. 00 on conveyance charge for taking treatment for his injuries. Thus the Tribunal came to the figure of Rs. 7 800 The Tribunal also found Respondent No. 1 must have been required to spend about Rs. 600. 00 on conveyance charge for taking treatment for his injuries. Thus the Tribunal came to the figure of Rs. 96 400 as the amount of damages suffered by Respondent No 1 under the aforesaid heads. One of the heads of the claim made by Respondent No. 1 was for future economic loss The medical evidence in the case showed that Respondent No. 1 has been left with 30 % permanent partial disability at the left leg. The Tribunal took that percentage of disability and reduced the then income of Respondent No. 1 which was Rs. 2 600 per month by 30% and came to a figre of Rs. 780. 00 p. m. which in the opinion of the Tribunal was the loss which Respondent No. 1 would suffer every month under the head of future economic loss. The Tribunal applied 10 as the multiplcand or the years purchase facto and came to an overall figure of Rs. 93 600 under the head of future economic loss Adding thereto the earlier figure of Rs. 26 400 the Tribunal came to a total figure of Rs. 1 20 0 As the Tribunal found Respondent No. 1 guilty of negligence to the extent of 50 % it sliced down the total damages of Rs. 1 20 0 to Rs. 60 0 and passed an award in favour of Respondent No. 1 for Rs. 60 0 with twelve per cent interest thereon per annum and proportionate costs. The Tribunal passed that award against the appellant being the owner of the car as also the driver of the car who was impleaded as party opponent in the petition The Tribunal accepted the contention of the Insurance Company that as the accident occurred at a place which was not a public place the Insurance Company was not liable to satisfy the judgment and award and on that basis the Tribunal exonerated the Insurance Company from its liability ( 7 ) THE owner of the car is in appeal before us. ( 8 ) MR. S. N. Shelat the learned Advocate for the appellant raised two contention before us. Firstly he submitted that the award under the head of future economic loss is highly excessive. We may mention here that Mr. ( 8 ) MR. S. N. Shelat the learned Advocate for the appellant raised two contention before us. Firstly he submitted that the award under the head of future economic loss is highly excessive. We may mention here that Mr. Shelat did not dispute the working of the damages under the other heads. Accordingly to Mr. Shelat the Tribunal has gone absolutely wrong in taking the mathematical formula of equating the percentage of anatomical disability with the actual future economic disability and the resultant economic loss. Mr. Shelat nextly contended that the view of the Tribunal that the place of the accident was not a public place within the meaning of the expression as used in the relevant provisions of the Act is erroneous and thoroughly unsustainable. According to Mr. Shelat the Tribunal has gone grossly wrong in exonerating the Insurance Company of its liability to satisfy the award. ( 9 ) MR. R. R. Marshal the learned Advocate who represented Respondent No. 1 supported Mr. Shelat on his second submission about the liability of the Insurance Company while supporting the award of the Tribunal even under the head of future economic loss. ( 10 ) MR. N. N. Gandhi the learned Advocate for the Insurance Company supported the Tribunals finding that the place where the accident happened is not a public place and therefore the Insurance Company is not liable to satisfy the Award. ( 11 ) WE may mention here that so far as the finding of the Tribunal that the accident happened because of the negligence on the part of both the scooterist as also the car drivel and that both of them were equally responsible for the accident is not in dispute before us. ( 12 ) THE facts in this Case so far as the quantum of compensation is concerned are not much in dispute. There is medical evidence to show that Respondent No. 1 had sustained fracture of the left Femur bone and he had also sustained some other injuries. There is evidence to show that after the accident Respondent No. 1 was taken to Lady Pillar Hospital and was treated there for about three months. Even after being discharged from the hospital he was advised to take bed rest. He was advised to use crutches while walking and for quite some time after he started walking he was required to use crutches. Even after being discharged from the hospital he was advised to take bed rest. He was advised to use crutches while walking and for quite some time after he started walking he was required to use crutches. As said above at the time of the accident he was serving with Gujarat Refinery as an Electrical Engineer. His age at the time of his deposition in January 1986 was 48 years. There is uncontroverted statement made by him that his promotion was delayed for one year because of the accident. There is also uncontroverted evidence to show that his left leg has been shortened by one inch and even at the time he gave the deposition he was suffering pain at the left leg. He stated that he cannot run nor can he walk fast and he finds difficulty while sitting. These facts have been stated by Respondent No. 1 in his deposition. ( 13 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 has examined Dr. Kantilal Patel who treated Respondent No. 1 for quite sometime for his fracture injury. As said above the accident happened on 21/07/1982 Respondent No. 1 was under the treatment of Dr. Kantilal Patel for about three years for the facture injury and the follow-up treatment. According to Dr. Patel during the treatment period Respondent No. 1 was given traction for ten days and he was also advised physiotherapy treatment. Lastly Dr. Patel examined Respondent No. 1 on 20/10/1985 i. e. more than 3 1/4 years after the accident and at the time Dr. Patel found that Respondent No. 1 had been left at the left hip with : (1) Mobility Flexion extention loss 20 %. (2) Abduction Abduction loss 20 % (3) Rotation loss 20 % Average loss 20%therefore in the opinion of the doctor the total disability on the ground of mobility was 6 %. Patel found that Respondent No. 1 had been left at the left hip with : (1) Mobility Flexion extention loss 20 %. (2) Abduction Abduction loss 20 % (3) Rotation loss 20 % Average loss 20%therefore in the opinion of the doctor the total disability on the ground of mobility was 6 %. The loss of muscle strength was assessed by the Doctor at 20 % Disability of the stability components was assessed at 8% and the total disability on the aforesaid ground was assessed by the doctor at 19 6 On account of deformity the disability was assessed at 49to for there was shortening of the left leg and on account of pain the disability was assessed at 3 % Thus the doctor has worked out the total disability of the left lower limb at 30 per cent the doctor stated that Respondent No. 1 would find difficulty in running and walking and he would not be in a position to sit fully squat and he would also not be in a position to sit cross-legged fully If Respondent No. 1 is required to stand for long periods he would develop pain In cross-examination by the learned Advocate for the Insurance Company the doctor said that Respondent No. 1 might get pain after standing or walking continuously for two hours The doctor however hastened to add that the disability will not affect the routine table work and the pain would not be permanent pain The doctor has deposed that the overall disability of the whole body would be 50% of the total disability of the lower extrimity. The fracture had completely healed The leg was shortened to the extent of one inch and elevated shoe will help Respondent No. 1 for his leg was shortened. ( 14 ) THUS there is evidence to show that Respondent No. 1 has suffered 30 % permanent partial disability of the left lower limb and even after 3 1 years of the accident when the doctor examined him it was found that Respondent No. 1 would find difficulty in running and walking He would not be in a position to sit fully squatted nor would he be in a position to sit cross-legged and if he was required to stand or walk for long spells of time he would develop pain. ( 15 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 was an Electical Engineer in Gujarat Refinery In the very nature of his job as an Engineer he would have to do some amount of field work and for that purpose he would be required to walk and stand for quite some time and that would certainly cause him pain and the result thereof would be decrease in his efficiency. Of course even after the accident albeit belatedly he has earned his promotion and after the promotion as on the date of the deposition his total emoluments had increased to Rs. 2 800 per month while earlier they were Rs. 2 600 per month. ( 16 ) SO far as future economic loss is concerned it has not two aspects One is positive loss in the shape of additional expenditure which Respondent No. 1 would probably have to make and which could certainly be related to the disability with which he has been left and the second would be negative aspect view loss of future income and that component would also include the probable loss of future prospects. So far as positive aspect is concerned as deposed by the doctor elevated shoe will help Respondent No. 1 for he has shortening of the leg. Therefore Respondent No. 1 would have at intervals to spend for elevated shoe. At the time of the accident he was 48 years of age. It could not be gainsaid that there are all the probabilities of an early onset of osteo-arthritis in case of person who have suffered such disability as has been suffered by Respondent No. 1 With the early onset of osteo-arthritis his mobility would certainly decrease and he would have with increasing frequency to go for hired conveyance for his locomotion. That would certainly entail quite some expenses to him. It also could not be denied that with the disability with which he has been left and which was found by the doctor at the end of 3 1/2 years after the accident he would have to spend some amount on medicines quite frequently and that frequency would increase with the increase in age. ( 17 ) THESE and other factors would certainly require Respondent No. 1 to incur extra expenditure which could be directly related to the disability with which he has been left. ( 17 ) THESE and other factors would certainly require Respondent No. 1 to incur extra expenditure which could be directly related to the disability with which he has been left. Of course it is very difficult to make even an estimate of the expenditure which Respondent No. 1 would have to make under these and similar heads. However at the same time we ale required to determine the amount of compensation payable to Respondent No. 1 for these future probable expenses as might appear to us to be just. ( 18 ) COMING to the negative aspect of the future economic loss looking to the disability with which he has been left the probability of his being required to absent from duty as and when he develops pain in future also cannot be ruled out and with the increases in absentism on account of pain his earnings would adversely be affected. With the shortening of the leg and the disability as described by the doctor and the chance of pain and difficulty or inability to sit cross-legged or to squat and looking to the nature of work as an Electrical Engineer he is expected to do the probability of the being compelled or required to prematurely retire also cannot be ruled out. There is one other aspect of the concept of negative side of future economic loss and it is like this. It is good that today Respondent No. 1 is continued in service and he has earned one promotion even after the accident. But of for some reason tomorrow he is required to quit his present job and to try for a job in the open market his prospects of getting an appropriate job would certainly be adversely affected. He having put in some years of service with his present employer his present employer may not either like or be in a position to throw him away form the job even with the disability with which he has been left and might have to pull on with him. But if he is required to seek a job afresh he would certainty be at a discount on account of the disability with which he is left. This aspect is required to be kept in mind while considering the question of future economic loss. But if he is required to seek a job afresh he would certainty be at a discount on account of the disability with which he is left. This aspect is required to be kept in mind while considering the question of future economic loss. To put it differently if for some reason Respondent No. 1 is required to go in the open market seeking some job he would not be in a position to get such a good and promising or lucrative job as he would have got if the had not been visited with the disability with which he has been now left. ( 19 ) THE Tribunal has as seen above straightaway worked out the future economic loss on the basis of 30% disability and Rs. 2 600 p. m. as has his emoluments. Now how far the percentage of anatomical disability would be reflected in the loss of future income would depend upon a variety of factors. It would mainly depend upon the job or nature of work that the man is supposed to do or is doing. Take the case of a manual labourer. If his leg has been shortened by one inch and he has been left with a disability similar to the one with which Respondent No. 1 has been left it would not be gainsaid that his earning capacity would be reduced substantially As against that the person who has to do table work and is not required to do much of manual or physical work even with the disability like the present as is seen from the medical evidence his future economic loss would not be of the same order as it would be in the case of a manual labourer. We are alive to the fact that Respondent No 1 is not a person who has only to do table work He is an Electrical Engineer As said above he would have to do some field work of course there is no clear evidence about the extent of the field work Respondent No. 1 has to do But then that he would have to do some amount of field work cannot be disputed looking to the fact that he is an Electrical Engineer working with Gujarat Refinery At the same time the fact that he has even with the disability earned promotion though belatedly is also required to be considered Keeping all these factors in mind we think we have to Strike a mean between the two extremes one being loss of future earning equivalent in percentage to the anatomical loss and the other being that even with the disability he has been continued in service and he has earned his promotion The Tribunal has taken Rs. 780/ - per month as the future economic loss of Respondent No. 1. In our opinion keeping all the relevant facts in mind that figure is on such a high side as would require interference at the hands of this Court even keeping in mind the fact that this Court normally would not interfere with the assessment of damages if it is within reasonable brackets Keeping all the aforesaid relevant factors in mind in our opinion Rs. 500. 00 per month should be taken to be the future economic loss of Respondent No. 1. The assessment on that basis we believe would be just and reasonable Rs. 500/ per month would work out to Rs. 6 0 per annum and taking 10 as the multiplicand or years purchase factor which has been adopted by the Tribunal to which no exception has been taken by any side the figure would come to Rs. 60 0 Adding that figure to the undisputed figure of Rs. 26 400 the grant total would come to Rs. 86 400 The contribution of Respondent No. 1 in the causation of the accident is apportioned by the Tribunal at 50 % and that apportionment is not challenged. Respondent No. 1 is therefore entitled to get compensation in the sum of Rs. 26 400 the grant total would come to Rs. 86 400 The contribution of Respondent No. 1 in the causation of the accident is apportioned by the Tribunal at 50 % and that apportionment is not challenged. Respondent No. 1 is therefore entitled to get compensation in the sum of Rs. 43 200 The appeal in so far as the amount of the award is concerned shall have therefore to be accordingly allowed. ( 20 ) THIS takes us to the second submission of Mr. Shelat The accident happened in the campus or premises of IPCL Respondent No. 1 in his deposition has stated that security guard remains present at the gate of IPCL and one has to enter the gate after taking permissi on The accident occur red on the road owned by IPCL. There is a road divider in the middle of the road Surykant Chimanlal who was one of the claimants in the other case in this group in his cross-examination stated that the incident occurred in the compound of IPCL. He said that before entering the premises one has to take permission from the guard at the gate. The Tribunal has taken these statements appearing in the evidence to hold that the place where the accident happened is a private campus and is not a public place It was on that basis that the Tribunal exonerated the Insurance Company from its liability to satisfy the award. . ( 21 ) THE panchnama of the place of the accident drawn by police in presence of the panchas soon after the accident has been admitted in evidence by the consent of all the parties. It is at Exh. 49 on the record of the case. The panchnama shows that the place of the accident was within the IPCL campus It was on the main internal road of the campus. The road was divided into two lanes-upper lane and lower lane-and the two lanes are separated by road dividers made of cement concrete. The two lanes of the road as such were tar surfaced lanes. The width of each of the two lanes of the road was 23 5. Thus the panchnama makes it clear that the road was sufficiently wide woad. It was a tar road. The two lanes were divided by cement concrete dividers. The two lanes of the road as such were tar surfaced lanes. The width of each of the two lanes of the road was 23 5. Thus the panchnama makes it clear that the road was sufficiently wide woad. It was a tar road. The two lanes were divided by cement concrete dividers. There is also evidence to show that there were electrical poles at intervals on the road. At the time of hearing of this appeal it was a conceded position that IPCL is a huge complex having a staff township within the premises and quite a large number of vehicles enter the complex every day We were told that in the IPCL complex about 10 0 employers may be working and staff buses quite large in number might be plying within the complex. It is also not in dispute that all sorts of persons having business of commercial relations with IPCL such as contractors businessmen transporters etc. have to visit the complex day in and day out There is evidence to show that there is a medical centre or medical complex within the IPCL complex. These facts would clearly show the magnitude of the IPCL complex. It is in light of these facts that we would have to decide whether the place where the accident happened should or should not be considered to be a public place within the meaning of that expression used in the relevant provisions of the Act ( 22 ) IN order to find that the place of the accident cannot be termed as a public place within the meaning of that expressed used in the relevant provisions of the Act the Tribunal has relied upon the decision in the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rabari Gandu Punja and Ors. 22 G. L. R. p. 1161 In that case the accident happened in the compound of Western India Tiles Company Makansar (Morvi ). The learned Single Judge of this Court was required to decide in that case whether the place of the accident could be said to be a public place. The learned Judge there held that the place of the accident could not be said to be a public place. In our opinion that decision is distinguishable on facts for there the place of the accident it appeals was in the compound of a small tiles factory. The learned Judge there held that the place of the accident could not be said to be a public place. In our opinion that decision is distinguishable on facts for there the place of the accident it appeals was in the compound of a small tiles factory. There were no well laid down roads within the factory premises as we have in the IPCL complex in the case before us. It appears from the report of the ease that it was a small tiles factory where some labourers were working and the truck in question while being driven in the reverse direction crushed to death a labourer woman. Such a place cannot be compared with the place of the present accident which was in IPCL complex the magnitude of which we have seen hereinabove. In the case before the learned Single Judge there was nothing to show that quite a large number of persons had access to the tiles factory. Here as indicated above thousands of persons must be having access to the IPCL complex every day and it is to clear to their needs that tar roads have been laid down with cement concrete road dividers dividing the up lane and the down lane and electric poles have been fixed for the proper use of these lanes of roads at night time. These features of the evidence in the case before us in our opinion would certainly distinguish the place of the accident in the case before us from the place of the accident with which the learned Single Judge of this Court was concerned in the case relied upon by the Tribunal. ( 23 ) MR. Shelat the learned Advocate for the appellant very heavily relied upon the Full Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Pandurang Chamaji Agale and Another v. New India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Pune and Others 1988 (2) Accidents Claims Journal p. 674. In that case the following question was referred to the Full Bench. Shelat the learned Advocate for the appellant very heavily relied upon the Full Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Pandurang Chamaji Agale and Another v. New India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Pune and Others 1988 (2) Accidents Claims Journal p. 674. In that case the following question was referred to the Full Bench. "whether a private road a private place to which the public have a permissive access would be the public place within the meaning of Section 3 (24) as well as used in Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939"the occasion to refer to the Full Bench arose in connection with a claim case that was filed arising from an automobile accident which occurred within the factory premises of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. situated at Pimpri Pune (TELCO for short ). In that case also before the Tribunal the Insurance Company contended that as the accident had happened in the private premised of TELCO the place of the accident could not be said to be a public place and therefore the Insurance Company was not liable to satisfy the award/judgment. That contention found favour with the Tribunal with the result that the Insurance Company was exonerated from the liability to satisfy the award. The owner of the offending vehicle and its driver carried the matter to the High Court and in the appeal as said above the aforesaid question came to be referred to the Full Bench. There the evidence showed that the TELCO complex was a huge establishment and in the compound of the establishment in addition to various structures there were open spaces and roads for the passage of traffic. Vehicles of all sorts were plied on the said roads. In addition to the large number of employees there was constant traffic of outsiders visiting the factory for various purposes. The width of the road at the place of the accident was 45 metres with a road divider in the centre. There was a traffic island nearby the place of the accident. There were other buildings near the vicinity of the place of the accident. There was also evidence to show that suppliers contractors and visitors were required to reach the various blocks of the main building in connection with their business. There was a traffic island nearby the place of the accident. There were other buildings near the vicinity of the place of the accident. There was also evidence to show that suppliers contractors and visitors were required to reach the various blocks of the main building in connection with their business. For going to the various blocks from the main gate of the factory one was required to travel a distance of about 1 1/2 to 3 kms. Permission was required for going to the various blocks. Various modes of conveyance mainly cars autorickshows scooters mopeds and other vehicles were used for reaching the various units. Daily about 500 to 600 parties visited the factory and about 100 vehicles of the transport contractors and other units of TELCO used to ply for arranging transport of the employees of the factory per shift. There were a large number of security personnel engaged by TELCO. The establishment was enclosed by compound walls. A causal visitor was given a gage pass while a regular visitor was given regular pass for a fixed period endorsed by the security department. The security department could refuse entry at the entrance in the absence of proper authority and the department was who had unauthorised entry in the premises. There was also evidence to show that the permission could be oral and it could also be in writing. The permission was verified at the time of entry in the factory permises. The entire factory premises including the main roads belonged to TELCO who were the owners of the offending motor truck. The maintenance of the road was also done by TELCO. There then were the feature of the evidence with which the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court was concerned while deciding the question whether the place of the accident in that case could be said to be a public place. After adverting to these features which emerged from the evidence in that case the Full Bench has in paragraph 6 of the report referred to the various provisions of the Act some of which have the reference to the use of a motor vehicle in a public place and some others have the reference to the use of a motor vehicle in a place which may not be even a public place. In paragraph 7 of the report the Full Bench referred to Chapter VII-A of the Act dealing with no fault liability on account of accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle in any place and not necessarily in public place. There the Full Bench has also referred to Chapter VIII of the Act which requires compulsory insurance of the motor vehicles against third party risk and with which the Full Bench was concerned in that case. The Full Bench also referred to Section 109-A to Section 109-C with regard to hit and run accidents which do not require that the accident should have occurred at public place to attract them. Section 110 contained in Chapter VIII as noticed by the Full Bench makes the provision for filing an application under Section 110 for claims arising out of the accident does not stipulate that the accident should occur in a public place. It has also been noticed that Chapter IX of the Act which deals with the offences under the act and penalties to be imposed for the same does not require that the offence of driving the vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drug should have occur red in a public place. Sections 126 and 127 have also been taken note of. In paragraph 8 of the report this is what has been observed:"it is in the light of the object of the statute its aforesaid relevant provision and the scheme that we have to appreciate the true import of the expression public place for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the Act. It has further to be remembered that the expression public place is a term of the Act the same having been defined specifically by sub-clause (24) of Section 2 of the Act". Then Clause (24) of Section 2 of the Act has been extracted. The same is as follows:" (24) public place means a road street way or other place whether a thoroughfare or not to which the public have a right of access and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage". The Full Bench proceeded to say:"the first thing to remember with regard to the definition is that it is an inclusive one. The Full Bench proceeded to say:"the first thing to remember with regard to the definition is that it is an inclusive one. Secondly it in term makes it clear that any road street way or other place for the purpose of the Act the only condition being that the public should have a right of access to it. Thirdly the expression used in the definition is a right of access and not access as of right. Lastly when it states that any place of stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage car stage is a public place it shows that it is not so much concerned with the ownership of the place as with its user. Stage carriage is defined in sub-clause (29) of Section 2 and it means a motor vehicle which is used to carry or adopted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver and which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey. In short it means a public passenger carrier. In other words by virtue of the last part of the definition the expression would include any place including private where public passenger carrier picks up or sets down passengers"the definition of public place under the Act is therefore wide enough to include any place which members of public use and to which they have a right of access The right of access may be permissive limited restricted or regulated by oral or written permission by tickets passes or badges or on payment of fee. The use may be restricted generally or to particular purpose or purposes. What is necessary is that the place must be accessible to the members of public and be available for their use enjoyment avocation or other purpose. It is also necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the expression right of access and access as of right The latter expression denotes a place where the members of public have a right of its use as members of public and as a matter of right whether regulated restricted or not They cannot however be denied the said right except on legal grounds. On the other hand where there is only a right of access the owner of the place if he happens to be a private owner may deny the access to any members of the public on any ground which he chooses. In other words in the former case the right of the members of the public to use the place is restricted compared to their right to use in the latter case. The definition under the Act uses the expression right of access as pointed out earlier. What is therefore significant to note is that under the present definition even a place the right to use of which is restricted is a public place Once this is borne in mind much of the controversy raised before us about the correct meaning of the expression public place losses its edge. If we further bear in mind the overall object of the provisions of Chapter VIII which deals with compulsory insurance of the vehicle to cover risks to third parties and their property with claims to be filed for recovering compensation no fault liabilities and liabilities arising out of hit and run accidents etc. the intention of the legislature is clear. It is to secure compensation to the persons and property which are exposed to the accidents caused by the vehicles. The very nature of the motor vehicle and its use mandate these provisions. The motor vehicle in this respect can be likened to a wild animal Whoever keeps it does so at his risk. As pointed out earlier some of the restrictions on the use of the vehicle contained in the Act are irrspective of the nature of the place where it is used and irrespective of whether it is piled or kept stationary. The legislature was concerned not so much with the nature of the place where the vehicle causes the accident as where it was likely to do so Hence all places where the members of public and/or their property are likely to come in contact with the vehicles can legitimately be said to be in its view when the legislature made the relevant provisions for compulsory insurance. it will have therefore to be held that all places where the members of public have an access for whatever reasons whether as of right or controlled in any manner whatsoever would be covered by the definition of public place in Section 2 (24) of the Act To hold otherwise would frustrate the very object of the said Chapter and the Act. ( 24 ) AFTER making the aforesaid pertinent observations and holdings on the content of the expression public place the Full Bench proceeded to refer to the dictionary meaning of the expression public place After having done so the Full Bench referred to the various judgments of the various High Courts on the point It is not necessary for us to dwell at length on all the discussion that has been made by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court Suffice it to say that the discussion clearly spells out the cleavage of opinion on the interpretation of the expression public place as used in the relevant provisions of the Act Some of the judgments noticed by the Full Bench took a view that if the place where the accident occurred is a private property it can never be a public place In that catena of decisions the Full Bench has also referred to the judgment in the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Rabari Gandu Punja and of Ewers rendered by the learned Single Judge of this High Court to which we have made a reference hereinabove. On the other hand the Full Bench has also referred to the other line of decision which took the contrary and more liberal view. It is interesting to note that while adverting to the decisions on that line the Full Bench has referred to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of State v. Sobhana Jamnadas AIR 1961 Guj. 182 . That of course was a case under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act In that case the concerned accused were found to be gambling in a Second Class Ladies Waiting Room at Jetalsar Railway Station. The Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act made the Act of gaming in a place to which public have or permitted to have access an offence punishable under Section 12 of that Act. The Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act made the Act of gaming in a place to which public have or permitted to have access an offence punishable under Section 12 of that Act. The question before the Division Bench of this Court was whether the Second Class Ladies Waiting Room at Jetalsar Railway Station could be said to be a public place so as to make the Act of the concerned accused an offence under Section 12 of the Act and that the definition of public place included a place to which the public have or are permitted to have access The definition of the expression public place under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act is slightly different than the definition of the said expression under Clause (24) of Section 2 of the Act Nonetheless the judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court renders some assistance to us as it did to the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in arriving at the meaning to be assigned to the expression public place as used in the relevant provisions of the Act after adverting to this Division Bench decision of this High Court bearing on the Anti-Gambling law and after referring to various other judgments the Full Bench in para 14 of the report observed as under"the survey of the aforesaid decisions shows that the Courts are not unanimous and there is a divergence of opinion with regard to the definition of public place in Section 2 (24) of the Act For the reasons which we have discussed earlier we prefer the view taken by the latter authorities and hold that at least for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the Act the expression public place will cover at places including those of private ownership where members of public have and access whether free of controlled in any manner whatsoever" ( 25 ) THIS judgment rendered by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has been referred to with approval in (1) Nagaraj Chhajar v. Soma Priya Ghosh and Ors 1991 A. C. J. p. 1049 (2) United India Insurance Co Ltd. v. Roop Kanwar and Others 1991 ACJ 74 and (3) Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd. v. Raghunath Muduli and Others 1992 ACJ p. 117as seen above the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has referred to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rabari Gandu Punja and has not preferred the holding therein to the contrary view taken by some other decisions. Even in the case of Nagaraj Chhajar (supra) that judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court has been referred to but the view of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has been followed in that case-Similar is the position in the ease of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Raghunath Muduli and Others (supra) where also the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this High Court has been referred to but the view of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has been followed ( 26 ) MR. N. N. Gandhi the learned Advocate for the Insurance Company relied upon the decision in the case of Nagarathinam v. Murugesan and Others 1991 ACJ 673 . We have gone through that judgment and we find that in that judgment neither the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court has been referred to nor has it referred to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court referred to by us hereinabove. The decision relied upon by Mr. N N Gadhi therefore has no assistance to render to us in this case ( 27 ) THE Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has as seen above emphasised that the use of the expression public place is not so much concerned with the ownership of the place as with the user thereof For emphasising this the Full Bench has resorted to the later part of the definition of the expression public place as given in Clause (24) of Section 2 of the Act In that later part of the definition of the expression public place given in Clause (24) of Section 2 of the Act in the expression public place is included any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage. This would mean that any place where a stage carriage plies for the purpose of picking up and setting down passengers would be a public place within the meaning of the expression of Clause (24) of Section 2 of the Act irrespective of the ownership of the place. This would mean that any place where a stage carriage plies for the purpose of picking up and setting down passengers would be a public place within the meaning of the expression of Clause (24) of Section 2 of the Act irrespective of the ownership of the place. The earlier part of the definition deals with the roads streets way or other place whether a thoroughfare or not to which the public have a right of access and the later part includes the place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by stage carriage. Therefore it is clear that it was not so much with the ownership of the place where the accident occurs that the Legislature was concerned in defining the expression public place as with the use of the place We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in paragraph 8 of its judgment. ( 28 ) AS said above in para 10 of the judgment of the Full Bench the learned Judges of the Full Bench laid down the objects underlying Chapter VIII We are in full agreement with whatever has been said in paragraph 10 of that judgment That being so we need not repeat everything contained therein. ( 29 ) MR. Gandhi submitted that when the definition of the expression public place employs the expression right of access what is meant is an absolute right of public to have access to a place and once that right is in any manner restricted the concerned place would not come within the purview of the expression public place We are not in a position to accept this submission of Mr. Gandhi One has to remember that we are concerned with an Act which was brought in the statute book in 1939 At that time there must not have been in this country such large complexes as IPCL and the like or at least there must not have been such large complexes in such large number as we find today With the increase in industrialisation and with the increase in commercialisation in this Country such big establishments are fast coming up and of necessity quite a large number of members of the public are day in and day out required to enter the campus of such large establishments May be for security reason or for some other reason the establishments might regulate the entry of public into their premises. In some establishments there might be a system of oral permission to be obtained from the security guard; in some there might be a system of written permission In some even without a formal request or permission there could be presumed permission But the thing remains that in such large establishments large number of the members of public day in and day out are of necessity required to go If such places are these days held to be not public place within the meaning of the expression as used in the relevant provisions of the Act the whole object underlying the scheme of compulsory insurance under Chapter VIII of the Act would be frustrated When we talk of entry of large number of members of public in such establishments we include therein entry of vehicles. As could be seen from the facts of the present case as also as could be seen from the facts of the case decided by the Bombay High Court through the premises of IPCL and TELCO may be private premises many vehicles ply therein; roads are laid down electric poles are laid down and large number of members of public either on foot or by means of vehicles have ingress to and egress from such premises If on a narrow construction of the expression public place such establishments or premises of such establishments are kept out of the purview of the expression public place in quite a large number of cases the scheme of compulsory insurance would be frustrated. ( 30 ) HAVING bestowed our anxious attention to the arguments levelled by the learned Advocate before us we think that the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court should commend to us and we hold accordingly. On that basis we hold that the place of the accident in the present case which was within the IPCL complex was a public place within the meaning of that expression as used in the relevant provisions of the Act That being so the place was covered within the ambit of public place as used in Section 95 of the Act and consequently under Section 96 of the Act the Insurance Company would certainly be liable to satisfy the judgment and award in the present case The finding of the Tribunal to the contrary cannot be upheld. It is set aside ( 31 ) WE have hereinabove indicated so far as quantum of compensation payable to Respondent No. 1 that it is required to be sliced down ( 32 ) IN the result therefore appeal is partly allowed and instead of the award in the sum of Rs. 60 0 passed in favour of Respondent No. 1 there shall be an award in the sum of Rs. 43 200 with 12 % interest thereon with proportionate costs against the present appellant as also Prakash Chunilal Shah the driver of the motor car in question. The New India Assurance Co Ltd. Respondent No. 2 herein shall also be liable to satisfy the award. The parties shall bear their own respective costs of this appeal. Appeal partly allowed .