JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava 1. Being aggrieved by the decision of the appellate authority, affirming the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, where under the accomodation in dispute had been released in favour of the landlord respondent in the proceedings initiated by biro in the year 1978 under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') the petitioner tenant has cow approached this court by means of the present writ petition for redress seeking the quashing of the aforesaid orders. 2. The accommodation in dispute which is being utilised by the petitioner tenant for business purposes was sought to be released for satisfying the need of the landlord's son to establish him independently in the lawyer's profession for which according to the landlord he bonafide needed the space for chamber end library. The release application was contested by the petitioner tenant on various grounds denying the allegations made in the release application and asserting that the need set up by the landlord was not a bonafide one as the landlord had at his disposal sufficient accommodation which could very well be utilised for satisfying the alleged requirement It was also asserted that the tenant petitioner who had been running his business in the accommodation in dispute for a period of 25 years will be put to a greater hardship in the case of the grant of release as compared to the hardships likely to be suffered by the landlord in the event of the rejection of the said application. The Prescribed Authority after carefully considering the evidence and the materials on the record came to the conclusion that the tenant was carrying op the business of mating silver in the accommodation in dispute for the past about 20 years and that the son of the landlord for whose requirement the release was sought was an Advocate with a standing of five or six years and his requirement for establishing a chamber and a library was genuine. The prescribed authority further recorded a finding that the tenant had acquired a piece of vacant land near the Nagar Palika road and there were several shops which were available to him where he could easily continue his business. The prescribed authority further recorded a finding that the tenant had acquired a piece of vacant land near the Nagar Palika road and there were several shops which were available to him where he could easily continue his business. The prescribed Authority further found that the tenant was a famous person and well known to the bullion merchants who were his customers and taking into consideration the nature of business carried on by him which was only the melting of the silver, there was no likelihood of his business being adversely affected in the event of the change of place In as much as, the tenant will carry his reputations with him. The prescribed authority further recorded a finding that the landlord did not have at his disposal any other accommodation which could satisfy the requirement for which the release was sought. While considering the question of relative hardships, the prescribed authority had accepted the case of the landlord that the tenant No. 1 had wound up his business in district Deoria and had shifted to Bombay. In this connection, the prescribed authority had taken into account the fact that the tenant petitioner no 1 had never put in appearance on any of the date fixed in the case and had also not filed any affidavit. The prescribed authority had placed reliance on the affidavit of Ranglal, tenant petitioner no. 2 where in he had admitted that Sri Subharao tenant petitioner no. 1 had started business in Bombay. The prescribed authority had also took note of the fact that the tenant petitioners had taken no step to obtain the vacant shops which bad become available, in view of the aforesaid findings, the prescribed authority allowed the application for release of the accomodation in dispute as claimed. 3. The findings recorded by the prescribed authority were affirmed by the appellate authority. The appellate authority found that the son of the petitioner was independently practising as an Advocate and In connection with his profession as an Advocate, be did bonafide require a chamber and the library and the need for the purpose as set up by the landlord was genuine and bonafide. The appellate authority further found that the landlord did not have at his disposal any such accommodation which could satisfy the requirement of his son. The appellate authority further found that the landlord did not have at his disposal any such accommodation which could satisfy the requirement of his son. The appellate authority also took into account the fact that taking into consideration, she extent of accommodation required for satisfying the need of the son of the landlord the nature and extent of the alternative accommodation suggested by the tenant, which according to him could be utilised for the purpose, was wholly insufficient and could not therefore meet the requirement. On the question relating to comparative hardships, the appellate authority came to the conclusion that for want of chamber and library the son of the landlord could not establish himself in the profession chosen by him and will be put to a greater hardship as compared to the tenant. It was found that the hardships likely to be suffered by the landlord in the event of the rejection of the application will be much greater as compared to the hardship likely to be suffered by the tenant in the event of the grant of the release application. The appeal filed by the learnt was therefore, dismissed. 4. I have heard Sri T. P. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri Shashi Nandan, learned Counsel, representing the landlord respondent and have carefully perused record. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the finding returned by the authorities below on the question relating to the bonafide requirement of the landlord is perverse and stand vitiated on account of errors apparent on the face of the record. In this connection, it has been asserted that the landlord had voluntarily vacated a shop In his tenancy which accomodation If retained could very well satisfy the alleged requirement It has been urged that the mere fact that the landlord voluntarily gave up the possession of a business accomodation, which could be utilised for satisfying the alleged need was more than sufficient to indicate that the need for the accommodation in dispute was not genuine and had been set up with a purpose to oust the tenant and not for satisfying the need of his son. In this connection the learned Counsel has heavily relied upon an application dated 29-11-1980 filed by Tarkeshwar Prasad, landlord respondent in P. A. Case no. In this connection the learned Counsel has heavily relied upon an application dated 29-11-1980 filed by Tarkeshwar Prasad, landlord respondent in P. A. Case no. 7 of 1980, the proceedings where of were initiated by Krishna Mureri Chhabariya seeking release of the accommodation in the tenancy of Tarkeshwar Prasad. A perusal of the aforesaid application shows that Tarkeshwar Prasad had admitted the genuineness of the need set op by Krishna Murary Chhabariya for the release of the accommodation and had admitted that the requirement for the release was a bonafide one. From the aforesaid application, ft is also clear that Tarkeshwar Prasad had vacated the said accommodation. There is so dispute that Krishna Murari Chhabariya had initiated the proceedings seeking release of an accommodation which was in the tenancy of the present landlord and was being utilised for the business purpose. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the prescribed authority had granted the release sought for by Krishna Murari Chhabariya without determining the question relating to the bonafide requirement and the relative hardships. The petitioner tenant cannot derive any advantage out of the aforesaid application in as much as, it is not expected that tenant will unnecessarily put In a false contest. If the tenant was satisfied that the claim of the landlord for the release of an accomodation under his tenancy is genuine and he will suffer greater hardship, it is open to the tenant to come forward with the truth and no contest is needed in that event. The release of an accommodation as envisaged under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act is granted when the requisite conditions contemplated there under are satisfied. Since It is admitted that the accommodation which was the subject matter of P.A. Case No. 7 of 1980 had been released, the mere fact that Tarkeshwar Prasad had not put in any contest thereunder cannot lead to an inference that the requirement set op in the present proceeding was not a bonafide one. In this connection it may be noticed that the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority have clearly recorded a finding that the proceedings of the P.A. Case No. 7 of 1980 were not collusive at all. In this connection it may be noticed that the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority have clearly recorded a finding that the proceedings of the P.A. Case No. 7 of 1980 were not collusive at all. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the wife of the landlord had her house near the accomodation in dispute which was situated just across the road and there was sufficient alternative accommodation which could be utilised for the purpose of satisfying the alleged need of the son of the landlord. In this connection, it may be noticed that the accommodation which can be deemed to be available to a landlord for satisfying the requirement which is the foundation for seeking the release must be an accommodation which is at the disposal of the landlord in respect whereof he has an immediate right of possession. The accommodation which is owned and occupied by another person cannot be taken to be such an accommodation which is at the disposal of the landlord. In such a circumstance, the house owned by the wife of the landlord cannot be deemed to be an accommodation which could be said to be at the disposal of the landlord. 5. In this connection, it may further be noticed that even if it be assumed that the accommodation in the house owned by the wife of the landlord could be said to be at the disposal of the landlord in that event also in face of the concurrent findings recorded by the authorities below to the effect that considering the extent of the accommodation required for satisfying the need, the alleged alternative accommodation can not be deemed to be sufficient, the grant of release can not be said to be vitiated on this ground. The findings recorded by both the authorities that there was no suitable alternative accommodation available to the landlord for satisfying the requirement of his son is based on appraisal of evidence and this finding does cot appear to suffer from any such infirmity which may Justify any Interference therein. 6. The findings on the question relating to relative hardships are also a finding which are based on appraisal of evidence. 6. The findings on the question relating to relative hardships are also a finding which are based on appraisal of evidence. In the cases where the question is of establishing a member of the family in the business or profession, which may provide a source of livelihood, the need for which is found to be genuine and bonafide, the question regarding relative hardships should be construed liberally in favour of the landlord. In the cases where there is inaction on the part of the tenant in searching for an alternative accommodation by seeking allotment or otherwise inspite of coming to know that the building in his tenancy is genuinely required by the landlord for satisfying his bonafide need, the question of relative hardships envisaged under the 4th Proviso to section 21 of the Act deserves to be considered liberally in favour of the landlord specially when the bonafide need for the grant of release sought for is established. While it is true that a proviso embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision and the train part cannot be construed in such a manner so as to render a proviso redundant yet under the scheme of the Act the 4th proviso to section 21 does not appear to fall within those exceptional cases where this proviso may be said to be a part of the substantive provision itself It should also not be lost sight of that a proviso can not be permitted to defeat the basic intent, expressed in the substantive provision which, as is apparent from the perusal of section 21 of the Act, is to ensure the availability of the demised premises to the landlord on bis successfully establishing the bonafide requirement of the same for the purposes envisaged in that section. It may be noticed in this connection that where the language of the main enactment Is clear and unambiguous a proviso cannot be permitted to have any repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment so as to exclude from ft by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. Failure of a tenant to make attempt to find out an alternative accommodation during the pendency of the release/ejectment proceedings would certainly be a factor against the tenant's case for greater hardship. 7. Failure of a tenant to make attempt to find out an alternative accommodation during the pendency of the release/ejectment proceedings would certainly be a factor against the tenant's case for greater hardship. 7. The connotation of the term 'requirement' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get an order of release. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds contemplated under section 21 of the Act. The provisions contained in the Act strike a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the great inconvenience and trouble of the tenants on the other Since section 21 of the Act is meant for the benefit of the landlord, therefore, it must be so construed as to advance the object behind the said provision The tenant has to establish that if he is evicted he will suffer greater hardship as compared to the landlord and must lead clear evidence to show that inspite of the best efforts he was unable to get another alternative suitable accommodation in the absence whereof the scale of relative hard-ships may be tilted in favour of the landlord as the inconvenience, loss or trouble resulting from a denial of the order of release in favour of the landlord will far outweigh the prejudice or the inconvenience which may likely be caused to the tenants. 8. This Court in its decision in the case of N. S. Datta v. VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1984 (1) ARC 113, had observed that the proviso in question requires a mandatory regard being had to the advantages or disadvantages either in the event of the application for release being allowed or otherwise but each party was required to adduce evidence to show that hardship could be paused to him by granting or refusal of the release of the building under tenancy and that the tenant must also adduce evidence to the effect that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him. It was further observed that the court is entitled also to take into account the fact that the tenant has neither alleged nor proved to have made effort to have an alternative accommodation and that non-availability of alternative accomodation to the tenant is not in itself an adequate ground to reject the landlord's application for release. In its decision in the case of Dr. Munni Lal v. IV Additional District Judge, Etah 1984 (1) ARC 378, this court has clarified that the fact that nothing is brought on record Indicating that the tenant had made any effort during the period of the pendency of the release application for getting some accommodation allotted in his favour or otherwise or that he had failed in his attempt Is a relevant circumstance while considering the question relating to comparative hardships. Taking into consideration the schema of the Act, I am of the firm opinion that such an in-action on the part of the tenant constitutes an additional circumstance which entitles the landlord to have a preference shown to him while striking the just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the likely inconvenience or trouble of the tenant on the other. It may further be borne in mind that the use of the pharse 'having' regard to 'as envisaged under the fourth proviso to section 21 of the Act would clearly show that this provision was not obligatory. The factors mentioned in rule 16 of the Rules should, however, be kept in mind while deciding the release application. No single factor can be held to be conclusive. As observed in its decision in the case of Mohd. Muslim v. District Judge, Varanasi, 1978 ARC 328, it is the cumulative effect of all that has to be seen. The inaction of the tenant to search for an alternative accommodation, as already indicated hereinbefore, constitutes an additional factor which may outweigh the hardship if any, likely to be suffered by the tenant in the event of the grant of the release application in a case where the bonafide requirement for the release stands conclusively established. Taking Into consideration, the facts and circumstances of the present ease, and the findings returned by the authorities below on the question of relative hardships also, the impugned order does not appear to suffer from any such infirmity which may justify any interference therein. Taking Into consideration, the facts and circumstances of the present ease, and the findings returned by the authorities below on the question of relative hardships also, the impugned order does not appear to suffer from any such infirmity which may justify any interference therein. 9. In view of the conclusions, indicated hereinbefore, no exception could be taken to the judgment passed by the respondent No. 1. The writ petition being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed. 10. However, there shall be no order as to cost.