JUDGMENT K.L. Sharma, J. - All these writ petitions have been filed against the State of U.P. by the Advocates working as Government Counsel in the district of Moradabad against the orders refusing the renewal of their term. All these writ petitions have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment as similar questions of law and fact arise in these petitions. 2. Writ Petition No. 688 (M/B) of 1992 has been filed by Gopal Sharma, Harpal Singh Chauhan, Rajendra Singh Verma, Dharam Pal Singh, Jagdish Saran Jain and Ajab Singh. According to the allegations in the writ petition the petitioner No. 1, Gopal Sharma, was appointed as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Moradabad' by an order dated 13th December. 1990 in a clear substantive vacancy. A photostat copy of the appointment order is annexure-1 to the writ petition. At that time no other 'person was working on that post. Petitioners 2 to 6, namely, Harpal Singh Chauhan, Rajendra Singh Verma, Dharam Pal Singh, Jagdish Saran Jain and Ajab Singh were also appointed against clear vacancies without replacing anybody as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal), Moradabad. 3. Petitioner No. 1 of Writ Petition No. 819 (M/B) of 1992, Sarvesh Sharma, was appointed as Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal) Moradabad while petitioners 2, 3 and 6, Rajni Kant Jain, Shiv Raj Singh and Satya Prakash, respectively, were appointed as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal), Moradabad vide order dated 25-2-1991 passed by the opposite party No. 1, in pursuance of which they joined on 5-3-1991. Petitioner No. 4, Mustafa Hasan and petitioner No. 5, Jaipal Singh, were appointed by order dated 31-7-1990 as Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal) Moradabad vide their letter of appointment dated 31st July, 1990 and they joined on 8th August, 1990. Initially petitioner No. 2, Rajani Kant Jain also joined as Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal) Moradabad but in view of the pronouncement of judgment in Km. Shreelekha Vidyarthi's case by the Hon'ble Supreme Court his appointment was cancelled and he was again appointed as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal), Moradabad. 4. Shyam Lal Sharma, petitioner of Writ Petition No. 888 (M/B) of 1992 was appointed as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal), Moradabad. 5. Abdul Waseem Siddiqui, petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1246 (M/B) of 1992 was appointed as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal), Moradabad. 6. 4. Shyam Lal Sharma, petitioner of Writ Petition No. 888 (M/B) of 1992 was appointed as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal), Moradabad. 5. Abdul Waseem Siddiqui, petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1246 (M/B) of 1992 was appointed as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal), Moradabad. 6. According to the petitioners of all the writ petitions their term has not been renewed by the State Government and the District Officer, Moradabad has been asked not to take work from them. The courts in which the petitioners are working were satisfied with the quality of work of the petitioners and always recognised their merit. The respondents did not maintain any character roll and if any character roll has been maintained by the District Officer placing therein any adverse entries against the petitioners, the same were never communicated to any of them. The Legal Remembrancer Manual provides for maintenance of character roll of the District Government Counsel. The District Judge and the District Officer are supposed to give their reports in pursuance of the provisions of para 7.08 of the Legal Remembrancer Manual in their respective fields. The District Judge, after consulting the Additional District Judges, in the present case, forwarded two lists with his recommendations. List A contains the names of the advocates whose work was found above average and list B contains the names of those advocates whose work was satisfactory. The District Officer has given his report against the petitioners in a general way on account of political pressure. Political pressure is said to have been exercised by Dr. Nepal Singh, District President of the Bhartiya Janta Party and Member of Legislative Council by writing a letter and recommending certain names for being considered as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) and one name as District Government Counsel (Criminal), Morad abacd. A copy of this letter dated 19-10-1991 has been filed as annexure-11 to Writ Petition No. 688 (M/ B) of 1992. In view of the pronouncement by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Km. Shreelekha Vidyarthi's case the term of the petitioners should have been renewed by the State Government. The engagements of the petitioners were made in clear and substantive vacancies and they could not have been removed without giving them an opportunity of being heard or without being confronted with the material which had been found against them. Shreelekha Vidyarthi's case the term of the petitioners should have been renewed by the State Government. The engagements of the petitioners were made in clear and substantive vacancies and they could not have been removed without giving them an opportunity of being heard or without being confronted with the material which had been found against them. The report of the District Officer is vague and could not have been made the basis for not renewing the term of the petitioners, without applying its mind. It is also alleged in writ petition No. 819 (M/ B) of 1992 that the District and Sessions Judge also came under political pressure and he changed his opinion within a span of five months of the recommendations made by him on 31st July, 1991 and later on 27th December, 1991. The District Magistrate, Sri V. N. Garg, had assumed charge in the last week of July, 1991 and he had only a short span of time to watch the work and conduct of the petitioners. The impugned orders of not renewing the term of the petitioners are stigmatic in nature. 7. The opposite parties have filed a counter affidavit in Writ Petition No. 819 (M/ B) of 1992. In that counter affidavit the opposite parties have alleged that the contents of paras 1 to 17 of the writ petition are misleading and misconceived. The term of the Government Counsel (Criminal) expired on 31st December, 1991. Thereafter the State Government on consideration of the report which was sent by the District Officer decided not to renew the term of the petitioners. The procedure for renewal of the term of Government Counsel as laid down in Km. Shreelekha Vidyarthi's case has been complied with. The allegations of arbitrariness, mala fide and political bias are wrong. The report submitted by the District Officer under para 7.08 of the L.R. Manual is not liable to be judicially scrutinised in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above mentioned case. 8. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. Learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that the District Officer while forwarding recommendations of not renewing the term of the petitioners has not followed the provisions of L.R. Manual. According to the learned counsel the opinion is of a general nature and it does not disclose any material against the petitioners. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. Learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that the District Officer while forwarding recommendations of not renewing the term of the petitioners has not followed the provisions of L.R. Manual. According to the learned counsel the opinion is of a general nature and it does not disclose any material against the petitioners. It is further argued that the character roll of the District Government Counsel who work in a district has to be maintained by the Collector and if there is any adverse material in the same that should have been mentioned in this report. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also contended that the non- communication of the reasons, if any; for the refusal to renew the term is stigmatic in its nature, and the impugned order having been passed without a show cause notice, or an opportunity of hearing is illegal. He has further urged that the impugned order is arbitrary and politically motivated and is therefore void and liable to be quashed. 9. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the State Mr. P.K. Sinha has replied that the impugned order has been passed by the State Government after following the procedure prescribed under Para 7.08 of the L. R. Manual for renewal of the term and the directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He has urged that the impugned order was passed on the report of the District Officer by the State Government and the reason for refusal was not necessary to be communicated and no opportunity of hearing before the passing of the impugned order was called for. The impugned order not disclosing the reason for refusing the renewal of the term cannot be said to be stigmatic or arbitrary or politically motivated. He has stated that the impugned orders are perfectly valid and are not liable to be quashed. The term of the petitioners had already expired on 31st December, 1991 and they had no subsisting rights to continue as such, after the State Government had communicated its decision to the petitioners through the District Magistrate, Moradabad. 10. The most crucial point involved in these writ petitions is whether the impugned decision of the State Govt. The term of the petitioners had already expired on 31st December, 1991 and they had no subsisting rights to continue as such, after the State Government had communicated its decision to the petitioners through the District Magistrate, Moradabad. 10. The most crucial point involved in these writ petitions is whether the impugned decision of the State Govt. refusing thereby the renewal of the term fixed by specific date of the petitioners can be judicially reviewed on merits or it has to be only over-seen from the point of view to find out whether it is an arbitrary decision or the decision taken after following the prescribed norms. Learned counsel for the petitioners has wholly based his arguments on the latest decision in the case of Km. Shrilekha Vidhyarthi v. State of U.P., 1991 SCC (L & S) 742 : (1991) 1 SCC 212 : ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ) and has called upon this Court to examine the merits of the impugned decision also. Even though the principles of the law declared by Hon'ble Supreme Court have finally settled the position of judicial review of all administrative actions also, by a number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are afraid that we cannot in our judicial review examine the merits of the impugned decision, its correctness or otherwise or by substituting our wisdom for that of the State Govt. or by substituting our decision in place of the impugned decision on the basis of the material which was considered by the State Govt. What we have understood from the plethora of the decisions, the object and scope of judicial review of the administrative action is to keep the administrative authorities within the limit of their powers under the law. Appeal, a creative of statute, on the other hand, means that superior administrative tribunal or Court to whom the appeal lies under the law has power to reconsider the decision of the inferior tribunal court on merits. Irrespective of a right of appeal, however, the court may exercise the power of judicial review over the acts and administrative decisions of administrative authorities on questions relating to jurisdiction, arbitrariness and mala fide. The correctness or otherwise of the administrative decision is not within the scope of judicial review. 11. On this point reference to the leading cases appears necessary. The correctness or otherwise of the administrative decision is not within the scope of judicial review. 11. On this point reference to the leading cases appears necessary. In the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) Hon'ble Justices P. N. Bhagwati, V. D. Tulzpurkar and R.S. Pathak, JJ. took up the judicial review of the purely administrative action against a decision of the Govt. whereby a contract was finalised following negotiations with only one party after the tenders were invited and rejected. In this case a very detailed examination was undertaken and the law was clearly declared as follows at page 1637 : "It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily, at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant, and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 which strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The State cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily in entering into relationship contractual or otherwise with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory." 12. In other case M/s. Dwarka Das Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 : ( AIR 1989 SC 1642 ) Hon'ble S. Mukharji, S. Ranganathan and M. H. Kania, JJ. In other case M/s. Dwarka Das Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 : ( AIR 1989 SC 1642 ) Hon'ble S. Mukharji, S. Ranganathan and M. H. Kania, JJ. also undertook judicial review of a purely administrative decision of the Board of Trustees of the Bombay Port Trust in a purely contractual matter in which the eviction of a tenant was ordered and eviction proceedings were started under the Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging Housing Rates (Control) Act, 1947. It was clearly held: "Hence every action/ activity of the Bombay Port Trust which constituted "State" within Article 12 of the Constitution in respect of any right conferred or privilege granted by any statute is subject to Article 14 and must be reasonable, and taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. Where there is arbitrariness in State action, Article 14 springs in and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every action of the Executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reasons. So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, it should meet the test of Article 14. If a governmental policy or action even in contractual matters fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. But there is always a presumption that a Governmental action is reasonable and in public interest. And it is for the party challenging its validity to show that the action is unreasonable, arbitrary or contrary to the professed norms or not informed by public interest, and the burden is a heavy one. In that course of above judicial review of the actions of a constituted authority, the Court cannot really substitute a decision reached by a fair procedure keeping the policy of the respondent in mind by a different decision only on the ground that the decision which appeals to the court is a better one. Otherwise, the court would under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power which does not belong to it. Judicial review is not concerned with the decision, but with the decision making process. It is, therefore, necessary to bear in mind the ways and means by which the court can control or supervise the judicial action of any authority which is subject to judicial control." 13. Judicial review is not concerned with the decision, but with the decision making process. It is, therefore, necessary to bear in mind the ways and means by which the court can control or supervise the judicial action of any authority which is subject to judicial control." 13. In the latest case (wholly relied upon by the petitioners) Km. Shrilekba Vidhyarthi v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1991 SC 537 ). Hon'ble Justices J. S. Verma and R. M. Sahai, undertook the judicial review in writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution and also Civil Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution arising out of a general decision of the Govt. of U.P. communicated through Govt. order dated February 6, 1990 terminating or curtailing the term of all Govt. counsel at the district level without following the prescribed procedure or norms and irrespective of the fact whether the term of the Govt. counsel was subsisting or not. In these cases also the settled principles of judicial review of the administrative action were reiterated and the general Govt. order dated February 6, 1990 was found to be arbitrary and without valid reason whereby the term of the Govt. counsel at the district level was either terminated or curtailed without following the procedure prescribed by paragraph 7.08 of the Legal Remembrancers Manual (hereinafter referred to as `the Manual'). But it was recognised and declared that the power of terminating engagement/ professional engagement /contractual relationship of Govt. counsel even during the subsistence of its term vests in the State Govt. and the State Govt. can exercise this power only in accordance with or after following the procedure/norms prescribed by paragraph 7.08 of the Manual. The prescribed norms/ procedure contained in the manual was also considered and found justified and not arbitrary or unreasonable and for this reason alone the Hon'ble Court directed in the following words : "In view of the above conclusion, all the existing appointees to the posts of Govt. Counsel in the districts throughout the State of U.P., by whatever name called, governed by the impugned circular dated February 7, 1990, who were in position at the time of issuance of the circular, must continue in office and be dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down in the L.R. Manual. Counsel in the districts throughout the State of U.P., by whatever name called, governed by the impugned circular dated February 7, 1990, who were in position at the time of issuance of the circular, must continue in office and be dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down in the L.R. Manual. Those Government Counsel, whose term had then expired or was to expire thereafter, would be considered for renewal of their tenure in the manner prescribed and steps for preparation of a fresh panel to replace them would be taken only if they are found unsuitable for renewal of their term as a result of an informed decision in the manner prescribed. The power of termination of any appointment during the subsistence of the term available to the State Government shall also be available for exercise only in the manner indicated, wherever considered necessary. In short the status quote and as on February 28, 1990, on which date the impugned circular dated February 6, 1990 was made effective will be restored and be maintained till change in any appointment is found necessary and is made in the manner prescribed." 14. In order to make things more clear and understandable the Hon'ble Supreme. Court in its judgment high lighted the following principles : (i) The Govt. Counsel holds the office or post of public nature as he is required to represent the State in its litigation before the Courts. This office is created by the rights and duties attaching thereto administratively or and by statute: (ii) The appointment of the Govt. counsel is in the nature of the professional engagement and creates a contractual relationship and the counsel is not a holder of a civil post/ service under the Government in the strict sense and cannot be treated as a Govt. servant; (iii) The appointment and termination of appointment of a Govt. counsel are within the power of the Govt. but this power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or without any reason and, therefore, procedure or norms if prescribed, must be followed before a decision is taken so as to make it reasonable and valid on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution. (iv) The provision for communication of decision "without assigning any cause" is based on public policy which is not questioned but reasons for the decision must nevertheless exist on record. (iv) The provision for communication of decision "without assigning any cause" is based on public policy which is not questioned but reasons for the decision must nevertheless exist on record. Communication of the reason underlying the decision is not necessary but non-communication or non-assignment of reason for decision does not mean that decision can be made without any reason. A decision or action without discernable cause, reason or reasonable principle is arbitrary and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the Rule of Law. (v) The question whether the impugned act is arbitrary or not is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is arbitrary. (vi) The scope of judicial review is limited to oversee the State action for the purpose of satisfying that it is not vitiated by the vice of the arbitrariness and no more. The wisdom of the policy or the lack of it or desirability of a better alternative is not within the permissible scope of judicial review in such cases. It is not open for the courts to recast the policy or to substitute with another which is considered to be more appropriate, once the attack on ground of arbitrariness is successfully repelled by showing that the act which was done, was fair and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case. (vii) There is a presumption of validity of the State action and the burden is on the person who alleges violation of Article 14 to prove the assertion. This can be done by showing in the first instance that the impugned State action is uninformed by reason inasmuch as there is no discernible principle on which it is based or it is contrary to the prescribed norm of exercise of the power or is unreasonable. This can be done by showing in the first instance that the impugned State action is uninformed by reason inasmuch as there is no discernible principle on which it is based or it is contrary to the prescribed norm of exercise of the power or is unreasonable. If this is shown, then the burden is shifted to the State to repel the attack by disclosing the material and reason which led to the action being taken in order to show that it was an informed decision which was reasonable. (viii) The appointments of the District Government Counsel are to be made and ordinarily renewed on objective assessment of suitability of the person based on the opinion of the District Officer and the District Judge as per relevant provisions of the Manual. We find on the facts and circumstances of the present cases after perusal of the record of the Govt. : (A) Before taking impugned decision the State Govt. has followed the procedure prescribed under paragraph 7.08 of the Manual for consideration of the renewal of the term of the Govt. Counsel at district level; (B) The opinions of the District Judge and the District Officer along with the statement in Form-9 as prescribed in the procedure were received by the Govt.; (C) The recommendations made by District Officers in his report to the Govt. were specific. (D) The opinions of the District Judge and the District Officer along with the statement in Form-9 were duly placed by the Legal Remembrancer and considered by the Govt.; (E) The Govt. agreed and accepted the recommendation of the District Officer for refusal of renewal of the term of the petitioners; (F) The decisions refusing the renewal of the term of the petitioners were duly communicated to the petitioners; (G) The reasons for refusal of the renewal of the term of the petitioners subsist on record but were not communicated to any of the petitioners. 14.1. The learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the impugned decisions on more than one ground. We now accordingly proceed to examine the grounds urged before us. 15. It has been urged that the work of the petitioners was appreciated by the Courts before whom they appeared and the certificate of appreciation has also been given by the particular presiding officer of the Court. We now accordingly proceed to examine the grounds urged before us. 15. It has been urged that the work of the petitioners was appreciated by the Courts before whom they appeared and the certificate of appreciation has also been given by the particular presiding officer of the Court. In support of this ground, letters of appreciation given by the presiding officers of the Courts have also been filed as annexures to the petitions. In writ petition No. 819/ MB/ 92, the following certificates of appreciation in favour of the petitioner Rajani Kant Jain have been filed vide Annexures 17-A to 17-F. Sri Shyam Babu Vaish, IVth Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued a certificate on 21-5-91 expressing in his appreciation vide Annexure 17-A. Sri Satya Narain, Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued a certificate of appreciation on 19-9-91 vide Annexure 17-B. Sri S. C. Agarwal, VIth Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued a certificate of appreciation on 30-8-91 vide Annexure 17-C. Sri B. N. Joshi, Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 27-9-91 vide Annexure 17-D. Sri Dharam Singh, Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 26-9-91 vide Annexure 17-E. Sri I.B. Singh, Special Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 21-5-91 vide Annexure 17-F. In favour of the petitioner Shiv Raj Singh, Assistant Sessions Judge and J.S.C.C. Moradabad Sri A. K. Malviya wrote a letter to District Judge on 14-11-91 vide Annexure Ex. 18. In favour of the petitioner Mustafa Husain, Sri Satya Narain, Vth Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 28-11-91 vide Annexure 19-A; Sri S.C. Agrawal, VIth Addl. District Judge, Moradabad wrote a letter to District Judge, Moradabad on 10-7-91 vide Annexure 19-B, and IXth Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 23-1-91 vide Annexure 19-C. J.S.C.C. Moradabad wrote a letter to District Judge, Moradabad on 21-7-91 recommending renewal of VIIth D. G. C. (Criminal) vide Annexure-20. In favour of the petitioner Satya Prakash, Sri Ganga Ram, Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation of 5-10-91 vide Annexure 21-A, and Sri Satya Narain, Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 8-11-91 vide Annexure 21-B. In writ petition No. 888/ MB/ 92, letter of recommendation and certificates of appreciation in favour of the petitioner Shyam Lal Sharma have been filed. District Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation of 5-10-91 vide Annexure 21-A, and Sri Satya Narain, Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 8-11-91 vide Annexure 21-B. In writ petition No. 888/ MB/ 92, letter of recommendation and certificates of appreciation in favour of the petitioner Shyam Lal Sharma have been filed. Sri Brijendra Singh, 1994 XIVth A. D. J., Moradabad wrote a letter to District Judge, Moradabad on 7-6-89 vide Annexure 6-A. XIIth. District Judge, Moradabad issued a certificate of appreciation on 20-2-90 vide Annexure 6-B. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Moradabad issued a certificate of appreciation on 19-9-91 vide Annexure 6-C. Sri V.P. Singh, XIVth Addl. triitrict Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 15-5-91 vide Annexure 6-D. Sri Shyam Babu Vaish, IVth A.D.J., Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 22-6-91 vide Annexure 6-E. Special Judge, Moradabad issued certificate of appreciation on 24-12-91 vide Annexure 6-F. In the writ petition No. 1246/ MB/ 92 J. S. C. C., Moradabad sent a letter to D.M. Moradabad on 21-7-91 vide Annexure-4 recommending the renewal of 7 A.D.G.C. (Criminal). The petitioner Abdul Wasim also filed 5 certificates of appreciation vide Annexures 5 to 9 issued by Sri S. B. Vaish, IVth Assistant Sessions Judge on 2-5-91; by Sri Udai Chandra, Xth Assistant Sessions Judge, Moradabad on 11-10-90; by Sri Dharam Singh, XIIth Addl. Sessions Judge on 1-5-91; Sri Pooran Singh, XIVth Addl. Sessions Judge on 2-5-91 and by Sri Ashwani Kumar, Vth Assistant Sessions Judge, Moradabad on 29-1-92 respectively. 16. We have examined the certificates of appreciation and also the letters of recommendation sent in favour of the petitioners. We are extremely pained to see lack of sense of responsibility, official proprietary and lack of knowledge exhibited by these senior Judicial Officers holding the post of Addl. District and Sessions Judges, Special Judges, Assistant Sessions Judges and Judge Small Causes. We have examined the certificates of appreciation and also the letters of recommendation sent in favour of the petitioners. We are extremely pained to see lack of sense of responsibility, official proprietary and lack of knowledge exhibited by these senior Judicial Officers holding the post of Addl. District and Sessions Judges, Special Judges, Assistant Sessions Judges and Judge Small Causes. Where an officer is enjoined by administrative instructions, or statutory provisions to give his opinions in his official capacity in official matters confidentially to and on the direction of a superior authority at the proper time, he is not only bound to send his confidential opinion/ remarks only to the superior authority concerned he is equally bound not to disclose the official secret confided in him, or to issue independently certificates of appreciation in favour of those persons holding official posts in respect of whom he is obliged to comment only confidentially and not privately or publicly. We remember that in accordance with this principle, the Hon'ble High Court has also issued an administrative circular to all the District Judges for the information of all the Judicial Officers prohibiting them from giving certificates of appreciation or good character to officials subordinate to them. Such certificate, appear to have been obtained by the petitioners directly from the officers concerned. It is thus obvious that these certificates have not been issued on the direction of any superior authority, but on the influence of the person concerned. These certificates and letters are, therefore, unauthorised communications and cannot be taken into consideration either by the competent authorities, or by this Court in the judicial review of the impugned decisions. Under para 7.09 of the manual, it is only the District Judge who is required before recording his opinion to obtain a report about the work and conduct of the District Government Counsel from the presiding officer of the court where they are generally required to practise. Even if the petitioner concerned had actually worked in the courts of the presiding officers who awarded them the certificates of appreciation; these certificates also lacked authenticity, material and relevance besides being unauthorised. Even if the petitioner concerned had actually worked in the courts of the presiding officers who awarded them the certificates of appreciation; these certificates also lacked authenticity, material and relevance besides being unauthorised. We deprecate such unauthorised practice on the part of the Judicial Officers and hope that this Court on the administrative side shall also issue another Circular deterring the Judicial Officers from granting certificates of appreciation, or good character to any official including the Government Counsel at their instance. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not attach any significance to these certificates of appreciation and letters of recommendation without authority and ignore them. Moreover the judicial review of the impugned decisions does not also entitle the. Court to substitute its decision for the impugned decision on the basis of the material brought before the Court. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot, therefore, be accepted. 17. It was urged that under para 7.09 of the manual, District Officer and the District Judge are required to maintain character roll of the District Government Counsel working in the district and to send a copy of their opinion recorded yearly and on transfer from the District to the State Government for record. But, in the present cases, such a character roll is not being maintained at the district level, and, therefore, in the absence of the character roll, the renewal of the term of the counsel cannot be refused. It is true that para 7-09 of the manual has prescribed maintenance of the character roll of the District Government Counsel to be maintained by the District Officer. This record is expected to contain the opinions of the District Officer and the District Judge recorded before the end of every year and also while leaving the district on transfer. It is, however, the admitted case that the provisions of this para 7.09 of the manual are not being complied with in practice. We are also given to understand that these provisions have become obsolete being out of practice and never following in any district in any year. That is why the character roll is also not being maintained at the Government level. It cannot be presumed that in the absence of the character roll every Government counsel is suitable for the renewal of his term. That is why the character roll is also not being maintained at the Government level. It cannot be presumed that in the absence of the character roll every Government counsel is suitable for the renewal of his term. In the absence of character roll, the question of communication of any adverse remark also does not arise, but that did not mean that every counsel was doing good work, showing good conduct and enjoying good reputation. However, in the absence of the character roll of the District Government Counsel, it can neither be inferred, nor it is reasonable to infer that the work, conduct, reputation and suitability of a Government Counsel cannot otherwise be estimated, or assessed by the State Government while considering the question of the renewal of the term. The provisions relating to the consideration of the renewal of the term of the Government Counsel are contained in another para 7.08 of the manual. A close perusal of the provisions of para 7.08 makes it clear that the consideration of the renewal of the term has not been made dependent on the maintenance of the character roll. For that purpose the opinion of the District Judge and the opinion of the District Officer based on different criteria constitute the material for the assessment about the District Government Counsel whereupon the State Government takes a decision either to agree or disagree with the recommendation of the District Officer. Therefore, this ground of non-maintenance of the character roll is not available to the petitioners for the judicial review of the impugned decision. This procedure prescribed for the Tratewal of the term of the Government Counsel was duly considered and approved in the case of Km. Srilekha Vidyarathi (supra). It was rather highlighted that the renewal of the term of the District Government Counsel was to be decided by the Government on objective assessment of suit-ability of the person based on the opinion of the District Officer and the District Judge as per provisions of para 7.08 of the manual. Therefore, in our judicial review of the impugned decision, the scope is limited to oversee that the provisions of para 7.08 of the manual have been followed before the impugned decision was taken by the competent authority. 18. Therefore, in our judicial review of the impugned decision, the scope is limited to oversee that the provisions of para 7.08 of the manual have been followed before the impugned decision was taken by the competent authority. 18. It was vehemently urged before us that the impugned decision is based on political consideration and not on objective assessment of the work, conduct and reputation of the petitioners. In support of this contention, the petitioners have filed photo copies of the two letters said to have been sent by Dr. Nepal Singh, Member of Legislative Council, U.P. and District President of the Bhartiya Janta Party at Moradabad, vide Annexures 11 and 17 in writ petition No. 688/ MB/ 92. vide Annexures 12 and 13 in writ petition No. 819/ MB/ 92, and Annexures 7 and 8 in writ petition No. 888/ MB/ 92. We have carefully perused these letters. One of the letter dated 14-1-92 merely says that considering the volume of the criminal work at Moradabad, the renewal of term of 15 A.D.G.C. (Criminal) should be done at the same time, whereas only the renewal of 12 Addl. D.G.C. (Criminal) has been done. This letter does not contain anything either against, or in favour of any particular Government counsel. This letter dated 14-1-92 addressed to the Law Minister, Government U.P. is of course, available in the Government file which has been produced before us. This letter does not in any way influence the mind of the State Government and also does not bring in any political pressure in favour of, or against any particular Government Counsel. Another letter not disclosing the date addressed to the District Magistrate Moradabad by Dr. Nepal Singh, however, contains a recommendation for renewal of the term of S/ Sri Sushil Singh, C.B. Bhatnagar, Mahendra Gupta, Rajendra Saran, H. N. Kapoor, Sudha Sharma, Khoob Singh, Arvind Gupta and Sushil Gupta. This letter also does not contain anything against any of the petitioners. Therefore, on the basis of these two letters of Dr. Nepal Singh, however, contains a recommendation for renewal of the term of S/ Sri Sushil Singh, C.B. Bhatnagar, Mahendra Gupta, Rajendra Saran, H. N. Kapoor, Sudha Sharma, Khoob Singh, Arvind Gupta and Sushil Gupta. This letter also does not contain anything against any of the petitioners. Therefore, on the basis of these two letters of Dr. Nepal Singh, it cannot be said that the political pressure has been exercised either on the District Magistrate, Moradabad, or on the Government for refusal of the renewal of the term of any of the petitioners and, therefore, the impugned decision of the State Government taken after following the prescribed procedure and on the basis of the material consisting of the opinions of the District Judge, Moradabad, and the District Officer, Moradabad cannot be tainted or vitiated by political element as urged before us. We would, however, like to observe that only in recent years the Government Counsel, or Advocates desiring to be Government Counsel have themselves started approaching the political functionaries and are intro ducting the political element in spheres where it is not desirable to do so. 19. It was also urged by the petitioners' Counsel that the opportunity has been given by the State Government before taking the impugned decision, and consequently they decision is bad on the ground of natural justice. We do not find substance in this contention. The principle of giving opportunity before refusing the renewal of the Government Counsel is neither warranted by law, or by prescribed procedure, nor is in public interest. While considering the clause without assigning any cause," the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly observed in the case of Km. Srilekha Vidyarathi (supra) that communication of the reasons for the decision arrived at is not necessary, and what is necessary is the communication of the decision itself without reason. The procedure prescribed by para 7.08 of the manual does nowhere lay down that opportunity be given to the concerned Government Counsel before the Government takes a decision on the basis of the opinions of the District Officer and the District Judge. There is no such rule that even in purely administrative matter, notice is ,required to be given to the concerned person before the decision is taken. There is no such rule that even in purely administrative matter, notice is ,required to be given to the concerned person before the decision is taken. The principle of natural justice is also not an absolute obligation, and the requirement of a notice if to depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and to be considered from the point of view of public interest that if notice is given, how much public interest would suffer, or if notice is not given, how much and to what extent the individual would suffer. In the case of Karnataka Public Service Commission v. B. M. Vijaya Shanker, JT 1992 (4) SCC 348 : ( AIR 1992 SC 952 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court elaborated the principles of natural justice, whereby an opportunity is required to be given to a person, against whom an adverse order is to be passed. In the case of an examinee who used unfair means in the Karanataka Civil Service Examination, the order of the Public Service Commission debarring the examinee was upheld as a valid one, and the requirement of notice was considered irrelevant and non-applicable to such a situation wherein the public interest would suffer more by the delay in the declaration of the results of the examination. In the present case also, even though not required by rule, or any administrative procedure if a notice of opportunity was given to the Government Counsel before a decision was taken by the competent authority, the delay in taking a decision would have been unestiamble, and the public interest would have suffered on account of the delay in the disengagement of the unsuitable Counsel and by the delay in the engagement of a suitable Counsel and by the confusion which would have prevailed in the meantime in regard to the conduct of Government cases with incalculable inconvenience to the course concerned. The giving of a notice communicating the unpleasant reasons to the Government Counsel would never stand to his benefit in his professional career and would stigmatise his reputation and estimation in the eyes of his relations and friends. Therefore, the giving of a notice to a Government Counsel in connection the renewal of the term is never desirable even on administrative and practical plane, and not in public interest also. Therefore, the giving of a notice to a Government Counsel in connection the renewal of the term is never desirable even on administrative and practical plane, and not in public interest also. There fore, we disapprove the contention of the learned counsel and hold that no notice in the form of an opportunity to explain the adverse material is required to be given to the Government Counsel before the State Government takes a decision. 20. The petitioners have taken a plea in the writ petitions that the impugned decision of the State Government is stigmatic because no reasons have been communicated in support of the decision. We have already discussed at length that the communication of the reasons is not required to be done, either before, or along with the decision. The reasons for refusal of the renewal of the term are presumably unpleasant and can never be in the interest of the reputation of the Government Counsel. If the unpleasant reasons are in fact communicated to the Government Counsel, that communication will actually cause a stigma on the Government Counsel himself. We are unable to appreciate as to how the decision without mentioning the unpleasant reasons will cause a stigma against the reputation, conduct and suitability of the Government Counsel. The decision without showing the reason will be a simpliciter one to discontinue the term from particular date. People can imagine or speculate the reasons as they like, but they cannot categorically assert that by such and such reason the order has been issued. The disclosure of the reason will not be in the interest of the Government counsel at all. Let it remain under the curtain; do not lift the curtain . Therefore, in our opinion, the non-communication, or non-assignment of the reason for the decision either by way of notice, or opportunity before the decision, or along with the decision is not at all stigmatic in nature. The plea taken by the petitioners is apparently misconceived and does not hold substance. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the impugned decision on the ground that the State Government did not have any material before it for taking the impugned decision. The plea taken by the petitioners is apparently misconceived and does not hold substance. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the impugned decision on the ground that the State Government did not have any material before it for taking the impugned decision. The learned counsel probably means by raising this contention that there should have been some complaint, or any other document containing any adverse material against the Government Counsel so as to deny him the extension of the term. We find from the perusal of the record of the Government produced before us by the learned standing Counsel that the opinions of the District Judge and the District Officer along with the prescribed statement in Form 9 on being placed by the Legal Remembrancer were considered by the State Government in accordance with the provisions of para 7.08 of the manual, and the State Government agreed with the recommendation of the District Officer not to renew further the term of the petitioner. The record of the opinions of the District Judge and the District Officer is sufficient material before the State Government to arrive at a particular decision, and it is only the requirement of the provision referred to above, the opinions of the District Judge and the District Officer provide to the State Government an objective assessment. The State Government has not taken any decision of its own without any material before it. 22. However, the learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the opinions of the District Judge and the District Magistrate were vague in itself without any supportive material. We are unable to appreciate as to what would be the material in support of the opinion of the District Judge, and the opinion of the District Magistrate. The prescribed procedure under para 7.08 of the manual speaks only of the opinions and not of the adverse materials against the Government Counsel. The opinions on points mentioned for the District Judge, and on points mentioned for the District Officer cannot always have any material in their formation. The opinion on the given points is of such a nature as can be formed only by observation, hearing and conviction. The dictionary meaning of the word 'opinion' clearly indicates that 'opinion' is a judgment or belief based on grounds short of proof; it is personal conviction or a view held as probable. The opinion on the given points is of such a nature as can be formed only by observation, hearing and conviction. The dictionary meaning of the word 'opinion' clearly indicates that 'opinion' is a judgment or belief based on grounds short of proof; it is personal conviction or a view held as probable. It can be formal statement by an Expert on a subject of science, Art or Law or special facts. But, in any view of the matter it means a personal conviction, belief or judgment. The District Judge and the District Magistrate are the important public functionaries in the districts exercising statutory and administrative powers and discharging public functions. In that capacity they have occasions to meet people, watch conduct and observe personality etc. The Government Counsel not only works before the District Judge, but also works with the District Officer in administrative, or quasi-judicial functions. Both these functionaries is can very well form their opinions, or belief on the points referred to in para 7.08 of the manual. Their opinions cannot necessarily be supported by material and may fall short of proof, but their opinion may constitute good material for the objective assessment about the suitability of the Government Counsel before the State Government. If the Government takes a decision on the basis of the opinions of these two public functionaries, it does not mean that the Government has taken a decision without any material. We are of the clear view that the recommendations of the District Officer containing his opinion and that of the District Judge cannot be called to be vague as they are merely opinions required of them under the prescribed procedure. It is a common experience that the Courts while observing the Government Counsel in the conduct of cases before them, form their opinion whether a particular Counsel is good at work, behaves well, and is not arrogant, and does not show anything touching upon his integrity, or lack of preparation, or study of law and facts. There cannot be any material with the Court to form such an opinion which becomes a quick conviction just by observation, hearing and experience. To expect material in support of this conviction is an impossible task to achieve. There can be good opinion or bad opinion. There cannot be any material with the Court to form such an opinion which becomes a quick conviction just by observation, hearing and experience. To expect material in support of this conviction is an impossible task to achieve. There can be good opinion or bad opinion. The certificates and letters of appreciation filed and relied upon by the petitioners in these cases are nothing but merely opinions of the Presiding Officers of the courts concerned. There is no material indicated in support of the opinions of appreciation. We are unable to appreciate how the petitioners expect this Court to rely on these certificates of appreciation containing personal opinions of the Presiding Officer without authority and without any material in support thereof. If opinions of appreciation can be accepted and relied upon without any material in support thereof, why not the bad opinions without material in support be accepted. The principle would remain the same and cannot change depending upon the tenor of the opinion; it may be bad, good or indifferent, but it shall remain the opinion in any case. The opinion given by the authorised officer on the prescribed points on the proper occasion in the prescribed manner and to the prescribed authority shall alone deserve the credence and respect by the competent authority. In the present cases, we find that it has been duly done in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The impugned decision is not at all vitiated on this ground. 23. The petitioners in their writ petitions have also alleged that they have been appointed in clear vacancies against regular posts and consequently they should have been ordinarily allowed to continue in their posts. This contention does not contain any sub stance and appears to be misconceived. The nature of the appointment of the Government Counsel has been made clear in para 7.01 read with clause (3) of para 7.06 of the manual, which are reproduced below for ready reference. "7.01. Definition - (1) The District Government Counsel are legal practitioners appointed by the State Government to conduct in any court, other than the High Court, such civil, criminal or revenue cases on behalf of the State Government, as may be assigned to them either generally, or specially by the Government. (2) The legal practiser, appointed to conduct criminal cases shall be known as District Government Counsel (Criminal). (2) The legal practiser, appointed to conduct criminal cases shall be known as District Government Counsel (Criminal). Similarly the legal practitioners appointed to conduct civil and revenue cases, shall be known as District Government Counsel (Civil) and District Government Counsel (Revenue) respectively." "7.06. (3) The appointment of any legal practitioner as a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and is not appointment to a post under the Government. Accordingly the Government reserves the power to terminate the appointment of any District Government Counsel at any time without assigning any cause." This position has also been accepted by the petitioners themselves by executing their deeds of engagement in Form No. 1 in respect of the fixed term of three years ending on 31st December, 1991. In the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also considered these provisions and observed as follows at page 546 : "The expression `professional engagement' is used therein to distinguish it from `appointment to a post under the government' in the strict sense. The expression `at any time' in the other part of clause (3) which enables the Government to terminate the appointment `at any time without assigning any cause' merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment. The expressions `without assigning any cause' means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated and is not to be equated with 'without existence of any cause'. It merely means that the reasons for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee, though the decision has to be communicated. The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. It is, thus, settled position that the Government Counsel is neither holding a civil post, or civil service under the Government, and cannot be treated as a Government servant, but, of course, he is holding a public office to which rights and duties are attached which a Government Counsel is required to discharge in such cases as may be assigned to him either generally, or specially by the Government before the concerned court/ tribunal, or any other authority. The designations of these Government Counsel referred to in clause (2) of para 7.01 of the manual also do not speak of any posts. Such holders of public officers are governed by the own terms and conditions defined by the executive orders of the Government. However, even though the Government Counsel does not hold any civil post/ civil service like a Government Counsel, the renewal of his term has to be considered in accordance with the existing procedure contained in para 7.08 of the manual. In the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed 'that the appointments are to be made and ordinarily renewed on objective assessment of the suitability of the person based on the opinion of the District Officer and the District Judge, there is obviously an element of continuity of the appointment, and unless the appointee is found to be unsuitable either by his own work or conduct, or age, or in comparison to any more suitable candidate available at the place of appointment." These observations clearly show that before the expiry of the term the suitability of the Government Counsel has to be estimated objectively on the basis of the opinions of the District Officer and the District Judge, and the character roll, if available. In the present case also the opposite parties have considered the renewal of the term of the petitioners on the basis of the opinions of the District Officer and the District Judge by following procedure prescribed by para 7.08 of the manual. However, the character roll which has not been maintained anywhere as a fact has not been considered due to its non-availability. However, the character roll which has not been maintained anywhere as a fact has not been considered due to its non-availability. In these circumstances the contention raised by the petitioners does not render them an assistance to continue after the expiry of the term o their appointment when the refusal of the renewal has been made in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The alleged existence of a clear vacancy and an appointment therein does not create any right whatsoever in favour of the petitioners. 24. In the recent case, Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, 1992 (4) JT 489 : (1992 All LJ 909) the Supreme Court observed that the right to remain in the post comes to an end after the expiry of the tenure of appointment. Though this observation was made in the case of a purely and ho employee appointed on contractual basis for a limited tenure, yet it makes the position clear that in the case of tenure appointment, there is no right to continue after the expiry of the tenure. However, in the present case the petitioner's case for renewal of the term has been duly considered by the competent authority at the proper time in accordance with the proscribed procedure, and as a result thereof the renewal of the term has been refused and decision communicated to the petitioners. 25. A reference has also been made to the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Sri P. N. Sethi v. State of U.P. in Writ Petition No. 47(M / B) of 1992. In this case the petitioner Sri P. N. Sethi working as District Government Counsel (Criminal), Lucknow was not given extension of his term under misconceived nation that the age of superannuation of District Government Counsel is 60 years. Under note to sub-clause (6) to para 7.08 of the manual provided that the renewal beyond 60 years of age shall depend upon continuous good work, sound integrity and physical fitness of the Counsel. Relying upon the decision in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), the Division Bench found that the extension of the petitioner was illegally refused on the basis that he had attained the age of superannuation, and no objective assessment of his work, inter grity and fitness was made. Relying upon the decision in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), the Division Bench found that the extension of the petitioner was illegally refused on the basis that he had attained the age of superannuation, and no objective assessment of his work, inter grity and fitness was made. The decision on facts and circumstances of a particular case is never a precedent and cannot practically apply to the facts and circumstances of each case even though similar in nature because it depends upon several factors and provisions administrative, or statutory. The principles of law governing the judicial review of purely administrative matter has already been elucidated at length with reference to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, we would like to endorse our agreement on the observations made by the Divisions Bench in the following words : "It is not a happy feature and if the State and its Lawyers start litigating between themselves the consequences can well be imagined, for it is supposed that a fiduciary relationship exists between a Lawyer and his client." We also feel that it would be conducive to the interest of both, the State and the Government Counsel to avoid, as far as possible, such litigation, lest it becomes a normal feature affecting the relationship of faith and trust. If the Government Counsel is allowed to continue as such under the orders of the Court, it would be practically difficult not only for the State, but also for the Government Counsel to work in the interest of efficient and expeditious conduct of Government cases when there is absence of mutual trust, confidence and faith, which makes them rely on each other. The element of acrimony is bound to come in between mutual trust and faith. Consequently public interest would suffer tremendously with resultant inconvenience to the courts and delay in the disposal of cases. Therefore, the effort should be to maintain mutual trust, confidence and faith by one party with the other party. 26. After considering the various contentions raised by the petitioners and also the various facets of the matter, we come to the following conclusions : (1) The judicial review of the impugned decision which is purely administrative in its nature not regulated by any statute, but only regulated by executive instructions, is limited to oversee the impugned decision that it has been taken after following the prescribed procedure. (2) It was neither necessary, nor desired in public interest to communicate the reason for the impugned decision. No prior notice or an opportunity of hearing before the communication of the impugned decision was necessary for such a matter. (3) Non-communication of the breach underlying the impugned decision is not at all stigmatic in nature against the petitioner. (4) The impugned decision against the petitioners was not tained by any political pressure. (5) The impugned decision has been taken by the State Government after following the procedure prescribed by para 7.08 of the manual. The record consisting of the opinions of the District Judge and of the District Magistrate, Moradabad along with statement Form No. 9 informs the decision as the subsisting reasons. (6) The merit of the impugned decision cannot be examined in the limited judicial review and cannot be substituted by a better one either of the court, or of any other authority. (7) In our judicial review of the impugned decision, we find that the impugned decision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and is justified by the objective assessment undertaken by the State Government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. 27. In the result, we find no merit in these writ petitions and no interference is called for. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are hereby dismissed. Since under the interim stay order made in these petitions, the petitioners have so far continued as Government Counsel, now they are directed to hand over the files, documents, registers etc, to the District Magistrate, Moradabad forthwith in keeping with their dignity and traditions. The opposite parties are also directed to pay off the retainer fee and other fees, if remaining undisbursed, within a period of two months from the date of this judgment.