JUDGMENT R.S. Dhavan, J. - One Dr. Navi Kant Jha died after having served as an Instructor at the Sam Purnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi. This institution came to be recognised as a University under the U.P. Universities Act, 1973. Giving recognition to the long tenure of service of Dr. Navi Kant Jha the petitioner's father and further regard being had to the circumstances that his family was in dire straightened circumstances and further on, compassionate grounds the University appointed him as an Instructor applying the rule of harness. There is a State Government rule known as Uttar Pradesh Sewakal Men Mritiya Sarkari Sewakon ke Ashriton Ki Bharti Niyamavali, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Harness Rules of 1974). The petitioner, Lakshmi Kant Jha received an appointment as an Instructor which appointment was continued from time to time and he served the University for over four years. The appointment was discontinued. Lakshmi Kant Jha pleaded the circumstances under which he had been appointed and formally requested the University to continue his appointment as an Instructor. He drew his last salary as on March 19, 1990, a fact mentioned in paragraph 13 of the petition and not denied in the counter-affidavit. 2. So far on facts there is no issue. 3. The University intended to make a selection to the post of Lecturer in Sanskrit. The petitioner was also one of them who applied for being considered as a Lecturer. There is an issue whether the petitioner was selected as a Lecturer. On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that regard being had to the circumstances that the Instructors were automatically assigned Lectureship, the issue whether the petitioner had been selected as Lecturer or not is not irrelevant. These are the facts in the writ petition. 4. The contention, as argued, on behalf of the respondents, by their counsel is that as the petitioner has not been selected as a Lecturer his services have been dispensed with. The petitioner submits that regard being had to the circumstances, assuming without conceding that he may not have been selected as Lecturer, he cannot be dismissed from his post as an Instructor. Hereinafter, the issues begin between the petitioner and the respondents. 5. The petitioner submits that regard being had to the circumstances, assuming without conceding that he may not have been selected as Lecturer, he cannot be dismissed from his post as an Instructor. Hereinafter, the issues begin between the petitioner and the respondents. 5. Before the court examines the issues as to how far they are compatible with law which is applicable to this University one aspect the court has not appreciated that learned counsel who argued on behalf of the respondents submitted against the case which is on record. According to him the Executive Council has taken an incorrect decision. This incongruity will happen if a counter-affidavit is avoided by a party respondent and will be filed through his clerk. This has given an impression to the court that the case submitted contradicts the Vice-Chancellor and the Executive Council both. It is also disrespect to the proceedings that while the Registrar ought to have filed a counter-affidavit on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor and himself, an office Assistant was deputed to do so. 6. Now the record of the case. 7. This court cannot forget the place which the law has given to the respondents as arrayed in the petition. The respondents are the Vice- Chancellor and the Registrar. Both have a place under the Act, aforesaid. Their designations find mention in Chapter IV particularly Section 9 as "Officers of the University." The Executive Council is referred to in Chapter V, particularly Section 19 as one of the first "Authorities of the University." Thus, in so far as this court is concerned it cannot ignore on what is one record of the petition between the officers and an authority of the University, notwithstanding the argument made by counsel for the University that the Executive Council and Vice-Chancellor were incorrect in their decisions in granting an appointment to the petitioner as an Instructor which power they did not have under the Harness Rules of 1974 and the power to make an appointment under the rules is reserved to the State Government only. This court would like to caution the University not to permit this incompatible and contradictory stand before the court. 8. This court views this matter in another context. No matter what be the reason, the records reveal that the petitioner Lakshmi Kant Jha was considered and given appointment on the post of an Instructor. This court would like to caution the University not to permit this incompatible and contradictory stand before the court. 8. This court views this matter in another context. No matter what be the reason, the records reveal that the petitioner Lakshmi Kant Jha was considered and given appointment on the post of an Instructor. Even if the Harness Rules of 1974 were to apply one aspect is clear that there can be no compromise on qualifications. Thus, if a person is not qualified he cannot even be considered for appointment under the Harness Rules of 1974. There is no issue that Lakshmi Kant Jha was not qualified. He was qualified to be an Instructor. 9. The matter whether petitioner Lakshmi Kant Jha ought to continue further, as an Instructor engaged the attention of the Executive Council at its meeting on July 4, 1991. After having deliberated over the matter the Executive Council thought it fit that a sub-committee be constituted to examine the continuance of the petitioner as an Instructor. Thus, the sub-committee was constituted comprising of two professors of the University and the Accounts Officer. They deliberated over the matter and came to the conclusion regard being had to the background that the petitioner was otherwise qualified and in the circumstances in which he was appointed, he ought to continue as an Instructor, a position in which he worked for more than four years since 1984. 10. Normally, this court would not have noticed the powers and the discretion which has been vested in the Executive Council but as an argument has been raised vehemently that the Executive Council is incorrect, the court is constrained to place on record that the Executive Council is not devoid of powers in considering the appointment of certain categories of persons, in reference to the context. In this regard the court refers to Chapter X, Part I of the First Statutes of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalava under the head "Classification of Teachers of the University particularly statutes 10.01 to 10.04. The category of teaching staff given under the head of "Professors, Readers and Lecturers" finds mention in statute 10.01. On the other hand there is another category of teachers who are known by the nomenclature of "Instructors or Teaching Research Assistants." 11. This court confines itself to the category, Instruction. The category of teaching staff given under the head of "Professors, Readers and Lecturers" finds mention in statute 10.01. On the other hand there is another category of teachers who are known by the nomenclature of "Instructors or Teaching Research Assistants." 11. This court confines itself to the category, Instruction. This nomenclature is mentioned in statute 10.04 which clearly stipulates on who may appoint Instructions or Teaching Research Assistants. For the benefit of the record, statute 10.04 is reproduced below : "10.04. Instructors or Teaching Research Assistants may be appointed by the Executive Council on such terms and conditions as may be provided for in the Ordinances." 12. Thus, this court does not appreciate the argument, which is outside the record of the University that the Executive Council has committed an irregularity. This statute prescribes a special power for the Executive Council and it is not the business of a petty clerk or even an officer of the University to question an action of the Executive Council appropriately taken in accordance with the Statutes. 13. Thus, what remains in the case is that the Executive Council was of the view to treat the appointment of the petitioner sympathetically. For this purpose the Executive Council had constituted a sub-committee which has recorded its report. No other officer may question it but the Executive Council. Otherwise it will be putting a contradiction in the administration itself. 14. This Court would even go to the extent to observe that even if the Harness Rules of 1974, were not there, the Executive Council has adopted the spirit of it. Assuming that in this case the Executive Council finds it has not, it is not every irregularity, which this court can interfere with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. Thus, this court parts with the record with the finding that the Executive Council rightly debated the matter on July 4, 1991, to appoint a sub-committee to examine continuing the petitioner on the post of an Instructor. Truly it is the Executive Council which will consider the matter, as even under the law it is a paramount body and an authority of the University. 16. Truly it is the Executive Council which will consider the matter, as even under the law it is a paramount body and an authority of the University. 16. In so far as this court is concerned, the petitioner having been appointed on the principle of the Harness Rules of 1974, aforesaid, has not been invalidly appointed and there is nothing irregular in the Executive Council in giving him an appointment as an Instructor from which post he cannot be dislodged, except in accordance with law. 17. This court is not laying down a precedent on the rule of harness as it may apply to appointments in Universities, but has rendered this decision in the context of the facts and circumstances of this case. 18. Petition is allowed with costs.