K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) IN this delay condonation application the question of quite great importance that arises for the consideration is: Whether in a case where the Trial indisputedly commences on the basis of the complaint filed by the Food Inspector and results into acquittal of the accused and further when the impugned order of acquittal though not challenged by the said complainant himself but yet at the same time the same came to be challenged none-the-less at his instance through the instrumentality of the State Government then whether the special benefit of the larger period of limitation of six months for filing the Acquittal Appeal under Section 378 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 which is otherwise available to the public servants can be reasonably availed of to hold that the acquittal appeal in question though formally filed by the State and therefore was technically beyond time and yet in substance and the spirit the same having been basically filed at the instance of the Food Inspector who is a public servant the same was within the time period of limitation. ( 2 ) TO appreciate and elicit the answer to the above question it is necessary first of all to set out few relevant facts and circumstances of the case leading to the present Misc. Criminal Application and in particular the question raised above. 2. 1 Few relevant facts: According to the Complainant-Mr. M. C. Desai Food Inspector Bhuj Municipality the Respondent-Mohanlal Valji was found selling adulterated chilly-powder in his shop and therefore a complaint for the alleged offences under Sections 7 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1955 came to be filed against him before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Kachchh at Bhuj. This was registered as a Summary Case No. 3136 of 1988. At the end of trial the learned Magistrate by his judgment and order dated 30th January 1991 acquitted the respondent and as a result the Complainant - Food Inspector moved the State Government to file an Acquittal Appeal in the High Court. Accordingly the State preferred a Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1991. In the said Appeal the office of this Court raised an objection that the same was beyond time by 63 days ultimately giving rise to the present Misc. Accordingly the State preferred a Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1991. In the said Appeal the office of this Court raised an objection that the same was beyond time by 63 days ultimately giving rise to the present Misc. Criminal Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 inter alia praying for condoning the said delay of 63 days. While explaining away the facts and circumstances allegedly resulting into the said delay Mr. B. N. Pandya Assistant Legal Department in his Affidavit while setting out the details as to how and under what circumstances the alleged delay of 63 days came to take place stated that the impugned order of acquittal was passed on 30-1-1991 and thereafter the Complainant - Food Inspector applied for certified copy of the same on 20-2-1991. This was ready for delivery on 19-7-1991 and was received by the Food Inspector on 25-7-1991. Thereafter the Complainant proposed an acquittal appeal which was routed through the Office of the Commissioner of the Food and Drugs Control Administration Gandhinagar and was ultimately received by the Registry Branch of the Legal Department on 26 After entering the same in the Inward Register the same was forwarded to the concerned Branch on 27-11-1991 which in its turn after duly processing and scrutinizing on the very day only submitted the same to the Joint Secretary for taking an appropriate decision. The Joint Secretary in his turn without loosing any time whatsoever took the decision to file an acquittal appeal on the said effect was issued and forwarded to the office of the Government Pleader Gujarat High Court Ahmedabad directing him to file an Acquittal Appeal. The said G. R. was received by the office of the Government Pleader on 28-11-1991 at 4-10 p. m. and on the very next day that is 29 the acquittal appeal came to be presented before this Court. The Criminal Branch of this Court thereafter on scrutinizing and examining the papers of the said acquittal appeal noticed that the same was beyond time by 63 days and accordingly raised an objection in the said regard giving rise to the present Misc. Criminal Application for condoning the delay of 63 days as stated above. ( 3 ) MR. Divetia the learned Addl. Criminal Application for condoning the delay of 63 days as stated above. ( 3 ) MR. Divetia the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing for the Appellant-State submitted that strictly speaking there is no delay as such as the present appeal is filed within the statutory period of limitation as prescribed under Section 378 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 because in substance and spirit it has been filed only at the instance of the Complainant - Food Inspector who is a public servant. Mr. Divetia further submitted that so far as the filing of an acquittal appeal by the public servant is concerned the same is specifically governed by the provisions contained in Section 378 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 where the period of limitation prescribed is six months. The said Section 378 (5) of the Code reads as under:appeal in case of acquittal 378 (1) xx xx xx xx xx. (2) xx xx xx xx xx xx. (3) xx xx xx xx xx xx. (4) xx xx xx xx xx. (5) No application under sub-Sec. (4) for the grant of special leave to be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months were the complainant is a public servant and sixty days in every other case computed from the date of that order of acquittal. Mr. Divetia in view of this legal position further submitted that the present appeal having been filed ai the instance of the Complainant - Food Inspector the same was strictly within the statutory period of time-limitation of six months as prescribed under Section 378 (5) of the Code and therefore no question of condoning any delay arises in this matter. Mr. Divetia in the alternative further submitted that assuming without admitting that the present appeal is not technically filed by the original complainant in his name and that the same has been filed by the State then in that case also taking into consideration on the one hand quite impersonal attitude and the resultant remissness of some of the public servants manning the public- administration vis-a-vis on the other hand the question of major public - interest involved in such cases of food adulteration namely that of the hazard to the health of the Society in the larger interest of the Society whatever be the delay the same is required to be condoned. In support of this contention Mr. Divetia has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court rendered in case of Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC at page 1353 wherein in para 3 it has been observed as under: 3 The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression sufficient cause employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the Law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appeal to have precolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) Every days delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including the State as a litigant are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step - motherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued within the note-making file pushing and passing on the buck echoirs delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provisions in the course of the interpretation of the expression sufficient cause. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. . . . On the basis of the above submissions Mr. Divetia finally urged that taking any view or the matter the contention regarding the period of limitation cannot be permitted to be sustained and in that view of the matter the present acquittal deserves to be decided and disposed off on merits according to the law. ( 4 ) AS against the above Mr. Divetia finally urged that taking any view or the matter the contention regarding the period of limitation cannot be permitted to be sustained and in that view of the matter the present acquittal deserves to be decided and disposed off on merits according to the law. ( 4 ) AS against the above Mr. C. H. Vora the learned Advocate for the respondent vehemently submitted that there was a great delay of as many as 63 days in filing the present acquittal appeal and therefore the same should not be condoned as to do so would be indirectly putting premium over the negligence of those public servants who are responsible for causing such delay. Mr. Vora further submitted that though the impugned judgment and order of acquittal was passed on 30 the Food Inspector applied for the certified copy of the same on 20-2-1991 that is to say after 20 days. Not only that but further according to Mr. Vora though the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order was received by the Food Inspector on 25-7-1991 still however for the reasons best known to him the proposal was not sent to the Legal Department till 26 Mr. Vora submitted that wide gap of about 4 months in remaining totally indolent and inactive in sending proposal to file an acquittal appeal has not been at all explained either by the petitioner herein or the Food Inspector. Mr. Vora still further submitted that had indeed the present appeal been filed by the Food Inspector himself then in that case the court would indeed surely have been justified in holding that there was no delay as the period of limitation would be six months as postulated in Section 378 (5) of the Code. But according to Mr. Vora that is not the case here as unmistakably the present appeal is filed by the State Government and not by the Complainant - Food Inspector as clearly indicated by the cause title of the appeal-memo. In support of the above submission Mr. But according to Mr. Vora that is not the case here as unmistakably the present appeal is filed by the State Government and not by the Complainant - Food Inspector as clearly indicated by the cause title of the appeal-memo. In support of the above submission Mr. Vora specifically invited the attention of this Court to the relevant Section 378 (4) of the Code which reads as under: s 378 (4)"if such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. On the basis of the above Mr. Vora accordingly further submitted that this is not a matter where any application for leave to appeal for acquittal is made by the original complainant and hence under the circumstances unless the facts of the case squarely fall within the purview of Section 378 (4) the provisions contained in Section 378 (5) of the Code cannot be of any assistance as contended to by the learned APP Mr. Divetia. When such is the situation Mr. Vora finally urged that the provisions contained in Section 378 (5) of the Code would no longer be of any assistance to cover the obvious remissness and the delay of 63 days by the State in filing this acquittal appeal and therefore the present delay condonation application be dismissed. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties at the very outset for the reasons discussed at length hereafter it appears to this Court that the submissions made by the learned APP has considerable force and therefore the same deserve to be accepted. It has got to be stated that the contentions raised by Mr. Vora are absolutely hyper-technical and not realistic one being not conducive to the substantial justice which every court aims at doing the justice and is duty-bound to be realistic. The judicial discretion can never be permitted to be stripped off the common sense approach and pragmatism nor could it be permitted to be ensnared and fall into the ditch of technicalities at the cost of real and substantial justice to the people for whom ultimately Laws are enacted and Courts exists. The judicial discretion can never be permitted to be stripped off the common sense approach and pragmatism nor could it be permitted to be ensnared and fall into the ditch of technicalities at the cost of real and substantial justice to the people for whom ultimately Laws are enacted and Courts exists. Thus having regard to the facts of the instant case namely that the offence alleged against the respondent is an offence vitally affecting the health of people involving the public interest no Court entrusted with the duty of doing justice can ever afford to over-look the same. No doubt it is true that the acquittal appeal in question has been filed apparently by the State of Gujarat but at the same time it also cannot be disputed that it has been filed very much and only at the instance of the proposal put forward by the Complainant - Food Inspector who is indisputedly a public servant. Not only that but within 20 days after the impugned order of acquittal came to be passed on 30 the complainant had applied for the certified copy of the same on 20-2-1991. This is quite indicative of the fact that the complainant was keen to file an acquittal appeal and that at no point of time he had abandoned his intention to file the appeal as the follow up action of sending proposal to file acquittal appeal to Legal Department. In this view of the peculiar situation also the appeal in substance and effect must be deemed to be an appeal by the Complainant - Food Inspector only through the instrumentality or the agency or proxy of the State Government. The contention of Mr. Vora that the provisions contained in Section 378 (5) of the Code is subject to and controlled by Section 378 (4) and that in the instant case since the Complainant - Food Inspector has not made an application praying for special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal which is requirement of Section 378 (4) the benefit of the period of six months of limitation cannot be availed of. Now this indeed is not a correct way of reading Section 378 (4 ). Now this indeed is not a correct way of reading Section 378 (4 ). The phrase on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf grant special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal does not necessarily mean that the application should be filed by the complainant himself as this Section does not prohibit filing of an appeal by proxy and/or through the instrumentality of the State. Now when the Court is required to interpret any provision of Law the same has got to be interpreted in a manner which is just and reasonable and advances the substantial cause of justice and not mere technical one which frustrates and defeats the same. Therefore merely because in form this appeal appears to have been filed by the different instrumentality viz. the State it cannot be permitted to alter the fact that the same in fact is filed at the instance of the Complainant - Food Inspector. Under such peculiar circumstances the period of limitation of filing the acquittal appeal would precisely fall within the time-limit ambit and purview of Section 378 (5) of the Code which gives six months for the same. In this view of the matter the objection raised by the Office that the appeal is filed beyond the period of limitation and vehemently supported by Mr. Vora having no substance cannot be sustained and therefore is over-ruled. ( 6 ) NOW assuming for the sake of argument only that the State is an agency distinct from the Complainant - F ood Inspector and further since the present acquittal appeal is filed by it only the period of limitation prescribed in law should be three months then even merely because there is some delay in filing the appeal because of certain none too difficult to appreciate and understand circumstances namely the red-tappism negligence arising out of some impersonal attitude or lack of efficiency pressure of work or in a given case some corruption extra-influences nepotism etc. of the public servant for not expeditiously sending the proposal to the Legal Department then even looking to the overall public interest involved in this case namely the prosecution against the respondent being under Food Adulteration Act a public-welfare legislation in the larger and absolute interest of the health of the people at large the delay if any at all is required to be condoned beyond any manner of doubt. The Court while dealing and deciding the cases of socio-economic offences can never be permitted to set them at naught merely on the ground of some hyper-technicalities. As to do so is neither the Law nor the Justice nor the manner in which the Courts are expected to do the Justice. Barring few exceptions it is an open secret that by and large the Government administration does not feel the pulse of the people it lacks the much needed public-orientation commitment to the public cause etc. These hard facts and the necked truth one may like it or not but is often noticed in the body politics of every public administration and this aspect has got to be borne in mind. We do come across number of such cases wherein despite its urgency and importance of the issues and problems involved touching upon the public causes they are dealt with by the administrative personnel in a manner as if they are dealing with some dry and dead papers feeling no pulse or heart-beats of public care hopes aspirations dreams urges and prayers for relief and redressal contained in it. When such is the situation in a die-hard bureaucratic set up except some few rays of hope it will be too much to expect efficiency in the public administration. The question is: Can under such circumstances the public cause be penalized and allowed to suffer because of some unavoidable delays caused by such indifferent inefficient public servants ? or Can the social piece of Legislation be permitted to be frustrated at the hands of inefficient administration? It is under such circumstances that if the pragmatic view of the problem is not taken then howsoever laudable object the particular Act may have the same will not reach the intended goal as over and above the ordinary breakers of law on its procedural path there are obstructive elements like inactive and inefficient public servants. It is under such circumstances that if the pragmatic view of the problem is not taken then howsoever laudable object the particular Act may have the same will not reach the intended goal as over and above the ordinary breakers of law on its procedural path there are obstructive elements like inactive and inefficient public servants. It may also be observed that if the public servant has conducted himself inefficiently in a casual way to the detriment of the public interest by delaying the filing of the appeal or revision before the court this indeed being a very serious thing he deserves to be departmentally inquired and proceeded with but then this is altogether a different issue and cannot be permitted to over-shadow the public cause of not getting the matter decided on merits because of some delay. ( 7 ) THUS taking into consideration the overall view of the matter in the opinion of this Court in the first instance there is no delay and therefore no question of condoning the same arises. In the alternative had indeed the learned Advocate for the respondent been even remotely successful to pursuade this court that there was a delay of 63 days then even taking into consideration the open secret of impersonal attitude and some other vices of the public administration in the larger interest this court as duty bound would have condoned the delay. ( 8 ) IN the result this Misc. Criminal Application is allowed. Rule made absolute. (NVA) Rule made absolute. .