JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - The Petitioner, the Pramukh of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, challenges the minutes of meeting of the Nagar Mahapalika held on 21st May, 1991, in accordance with Section 15-A read with Section 16 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam). The District Judge, Allahabad, the respondent no. 2, presided over the said meeting. 2. The Presiding Officer recorded that on account of the turbulence in the meeting it became impossible to proceed further and he, therefore, adjourned the meeting. He also recorded that the voting did not appear to be fair and just and impersonation too could not be ruled out. He. therefore. ordered 'repoll' and requested the Commissioner of the Allahabad Division to fix another date for "iepolling-'. 3. It will be convenient to set out the report of the District Judge, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-1 to this petition. Its material contents are these. The meeting to consider the motion of no-confidence in the petitioner as convened by the Commissioner commenced on 21st May, 1991, at 11.00 A M. in the Committee room of the Nagar Mahapalika. At 11.30 A M. 39 members, including the petitioner, were present. Between 11 00 A.M. and 11.30 A.M. some persons came inside the Committee room while some other persons went out. There was no police arrangement. The members did not pay any heed to the appeal to take their seats. Between 11 00 A.M. and 11.40 A M. members and others persons were going outside the Committee room and coming inside. The discussion on the motion commenced at 11.30 A.M. At 11.40 A M. an application was filed by one Sri Lalji stating therein that since the quorum was not complete the proceedings may be stopped. Section 16 of the Adhiniyam did not provide for any quorum at the stage of commencement of the meeting. It merely provided that the motion of no-confidence will be deemed to have been carried only if it had been passed by majority of more than half of the members of the Mahapalika. Since the discussion was going on and the stage for voting had not arrived, the proceedings of the meeting could not be interrupted for want of quorum. During the course of the discussion 9 more persons came inside the Committee room. In all 48 members were present. Since the discussion was going on and the stage for voting had not arrived, the proceedings of the meeting could not be interrupted for want of quorum. During the course of the discussion 9 more persons came inside the Committee room. In all 48 members were present. In the absence of any proper arrangements members were coming inside and going outside. At 12.15 P. M. 48 members were present. Ballot papers were distributed to all of them. Two members complained of non-receipt of ballot papers. Since all the members had been supplied with ballot papers, the request of the 2 members was refused. The account of the ballot papers given by B. K. Dwivedi, the Secretary of the Mahapalika showed that 49 ballot papers bad been issued though only 48 members were present. In the circumstances, repoll was directed. No one objected to this procedure. Another ballot box was brought in and a fresh ballot paper was given to the petitioner. He agreed to the arrangement and cast his vote. The second ballat paper was given to one Sri Atul Kumar. At this stage, the petitioner raised an objection that repolling should not be held. A number of persons came from outside and objected to the repolling. They appeared to be agitated. Two factions were shouting slogans. Some of them stood on the tables and indulged in slogan shouting at the top of their voice. The atmosphere became surcharged. It became impossible to proceed further. The meeting was, therefore, adjourned. The Commissioner is being requested to convene a fresh meeting on another date. He is also being requested to ensure that proper police arrangements are made. Without the police force it will be impossible to hold the meeting and get the polling done. In all there were 48 members. However, the petitioner, Sri Quamaruddin and Sri Ashok Kumar Sonkar refused to sign the attendance register. The Presiding Officer was informed that some yellow substance had been poured inside the ballot box. The voting did not seem to be just and fair. Impersonation could not be ruled out. Sri Jamuna Prasad had complained that the supporters of the petitioner were preventing the Sabhasads from coming inside the Committee room. 4. The Petitioner has made allegations against the Presiding Officer. The burden of his song is that his report contained incorrect facts. The voting did not seem to be just and fair. Impersonation could not be ruled out. Sri Jamuna Prasad had complained that the supporters of the petitioner were preventing the Sabhasads from coming inside the Committee room. 4. The Petitioner has made allegations against the Presiding Officer. The burden of his song is that his report contained incorrect facts. Having read the report more than once and having gone through the contents of the writ petition and the counter affidavit of Sri Uma Shanker Srivastava, the steno to the Presiding Officer, and the Annexures thereto, I am satisfied that no valid reason exists for disbelieving the version of the Presiding Officer. 5. The petitioner's case is that in all, on the relevant date, there were 97 members of the Nagar Mahapalika. This figure is not acceptable to the respondents. However, for the purposes of this writ petition I am proceeding on the assumption that the total membership was of 97. Annexure-III to the writ petition is a true copy of the application made to the Presiding Officer on 2lst May, 1991, at 11.50 A. M. stating therein that since the quorum was not complete, therefore, the meeting should be adjourned. This application was received by the stenographer to the Presiding Officer at 11.55 A. M. vide his endorsement thereon. The Presiding Officer made the following endorsement on the said application : "45 persons are present till 11.55". On 24th May, 1991, the petitioner made a representation to the Commissioner of the Allahabad Division (Annexure-IV to the writ petition) inter alia, stating therein that at 11.30 A. M. 38 members -f the Nagar Pramukh were present, the motion should have been declared to have been lost for want of quorum. However,'the meeting was continued even after 11.30 A. M. and at 11.45 A. M. 45 members including the petitioner were present. The total membership being 97, therefore, in accordance with Section 90 (1) of the Adhiniyam 48 members would constitute the quorum and even till the end only 47 members, including the petitioner, remained present. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions as contained in sub-section (16) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam the motion should have been declared to have lost. The Presiding Officer could not, therefore, invoke the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 16 for the purpose of holding another meeting. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions as contained in sub-section (16) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam the motion should have been declared to have lost. The Presiding Officer could not, therefore, invoke the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 16 for the purpose of holding another meeting. In paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the writ petition too reliance is placed on sub-section (1) of Section 90 of the Adhiniyam, The first ground to the petition too is based upon Section 90. Indeed, learned counsel for the petitioner was fair enough to addresses on the basis of sub-section (1) of Section 90 of the Adhiniyam. 6. Section 87 of the U. P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), prior to the enforcement of U. P. Act 9 of 1933, inter alia, emphasised that any business could be transacted at any meeting, the exception being that no business which was required to be transacted by a special resolution could be transacted unless previous notice to transact such a business had been given. By Section 8 of the U. P. Act No. 9 of 1933 the second proviso Section 87 was added. This proviso, inter alia, provides that nothing in Section 87 shall apply to a motion that the Board shall adopt a resolution expressing non-confidence in the President or to a motion that the Board shall adopt a resolution calling upon the President to resign. Simultaneously by the said Act Section 87-A was inserted in the Act. The provision laid down a code in the matter of motion of non-confidence in the President. In particular, sub-section (3) of Section 87-A laid down a detailed procedure in the matter of giving of a notice to the members of the Board of the meeting to be convened for considering the motion of non-confidence in the President. This explains the addition of the second proviso to Section 87 of the Act. 7. Section 12 of the Adhiniyam provides for the election of a Nagar Pramukh by the members who are enumerated in sub-section (38) of Section 2. It is obvious that the election of a Nagar Pramukh has to take place at a meeting of the Nagar Mahapalika. Section 88 will be applicable to such a meeting. Therefore, even when the members of the Nagar Mahapalika elect the Nagar Pramukh they transact business within the meaning of Section 88. It is obvious that the election of a Nagar Pramukh has to take place at a meeting of the Nagar Mahapalika. Section 88 will be applicable to such a meeting. Therefore, even when the members of the Nagar Mahapalika elect the Nagar Pramukh they transact business within the meaning of Section 88. It follows that to such a meeting Section 90 will be applicable. Since it is not the requirement of any provision as contained in the Adhiniyam that the business of the election of the Nagar Pramukh is to be transacted by a special resolution, sub-section (1) of Section 90 will have no application. Necessarily, sub-section (2) thereof will govern the situation. 8. Section 15-A posits that the provisions of Section 16 will apply to a motion of non-confidence in the Nagar Pramukh. However, it lays down that sub-section (7) of Section 16 shall be deemed to be omitted and any reference to the Nagar Pramukh in Section 16 shall be construed as reference to the District Judge. Sub-section (3) of Section 16, inter alia, states that written notice of intention to make a motion of non-confidence in the Pramukh should be signed by not less than one-half of the total number of members of the Mahapalika. Sub-section (15) provides that the motion shall be deemed to have been carried only when it has been passed by a majority of more than one-half of the total number of members of the Mahapalika. Sub-section (16) provides that if the motion is not carried in the manner laid down in sub-section (15), or if the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum, no notice of a subsequent motion of non-confidence in the same Nagar Pramukh shall be received until the expiry of a period of one year from the date of the meeting. 9. The crucial question is : what should constitute the quorum within the meaning of Section 16 ? Very rightly, it is nobody's case, nor can it be, that a combined reading of sub-sections (15) and (16) indicates that the number of votes required for carrying a motion of non-confidence is not a concept distinct and separate from the number of members required to constitute a quorum. It is trite law that a quorum denotes the presence of the minimum number of members of a body so as to enable it to conduct its proceedings. It is trite law that a quorum denotes the presence of the minimum number of members of a body so as to enable it to conduct its proceedings. The Legislature has, therefore, very clearly in sub-section (16) contemplated two distinct situations. The first is when the motion is put to vote and is deemed to be lost on account of the fact that requisite numbers have not voted in its favour. The second is when the meeting itself cannot be held for want of the presence of the requisite minimum number of members. The question, therefore, of putting a motion to vote in a meeting will only arise if the minimum number of members are present. It is a settled law that, in the absence of a quorum, no meeting, in the eye of law, can take place and if any business is transacted at such a meeting the same is void. We also find that though in Section 16 the Legislature has intended to provide a complete code in relation to a motion of non-confidence in the Pramukh or the Up Pramukh, yet it has not, in sub-section (16), indicated the presence of a minimum number of members so as to constitute a quorum. In the absence of such a provision in Section 16,1 shall first have to look for such a provision in the statute itself. 10. Sub-sections (I) and (2) of Section 90 are relevant and may be extracted : "90. Quorum(1) Where any business is required to be transacted by special resolution, the quorum for the transaction of such business shall be at least one behalf of members of the Mahapalika or the Committee as the case may be. (2) No business shall, except as provides in sub-section (3) be transacted at any meeting of the Mahapalika, the Executive Committee, the Development Committee or any other Committee constituted under Section 5 unless at least one-fifth of the total number of members thereof be present throughout the meeting." 11. As already indicated, the sheet-anchor of the petitioner's case is sub-section (1). On the contrary, the respondents have rested their ours on sub-section (2). It is the common case of the parties that the consideration of a motion of non-confidence in a Pramukh in a meeting of the Mahapalika is business within the meaning of Section 90. As already indicated, the sheet-anchor of the petitioner's case is sub-section (1). On the contrary, the respondents have rested their ours on sub-section (2). It is the common case of the parties that the consideration of a motion of non-confidence in a Pramukh in a meeting of the Mahapalika is business within the meaning of Section 90. For attracting sub-section (1) it has to be established that the statute either expressly or impliedly requires the passing of a special resolution by the members of the Mahapalika when they purport to express non-confidence in a Praniukh or Up Pramukh. In Sections 15-A and 16 there is not even a whisper of a special resolution although the passing of a resolution is implicit in sub-sections (15) and (16) of Section 16. On the contrary. I find that in some provisions of the Adhiniyam it is categorically mentioned that the Mahapalika shall take certain decisions by special resolutions. They are sub-section (1) to Section 95, sub-section (1) to Section 2 Q and sub-section (2) of Section 221. The Legislature, it appears. was conscious of the fact that it had not given a statutory definition to the expression "special resolution" in Section 2 and, therefore, it had taken good are to make specific reference to the transaction of businesses by special resolutions wherever it though it was necessary to do so. The fact that the Legislature has used the said expression in some provisions and has refrained from using the same in Sections 15-A and Section 16 is a strong pointer that it did not intend that the resolution of a non-confidence in a Pramukh should be a special resolution. I find no force in the contention of Sri R. P. Goyal, the learned counsel for the petitioner that since a special meeting is convened to consider a motion of non-confidence, therefore, the passing of a special resolution at such a meeting is implicit. The first proviso to Section 87 of the Act too does not advance the case of the petitioner. In it the emphasis is upon the giving of a previous notice of an intention to transact a business which is required to be transacted by a special resolution. 12. Sub-section (2) of Section 90 of the Adhiniyam embraces all the other businesses which are not required to be transacted by a special resolution. In it the emphasis is upon the giving of a previous notice of an intention to transact a business which is required to be transacted by a special resolution. 12. Sub-section (2) of Section 90 of the Adhiniyam embraces all the other businesses which are not required to be transacted by a special resolution. Reading sub-sections (1) and (2) together the meaning to be assigned to the expression "required" assumes importance. In the context of Sub-Section (1) the said expression, to my mind, clearly means when it is necessary. The necessity, will, however, arise only if the statute so requires. In the context again the expression means indispensable. Again, I have to revert to the statute to find out as to whether the passing of a special resolution is necessary. The word 'required' has at least two meanings. The first is absolutely and necessarily required. In our view, prima facie the meaning to be adopted for words used in any statute is its primary meaning. In sub-section (1) of Section 90 of the said word is used in the sense that it is mandatory. If such a construction is adopted, it harmonises sub-sections (1) and (2). Therefore, I come to the conclusion that in the resolution expressing no-confidence in the Pramukh the idea of a special resolution is not implicit. 13. Before the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 41 of 1976 sub-section (12) of Section 87-A of the Act laid down, inter alia, that the motion of no-confidence shall be deemed to have been carried only if it has been passed by a majority of more than half of the total number of members of the Board. Sub-section (13) posited that if a motion had not been carried by the majority aforementioned or if the meeting could not be held for want of a quorum, no notice of any subsequent motion of no-confidence in the President could be received until after the expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of meeting. I, therefore, find that in sub-section (13) of the Act a quorum had not been prescribed by the Legislature. However, Section 88 provided for the quorum. Sub-section (1) related to a transaction of business other than the businesses which were required to be transacted by a special resolution. Sub-section (2) related to a business required to be transacted by a special resolution. However, Section 88 provided for the quorum. Sub-section (1) related to a transaction of business other than the businesses which were required to be transacted by a special resolution. Sub-section (2) related to a business required to be transacted by a special resolution. In the former case presence of not less than one-third of the total number of members of the Board for the time being was necessary. In the latter case the presence of not less than one half of the members of the Board was necessary. We may indicate that in the Act too the Legislature had provided for different situations in which a business could be transacted only by means of a special resolution. However, Section 87-A read as a whole did not contain any whisper of a special resolution. Therefore, for the purposes of motion of no-confidence in a President of a Board the quorum as fixed in sub-section (1) of Section 88 must have been in vogue. By U. P. Act No. 41 of 1976, a change was brought about, in sub-section (13) of Section 87-A and a quorum was fixed and that was 'not be less than two-third of the total number of members of the Board for the time being", At this juncture, I may note that Section 15-A in the Adhiniyam too was inserted by U. P. Act 41 of 1976. Yet, the Legislature did not consider it advisable to make any change whatsoever in sub-section (16) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam with the result that the provision continued to contain no quorum and, therefore, one had to travel to Section 90. This deliberate act on the part of the Legislature indicates that for finding out the quorum in sub-section (16) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam one has to turn to Section 90 and then apply sub-section (2) of that provision. 14. The Presiding Officer is conferred with a power to be exercised for public purposes and in the public interest. He holds such a power upon trust. In sub-section (16) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam he is required to apply his mind and give his decision that a meeting cannot be held for want of quorum. He can do so only if he is conscious of his powers Therefore, there is an element of discretion to be exercised objectively upon a genuine application of mind. In sub-section (16) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam he is required to apply his mind and give his decision that a meeting cannot be held for want of quorum. He can do so only if he is conscious of his powers Therefore, there is an element of discretion to be exercised objectively upon a genuine application of mind. A partial or total failure to exercise discretion may occur because the competent authority has failed to appreciate its amplitude of discretion. An error of law on his part can result in the refusal to exercise the discretion conferred upon him. A discretional y power can be abused even in good faith. There can be a refusal to exercise jurisdiction by conduct. This is precisely what has happened in the instance case. 15. The Presiding Officer was all along under a bona fide but an erroneous impression that the presence of a minimum number of members throughout the meeting was not required for the purposes of sub-section (16). He genuinely felt that the only requirement was that the motion should have been put to vote and deemed to have been carried if a majority of more than half of the total number of the members had voted in its favour. This erroneous approach blurred his vision. Had he been conscious of the fact that the meeting could fail for want of quorum, had he been aware that no valid meeting could be held for lack of quorum and had been aware of the legal position that in the event of failure of the meeting for ant of quorum a motion of no-confidence in the petitioner could not be brought within one year from the date of the meeting, he would have taken care not to commence the meeting at all and saw to it that a proper atmosphere prevailed in the Committee room. He could have exercised his discretion by taking the view that on account of the law and order situation prevailing in the Committee room a meeting could not be held. The failure on his part to be aware of the correct legal position, in may opinion, vitiates the proceedings of 21st May, 1991. He could have exercised his discretion by taking the view that on account of the law and order situation prevailing in the Committee room a meeting could not be held. The failure on his part to be aware of the correct legal position, in may opinion, vitiates the proceedings of 21st May, 1991. The petitioner cannot be allowed to take advantage of the lapse on the part of the Presiding Officer and urge that, since the meeting failed for want of quorum, he is immune from a motion of no-confidence for a period of one year from the said date. 16. I may again advert to the report of the Presiding Officer. In substance, he has emphasised that the condition in the Committee room was chaotic. He has made a mention of the complaint in writing given by one of the members to the effect that the supporters of the petitioner outside the Committee room were preventing the members from entering into the same. I have seen the application a true copy of which has been filed as one of the Annexures to the counter affidavit of Shri Uma Shanker Srivastava. The petitioner has strongly refuted the allegation that his supporters prevented the members from entering into the Committee room. On the material on record, it not possible for me to record a categories finding that the members were, in fact, prevented from entering into the Committee room. Nonetheless such a possibility could not be ruled out. 17. I have held that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 90 of the Adhiniyam were applicable. Therefore, quorum was one-fifth of the total members. A fortiori the presence of more than twenty members was necessary. Hence, on merits, the petitioner has no case. 18. I have also held that the proceedings of 21st May, 1991 stood vitiated as the Presiding Officer acted under a misconception of law. Even if sub-section (1) of Section 90 applied and the quorum was to be more than one half of the total number of members, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not consider it a fit case for interference in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution so as to entitle the petitioner to have an immunity for a period of one year from being subjected to a motion of no-confidence. 19. 19. On 31st May, 1991, this Court passed an interim order to the effect that the meeting scheduled to be held on 5th June, 1991 to consider the motion of no-confidence in the petitioner shall take place but the result of the voting shall not be declared. That interim order continues to operate even now. 20. In the draft of the judgment prepared by me and sent to Birla, J. I had taken the view that if a meeting had taken place on 5th June, 1991 and voting had taken place in accordance with the direction given by this Court, the Presiding Officer should proceed to declare the result of the voting in accordance with law. 21. I have gone through the draft of the judgment prepared by Birla, J. He has persuaded himself to agree with me that the principal contention of the petitioner that the meeting on 21st May, 19yl. could not be held for want of quorum should be repelled. He has, however, opined that the provisions as contained in sub-section (6) of Section 16 are mandatory in their entirety and, therefore, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to fix the date and time of the adjourned meeting. Accordingly, he has disagreed with my view point that the Presiding Officer should be called upon to declare the result of the voting, On the contrary, he has taken the view that the Presiding Officer should have himself fixed the date and time and thereafter the Commissioner should have convened a meeting for putting the motion of no-confidence to vote. 22. Sub-section (6) of Section 16 may be extracted : "If the District Judge is unable to preside at the meeting, he may after recording his reasons adjourn the meeting to such other date and time as he may appoint, but not later than fifteen days from the date appointed for the meeting under sub-section (4). He shall without delay communicate in writing to the Commissioner of the Division the adjournment of the meeting. He shall without delay communicate in writing to the Commissioner of the Division the adjournment of the meeting. It shall not be necessary to send notice of the date and the time of the adjourned meeting to the members individually, but the Commissioner of the Division shall give notice of the date and the time of the adjourned meeting by publication in the manner provided in sub-section (4)." A bare lock at the aforesaid provisions indicates that in it the Legislature has used the expressions "may" and "shall" wherever it had thought it proper to do so. Normally the word 'may' is treated as directory and the word "shall" signifies a mandate to be carried out. In the context and setting of subsection (6) it is not possible to take the view that the word "may" should be read as "shall". The emphases in sub-section (6) is that the adjourned meeting shall not take place beyond the period of fifteen days from the date appointed for the meeting convened under sub-section (4) namely, the meeting for consideration of the motion of no-confidence. In the instant case the meeting was convened on 5ih June, 1991. viz., within fifteen days from 21st May, 1991. It is emphasised that it is imperative upon the District Judge to inform the Commissioner of the Division of the date and time of adjournment of the meeting without any loss of time. In the instant case, it is everybody's case that the District Judge informed the Commissioner on 21st May, 1991, itself that the meeting had to be adjourned. Again, it is emphasised that it is not imperative to send the notice of the date and time of the adjourned meeting to the members individually. It is not the complaint of the petitioner that the date and time of the adjourned meeting was not duly communicated to him. Having considered the matter with the attention it deserves. It have not been able to persuade myself to take the view that it was imperative upon the District Judge to fix the date and time of the adjourned meeting himself and his failure to do so was fatal in so far as no meeting as convened by the Commissioner on 5th June, 1991, could be held. It is trite law that statutory provisions outweigh the common law principles. It is trite law that statutory provisions outweigh the common law principles. In sub-section (6) a more or less complete code has been enacted. A discretion has been conferred upon, the District Judge to adjourn the meeting, if he is unable to preside. He can do so only after recording his reasons. He has also been given the discretion to fix the date and time of the meeting and the outer limit of the date of the adjourned meeting has also been fixed. I may indicate here that it is not the case of the petitioner that the District Judge, while adjourning the meeting, did not record reasons. The question, therefore, is whether anybody much less the petitioner suffered any prejudice on account of the failure of the District Judge to fix the date and time of the meeting. No prejudice has either been pleaded or is visible. The provision that the District Judge may appoint a time and place of the meeting is in my opinion, purely directory. 23. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. v. Rampur Municipality, AIR 1965 SC 895 the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Section 131 (3) and Section 94 (3) of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Section 131 (J) of the said Act empowers a Board to impose a tax by Special resolution and for that purpose it is required to frame proposals in the manner laid down in sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) requires that a draft of the rules may also be prepared. Sub-section (3;, however, lays down that the Board shall publish tax proposals and the draft rules in the manner prescribed in Section 94. Section 94 (3) lays down that every resolution passed by a Board at a meeting shall be as soon thereafter as may be published in Hindi in any local newspaper. The Municipal Board, Rampur, had published the tax proposals and the draft rules in a local newspaper but the newspaper was not a Hindi newspaper, instead it was an Urdu newspaper. The contention that Section 131 (3) read with Section 94 (3) was mandatory in nature, therefore, it required strict compliance, the Board's failure to publish the tax proposals and the draft rules in a local Hindi newspaper vitiated the imposition of the tax, was repelled by the Supreme Court. The contention that Section 131 (3) read with Section 94 (3) was mandatory in nature, therefore, it required strict compliance, the Board's failure to publish the tax proposals and the draft rules in a local Hindi newspaper vitiated the imposition of the tax, was repelled by the Supreme Court. It was held that the first, part of the sub-section (3) of Section 131 which required publication of the tax proposals and the draft rules was mandatory in nature, but the second part of the sub-section which laid down manner of publication was directory in nature, therefore, substantial compliance of the same would meet the requirement of law. 24. Wanchoo, J., speaking for the majority held : "The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatoryinasmuch as it uses the word "shall" as in the present caseor is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or director." 25. I may repeat that the purpose of sub-section (6) is that a motion of no confidence should be put to vote and no party should be permitted to frustrate the motion by creating such a situation that a meeting may not be held. At the same time, the Presiding Officer has not been given an arbitrary power to adjourn the meeting. His discretion to do so is hedgedin with the condition that he has to record reasons while adjourning a meeting. He is required to send an immediate communication to the Commissioner and it is also required that the adjournment of the meeting shall not be for a period exceeding fifteen days from the date fixed for the meeting under sub-section (4). He is required to send an immediate communication to the Commissioner and it is also required that the adjournment of the meeting shall not be for a period exceeding fifteen days from the date fixed for the meeting under sub-section (4). It is, therefore obvious that the fixing of the date and the time of the adjourned meeting is consequent upon the exercise of the discretion to adjourn a meeting. The question whether a meeting should or should not be adjourned involves the exercise of the discretion of the Presiding Officer, but once a decision is taken that a meeting should be adjourned the fixing of the date or time of the adjourned meeting appears to be more or less mechanical. 26. In Gyan Singh v. District Magistrate, Bijnor, AIR 1975 Alld. 315, a Full Bench of 5 Hon'ble Judges of this Court was considering the question as to whether the provisions as contained in sub-section (3) of Section 87-A of the Municipalities Act which, inter alia, provide that the District Magistrate shall convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion on a date not earlier than thirty and not later then thirty five days from the date on which notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to him and he shall send by registered pest not less than seven clear days before the date of the meeting, a notice of such meeting and of the date and time a pointed therefor, to every member of the board at his place of residence...as a whole were mandatory. It was held that the second part of sub-section (3) of Section 87-A laying down the manner for sending the notice to the members of the Board is directory while the first part of sub-section (3) requiring the District Magistrate to convene the meeting and to send notices to the members is mandatory. 27. It was held that the second part of sub-section (3) of Section 87-A laying down the manner for sending the notice to the members of the Board is directory while the first part of sub-section (3) requiring the District Magistrate to convene the meeting and to send notices to the members is mandatory. 27. In Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normwndin, 1917 AC 170 it was held : "When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over these entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done." Undoubtedly the District Judge is enjoined to perform a public duty in subsection (6). His failure to fix the date and time of the meeting will, if the view point of Birla, J. is correct, would work serious general inconvenience in so far as a fresh meeting of the Mahapalika will have to be convened and the motion has to again put to vote after making the necessary security arrangements etc. Such a course will not only cause dislocation in the work of the district administration, but will also result in unnecessary expenditure of the public money. Obviously, the members of the Mahapalika bad no control over the action of the District Judge. The main object of the Legislature as exhibited in sub-section (6) too will not in any manner be promoted by insisting that the date and time of the meeting in all cases should be fixed by the District Judge. 28. The District Judge in his communication to the Commissioner gave reasons for adjourning the meeting and also requested him to fix another date for "repolling". In Paragraph 33 of the counter-affidavit of Sri Uma Shanker Srivastava, it is stated that the District Judge directed the Commissioner to fix the date and time of the adjourned meeting. The same version is given in the narrative of the District Judge himself, which has been filed as Annexure I to the counter affidavit of Sri Uma Shanker Srivastava. In Paragraph 33 of the counter-affidavit of Sri Uma Shanker Srivastava, it is stated that the District Judge directed the Commissioner to fix the date and time of the adjourned meeting. The same version is given in the narrative of the District Judge himself, which has been filed as Annexure I to the counter affidavit of Sri Uma Shanker Srivastava. It is apparent and it will also be presumed that the District Judge purported to act under sub-section (6) of Section 16. It will be presumed that he was aware of the statutory provision that the date of the meeting could not go beyond the period of fifteen days from 21st May, 1991. It shall also have to be presumed that the District Judge had no objection to any date and time being fixed by the Commissioner provided the date did not go beyond a period of fifteen days from 21st May, 1991. Therefore, there can be no difficulty in taking the view that by necessary implication the District Judge fixed the date and time. In any view of the matter, the communication of the District Judge to the Commissioner coupled with the contents of the narrative amply demonstrate that the provisions of sub-section (6) were substantially complied with. 29. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Annexure-IV to the writ petition is a true copy of a representation dated 24th May, 1991, made by the petitioner to the Commissioner. The thrust in this representation is that since the meeting on 21st May, 1991, could not be held for want of quorum, the petitioner became immune from a motion of no confidence for a period of one year in view of the provisions of sub-section (16) of Section 16. The other aspect emphasised is that the District Judge could not invoke sub-section (6) of Section 16 as the meeting did take place on 21st May, 1991, and the District Judge should have declared that the meeting could not take place on account of want of quorum. It is significant to note that in his representation the petitioner did not point out that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to fix the date and time of the adjourned meeting and the same could be done only by the District Judge. It is significant to note that in his representation the petitioner did not point out that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to fix the date and time of the adjourned meeting and the same could be done only by the District Judge. Had this been the petitioner's assertion, there would have been no difficulty in the Commissioner asking the District Judge to fix the date and time of the adjourned meeting. This petition was sworn on 26th May, 1.991. It was presented in this Court on 30th May, 1991. On 31st May, 1991, an interim order was passed and in this interim order it was mentioned that the meeting was scheduled to be held on 5th June, 1991. In the petition prayer (b) was to the effect that a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad not to give effect to the minutes dated 21-5-1991 and directing him not to fix any other date for considering the no-confidence motion in pursuance of the minutes dated 21-5-1991 be issued. It is thus clear that the Commissioner had not at least fixed the date and time of the meeting till 26th May, 1991. It follows that the petitioner was either not serious to take the objection that the Commissioner could not fix the date and time of the meeting or he had deliberately kept this objection in his sleeve. This conduct, in my opinion, dis-entitles him to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with the contention that the motion of no confidence could not be considered on 5th June, 1991 as the date and time of that meeting had not been fixed by the District Judge. 30. Birla, J. has, in his draft judgment, categorically stated that the argument that the Commissioner could not fix the time and date of the adjourned meeting had been advanced at the Bar on behalf of the petitioner and I had failed to notice the same while preparing my draft judgment. If my memory does not fail me, no debate worth taking notice of on the said question took place at the Bar. Indeed, Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, a senior and eminent counsel of this court, who appeared on behalf of the respondents, neither addressed us at all on the said question nor did Birla, J. ask him to do so. If my memory does not fail me, no debate worth taking notice of on the said question took place at the Bar. Indeed, Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, a senior and eminent counsel of this court, who appeared on behalf of the respondents, neither addressed us at all on the said question nor did Birla, J. ask him to do so. However, keeping in view the interest of justice I have dealt with the argument on the footing that the same had been advanced and regret I am unable to agree with Birla, J. on this point. 31. The motion of no-confidence has been pending since long No action could be taken by the District Judge on account of the interim order passed by this court on 31st May, 1991. There is a slight difference between me and Birla, J. According to me, the meeting held on 5th June, 1991, should be treated to be validly held and, therefore, the District Judge should be asked to declare the result of the voting. According to Birla, J. a fresh meeting should be convened by the Commissioner after the District Judge has fixed the date and time of that meeting. To me, it appears that, in so far as this case is concerned, the time is of the essence. Public interest requires that since a motion of no-confidence has been tabled it should be put to vote as early as possible. In the event of a difference of opinion between me and my learned colleague, the matter is bound to go to a third Judge, thereby resulting in further delay in the decision of this petition. I, therefore, agree to the ultimate order proposed by my brother, though reluctantly. K K. Birla, J.I have the opportunity of going through the order proposed by my esteemed brother. I find myself unable to agree with the final order of dismissal proposed by him for the reasons discussed below. 33. The meeting for considering the motion of no confidence against Nagar Pramukh (Petitioner) of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad was held on 21st May, 1991. This meeting was adjourned by the respondent No. 2, the District Judge, Allahabad who also directed the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad, respondent No. 1 to fix another date for repolling. 34. 33. The meeting for considering the motion of no confidence against Nagar Pramukh (Petitioner) of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad was held on 21st May, 1991. This meeting was adjourned by the respondent No. 2, the District Judge, Allahabad who also directed the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad, respondent No. 1 to fix another date for repolling. 34. Being aggrieved by this order the petitioner has filed this writ petition for issue of the writ of certioari quashing the minutes of the meeting dated 21st May, 1991 and also for the issue of writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 1 not to give effect to the minutes dated 21st May, 1991 and directing him not to fix any other date for considering no confidence motion in pursuance of the minutes, dated 21st May, 1991. The necessary facts regarding what generally transpired in the meeting is given in the order of my esteemed brother and need not be repeated. The minutes of the meeting wore filed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The narrative of the respondent No. 2 has been filed as Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit of Sri U. S. Srivastava, Steno to the respondent No. 2. The petitioner has given his own version, One Sri Jamuna Prasad has also filed an affidavit purporting on behalf of the respondents giving the details what transpired in the meeting according to him. I am in full agreement with my esteemed brother that the version given by the Presiding Officer respondent No. 2 should be believed. 35. At about 10.40 A.M. an application challenging the proper quorum for the meeting was raised. The Presiding Officer was of the opinion that no quorum for holding the meeting was required and the quorum was only required at the time of the voting under sub-section (15) of Section 16 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (hereinafter referred as the Adhiniyam). However, under sub-section (16) of the Adhiniyam it is provided that if the motion is not carried as aforesaid, or if the meeting cannot be held for want of a quorum, no notice of any subsequent motion of non-confidence in the same Up Nagar Pramukh shall be received until after the expiry of a period of two years from the date of meeting. Therefore, this sub-section contemplates a situation also where the meeting cannot be held for want of a quorum and I fully agree with my esteemed brother in this regard. However, in my opinion, this erroneous view of the Presiding Officer, that no quorum for the meeting itself was required will not vitiate all the proceedings of the meeting. 36. From the narration given by the respondent No. 2 it is clear that he held the meeting discussion was also held, the voting took place and the ballot papers were put inside the sealed box. Not only this later on two more ballot papers were issued and it was at that time that it become impossible for the Presiding Officer to proceed further and he adjourned the meeting. It may be that if the Presiding Officer was not ignorant of the law that a quorum was needed for the meeting, he would have considered this aspect when the objection was raised and would have passed the necessary orders in this regard. But under a mistaken notion ne disallowed this objection and proceeded with the meeting. But in the opinion all the proceedings held in the meeting shall not stand vitiated or be taken to be nonexistent on this account. It may be relevant to point out that according to the counter affidavit of Sri Jamuna Prasad, who appears to have filed the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents also 48 corporates had entered into the Committee hall. There signatures were taken and then on their asking the Presiding Officer had started the proceedings and that after discussion that ballot papers was distributed. Therefore, in my opinion it cannot be said that no meeting had taken place. It may be that the Presiding Officer may be wrong and may even decide a point wrongly which may effect the ultimate result but it will not wipe-out the meeting from the record, though the lapse on the part of the Presiding Officer may affect the validity of the meeting. No doubt, the motion of no confidence is an important weapon against arbitrary or misuse of power by the. Pramukh. But it is equally important that a person who been duly elected to an officer could be removed only in accordance with law and if there is something amiss, it should not be taken against him. No doubt, the motion of no confidence is an important weapon against arbitrary or misuse of power by the. Pramukh. But it is equally important that a person who been duly elected to an officer could be removed only in accordance with law and if there is something amiss, it should not be taken against him. Therefore, I am in respectful disagreement with my esteemed brother that this erroneous legal view of the Presiding Officer had vitiated the proceedings of that meeting completely. It may also be pointed out at this stage that in case the meeting, dated 21st May, 1991 is held to be non-existent the meeting held on 5th June, 1991 will not be in accordance with the time contemplated under sub-section (4) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam) and hence a nullity. In view of the above discussion I am of the opinion that the merits of the petition will have to be considered after accepting that the meeting was adjourned by the Presiding Officer. 37. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent No. 2 did hold the meeting and the discussion was held. According to him in view of sub-sections (8) and (10) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam this meeting could have not been adjourned and the order of the adjournment is illegal. It is also contended that as the motion had not been carried, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of sub-section (16) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam. In my opinion this contention can not be accepted. From the narration of the respondent No. 2 and the minutes of the meeting it is clear that at one point of time it had become impossible for him to proceed further with the meeting. It appears and it should be taken that on account of the prevailing atmosphere and the chaotic condition in the Committee hall the Presiding Officer was not in a position to proceed further. 38. In certain circumstances the meeting can be adjourned, even if there is no specific provisions regarding the same. It appears and it should be taken that on account of the prevailing atmosphere and the chaotic condition in the Committee hall the Presiding Officer was not in a position to proceed further. 38. In certain circumstances the meeting can be adjourned, even if there is no specific provisions regarding the same. In Horsley's Meetings Procedure, Law and Practice at page 86 para 1C09 it has been provided that "the Chairman has implicit power to adjourn a meeting on his own initiative where it is impossible for him to maintain order i. e., if the meeting is in danger of becoming so disorderly that it appears impossible for business to be transacted ; such an adjournment may be for just a short time or until another day as announced by the Chairman. However, any such adjournment must be in the interests of facilitating the progress of the business of the meeting and should not be for any longer period than the Chairman considers necessary for the restoration of order. In para 1016 of the same book also it is provided that the meeting may be adjourned by the Chairman where he considers this necessary to maintain order or for the purpose of taking a poll. Similarly in Shackleton on the law and practice of meetings seventh edition at page 79 one of the instances where the Chairman has the right to adjourn the meeting given is as "the Chairman may adjourn on his own authority, in order to facilitate the business of the meeting..............in the case of Persistent disorder, the Chairman is empowered to adjourn the meeting ; sometimes a short adjournment.................." 39. In the Law and Procedure of meeting by matthew moore as well at page 76 it is provided that at common law the chairman is only entitled to adjourn without the consent of the meeting if ; (1) there is serious disorder and he has attempted to quell the disturbance and to apply any rules on adjournment but this has been impossible............. 40. Similarly in the case of Chandrakant Khaire Dr. Shantaram Kale and others, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1665 as well it has been held that the meeting could be adjourned when there was total confusion and bedlam inside the meeting hall and no business could be transacted. 40. Similarly in the case of Chandrakant Khaire Dr. Shantaram Kale and others, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1665 as well it has been held that the meeting could be adjourned when there was total confusion and bedlam inside the meeting hall and no business could be transacted. In the instant case the Presiding officer found at a later stage that no further business could be transacted. Therefore it should be take that the Presiding Officer was right in the meeting. 41. The next meeting had been held on 5th June, 1991. The date and time for the same had been fixed by the Commissioner. The Presiding Officer while adjourning the meeting had not fixed the date and time for the adjourned meeting. The legality of the meeting held on 5th June, 1991 has also been challenged. In the relief No. 2, a mandamus has been asked for commanding the Commissioner, Allahabad Division not to fix any other date for no confidence motion in pursuance of the minutes dated 21st May. 1991. In para 21 of the writ petition it is contended that the action and minutes as prepared by the respondent No. 2 in so far as it recommends the Commissioner for fixing another date is wholly without jurisdiction and against the provisions of law. In the application for interim relief as well it was prayed that the Commissioner, Allahabad Division be restrained from fixing any date for considering the no confidence motion against the petitioner. A limited interim relief was granted that the result of the voting shall not be declared, through the meeting shall be held and the proceedings of entire meeting will be subject to the decision of the writ petition. 42. The next point for considering which arises is whether it was the District Judge alone who could have fixed the date and time of the adjourned meeting or he could have abdicated this power to the Commissioner. During the arguments the legality of the meeting held on 5th June, 19 H was also raised but the main stress was about the quorum and the propriety and legality of the meeting being adjourned by the Presiding Officer. This aspect has not been considered by me learned brother. In my opinion this aspect goes to the root of the case and it needs consideration and discussion. 43. This aspect has not been considered by me learned brother. In my opinion this aspect goes to the root of the case and it needs consideration and discussion. 43. The relevant provisions of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam (hereinafter referred as the Adhiniyam) may be quoted : 15-A Motion of no confidence against Nagar Pramukh.The provisions of Section 16 shall apply to a motion expressly no confidence in the Nagar Pramukh with the following modifications namely (a) Sub-section (7) shall be deemed to be omitted, and (b) any reference to the Up Nagar Pramukh and the Nagar Pramukh shall be constituted as references to Nagar Pramukh and the District Judge respectively. 16.(5)The Nagar Pramukh shall preside at the meeting convened under this section and no other person shall preside thereat. If within half an hour from the time appointed for the meeting, the Nagar Pramukh is not present to preside at the meeting, the meeting shall stand adjourned to the date and time to be appointed by the Nagar Pramukh under sub-section (6). 16(6)If the Nagar Pramukh is unable to preside at the meeting, he may, after recording his reasons adjourn the meeting to such other date and time as he may appoint, but not later than fifteen days from the date appointed for the meeting under sub-section (4). He shall without delay communicate in writing to the Commissioner of the Division the adjournment of the meeting. It shall not be necessary to send notice of the date and the time of the adjourned meeting to the members individually, but the Commissioner of the Division shall give notice of the date and the time of the adjourned meeting by publication in the manner provided in cub section (4). It shall not be necessary to send notice of the date and the time of the adjourned meeting to the members individually, but the Commissioner of the Division shall give notice of the date and the time of the adjourned meeting by publication in the manner provided in cub section (4). (7)If there is no Nagar Pramukh in office or if the Nagar Pramukh does not comply with the provisions of sub-section (6) or fails to preside at the adjourned meeting (which shall again stand adjourned in such a case) then notwithstanding anything in sub-sections (5) and (6) (a) the District Judge and in his absence the judicial officer who has assumed charge of the duties of the District Judge shall preside at the meeting or the adjourned the meeting, as the case may be ; (b) the date and time for the adjourned or re-adjourned meeting, as the case may be, shall be fixed by the Commissioner of the Division who shall give notice thereof in the manner provided in sub-section (6) ; and (c) all references hereinafter in this section to the Nagar Pramukh shall be deemed to be references to the aforesaid District Judge or judicial officer, as the case may be. 44. Thus under Section 16(6) of the Adhiniyam if the Presiding Officer is unable to preside the meeting he has to record his reasons and then has to adjourn the meeting to such other date and time as he may appoint but not later than fifteen days from the date appointed for the meeting under subsection (4). Therefore, it is the Presiding Officer (the District Judge) who while adjourning the meeting, is to adjourn the meeting to some date and time which has not to be later than fifteen days from the date appointed. 45. The point is whether this whole part is mandatory or can be said to be directory. The relevant provisions mentioned in the above mentioned books regarding the power of the Chairman to adjourn the meeting, if there is serious disorder or persistent disorder or where the meeting has become disorderly and it is impossible to maintain the order, have been quoted above. They clearly not only go to show that it is the power of the Chairman to adjourn the meeting but also that it should be done only for a period which the Chairman considers to be necessary. They clearly not only go to show that it is the power of the Chairman to adjourn the meeting but also that it should be done only for a period which the Chairman considers to be necessary. Thus this is the exclusive right and power of the Presiding Officer to fix date and time of the adjourned meeting. In some cases this period may be even for some hours. In some cases the meeting may be adjourned to some other date. In the case of Chandrakant Khaire v. Dr. Shantaram Kale and others (Supra) also it has been held that "even if the relevant rules do not give the Chairman power to adjourn the meeting, he may do so in the event if disorder. Such an adjournment must be for no longer than the Chairman considers necessary and the Chairman must so far as possible, communicate his decision to those present" Therefore, from the above discussions and from the very nature of the things leading to the adjournment I am of the opinion that it is the Presiding Officer alone who can and should fix the time and date of the adjourned meeting and such power, or discretion cannot be abdicated by him in favour of some other authority. 46. Another point which needs consideration in this regard is whether the provisions regarding the fixing of the date and time can be said to be director. As it may be said by some that once the Presiding Officer had decided to adjourn the meeting the fixing of the date and time is a mere formality. In my opinion considering the scheme of the Act and the fact that exceptional power is exercised by the Presiding Officer while adjourning the meeting on account of disorder that the provisions should be construed strictly, it is not a mere matter of procedure or formality relating to the details but it is matter of the competence and the power of the authority i.e., the Presiding Officer in the instant case. 47. In the case of Gyan Singh v. The District Magistrate Bijnor and other, reported in AIR 1975 Allahabad 315 (Full Bench) Section 87-A (3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act was considered. Under the provision the District Magistrate is required to send the notice to the members by registered post. 47. In the case of Gyan Singh v. The District Magistrate Bijnor and other, reported in AIR 1975 Allahabad 315 (Full Bench) Section 87-A (3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act was considered. Under the provision the District Magistrate is required to send the notice to the members by registered post. The word used is shall send." in that case the notice was sent through ordinary post The notice was served on the petitioner and he had full knowledge about the date and time and place. It was held that there was substantial compliance with the directory provisions of the Act and it would not be Proper to exercise discretion and grant relief to the petitioner. The provisions under Section 87-A (3) regarding sending of the notice by registered post was held to be directory. In the cited case the part requiring the District Magistrate to convene the meeting of the Board for considering the motion of no confidence against the President was held to be mandatory. 48. In my opinion this case will not be of much help in case before us. Before us the very competence or the authority of the person who can fix the date time of the adjourned meeting is involved and not the procedure or details how the information etc. is to be given to the members. Fixing the date and time of the adjourned meeting is an integral part of the adjournment. It is for the adjourning authority to decide for what time or for how many days the meeting should be adjourned. Therefore, the contention That the fixing of date and time is directory will have to be rejected, in my opinion. 49. In the case of Kishore Goswami v. District Magistrate and others, reported in 1970 ALJ 978 also the provisions of Section 87-A (3) of the Municipalities Act were considered. There the notice of motion of no confidence was presented before the District Magistrate. However, the date and time was not fixed by the District Magistrate but by an officer subordinate to him It has been held that "Section 87-A (3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act requires that the date and time of the meeting have to be appointed by the District Magistrate and the manner of publication of the notice has also to be determined by the District Magistrate. The matters cannot be left to any other authority and if the District Magistrate has not applies his mind and taken decisions on these matters, there is a clear breach of the provisions of Section 87-A (3) (See para 5). It has been observed in paras 9 and 11 that I come to the conclusion that the provisions which cast duties which the District Magistrate should himself perform and relate to matters on which he himself has to take decisions, are mandatory and not directory and if those duties are not performed and those decisions are not taken by him but are performed and take by another authority, there is a clear violation of Section 87-A (3) of the Act. Accordingly, since the notice of the meeting in the present case has not been issued pursuant to the decision as to date and time taken by the District Magistrate himself as contemplated by Section 87-A (3) of the Act, the notice ought to be regarded as invalid and, it follows, the proceedings of the meeting held pursuant to the invalid notice are also vitiated." Therefore a distinction will have to be made when there is non-compliance of some provisions relating to the manner or the details in which a thing has to be done and a case where the important action is not taken by the authority provided under the law but by some other person nominated by such authority. 50. There is another important aspect in this regard which clearly goes to show that it was beyond the competence of the Commissioner to fix the date and time of the meeting and such action on his part is clearly illegal and unwarranted by law. 51. Section i6 sub-section (5) contemplates the adjournment of the meeting if the Presiding officer is not present to preside over the meeting within naif an hour from the date and time appointed for the meeting. In this case also the meeting has to be adjourned to the date and time to be appointed by the Nagar Pramukh (District Judge in this case) under subsection (6) As already mentioned above, sub-section (6) also provides for the adjournment of the meeting to such date and time as maybe appointed by the Presiding officer. 52. Section 16 (7) inter alia contemplates a situation where the Presiding Officer does not comply with the provisions of sub-section (6). 52. Section 16 (7) inter alia contemplates a situation where the Presiding Officer does not comply with the provisions of sub-section (6). It will also cover a case where the Presiding officer adjourns the meeting but does not fix the date and time. In such a case under clause (b) the power of fixing the date and time has been given to the Commissioner who is also to give the notice. But as pointed earlier, sub-section (7) of Section 16 has been omitted by Section 15-A as far as the motion of no confidence against Nagar Pramukh is concerned. This clearly shows the intention of the legislature that in the case of Nagar Pramukh such power can be exercised by the Commissioner and therefore can be exercised by the District Judge alone. It may be pointed out that under sub-section (6) it is already provided that the notice regarding adjourned meeting shall be given by the Commissioner. Therefore this clearly shows that where the meeting regarding motion of no confidence against the Nagar Pramukh is adjourned, the Commissioner has no power under the law to fix the date and time for such adjourned meeting ; otherwise such power would have been provided under sub-section (6) or the proper provisions would have been made under Section 15-A in this regard so as to make clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 16 applicable. 53. In view of the above discussions I am of the opinion that under Section 16 (6), it is mandatory on the part of the District Judge to fix the date and time of the adjourned meeting also, if he adjourns the meeting. The fixing of the late and time of the adjourned meeting can he left by him to the Commissioner or for the at matter to any other authority. I am, further of the opinion that the meeting so convened on 5-6-1991 by the Commissioner is against law and stands vitiated. As the meeting convened on 5th June, 1991 is a nullity in the eye of law, in my opinion it is a fit case where this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should quash the proceedings of that meeting. It is not a such case where only some irregularity has been done and this court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 54. It is not a such case where only some irregularity has been done and this court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 54. It has been stressed on behalf of the petitioner that the meeting had failed for want of a quorum. Under sub-section (16) of Section 16 of the Adhiniyam it is also mentioned that if the meeting cannot be held for want of a quorum, no notice of subsequent motion of no confidence can be given for a certain period provided therein. But it is not provided what that quorum would be. On the other hand in the analogous provisions of Section 87-A (13) of the Municipalities Act it is inter alia provided that if the meeting is not carried by a majority or if the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum which shall be less than one half of the total number of the members of the Board for the time being..." From the scheme of Section 15-A and Section 16 of the Act it is clear that the procedure for holding such motion is defined in the section itself. In sub-section (1) of Section 16 it is clearly mentioned that a motion expressing non-confidence in the Up Nagar Pramukh shall be made only in accordance with the procedure laid down in this section. Therefore, in my opinion it appears to be a case of omission by the legislature for not providing such quorum in sub-section (16) of Section 16 of the Act. 55. In my view it is arguable whether in the light of sub-section (1) of Section 16, Section 16 is so self contained as not to attract the other provisions of the Act including Section 90 of the Act and the point of quorum should be considered under the general law about it. But both the parties have relied on Section 90 of the Act determining the quorum for the meeting under Section 16 of the Act as well. Therefore, I do not consider it necessary to dwell on this aspect in this case and the question of quorum be considered in the light of Section 90 of the Act. 56. It was strenuously urged on behalf of the petitioner that the case will be covered under Section 90 (1) of the Act. Therefore, I do not consider it necessary to dwell on this aspect in this case and the question of quorum be considered in the light of Section 90 of the Act. 56. It was strenuously urged on behalf of the petitioner that the case will be covered under Section 90 (1) of the Act. My esteemed brother has, after detailed discussion, found that it is Section 90 (2) which will be applicable in the present case. This sub-section provides that at least one fifth of the total numbers of members thereof should be present throughout. Therefore, according to him. the meeting did not fail for want of quorum. I am also in respectful agreement with his conclusion. However, I will like to add further that there was disorder and chaos in the meeting from its start. The persons were coming in and going out freely. On account of the erroneous view the Presiding Officer did not consider the question of quorum in the right perspective when the objection was raised. According to para 12 (f) of the affidavit of Jamuna Prasad meeting had started after 48 corporator's had come inside. The version of the petitioner is different. Therefore, even if the petitioner's contention is considered, there is no sufficient and satisfactory material on record to come to a positive finding that the meeting could not be held for want of quorum The burden to prove this aspect is clearly on the petitioner. Therefore this contention made on behalf of the petitioners deserves to be rejected. 57. To sum up, the meeting had started, it did not fail for want of quorum. On account of persistent disorder the Presiding officer was unable to preside at a later stage and it had to be adjourned by the respondent No. 2. But he illegally abdicated his authority to fix date and time to the respondent No. 1. The date and time fixed by the respondent No. 1 is without legal authority and the meeting held subsequently and its proceedings are as such a nullity. 58. It remains to be seen what order should be passed in these circumstances. 59. In the Division Bench case of K.C. Gupta v. Prayag Narain, 1961 ALJ page 226 the meeting under Section 87-A of the U. P. Municipalities Act was under consideration. 58. It remains to be seen what order should be passed in these circumstances. 59. In the Division Bench case of K.C. Gupta v. Prayag Narain, 1961 ALJ page 226 the meeting under Section 87-A of the U. P. Municipalities Act was under consideration. This meeting was held on the date fixed by the High Court while dismissing an earlier writ petition. The fixing of the dato by the High Court was challenged in the cited case. It was observed that a particular direction therefore, was in no sense in contravention of the law but was in advancement of the purpose for which Section 87-A existed. The meeting held on the date fixed by the High Court was held to be valid. In my opinion, the proper course in the present case will, therefore, be now to direct the respondent No. I to fix the date and time of the adjourned meeting. 60. In view of the above discussion in my opinion the order of the respondent No. 2 adjourning the meeting should be up-held but his order requesting the Commissioner to fix the date of the meeting has to be quashed and the meeting held in pursuance of the date and time being fixed by the Commissioner has also be taken to be vitiated and a nullity. The proper course for the District Judge will be now to fix the date and time of the meeting which should be not later than 15 days from today. He should also at once communicate in writing about the same to the respondent No. 1 who should issue notice in accordance with sub-section (6) of Section 16 of the Act. It is needless to stress that the district administration will make necessary arrangements, including the police arrangements, so as to ensure the peaceful and orderly conduct of the meeting. 61. I would therefore, allow the writ petition partly without any order as to costs and will quash the proceedings of the meeting held on 5th June, 1991. I will further direct the respondent No. 2 to fix within 3 days from today the date and time for the adjourned meeting which should not be later than 15 days from today. I would therefore, allow the writ petition partly without any order as to costs and will quash the proceedings of the meeting held on 5th June, 1991. I will further direct the respondent No. 2 to fix within 3 days from today the date and time for the adjourned meeting which should not be later than 15 days from today. He shall further communicate the same to the respondent No. 1 without delay about the same who shall act further in accordance with sub-section (6) of Section 16 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. 62. By the Court we allow this petition is part. We quash the proceedings of the meeting held on 5th June, 1991. We direct the District Judge, Allahabad, to fix the time and date of the adjourned meeting within three days from today. He shall fix a date which shall not go beyond a period of fifteen days from today. He shall communicate his decision to the Commissioner Allahabad Division, Allahabad, without delay. The Commissioner shall act in accordance with sub-section (6) of Section 16 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and convene the meeting as expeditiously as possible but not beyond a period of fifteen days from today. There shall be no order as to costs. 63. Copies of the two judgments along with the operative portion, which we have dictated today, be given to the learned counsel for parties within 24 hours, if possible.