JUDGMENT S.N. Sahay, J. - This is a writ petition for quashing the orders of suspension passed against the petitioners and the departmental proceedings pending against them. 2. From the counter affidavit it appears that in 1973 during police P.AC. riots for the alleged illegal activities of the Local Intelligence Units personnel, Case Crime No. 187 under Section 3(1), Police Force (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1976 and Section 3, Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act and D.I.R., 1971 was registered at Police Station Husainganj, Lucknow on May 30, 1973 against six police personnel including the petitioners. The case was tried by Judicial Magistrate I, Lucknow who acquitted the accused by judgment dated January 21, 1982. After the acquittal of the accused, the matter of initiating departmental action against the petitioners was considered. A preliminary inquiry was made by Circle Officer Kaiserbagh, Lucknow and thereafter the Senior Superintendent of Police moved the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lucknow to accord permission for taking departmental action against the petitioners under para 493(c) of the U.P. Police Regulations. The necessary permission was accorded and thereafter proceedings under Section 7, Police Act were commenced against the petitioners by submitting charge sheet dated September 27, 1986 contained in Annexure 5, to the writ petition. The petitioners have, however, been continued under suspension and the departmental proceedings are still pending. 3. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that since the petitioners were arrested in connection with the criminal case mentioned above, they were deemed to have been suspended with effect from the dates of their illegal arrest and even after their acquittal they have not been reinstated nor any salary etc has been paid to them. According to the petitioners, it is not permissible for the Superintendent of Police in view of para 493 of the Police Regulations in the course of a departmental proceedings against a police official who has been tried judicially, to reexamine the truth of any fact in issue on the judicial trial as the findings of the Court on these facts must be taken as final. In view of this provision it is submitted that the departmental proceeding which has been initiated against the petitioners is misconceived. 4. In view of this provision it is submitted that the departmental proceeding which has been initiated against the petitioners is misconceived. 4. It does not appear from a perusal of the impugned chargesheet Annexure 4, and it has not been shown that the grounds on which the departmental proceedings have been started against the petitioners are identical to those on the basis of which they were tried judicially. Under para 493(c), on which the opposite parties have placed reliance, it is provided that if the accused has been judicially concluded (acquitted?) or discharged and the period of riling appeal has elapsed and/or no appeal has been filed, the Superintendent of Police must at once reinstate him if he has been suspended, but should the finding of the court not be inconsistent with the view that the accused has been guilty of negligence or unfitness for the discharge of his duties within the meaning of Section 7 of the Police Act, the Superintendent of Police may refer the matter to the Deputy Inspector General of Police and ask for permission to try the accused departmentally for such negligence or unfitness. Therefore, it is clear that even after the acquittal of the petitioners by the criminal court, departmental proceedings may be started against them if the circumstances referred to in para 493(c) exist. The prayer for quashing the departmental proceedings cannot, therefore, be entertained at this stage in view of the conclusion recorded above that the grounds do not appear to be identical. It may, however, be made clear that the provisions contained in the opening paragraph of 493 govern all the subsequent clauses and so even in the departmental proceedings which are initiated after the acquittal of the accused under Clause (c), the authorities are debarred from reexamining the truth of any facts in issue at the judicial trial and the findings of the court on these facts must be taken as final. The departmental proceedings which are, therefore, to be continued and concluded in accordance with law subject to the said provisions of para 493. 5. The departmental proceedings which are, therefore, to be continued and concluded in accordance with law subject to the said provisions of para 493. 5. With regard to the suspension of the petitioners, it is contended on their behalf that they were deemed to have been suspended with effect from the dates of their illegal arrests, but there is no provision for deemed suspension and there should have been specific orders of suspension passed against the petitioners under para 496 of the Police Regulations. No order of suspension has been shown to exist in this case. Although the petitioners are said to have been reinstated in 1988, it does not appear that salary etc. has been paid to them for the period between the date of suspension and date of reinstatement. There is a further grievance that the petitioners are still being paid their salary at the rate which were in force in 1973 at the time of the arrests of the petitioners. There can be no justification for the same. After their acquittal, the petitioners are entitled to payment of full salary and allowances according to rules, from the date of their suspensions. 6. The writ petition is accordingly, allowed. The opposite parties are directed to pay full salary and allowances to the petitioners as admissible to them under the rules from the dates of suspension to the date of reinstatement, within one month from the date on which a copy of this judgment is produced by them before the concerned authority. The opposite parties are further directed to conclude the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners according to law in the light of the observations made in the body of this judgment as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months from the date on which a copy of this order is produced before the authority concerned. Parties shall bear their own costs. 7. Let a certified copy of this order be given to the petitioners on payment of requisite charges within three days.