JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This is tenant's petition arising from a suit for ejectment from accommodation and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The relief for ejectment was sought on two grounds (i) default in payment of rent within the meaning of Section 20(2)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (13 of 1972), for short Act, and (ii) subletting within the meaning of Section 20(2)(e) of the Act. The decree for ejectment has been passed by both the courts below on the ground of sub letting. Since the question of default has become final between the parties I am mentioning herein facts relating to sub letting only. 2. In the year 1967 the landlady of the accommodation in question filed suit no. 59 of 1967 against the tenant for ejectment from accommodation and for recovery of arrears of rent. In this suit it was pleaded by the landlady that the accommodation in question had been constructed in the year 1958 and, therefore, U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (3 of 1947), for short old Act, was not attracted. The plea of the landlady that the accommodation was constructed in 1958 was upheld by the trial court and accordingly decree for ejectment was passed. The trial court had decreed the suit on 7th April, 1972. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree the tenant preferred First Appeal before the learned District Judge. During the pendency of the appeal the old Act was repealed and the New Act was enforced with effect from 15th July, 1972. The new Act applied even to the accommodation constructed prior to its enforcement and had completed ten years from the date of its construction. Since the accommodation in question had completed this period of ten years prescribed in Section 2(2) of the new Act it fell within the purview of the Act. Section 39 of the new Act made provision for pending suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under the Act for the first time. Under this provision the tenant could get relief from the decree for eviction if he deposited the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation together with interest at the rate of 9% within the time prescribed in the section. Under this provision the tenant could get relief from the decree for eviction if he deposited the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation together with interest at the rate of 9% within the time prescribed in the section. In order to avail of the benefit of Section 39 the tenant deposited the amount and claimed relief from ejectment. The first appellate court did not relieve the tenant from the liability of ejectment on the ground that he was not in occupation of the accommodation as he had inducted therein Smt. Kamla Devi Wahi and Sri Kulbir Wahi, opposite parties 8 and 9. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed. Against the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court Second Appeal was filed in this Court by the tenant and the persons who had been inducted by the tenant into the accommodation in question. This Court was of the opinion that since the landlady had not amended her plaint in order to take advantage of Section 2C(2)(e) of the Act the tenant was entitled to be relieved of the liability of ejectment from the accommodation in question. Accordingly by judgment and order dated 14th May, 1976 the Second Appeal was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Thereafter the landlady issued notice dated 25th March, 1977 to the tenant demanding arrears of rent and terminating his tenancy. Sometime after 24th April, 1977 Small Cause Court Suit No. 808 of 1977 was filed which has given rise to the present writ petition. In the suit, ejectment was claimed on the basis of default in payment of rent as well as on the ground of subletting. The tenant deposited the amount mentioned in Section 20(4) of the new Act, and therefore, the landlady was held to be disentitled to claim ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent. However, her right to claim ejectment on the ground of subletting was upheld and accordingly decree for ejectment was passed. In revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act filed by the heir of the deceased tenant Pyare Lal and the subtenants, the finding of subtenancy was maintained and accordingly the revision was dismissed. Aggrieved by the decree for ejectment the widow of the deceased tenant Pyare Lal has preferred the instant petition. In revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act filed by the heir of the deceased tenant Pyare Lal and the subtenants, the finding of subtenancy was maintained and accordingly the revision was dismissed. Aggrieved by the decree for ejectment the widow of the deceased tenant Pyare Lal has preferred the instant petition. Opposite parties 8 and 19 to this petition are the subtenants and opposite parties 5 to 7 are the other heirs of the deceased tenant Pyare Lal. Opposite parties 3 and 4 are the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased landlady Smt. Durga Devi. 3. In the present petition I have heard Sri R.P. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the heirs of the deceased landlady. 4. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even on the finding of fact recorded by the courts below the subletting in question is not hit by clause (e) of Section 20(2) of the new Act and, therefore, the suit could not be decreed for ejectment. The argument is two fold (i) Section 20(2)(e) covers only the subletting done after the enforcement of the Act and not one done before its enforcement, and (ii) the subletting in question had the implied consent of the landlady. In elaboration of the first argument the learned counsel submits that the new Act is not retrospective in operation and, therefore, it will not cover a subletting done prior to the enforcement of the Act. 5. Controverting the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner the learned counsel for the landlords invites my attention to the expression has sublet used in clause (e) of Section 20(2) and submits that it is present perfect tense & not present tense and, therefore, clause (e) hits not only the subletting created after the enforcement of the Act but also the subletting made prior to the enforcement of the Act. 6. I will take up the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the order in which they have been stated. 7. Clause (e) of Section 20(2) of the Act reads as follows: that the tenant has sublet, in contravention of the provisions of Section 25, or as the case may be, of the old Act the whole or any part of the building. 7. Clause (e) of Section 20(2) of the Act reads as follows: that the tenant has sublet, in contravention of the provisions of Section 25, or as the case may be, of the old Act the whole or any part of the building. Under the above provision subletting which would furnish ground for eviction should be prohibited either by Section 25 of the Act or some provisions of the old Act. From this it would follow that in order to attract clause (e) it is not necessary that the subletting should have been done after the enforcement of the Act. A subletting done prior to the enforcement of the Act is also covered by clause (e). Of course the latter subletting should be in contravention of the provisions of the old Act. This consequence flows even if it is held that the Act is prospective in operation. 8. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that the subletting in question was done at a time when neither the old Act applied to the accommodation in question nor the present Act and, therefore, the said subletting could not be said to be either in contravention of Section 25 of the present Act or of any provision of the old Act. In this connection it is pointed out that the landlords' own case was that the house was constructed in the year 1958 and the subletting was done in 1968 and under Section 1A of the old Act a building constructed on or after 1st January, 1951 was exempt from the operation of the Act. Such a building came under regulation with effect from 15th July, 1972 when the new Act was enforced. On this basis it is submitted that the subletting in question could not be said to be in contravention of the provisions of the old Act also. So far as general law of tenancy is concerned, it is pointed out that it neither prohibits subletting nor Section 20(2)(e) refers to it. 9. Section 25 which is referred to in Section 20(2)(e) of the new Act reads as follows: 25(1) No tenant shall sublet the whole of the building under his tenancy. (2) The tenant may with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate, sublet a part of the building. 9. Section 25 which is referred to in Section 20(2)(e) of the new Act reads as follows: 25(1) No tenant shall sublet the whole of the building under his tenancy. (2) The tenant may with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate, sublet a part of the building. Explanation For the purposes of this section (i) where the tenant ceases, within the meaning of clause (b) of subsection (1) or subsection (2) of Section 12, to occupy the building or any part thereof, he shall be deemed to have sublet that building or part; (ii) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not amount to subletting. 10. Under the above provision a subtenancy to be valid must have the permission in writing of two persons (1) landlord, and (2) the District Magistrate. If this permission is lacking the subletting will be invalid and it will furnish ground for eviction under Section 20(2)(e) of the new Act. 11. Section 7(3) of the old Act provides No tenant shall sublet any portion of the accommodation in his tenancy except with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the district Magistrate previously obtained. Under this provision also a subtenancy to be valid required the written permission of the landlord and the District Magistrate. Section 3(1) of the old Act prescribes conditions on the fulfilment of which the landlord may seek eviction of his tenant. These conditions are contained in Clause (a) to (g). Clause (e) reads as follows: That the tenant has on or after the 1st day of October, 1946 sublet the whole any or portion of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord. 12 . In this clause written permission is not insisted upon. If permission exist, the landlord will not be entitled to claim eviction. 13. From the above discussion it follows that both the Acts insist on permission of the landlord for validation of subtenancy. Thus if subletting is done without the permission of the landlord the same would be in contravention of the provisions of old Act as well as of Section 25 of the new Act. According to the finding of fact recorded by the trial court which has not been disturbed by the revisional court, the subletting in question was done without the permission of the landlady. According to the finding of fact recorded by the trial court which has not been disturbed by the revisional court, the subletting in question was done without the permission of the landlady. The said subletting is, therefore, squarely covered by Section 20(2)(e). Of course when the subletting was done, the old Act, though in operation, was not applicable to the building and the new Act had not been enforced. The question now for consideration is whether the present subletting should remain immune from the clutches of S. 20(2)(e) on account of the mere fact that it was done at a time when neither the new Act nor the old Act governed the building. 14. At the time the impugned subletting was done the landlord had unrestricted right to evict his tenant. It was not necessary for him to plead and prove existence of any fact to claim eviction except the fact that tenancy had been terminated by service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. After the enforcement of the new Act the unrestricted right to evict has been lost. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted, the position of the landlord will be very precarious. He loses the unrestricted right to claim eviction and does not gain even the qualified right available to other landlords under Section 20(2)(e) of the new Act. In my opinion it would be most unfair to deprive the landlord of the right of eviction available under the general law as well as under the special law. The legislative history of letting and eviction laws shows that the legislature never intended the situation canvassed on behalf of the petitioner. I may consider the legislative history. 15. There was tremendous rise in population and the available accommodation did not meet the requirement. This led to exploitation of the tenants by the landlords. The landlords would seek enhancement of rent to unreasonable extent and if the tenant would not agree to such enhancement they would resort to eviction proceedings. In order to check the situation Rent Control Laws were enacted by legislatures of different Provinces/States of the country. In our own State, the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (3 of 1947) was enacted. This Act, as originally enacted, applied to all accommodations, irrespective of the time of their construction. In order to check the situation Rent Control Laws were enacted by legislatures of different Provinces/States of the country. In our own State, the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (3 of 1947) was enacted. This Act, as originally enacted, applied to all accommodations, irrespective of the time of their construction. The Act put restriction on the right of eviction as well as on the right of enhancement of rent. This affected construction of new houses. New houses were required to provide accommodation to the ever increasing population. Accordingly Section 1A was introduced through amending Act Number IX of 1951 which came into force on March 15, 1951. This section was enforced retrospectively with effect from 1st January, 1951. Under this section buildings constructed after 1st January, 1951 were exempted from the operation of the Act. The obvious purpose of this exemption was to encourage construction of new houses. This exemption continued till 15th July, 1972 when the new Act was enforced. The new Act contained its own exemption clause which was different from Section 1A. In the new Act the exemption clause is subsection (2) of Section 2 which reads thus Except as provided in subsection (5) of Section 12, subsec. (1A) of Section 21, subsection (2) of Section 24, Sections 24A, 24B, 24C or Subsection (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. There are two provisos to this subsection with which we are not concerned in the present case. The building in question had completed the period of ten years referred to in this subsection prior to 1571972 and, therefore, the said building came under the Regulations provided in the new Act. In view of this position the landlord lost the unrestricted right to claim eviction of the tenant which he had prior to 1571972. For claiming eviction he had to make out a case under one of the clauses (a) to (g) of Section 20(2). The legislative history shows that the Legislature intended to protect honest tenants of accommodations. Honesty in the context of Rent Control Regulations meant occupation of the accommodation by the tenant himself. For claiming eviction he had to make out a case under one of the clauses (a) to (g) of Section 20(2). The legislative history shows that the Legislature intended to protect honest tenants of accommodations. Honesty in the context of Rent Control Regulations meant occupation of the accommodation by the tenant himself. If the tenant is allowed the protection afforded by the Act and is also permitted to sublet accommodation at his will the purpose of the Act will be diluted. Opportunity to exploit and harass which the Act seeks to check will not be checked. Only the person who may avail of the opportunity may change. Instead of the owner of the house it would be the tenantinchief. This situation cannot be countenanced. This would be against legislative history and legislative intent. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that for applying Section 20(2)(e) buildings will have to be classified into three categoriesnamely (1) Those covered by the old Act (2) those not covered by the old Act, and (3) those covered by the new Act. According to him Clause (e) will apply only to the buildings falling under categories (1) and (3) but would not apply to buildings falling under category (2). The basis of the submission is that what is not illegal at the time of inception cannot become illegal subsequently. In this context it is pointed out that in respect of buildings falling under category (2) rights and obligations of the landlord and the tenant will be governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act under Section 108 (B)(j) of which the tenant has the right to sublet the tenement and this right is lost only when there is contract or local usage to the contrary. It is submitted that the landlord in the present case neither pleaded nor proved any such contract or usage. 17. In my opinion Clause (e) does not deal with legality or illegality of subletting. It deals with conditionalties for the exercise of power of eviction. If the conditionality prescribed in this clause exists the landlord will have the right to eject the tenant. If, on the other hand, conditionality does not exist, the right will not be available. In fact that is the position in respect of all the conditionalties prescribed in various Clauses of Section 20(2). If the conditionality prescribed in this clause exists the landlord will have the right to eject the tenant. If, on the other hand, conditionality does not exist, the right will not be available. In fact that is the position in respect of all the conditionalties prescribed in various Clauses of Section 20(2). Under Clause (e) not all sublettings furnish ground for eviction; only a subletting which is hit by either Section 25 of the new Act or by the provision of the old Act furnishes such ground. All sublettings done after the enforcement of the new Act will obviously be regulated by Section 25. Any subletting done prior to the enforcement of the new Act will similarly be regulated by the provision of the old Act. If the intention of the legislature is not to cover by Clause (e) a subletting done prior to the enforcement of the new Act in respect of a building not covered by the old Act, reference to old Act in Section 20(2)(e) becomes redundant. Any subletting in respect of a building covered by both the Acts would have furnished ground for eviction even without the clause or as the case may be, of the old Act. The legislature is presumed not to use redundant expression. The redundancy is avoided by reading clause (e) as merely prescribing conditionalties for the exercise of the right of eviction. It has nothing to do with the applicability or nonapplicability of the Act to the building. 18. The new Act applies to all the buildings equally except those which have not completed the period of ten years from the date of construction. Therefore, the Act contemplates classification of buildings into two categories (1) buildings which have completed the period of ten years from the date of construction, and (2) buildings which have not completed this period. This classification is reasonable. The exemption of 10 years has been made in the expectation that the construction activity will not be completely affected. The need for construction of more houses continues. 19. There is another way of looking at the matter. All buildings which have completed the period of 10 years from the date of construction form one class. This classification is reasonable. The exemption of 10 years has been made in the expectation that the construction activity will not be completely affected. The need for construction of more houses continues. 19. There is another way of looking at the matter. All buildings which have completed the period of 10 years from the date of construction form one class. If the petitioner's contention is accepted, a subletting done on or after 15th July, 1972 in respect of such a building it would be covered by Section 20(2)(e) but if it is done on 14th July, 1972 or earlier, it would not be covered. There would be no reasonable basis for this classification. Therefore, if the petitioner's contention is accepted, Section 20(2)(e) has the prospect of becoming constitutionally invalid under Article 14 of the constitution. Whenever two interpretations of an enactment are possible, one ensuring its validity and the other leading to its invalidity, the former is to be preferred. For this reason also it will have to be held that Section 20(2)(e) covers also a subletting created before the enforcement of the new Act in respect of a building which was not covered by the old Act but was covered by the new Act. 20. There is another way of interpreting clause (e). It uses the expression has sublet. The sentence is in present perfect tense. It is not in present tense. It would have been in present tense if it had used the word sublets without the preceding word has. The connotation arising from this present perfect tense has been dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gappulal v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji & another AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1291. This was also a case arising from a Rent Control Law enacted by the Rajasthan Legislature. In paragraph9 of the Report their Lordships have observed as follows: The question whether a subletting before the coming into force of the Act is within the purview of clause (e) of Section 13(1) depends upon the construction of that clause. The relevant words are has sublet. The present perfect tense contemplates a completed event connected in some way with the present time. The words take within their sweep any subletting which was made in the past & has continued upto the present time. The relevant words are has sublet. The present perfect tense contemplates a completed event connected in some way with the present time. The words take within their sweep any subletting which was made in the past & has continued upto the present time. It does not matter that the subletting was either before or after the Act came into force. All such sublettings are within the purview of clause (e). 21. The above authority was relied upon by a Full Bench of three Judges of this Court in Smt. Keshar Bai v. District Judge, Mathura and others 1980(6) ALR 165, In this case Section 12 (1)(a) of the new Act was held to be prospective in operation but Section 12(1)(b) was held to be retrospective. It was indeed not a case under Section 20(2)(e) of the new Act but was a case under Section 12 of the new Act. However, some significant observations have been made which help in interpreting clause (e). After tracing the legislative history of the Rent Control Regulations it has been observed at page 172. ............................The context, if kept into account, would show that the legislature intended to cover not only a case of illegal subletting which had been done after the enforcement of the Act but even before U.P., Act No. 3 of 1947 had been enacted to prevent the eviction of tenants from buildings. The Act, however, did not permit the tenant to sublet a part or whole of the building. Unauthorised subletting had been provided for as a ground of ejectment of a tenant and subtenant. Again at page 175 it has been observed Thus judged, we find, as pointed out above, that subletting or parting with possession has ever since the advent of Rent Control legislation been looked with scorn. It has almost been cast in the mould of inexonerable public policy. It has, thus, never been a right, much less a vested right of a tenant to unauthorisedly sublet a premises. Thus, the provision under consideration does not impair a vested right. It does not create a now obligation either........................ At page 175 it has been observed For the reason given above we find that Section 12 (1)(b) takes within itself, not only the cases which came into existence, after the commencement of this Act but also before. It is retrospective in operation. 22. It does not create a now obligation either........................ At page 175 it has been observed For the reason given above we find that Section 12 (1)(b) takes within itself, not only the cases which came into existence, after the commencement of this Act but also before. It is retrospective in operation. 22. That Section 20(2)(e) covers also the subletting done prior to the enforcement of the new Act but after 111951 is apparent also from Section 39 of the Act. This section applies to pending suits for eviction in respect of accommodation which have been brought under the purview of the Act for the first time. Under this section the tenant is relieved from the liability of ejectment if he deposits the amounts mentioned therein. The section further provides that it is permissible to the landlord to proceed with the suit for eviction by amending the pleadings and availing of the grounds for eviction prescribed in clauses (b) to (g) of subsection (2) of Section 20. The only ground which cannot be availed of under Section 39 is that contained in clause (a) of Section 20(2). If a pending suit for eviction from an accommodation to which the old Act did not apply can be continued on the ground of subletting done at a time when neither the old Act applied to the building nor the new Act, I see no reason why a fresh suit for eviction cannot be filed in respect of such subletting. 23. A few decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner may now be noticed. The first decision cited by him is 1976 AWC 1 : AIR 1976 Allahabad 517 (FB) Smt. Ram Mani Devi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer and others. This is a judgment by a Full Bench of five Judges. The question referred to the Full Bench by a learned Single Judge was Whether a vacancy occurs under the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 in case a tenant sublets a portion of his accommodation. The answer was given in the negative. This case has no application to the facts of the present case. The question referred to the Full Bench by a learned Single Judge was Whether a vacancy occurs under the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 in case a tenant sublets a portion of his accommodation. The answer was given in the negative. This case has no application to the facts of the present case. The question involved in this case was whether the tenement could be said to be vacant so as to entitle the District Magistrate to exercise power of allotment under Section 7(1) of the old Act when the tenant sublets the whole or a portion of the tenement. This judgment does not deal with the entitlement or otherwise of the landlord to claim eviction of the tenant who sublets the whole or part of the tenement without the permission of the District Magistrate and the landlord. This judgment is authority only for the proposition that under the old Act subletting does not result in creation of vacancy so as to entitle the District Magistrate to exercise power of allotment. Under the old Act allotment by the District Magistrate was possible only on occurrence of vacancy. 24. Smt. Gttlab Devi and others v. The VIIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others 1981 ARC 6C2 was cited for submitting that Explanation (1) to Section 25(2) was not retrospective. It was indeed held so in this case and it was further held that where subletting had been done before the enforcement of 1972 Act its validity or otherwise was to be considered with reference ta Section 7(3) of the old Act. This judgment is authority for the proposition that where subletting is relied upon as a ground for eviction and such subletting is alleged to have taken place before the enforcement of 1972 Act its validity or otherwise is to be judged with reference to Section 7(3) of the old Act. Even by application of this proposition the case of the plaintiff of the present suit is not defeated. Section 7(3) of the old Act lays down that no tenant shall sublet any portion of the accommodation in his tenancy except with the permission in writing of the landlord and the District Magistrate previously obtained. In the present case while inducting the subtenants in the accommodation in question the tenant had not obtained permission either from the landlord or from the District Magistrate. In the present case while inducting the subtenants in the accommodation in question the tenant had not obtained permission either from the landlord or from the District Magistrate. Accordingly the impugned subletting was contrary to the provisions of Section 7(3) of the old Act. This is all that the learned Single Judge of this court intended to say and this is apparent from his subsequent decision in Dr. Om Prakash Bharti & others v. The IIIrd Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1982(1) ARC 98. In this case also the subletting had been done prior to the enforcement of the new Act and the suit for ejectment was filed after the enforcement of the Act. The trial court decreed the suit but the revisional court reversed the decree. Relying upon Smt. Keshar Bai's case (Supra) the learned Judge (N.D. Ojha, J.) held that Section 12 (1)(b) of the new Act was retrospective and, therefore, the question of subletting was to be dealt with according to the provisions of Section 12 (1)(b) and Section 20(2)(e). Since the question of subletting had not been dealt with by the court below in this manner the writ petition of the landlord was allowed and the case was remanded to the revisional court. 25. The last case relied upon by the learned counsel is Khanna Brothers, Kanpur and others v. Smt. Sita Devi and others 1985(2) ARC 415. In this case a learned Single Judge of this Court held that Section 25 of the new Act was not retrospective in nature. From the Report it appears that the building had been constructed in the year 1967 and the subletting had been done in the year 1975. On these facts the question of retrospectively or prospectively of Section 25 did not arise in this case. The Act, as already noticed, came into operation on 1571972. On this date the building which was exempt from the operation of the old Act came within the purview of the new Act. The subletting having been done in 1975 was after the building had already come under the Rent Control Regulations. All the same the view taken in this case is not in conformity with the Full Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Keshar Bai's case (Supra) and the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gappulal's case (Supra). The subletting having been done in 1975 was after the building had already come under the Rent Control Regulations. All the same the view taken in this case is not in conformity with the Full Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Keshar Bai's case (Supra) and the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gappulal's case (Supra). Further the question of constitutional validity of Section (2)(c) which has been discussed hereinabove was not gone into in this case. Accordingly no benefit can be given to the petitioner from this authority, 26. There is no inaction on the part of the landlady after acquiring knowledge of subletting and, therefore, it cannot be said that there was implied consent of her to the impugned subletting. Suit for eviction had been filed prior to the enforcement of the Act and after the enforcement of the Act the suit which has given rise to the present writ petition was filed. Accordingly the theory of implied consent put up by the petitioner cannot be accepted. 27. In view of the above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs to the contesting opposite parties 3 and 4. Interim order, if any, shall stand discharged. (Petition dismissed.)