Judgment :- Even though the pleadings are elaborate the facts to be considered fall in a narrow compass. The dispute, stated to be arising between the petitioners and second respondent, was referred for adjudication by Ext.P2. It says that Government is of opinion that the industrial dispute exists between the second respondent and the petitioners, as well as the workmen of the second respondent including Sri. K. Rajamoni, the first respondent, in respect of the matters mentioned in the Annexure and the same is referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Kozhikode. The Industrial Tribunal was directed to pass award within a period of three months. The dispute referred is: "Eligibility of the workmen, employed for the construction of Padinjarathara Dam for Kuttiadi Augmentation Scheme, for the wage rates and other benefits fixed in the minimum wage notifications issued by the State Government for the workers doing similar works in the employments coming under Item No.3.7 and B part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, and (2) Conversion of the advance paid to the above workers as payable wages." 2. Notice relating to reference was received by the petitioners on 18-2-1992. The Industrial Tribunal viz. the third respondent registered the dispute as I.D.No.2 of 1992and posted the same on 9-3-1992 at kozhikode. On that day the petitioners, through their counsel, prayed for one month's time for filing written statement. But the petitioners were given only a week's time by the third respondent. The case was thereafter posted to 16-3-1992 with the endorsement that no further time would be granted for tiling the written statement. On 16-3-1992a senior counsel was engaged by the Board and the case stood adjourned to 30-3-1992. On 30 -3-1992 the Board as well as the contractor filed written statements. The case was adjourned for evidence on 20-4-1992. on 20-4-1992 the claimant filed a rejoinder raising fresh contentions and allegations against the Board. The petitioner) Board wanted to file a replication. The case was posted to 11-5-1992, even though the Board wanted one month's time for filing the replication. On 11-5-1992 the Board also filed a supplementary statement clarifying certain points and also filed an application viz. C.M.P.N6.26 of 1992 in I.D.No.2 of 1992. The petitioner) Board wanted to file a replication. The case was posted to 11-5-1992, even though the Board wanted one month's time for filing the replication. On 11-5-1992 the Board also filed a supplementary statement clarifying certain points and also filed an application viz. C.M.P.N6.26 of 1992 in I.D.No.2 of 1992. Petitioners wanted to produce certain documents and also for permission to adduce oral evidence But, by order dated 18-5-1992, the third respondent Tribunal dismissed the prayer of the Kerala State Electricity Board and posted the case on 27-5-1992 for final hearing. Ext.P8 is the said order. The order says that: "On examination of the petition to summon the documents and also the objection raised by the authorised representative of the workman and the contractor, I find that the documents now required to be summoned are not at all necessary for the adjudication of this diffuse, in the light of the circumstances of the case. Hence the petition summoning the documents is dismissed." This original petition is filed for quashing Ext.P8 order. 3. The Supreme Court in Cooper Engineering Ltd: v. P.P.Mundhe (1975) IILLJ. 379 noticed the delay and consequential disadvantage and hardship that may be caused by the writ courts interfering with the speedy disposal of industrial dispute. With a view to obviate undue delay in adjudication of the real dispute caused by moving writ courts, the Supreme Court advised against stalling of industrial adjudication by questioning decision relating to preliminary issues. In the aforesaid decision their Lordships observed as follows: "We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene, at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication." The attempt of evading a decision on merit by raising objection at intermediate level was deprecated by the Supreme Court once again in the decision in S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983 Lab.I.C.1483). Their Lordships observed: ".... We expect public sector corporations to be model employers and model litigants. Their Lordships observed: ".... We expect public sector corporations to be model employers and model litigants. We do not expect them to attempt to avoid adjudication or to indulge in luxurious litigation and drag Workmen from court to court merely to vindicate, not justice, but some rigid technical stand taken up by them. We hope that public sector corporation will henceforth refrain from raising needless objections, fighting needless litigations and adopting needless postures." The view is once again emphasised in the decision reported in O.P, Maheshswari v. Delhi Admn. (1983 Lab.I.C.1629) wherein it is observed as under: "We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where, delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Art.226 and Art.136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Art.226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Art.136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Art.226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Art.136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues." The practice of raising preliminary objections to the reference was disapproved by the Supreme Court in Workmen Employed by Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (1984) 4 SCC 392). The Court observed: "It is most unfortunate that all those unhealthy and injudicious practices resorted to for unduly delaying the culmination of civil proceedings have stealthily crept in, for reasons not unknown in the adjudication of industrial disputes for the resolution of which an informal forum and simple procedure were devised with avowed object of keeping them free from dilatory practices of civil courts. Times without number this Court, to quote only two D.P. Maheswari v. Delhi Administration' and S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra disapproved the practice of raising frivolous preliminary objections at the instance of the employer to delay and defeat by exhausting the workmen the outcome of the dispute yet we have to deal with the same situation in this appeal by special leave." 4. If the petitioners are aggrieved against the final award, they have adequate remedy at that stage. If opportunity has not been given to the petitioners to give evidence or if the Tribunal proceeded in violation of the principles of natural justice, the award can be challenged at that stage. If the award is in favour of the petitioners, the petitioners cannot be aggrieved and, therefore, there is no ground for staying the further proceedings, in any case, at this stage in this Original Petition. A speedy disposal of the industrial dispute is the prime requisite and this court will not be instrumental in stalling the proceedings and arresting final adjudication on the merit. Without prejudice to the petitioners' right to raise all the grounds raised in this petition if they are aggrieved at a later stage, I dismiss this petition.