Judgment B. N. Agrawal J. 1. -the defendant-tenant has moved this Court of the by filing the present revision application under Sec.14 (8) of the bihar Buildings (tease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (Bihar Act IV of 1983) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) challenging the order of eviction passed in a suit tor eviction in which the sole ground for eviction was bona fide personal necessity, which was denied by the defendant. 2. When the revision application was placed for admission, a learned single Judge of this Court admitted the same and directed the matter to be placed for hearing before a Division Bench as he was made to understand that the point raised in this case, whether remedy of the tenant was to prefer an appeal or to file revision application under proviso to Sec.14 (8) of the act, was net concluded by any judgment of this Court, It appears to me that the point is concluded by decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Mohd. Akhtar Khan V/s. Salamul Hague (1984 P. L. J. R, 64) wherein it was laid down that if in a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide personal necessity special procedure prescribed under Sec.14 of the Act has not been followed and order for eviction has been passed, the only remedy of the defendant-tenant was prefer an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and no revision under proviso to Section 14 (8) of the Act was maintainable. In this application, we have been called upon to consider the correctness of the law laid down in the case of mohd. Akhtar Khan (supra ). 3. In the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 1947 Act) and the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 1977 Act), there was no provision similar to Sec.14 of the Act which has been introduced for the first time in the Act in the year 1982. There is a general impression that suit fcr eviction upon grounds enumerated under Sec.11 ( (1) of 1947 act and Sec.12 of 1977 Act is filed under the provisions of Buildings control Act. I do not find any such provision in these enactments to show that suit for eviction is filed thereunder. There is a general impression that suit fcr eviction upon grounds enumerated under Sec.11 ( (1) of 1947 act and Sec.12 of 1977 Act is filed under the provisions of Buildings control Act. I do not find any such provision in these enactments to show that suit for eviction is filed thereunder. It is well settled that all eviction suits are filed under Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and by virtue of the provision of Sec.11 of the act, a protection has been provided to a tenant against unreasonable eviction unless a decree is passed by a court on any of the grounds enumerated therein in relation to cases which are governed by the provision of the Act. Section 14 of the Act prescribes special procedure for disposal of eviction suits where the grounds taken for eviction are either bona fide personal necessity or expiry of the period of tenancy or both. Sec.13 of the Act lays down that provision of Sec.14 shall have over-riding effect. For better appreciation, it will be useful to refer to the provisions of Sections 13 and 14 of the Act which read thus: "13. The provisions of Sec.14 to have overriding effect. The provisions of Sec.14 or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained else where in this or in any other law for the time being in force. " "14. Special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bona fide requirement.- (1) Every suit by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (c) or (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed form in every suit referred in sub-section (1) without delay. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed form in every suit referred in sub-section (1) without delay. (3) (i) The Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant or tenants, also direct the summons to be served by registered post with acknowledgement due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require also direct the publication of the summons in the official Gazette or in newspapers circulating in the locality, in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. (ii) When an acknowledgement purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent has refused to take delivery of the registered article, the court may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. (4) The terant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court as hereinafter provided; and in default of the appearances in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11. (6) When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may,within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after sing the requisite court fee, required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifeeen days cf the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The Court shall thereafter commence the bearing of the suit as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure.1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this section shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made In accordance with procedure specified in this section : provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order under the section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order m respect thereto as it thicks fit. (9) Where ao application has been made to the High Court in revision as laid down in sub-section (8) above, the Court, which passed the order for eviction may exercise the powers of review in accordance with the provision of Otder XLVII of the First schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908 ). Provided that no such review shall be made unless an application is filed for the same within ninety days of the date of order of eviction. " (Emphasis added ). 4. Provided that no such review shall be made unless an application is filed for the same within ninety days of the date of order of eviction. " (Emphasis added ). 4. From a comparative study of 1947 Act, 1977 Act and the Act, it would appear that various changes have been made in 1977 Act and the Act for speedy disposal of eviction suits.1947 Act was enacted to give protection to tenants against their unreasonable ejectment. The main provision therein for protection of the landlord was Sec.11-A whereby the defence of the tenant against ejectment was liable to be struck off upon non-payment of rental either current or arrear, or both. In 1977 Act more or less similar provisions were made Within a span of 35 years from the date of promulgation of 1947 Act, the legislature felt that the tenant were exploiting the protection given to them under 1947 and 1977 Act. It was felt that tenants used to linger eviction suits as far as possible as a result of which eviction suits based even upon grounds of bona fide personal necessity and expiry of the period of tenancy, which ought to have been disposed of with utmost expedition, could not be disposed of. As such, legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to introduce Sec.14 of the Act prescribing special procedure for speedy disposal of eviction suits based upon the aforesaid grounds. The special procedure prescribed under section 14 of the Act is for the benefit of the landlord and to curve the tendency of tenants of taking frivolous defence in eviction suits filed upon any of the aforesaid two grounds. 5. Under Sec.14 (1) of the Act, all the suits for eviction based upon any of the aforesaid two grounds are liable to be tried in accordance with the special procedure prescribed thereunder. According to Sec.14 (2) the court is required to issue summons in the prescribed form without any delay. Under Sec.14 (3) the court can simultaneously issue summons to the tenants for service in ordinary mode as well as under registered cover and in appropriate cases can pass orders for substituted service also. According to Sec.14 (2) the court is required to issue summons in the prescribed form without any delay. Under Sec.14 (3) the court can simultaneously issue summons to the tenants for service in ordinary mode as well as under registered cover and in appropriate cases can pass orders for substituted service also. Under Section 14 (4), upon service of summons, a tenant is required to apply for grant of leave to contest the suit for eviction by filing an affidavit and under Section 14 (5) the court can grant leave to contest only if the conditions mentioned therein a. e fulfilled otherwise he was obliged to reject the prayer. According to Sec.14 (4), where leave is not obtained after service of summons or prayer for grant of leave is rejected, the statements made by the landlord in the plaint shall be deemed to have been admitted by the tenant, and the landlord shall be entitled to an order of eviction. Under Sec.14 (6) when leave is granted, a tenant is required to file written statement within the time fixed. It further lays down that if after grant of leave, no written statement is filed, the court shall proceed to hear the suit and shall not allow the tenant to file written statement at any subsequent date. Sec.14 (7) lays down that the court while following special procedure prescribed under that section shall be required to follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small causes including the recording of evidence. Under Sec.14 (8), right of a person to prefer first appeal and second appeal has been curtailed in certain circumstances and power of revision has been conferred upon High Court under the proviso. Sub-section (9) confers powers of review upon (be court which passed tne final order under the circumstances enumerated thereunder. Sec.13 lays down that provision of Sec.14 shall have overriding effect. 6. The cumulative effect of Sections 13 and 14 (1), in my view, would be that if the suit for eviction is based upon any of the two grounds specified under clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11 of the Act, namely, bona fide personal necessity or expiry of the period of tenancy, the same has got to be tried in accordance with the special procedure prescribed under section 14 of the Act. A duty is cast upon the court itself to follow the special procedure. This provision has been engrafted for the benefit of the landlord. It cannot be said that only duty is enjoined upon the court to try suits in accordance with the special procedure, but parties should also insist for trial of the suit ia accordance with the special procedure. If the court fails to adopt the special procedure, any of the parties should take objection and insist for trying the suit in accordance with the special procedure. If such an objection is taken, the cou-t is bound to allow the same and has no option but to try the suit in accordance with the special procedure. 7. A question may arise, if the court illegally refuses to adopt special procedure and rejects prayer of a party for following the same, what is the remedy In my view, remedy of a party is either to file a revision application before this Court under Sec.115 of the Code challenging the order or a review application under the Cede in which he is bound to succeed, f the same are otherwise not incompetent. If a patty fails to raise objection or fails to move the High Court in revision or trial court for review at the initial stage against the order refusing to follow the special procedure, he cannot be permitted to attack the final judgment before higher court on the ground that special procedure prescribed has not been followed, because nonobservance of the special procedure is true an illegality but is not such an illegality which would make the judgment/decree \void ab initio. Such illegality should be pointed out at the initial stage and if it is not so done, a party cannot be allowed to take a chance in the suit and in the event of failure in the suit on merit, take this as a ground of objection to the judgment. So far as tenant is concerned, he cannot be said to have been prejudiced by non-observance of the special procedure prescribed rather he has been benefited by it. According to the special procedure, suit is required to be tried in a summary manner and where a suit has been tried as a regular suit in which much more detailed procedure has to be followed, a tenant cannot be said to have suffered in any manner. According to the special procedure, suit is required to be tried in a summary manner and where a suit has been tried as a regular suit in which much more detailed procedure has to be followed, a tenant cannot be said to have suffered in any manner. So far as the landlord, is concerned, though he has suffered by no-observance of the special procedure, but since he has not taken objection in the trial court and has allowed the trial to proceed in accordance with general law. he cannot attack the final judgment en this ground before the higher court. On the same analogy, in similar circumstances, an unsuccessful party cannot be allowed to take this ground in a review application filed under Sec.14 (9) of the Act. Even in criminal cases, it is well settled that if a case which has to be tried summarily has been tried as a warrant case, an unsuccessful party cannot attack judgment delivered upon the conclusion of trial on the ground that the case has not been tried in a summary manner. So far as accused is concerned, he has not been prejudiced by following the procedure of regular trial. So far as prosecution is concerned, wider procedure has been followed because of the fault of the prosecutor of having not taken any objection before the trial court. 8. The crucial question for consideration is as to what remedy is available to an unsuccessful party in cases where suit which is required to be tried in accordance with the special procedure has not been tried in accordance therewith but tried as a regular suit, whether an appeal would lie under the code or revision would lie under proviso to Sec.14 of the Act. Since an eviction suit is filed under Sec.9 of the Code, a party had a vested right of appeal, as specified under the Code. It has been settled by the Supreme court in Garikapati Veeraya V/s. N. Subiah Choudhry and others, AIR 1957 supreme Court, 540, that vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. If Sec.14 (8) of the Act would not have been there, a person bad a vested right of appeal even in such an eviction suit. If Sec.14 (8) of the Act would not have been there, a person bad a vested right of appeal even in such an eviction suit. By section 14 (8) of the Act, right of appeal has not been taken away in its entirety in eviction suits filed even on the grounds of personal necessity or expiry of the period of tenancy. There are three conditions for application of the bar put by sub-section (8), firstly that an eviction suit has been filed on the grounds enumerated in clause (c) or (a) of Sec.11 (1) of the Act or both and on no other ground ; secondly, the same has been tried in accordance with special procedure specified in Sec.14 and, thirdly, in such a suit an order for recovery of possession has been passed. Last two conditions have been expressly specified ia sub-section (8), as such, it can be said that the same have been made explicit in the statute whereas the first condition is implicit in it. If thif interpretation is not given, that will lead to preposterous result. For analogy, a suit for eviction on the ground of default alone cannot be tried in accordance with the special procedure, but if the same has been tried thereunder and order of eviction has been passed, what would be the remedy to a party. Likewise in a suit for eviction on the ground of default and personal necessity both, which cannot be tried in accordance with the special procedure, as laid down by a Division Bench o this Court in Bhim Singh V/s. Mohan Lal Agarwala, 1991 (2) PLJR 325, if tried thereunder and an order of eviction has been passsd, what would be the remedy of a party. Would the bar put by Sec.14 (8) govern such orders of eviction If it is held that the first condition is not necessary for applicability of the bar put by sub-section (8) upon vested right of a person to prefer an appeal, then in that eventuality even after passing of such an order of eviction, no appeal would lie. If such an interpretation is given, then that would go contrary to the spirit of legislation, as legislature did not intend to curtail the right of appeal in a suit for eviction filed on grounds other than those mentioned in clause (c) or (e) of Sec.11 (1) of the Act. 9. If such an interpretation is given, then that would go contrary to the spirit of legislation, as legislature did not intend to curtail the right of appeal in a suit for eviction filed on grounds other than those mentioned in clause (c) or (e) of Sec.11 (1) of the Act. 9. In my view, sub-section (8) takes away vested fight of appeal to some extent. Therefore, this provision should be construed very strictly so as to give effect to the intention of the legislature. It is well settled rule of it terpretaticn that where language of statute is clear and explicit and there is no ambiguity in it, the same should be interpreted in such a manner so as to give effect to every word of the statute for carrying out the intention of the legislature. It is also well settled that legislature does not use redundant word and every word that is used by legislature must be given due import and significance. In Md. Jainul Ansari V/s. Md. Khalil, 1990 (2) PLJR 378 : 5 990 (2) BLJ 601 a Full Bench cf this Court was considering a case as to what will happen if in a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity which was tried in accordance with the special procedure prescribed under section 14 of the Act, no order for eviction has been passed but the suit has been dismissed ; whether the remedy is appeal or a. revision under proviso to sub-section (8 ). This Court over-ruled the Division Bench decision of this court and laid down the law that the expression used is order of eviction, therefore, if no order of eviction has been passed and the suit for eviction has been dismiised, sub-section (8) shall have no application and the remedy of a party would be to prefer regular appeal under the Code. This view has been reiterated by another Full Bench decision of this Court in Mostt. Saraswati devi and others V/s. Kunti Devi and another, 1991 (2) PLJR 446. 10. Now it has to be considered as to what will happen in a case where the suit was required to be tried in accordance with the special procedure, but the same has not been followed, whether bar put by sub-section (8) would apply or not. Saraswati devi and others V/s. Kunti Devi and another, 1991 (2) PLJR 446. 10. Now it has to be considered as to what will happen in a case where the suit was required to be tried in accordance with the special procedure, but the same has not been followed, whether bar put by sub-section (8) would apply or not. Sub-section (8) says that "no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with the procedure specified in this section". If legislature would have intended that bar of appeal would apply to all such suits where order of eviction has been passed in a suit which was required to be tried in accordance with the special procedure prescribed under Sec.14 (8) of the Act, then there was no necessity of using the words made in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. The legislature intended that all such suits should be tried in accordance with the special procedure. It was also conscious of the fact that if for any reason such a suit is not tried in accordance with the special procedure, then the bar will not operate. Therefore, it has used the expressions order made in acsordance with the procedure specified in this section. If such an interpretation is not given, then that would make the expression order made in accordance with the procedure specified in this section redundant which interpretation is not permissible in law. Therefore, I am clearly of the view that in such an eventuality, bar put by sub-section (8) shall not operate and a party shall have right of appeal and civil revision application would not be maintainable. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in the case of Md. Akhtar Khan (supra) by a learned single Judge of this Court and hold that law has been correctly laid down in that decision. 11. In view of the foregoing discussions, the law laid down in this case is summarised as follows: - (i) When an order of eviction has been passed in a suit required to be tried in accordance with the special procedure prescribed under section 14 of the Act, but has not been tried thereunder, an appeal would lie against eviction decree and civil revision would not be maintainable against order of eviction. (ii) In a suit which is required to be tried in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Sec.14 of the Act, a duty is oast upon the Court to try the same in accordance therewith and if it fails to adopt the procedure and any of the parties insists for following the special procedure, the trial court has no option but to grant the prayer. (iii) If the prayer for following the special procedure has been rejected then the correctness of the order can be challenged either by filing a review application in accordance with law during the pendency of the suit or by filing a civil revision application before this Court against the rejection order at the interlocutory stage. (iv) Judgment/decree passed in an eviction suit cannot be challenged on the ground that special procedure prescribed under Sec.14 of the Act has not been followed. (v) If special procedure prescribed under Sec.14 of the Act has been followed in such an eviction suit, which is not required to be tried in accordance therewith, judgment/decree would be liable to be set aside by higher court on this ground alone. 12. In the rasult, this revision application is dismissed as not maintainable. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that parties shall bear their own coats. I may, however, observe that if the petitioner prefers an appeal before competent court against the decree with an application under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, the lower appellate court would be well advised to condone the delay in preferring the appeal, as the petitioner was bona fide prosecuting the present revision application before this Court. Revision dismissed.