Judgment :- The above Writ petition has been filed for a Writ of Certiorari to call for and quash G.O.Ms. No. 59 dated 3.4.1976 and published in the gazette of Pondicherry dated 13.4.1976 and the Notification bearing No. 36/73 published in the Gazette of Pondicherry dated 15.1.1974 under S. 6 and 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 respectively in so far as the same relate to the Petitioners land measuring 1.56.00 Hectares bearing Resurvey No. 7/2 (Old Survey Nos. 50 & 56) in Muthialpet, Pondicherry taluk on the file of the third respondent. 2. Having regard to the nature of the controversy placed before me, reference to a few salient facts of the matter alone would do. The acquisition in question of an extent of 6.10.30 Hectares of land is for the public purpose of implementing various housing schemes under the Land Acquisition and Development Schemes in the State of Pondicherry. The petitioner is the owner of the lands in question measuring about 1.56.00 in resurvey No. 7/2 (Old Survey Nos. 50 and 56) in Muthialpet, Pondicherry taluk, Pondicherry State. Notification under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act) came to be issued and published in Gazette No. 3 Pondicherry Gazette dated 15.1.1974 S. 5(A) enquiry has been conducted into the objections filed and the declaration under S. 6 of the Act was issued under the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 59, dated 3rd April 1976. Notice of Award appears to have been issued under S. 9(3) and 10 of the Act and the enquiry was fixed to be held on 24.5.1976. At this stage, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 2065 of 1976. Though the Writ Petition was entertained and interim order of stay was granted, by an order of 15.12.1978, the said Writ Petition was ultimately dismissed. Thereafter, the petitioner filed W.A. No. 482 of 1979 and this also came to be dismissed ultimately on 7.1.1980. Since according to the petitioner, nothing has happened thereafter, even after a lapse of 4 years one month and 23 days, the petitioner was obliged to again file the present Writ Petition for the relief referred to supra. 3. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Since according to the petitioner, nothing has happened thereafter, even after a lapse of 4 years one month and 23 days, the petitioner was obliged to again file the present Writ Petition for the relief referred to supra. 3. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. G. Masilamani, while reiterating the stand taken in the affidavit and placing reliance upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in Krishnan, L. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1992 Writ L.R. 25 contended that the entire proceedings have been kept under suspended animation for 4 years, 1 month and 23 days meaning thereby that not even a notice has been issued for commencement and proceeding further with the Award enquiry and that if the acquisition is to be proceeded further on the earlier declaration under the Act, grave injustice would be caused to the petitioner, in that the substantial rights of the petitioner would be deprived. Argued the learned Senior Counsel further that the delay caused at every stage of the proceedings relating to the present acquisition renders the very acquisition proceedings arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in as much as there was absolutely no justification whatsoever according to the learned senior counsel for the indifferent and lethargic attitude adopted in the matter. 4. Mr. Ahamed, learned Government Pleader for the State of Pondicherry, while reiterating the contentions in the counter-affidavit has contended that the initial delay if any in completing the proceedings was on account of the writ petition and Writ Appeal filed by the very petitioner and that the entire delay as such cannot be attributed to the respondent. It is also contended for the respondent that the Government have taken sufficient steps to continue the proceedings and invited my attention to the av erments in paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit which reads as under:— “The Government have taken steps to continue and complete the proceedings, after completion of all statutory formalities in accordance with the provisions of the Act. When the Government have acquired large track of land wherein petitioners land are also included notices have to be given to all the persons interested in respect of each and every stage for the purpose of completion of statutory formalities. That apart the pendency of the proceedings in Court has also taken considerable time. When the Government have acquired large track of land wherein petitioners land are also included notices have to be given to all the persons interested in respect of each and every stage for the purpose of completion of statutory formalities. That apart the pendency of the proceedings in Court has also taken considerable time. While so the allegations that Government are no very serious about the acquisition for the public purpose and that the supine indifference on the part of the Land Acnuisitiou Officer and that failure to take further proceedings under S. 6 declaration etc. would deny the market value, have no substance. It cannot be said that the petitioners would be denied the market value as alleged. The petitioner is entitled to compensation as per the provisions of S. 23 of the Act. The allegation that the conduct on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer causes loss, deprivation and injury to the petitioners and that has to be visited with the inescapable consequences of setting aside all the proceedings as illegal and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, has no substance for the reason that the Land Acquisition Officer continued the proceedings in order to complete the same in accordance with the provisions of the Act and there is no delay on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer. On the other hand, the ac t of petitioners and other persons interested in the lands under acquisition is a contributing factor for delay in the instant acquisition proceedings and consequently it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings are illegal and violative of provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.” 5. The learned Government Pleader for the respondents while distinguishing the reasoning of the Division. Bench also relied upon the decision in Aflaton v. Lt. Govermor, Delhi AIR 1974 S.C. 2077 in support of his plea that the acquisition proceedings cannot be interfered with having regard to the fact that the petitioner will always get the reasonable market value for the property acquired. An objection based on the principle of res-judicata was also raised and it was contended that after the dismissal of the Writ Petition and Writ Appeal referred to supra, there is no survival of any cause of action to file the present writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 6. An objection based on the principle of res-judicata was also raised and it was contended that after the dismissal of the Writ Petition and Writ Appeal referred to supra, there is no survival of any cause of action to file the present writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In my view, the case on hand is clearly covered by the recent decision of the Division Bench referred to supra and relied upon for the petitioner. The grievance sought to be made out for the petitioner about the reduction in the value of the money and the steep rise and increase in the price of the immovable property cannot be underrated or overlooked. The learned Judges of the Division Bench, considered cases where the delay was in respect of different periods in different cases and as a matter of fact, in one of the cases dealt with by the learned Judges, the delay noticed was 4 years. The plea that the proviso to S. 11(A) of the Act permits the passing of an Award within two years from the date of publication Of S. 6 declaration, was also repelled as irrelevant in the context of the case on the view that the provisions of S. 11-A which came into force on 24.9.84 as such did not apply that case. In my view, on a careful consideration of the matter and, in the light of the Division Bench Judgment referred to supra, the ratio of the Division Bench Judgment squarely applies to the case on hand in all fours. 7. The averments contained in paragraph 10 of the Counter-affidavit which has been extracted supra, in my view do not constitute sufficient explanation or cause for the delay of more than 4 years. As the learned counsel for the petitioner rightly pointed out, the delay in this case is not in completing the Award enquiry and passing the award but even in taking any tangible action by atleast issuing a notice before the petitioner moved this Court by means of the present Writ petition even for more than 4 years. As the learned counsel for the petitioner rightly pointed out, the delay in this case is not in completing the Award enquiry and passing the award but even in taking any tangible action by atleast issuing a notice before the petitioner moved this Court by means of the present Writ petition even for more than 4 years. The general claim that large track of land including the petitioners lands were proposed to be acquired and it involved verification of claims of several persons interested, does not appear to be either convincing or meriting acceptance. The total extent sought to be acquired was only 6.10.1930 Hectares and the number of persons interested does not also appear to be innumerable and even that apart, that is no ground to justify even a delay in the issue of a notice for re-commencing the enquiry, leave alone the completion in time or expeditiously passing the Award. Consequently, the Writ Petition deserves to be allowed applying the ratio of the Division Bench referred to supra. The decision relied upon for the respondent in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor Delhi AIR 1974 S.C. 2077 does not really govern a situation like the one on hand apart from the fact that the delay complained of in the present case is not covered by any orders of stay. The plea that the petitioner would be suitably compensated by way of compensation in the shape of the market value is no answer in a case like this, where the lapse of time was such that the market value that may be paid with reference to the notification under S. 4(1) may not really represent the real or even the probable market value but would be more illusory. The observations of the Apex Court, relied upon, were made in the context of a challenge to the Constitutional validity of S. 23 of the Act and the same cannot be applied to the case on hand. That apart, the Supreme Court in that case declined to interfere in the matter on the view that the learned Single Judge and the Divisional Bench of the High Court were of the view that there was no inordinate delay on the part of the Government in completing the acquisition proceedings and therefore Their Lordships of the Supreme Court are not persuaded to come to a different conclusion. There is no analogy in any respect of the said case to the case on hand before me for consideration. The objection raised on the principle of res-judicata deserves mention only to be rejected. The cause of action for the present Writ Petition is mainly the delay occasioned after the disposal of the Writ Petition and Writ Appeal and not with reference to anything that occurred prior to the dismissal of the Writ Petition and Writ Appeal filed by the petitioner on earlier occasions. The principle of res-judicata has no application in such a situation and consequently, the same is overruled. For all the reasons stated above, the S. 6 declaration is quashed as prayed for in so far as it relates to the lands of petitioners and the Writ petition shall stand allowed. But, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.