JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava 1. This petition by the landlady is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the respondent no. 1 whereunder allowing the revision filed by the tenant under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. the decree of eviction passed by the Judge Small Causes Court Against the tenant-respondent was set aside and the suit for recovery of possession was dismissed. 2. The facts shown of details and necessary for the disposal of the present case are that the petitioner-landlady had filed the suit claiming a decree for the eviction of the respondents nos. 3 and 4 from the premises in dispute and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages on the allegations, inter-alia, that the premises In dispute had been let out to the respondent no. 3 at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month but since he had not paid the rent due with effect from 1-3-78 he was a defaulter within the meaning of section 20 (2) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act 1972 (U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972); that he had created an illegal subtenancy in favour of the respondent no 4 and that the tenant had without the permission in writing of the landlady made unauthorised construction and structural alteration in the building in dispute and since respite of the service of the notice he had neither cleared of the arrears nor vacated the premises, hence the suit. The aforesaid suit was contested by respondents nos. 3 and 4 denying the plaint allegations asserting that neither any default had been committed In the payment of rent nor any illegal sub-tenancy had been created. The defendant-tenant also claimed benefits available under section 20 (4) of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972. "In the joint written statement filed in the suit, it was asserted is para 22 thereof that the defendant second set-present respondent no. 2-was the real younger brother of present respondent no. 3 and not a sub-tenant in the accommodation in question and he had simply been coming to defendant no. 1 time to time who is his elder brother and the defendant no, 2 did not reside in the disputed accommodation. 3. After appraising the evidence on record, the (rial court on cogent grounds came to the conclusion that the case of the defendant no. 1 time to time who is his elder brother and the defendant no, 2 did not reside in the disputed accommodation. 3. After appraising the evidence on record, the (rial court on cogent grounds came to the conclusion that the case of the defendant no. 2,-present respondent no 4-to the effect that he used to reside in the village and not in the accommodation in dispute was cot acceptable. Being of the view that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that defendant no. 2 was in exclusive occupation of a portion of the accommodation in dispute and was residing therein separately and was also paying rent to the chief tenant, the trial Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had been successful In establishing that the defendant second set was residing in the accommodation in dispute along with defendant no. 1 and that was sufficient for determining the status of the defendant second set to be that of a subtenant. The trial court raised a presumption relating to coming into existence of a sub-tenancy available to a landlord under the explanation to section 25 of the U. P. Act no 13 of 1972 and held the status of the defendant no. 2 to be that of a sub-tenant. The case of the plaintiff about (he accommodation in dispute having been materially altered within the meaning of section 20 (2) (c) of U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 was However, accepted. The trial court further held the defendant-tenant to be entitled to the benefits available under section 20 (4) of U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972. In the above circumstances, in view of the finding on the question of illegal sub-tenancy and unauthorised structural alterations the suit was decreed as prayed. 4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decree the respondents nos. 3 and 4 filed a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The revisional court came to the conclusion that the defendant no. 1- the present respondent no. 3-was continuously residing in the accommodation in dispute since it was not the case of he plaintiff that the said accommodation had been split up into two portions, the revisional court concluded that the tenant was to be deemed to be in actual occupation of every Inch of the house with the result that the defendant no. 2 present-respondent no. 3-was continuously residing in the accommodation in dispute since it was not the case of he plaintiff that the said accommodation had been split up into two portions, the revisional court concluded that the tenant was to be deemed to be in actual occupation of every Inch of the house with the result that the defendant no. 2 present-respondent no. 4 could not be held to be in occupation of the disputed house st all The revisional court further observed that in the facts and circumstances, it was a case of mere residence which might be as a guest or in some other capacity but the main ingredient of sub-tenancy was not satisfied because the complete possession could not be established with the defendant no. 2 the alleged sub-tenant. The revisional court, therefore, reversed the finding of the trial court and the question of the coming into existence of the alleged sub-tenancy. The revisional court further reversed the finding of the trial court on issue no. 2 and in view of the reversal of the finding on the question of sub-tenancy and unauthorised material alterations envisaged under section 20 (2) (c) and (e) of the Act, the revision was allowed and the suit for recovery of possession was dismissed. The landlady has now approached this Court for redress seeking the quashing of the judgment and decree passed by the revisional court dated 17-2-81. 5. I have heard Sri Yogesh Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P. K. Singhal, learned counsel representing the respondent nos. 3 and 4 and have carefully gone through the record. 6. As seen above the suit giving rise to the present writ petition had been filed on the grounds contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) and (e) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 The findings recorded by the trial court which have not been up-set by the revisional court clearly show that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree of eviction on the grounds contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his submissions In the present case on the questions relating to the finding recorded by the revisional court about the status of the defendant second set i.e. present respondent no. Learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his submissions In the present case on the questions relating to the finding recorded by the revisional court about the status of the defendant second set i.e. present respondent no. 4 and the availability of the ground envisaged under section 20 (2) (c) of the Act for sustaining the decree of eviction passed by the trial court and has asserted that in the facts and Circumstances of the present case an illegal sub-tenancy had come into existence making out a ground envisaged under section 20 (2) (e) of the U. P. Act No 13 of 1972 which was sufficient for maintaining the decree of eviction passed by the trial court. It has further been asserted that in the circumstances of the present case a presumption of fact about coming into existence of a sub-tenancy had become available to the plaintiff which presumption had not been rebutted at all by the defendants and consequently there could be no impediment in the grant of the decree for eviction of the defendants. The learned counsel for the petitioner had further urged that the finding on the question covered by issue no. 2 framed by the trial court did not require any interference by the revisional court. The materials on record show that in support of her case apart from examining various other witnesses the petitioner landlady had examined herself as a witness (PW 3) and had asserted that the defendant first set bad created an illegal sub-tenancy in favour of defendant-second set who was residing in the rooms situate in the middle and the back portion of the house in dispute and had further asserted that the defendant-second set was utilising a portion of the accommodation in dispute as a kitchen. In her deposition, therefore, the plaintiff-landlady had clearly asserted the defendant-second set to be in exclusive possession over a portion of the accommodation in dispute. In her cross-examination, however, there is a stray which Indicate that the petitioner landlady had no knowledge about the defendant-first set and second set being brothers or that they were living in the house in dispute together. She, however, stated that both were occupying the house in dispute. So far as the stray sentence occurring in the cross-examination referred to above is concerned suffice it to say that the statement of the plaintiff had to be read as a whose. She, however, stated that both were occupying the house in dispute. So far as the stray sentence occurring in the cross-examination referred to above is concerned suffice it to say that the statement of the plaintiff had to be read as a whose. In the case of Nathoo Bam v. District Judge, Shahjahanpur, 1992 (2) ARC 433, it was observed that long back in its decision in the case of Umar Darez and others v. Nihal Singh and another. S. A no 717 of 1960, decided on 3rd May, 1965, this Court had clarified that a party which proposes to rely on an admission made by the other party in cross-examination should be in a position to quote the exact words of the admission, and for this purpose it should ask the trial court to take down the question as well as the answer In cross-examination, It was pointed out that unfortunately In India there is no short hand record of Court proceedings, and questions are never recorded by the Court and the answers In cross-examination are paraphrased by the trial Court in the process of recording In these circumstances, the Court should be cautious in assessing the legal effect of an alleged admission made in cross-examination Moreover, this Court pointed out, that it is common experience that witnesses under pressure of cross-examination get confused and say all kinds of things without realising their significance. The art of 'bamboozling' a witness has attained a high degree of perfection. For these reasons no importance should be given to the so called admission. 7. I had an occasion to consider the implication arising under section 12 (1) (b) and section 23 of the U. P. Act Mo. 13 of 1972 in the case of Gur Dayal Khanna and others v. Smt. Malti Devi and others (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19055 of 1988 decided on 17-9-92 now reported in 1992 (2) ARC 456) wherein it had been observed that 'in the cases involving subletting it is difficult for the landlord to produce direct evidence in this regard showing the existence of the relationship of tenant-in chief and the alleged sub-tenant because the matter is specially within this knowledge, therefore, in order to prove sub-letting the landlord has to rely on attending circumstances. It is in this view of the matter that the Legislature has provided for a presumption of fact about coming into existence of sub-tenancy taking recourse to a legal fiction. Once a sub-letting takes place the impediment in the way of the landlord to recover possession stands removed inducing him to go to Court and ask for recovery of possession. The tenant's liability to eviction arises once the fact of unlawful sub-letting is proved. 8. It cannot, however, be overlooked that while the initial onus of proving sub-letting or a transfer of the lease holding is upon the landlord yet once the court is satisfied that there has been a transfer of possession, the onus may shift end within whose special knowledge the facts explaining the manner In which such possession has been transferred lie, may have to bear the burden thereafter. It is therefore, clear that when once the parting possession is proved, the burden shifts on to the tenant to show that the alleged sub-tenant is in occupation not as a sub-tenant but only as a licensee or as a person in permissive occupation. The initial onus to prove the ground of eviction, thus, rests on the landlord. But the facts which are in the special knowledge of the tenant must be proved by tenant and the tenant cannot take advantage of the onus of proof to withhold the best evidence in his possession or power to satisfy the court with regard to the correctness of the case set up by him. On proof of the fact that the tenant has parted with the possession, even in respect of a part of accommodation let out to him and that the alleged sub-tenant is in exclusive possession of that portion of the demised premises an inference of sub-letting can be legitimately drawn unless the tenant is able to prove satisfactorily some arrangement between him and the alleged sub-tenant which negative the inference of sub-letting. 9. In the present case the implications arising under section 25 of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 have not been considered by the trial court in a correct perspective with the result that its entire approach to the question relating to the creation of sub-tenancy became vitiated in law. 9. In the present case the implications arising under section 25 of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 have not been considered by the trial court in a correct perspective with the result that its entire approach to the question relating to the creation of sub-tenancy became vitiated in law. The view of the trial court to the effect that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the alleged sub-tenant was in possession over a specific portion of the accommodation in dispute does not appear to be correct. It was incumbent upon the trial court to consider the evidence of the plaintiff on merits keeping in mind the implications arising under section 12 (1) (b) and the explanation to section 25 of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 as held in the ease of Gur Dayal Khanna referred to hereinbefore. The revisional court also appears to have proceeded on antirely erroneous assumption to the effect that for the coming into existence of a sub-tenancy as envisaged under section 25 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the splitting up of the accommodation in dispute into two portions was necessary. The inference drawn by the revisional court to the effect that in the absence of splitting up of the accommodation in dispute into two portions the chief-tenant will be deemed to be continuing in actual occupation of every inch of the house eliminating the possibility of the alleged sub-tenant being in occupation at all of any portion of the disputed house is manifestly erroneous. It further appears that the revisional court had not at all cared to consider the statement of Smt. Kiran Goel examined as PW 3 and her assertion on oath that the defendant second set was in exclusive possession over a portion of the accommodation in dispute. It may further be noticed that the finding of the revisional court on the question involving section 20 (2) (c) of the Act is also manifestly erroneous. It his been overlooked that the mere fact that no portion of the disputed structure is embedded in the main structure of the building cannot make any difference for it is quite possible to raise a construction in the open area of a demised premises. It his been overlooked that the mere fact that no portion of the disputed structure is embedded in the main structure of the building cannot make any difference for it is quite possible to raise a construction in the open area of a demised premises. As observed by this Court in its decision in the case of Smt. Rajrani Kapoor v. Bhupender Singh, 1986 (2) ARC 457, such a construction cannot cease to be a construction merely for this reason. It has further been clarified in that case that it was immaterial whether the structure reaised is for a temporary or permanent nature or whether it can be removed without causing any damage to the building The question about the availability of the ground envisaged under section 20 (2) (c) of the Act depends upon the totality of the circumstances including the kind and place for the structure and the over-all effect it has on the building. The trial court while deciding the issue no. 2 does not appear to have considered the controversy raised under the issue after taking into account the above factors and no finding has been recorded about the diminishing of the value or utility or regarding disfigurement as required under section 20 (2) (c) of the Act. 10. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the firm opinion that the courts below have clearly misdirected themselves and had failed to consider the ground of sub-tenancy envisaged under section 20 (2) (e) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as well as the ground envisaged under section 20 (2) (o) of the said Act taken up by the petitioner-landlady in a correct perspective which has resulted manifestly erroneous conclusions. Thus, a case for interference by this Court has been made out. In the result, in view of my conclusions Indicated hereinbefore, this writ petition succeeds in part. The judgment and order passed by the respondent no. 2 dated 23-8-79 so fat as It relates to the decree of eviction as well as the judgment and order passed by the respondent no. 1 dated 17-2-81 are hereby, quashed and the trial court respondent no. 2 Is directed to decide the question relating to the availability of the grounds envisaged under section 20 (2) (c) and (e) of the U. P. Act no. 1 dated 17-2-81 are hereby, quashed and the trial court respondent no. 2 Is directed to decide the question relating to the availability of the grounds envisaged under section 20 (2) (c) and (e) of the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 to the plaintiff for having a decree of eviction of the defendants passed against them in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. The trial court shall decide the aforesaid questions on the evidence and the materials already en the record. The findings on Issues nos. 3 to 6 framed by the trial court shall not be disturbed. The trial court shall decide the suit within a period of three months from the date of production before it a certified copy of this judgment. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.